This text analyses the conditions in which the Central African Republic, a failed state emerging from an existential crisis, is able to play on its own weaknesses and a particular regional and international configuration to coerce the political arena, terrorizing its own population by creating an enemy that is inevitably foreign, and using Russia as an instrument to perpetuate itself. The means and techniques of coercion are extremely modern, even if they are based on a repertoire of coercive practices already well established in Central Africa. Such authoritarianism is based on the construction of a specific threat (transnational armed groups), a lacklustre international community that is exhausting itself in implementing outdated solutions, and a security offer that relegates UN peacekeeping or European training missions to the sidelines: Russian and Rwandan military involvement reflects a desire to substitute the regional and international management of the crisis, while at the same time maintaining a concessionary economy in the mining and agricultural sectors, the primary beneficiaries of which continue to be the rulers in Bangui.
The Darfur crisis has shed light on unresolved crises at its borders in Chad and the Central African Republic. What these various conflicts most have in common is probably the existence of transnational armed movements that endure and reorganize in the fringes created by state dynamics in the region as well as the aporias of the international community’s conflict-resolution policies doubled by the choices of certain major powers. An analysis of the situation in the Central African Republic and the history of certain armed movements active in this regional space argues in favor of a less conventional approach to crisis-solving strategies. It points up a zone centered on the Central African Republic and its borders with neighboring countries as the real site for the analysis of armed factionalism since the wave of independence and the specific trajectories of state-building.
