Home > The Russian Policy towards Europe/the West after the Ukrainian crisis: stakes, goals, capabilities

The Russian Policy towards Europe/the West after the Ukrainian crisis: stakes, goals, capabilities

 Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova

The Ukrainian conflict has brought the Russia-West relations to the edge of confrontation for the first time since the end of the Cold war. However, deep divides have appeared not only in the Russia-West relations but in the European space at large affecting relations between the EU countries and within them as well as the CIS region. Figuratively speaking, the European mirror has cracked.

The Ukrainian crisis is viewed as the first direct conflict between differing regional strategies of Russia and the EU – Brussels’ Eastern partnership and Moscow’s Eurasia Union concept.  Ukraine has been central to both strategies, and “the either/or” choice presented to Kiev ultimately made a conflict inevitable.  However, the reason for this confrontation goes much deeper than the clash of two opposing regional strategies and rooted heavily in the 1990s. Therefore Ukrainian conflict should be viewed as a quintessence of the mutual disappointment of Russia and the West, resulted from their mistakes after the end of bipolarity.

The crisis stems from the profound misunderstanding of each other’s views regarding acceptable foundations of European security and stakes across the post-Soviet space. There were continuous and open-ended debates on the former: Moscow was against European security built on the EU and NATO, in which Russia had no direct influence on policy-making. But post-Soviet space was never discussed openly and sincerely during the post-Cold War era. These contradictions are still casting a long shadow over Russia’s foreign policy. The Caucasus conflict of 2008 was a creation of the Russia-NATO/US differences over the security arrangements in the post-bipolar Europe, while the conflict over Ukraine smashed to pieces the West-Russia “strategic partnership” based on four common spaces of co-operation because none of these spaces addressed the CIS issue.

Evolution of Putin’s foreign policy:
same goal, different means

The Western analysts argue that Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin has undergone a substantial evolution. However it is not so much the goals of Putin’s foreign policy but rather its means that varied during his several presidential terms. Since Vladimir Putin became President of Russia in 2000 status-rebuilding became the main foreign policy objective and the guiding principle in Russia’s relations with the West. This goal has become kind of   idée fixe for the Russian leadership. Russia’s post-Soviet euphoria was replaced with a sense of loss of empire and status of world super power equal to the US.  It is all the more so, that on many occasions the American politicians provoked Putin by slamming Russia as a "regional power" losing strength1.

Of course, there have been other more pragmatic objectives focused on economic cooperation and profit. However, with all importance of revenues from energy exports and arms trade, economic goals have been always secondary to the main political goal directed at reinstating Russia’s international positions. Lenin’s famous formula that politics is a concentrated expression of economy has nothing to do with the real state of affairs in Russia, where economy has always been a concentrated expression of politics. Put simply, there are no such economic sacrifices that Russia would be unwilling to make for the sake of its status of great power.
Vladimir Putin - let us say Putin I - was officially introduced to Russian people as Yeltsin’s successor and he publicly committed himself to democratic reforms in Russia. At the same time he was required by the majority of Russian population as a long awaited strong hand, kind of “anti-Yeltsin” who would be able to reinstate Russia’s prestige and international positions on equal footing with the West after the decade of humiliation. This situation created a certain dichotomy for the Putin presidency – “succession and negation”, which was reconciled by the Kremlin strategists in a new formula.   The foreign policy dimension of the succession element was merely embodied in the recognition of Russia’s pro-Western vocation (democratic values and market economy), the negation - in the concept of  «a strong state» and that of «controlled democracy» in contrast to the Yeltsin amorphous regime whose foreign policy was a sequence  of Russia’s unilateral concessions to the West.  

Putin I wanted to achieve the goal of status re-building through cooperation and integration with the West – EU and US/NATO. In practical terms this policy was aimed at upgrading Russia’s legal status with European Union through negotiations on a new post-PCA strategic partnership based on four common spaces of cooperation. After 9/11 when Putin sided up with the US and NATO in the counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan he tried to change Russia’s relations with NATO having promised to reconsider Kremlin’s position on NATO’s enlargement, if this process was expanded to Russia2.  It should be noted that in that period Russia and Ukraine was following the same European path (although with a different speed). But unwillingness of the West to engage Russia on her own terms – controlled democracy at home, the growing self-assertiveness in the post-Soviet space and cooperation with the West - did away with Putin’s illusions about re-instating Russia’s international positions on equal-footing with the EU and NATO/US. It should be also noted, that the West has never understood the dialectical link between international relations, Russia’s domestic policy and her foreign policy: the better the international relations, the better Russia’s domestic policy and the better and more cooperative its foreign policy. Since the EU and NATO became obsessed with a prospect of a new Russian empire, they saw the separation of Russia from its CIS partners as a guarantee that a new USSR would never be brought back to life. Hence the EU and NATO regional strategies unhesitatingly bypassed Russia.

Putin II came to power in a markedly different foreign policy and domestic situation.  As Putin returned to presidency he faced a very different West. The world economic and financial crisis had deeply affected the US and EU.  The ongoing eurozone crisis resulted in damage to the EU’s reputation as a model of both competent economic policy management and successful regional integration and multilateral cooperation. As a result of the crisis and intense competition from emerging powers, the EU member states started to compete for economic deals with Russia and China. In short, the crisis dealt a heavy blow to the attractiveness of the EU soft power model for third countries – including Russia. Putin felt that Russia should no longer solicit modernization guidance from the weakened EU. From his point of view, Europeans were in no position to lecture other countries on good governance and democracy. But the main reason for Putin’s departure from Europe was that Russia’s European vocation presented a threat to the existing system based on “controlled or sovereign democracy” and economic petrol-state model.

When Putin came back to Kremlin, he expected quite a cold reception from the West, but what came as a great surprise was a mass movement of protest inside Russia. This movement consisted of liberal, nationalist and leftist groups. Although liberals were not the largest element, it was with them that Putin had the deepest split, and it was them that were receiving strong political and moral support from the West. Hence, the conclusion in Kremlin was that the West was actively sponsoring mass opposition, considered Putin “illegitimate” head of state, and aiming at “colored revolution” to dismiss the regime.

Therefore Putin II made a U turn and chose the Eurasian project as a means to prevent a couloured revolution and  rebuild Russia’s great power status. He wanted Russia to remain a sovereign centre of power, with its area of primary influence based on the Eurasian Union. European vocation was replaced with Eurasian pivot and Partnership for Modernization launched earlier by Dmitry Medvedev – with a New Industrialization plan based on “sophisticated military technologies”.  Putin stated that the Eurasian Union would play an increasingly important role on the global stage, adding that the EU would have to deal with the Eurasian Union’s commission along with Moscow. Ukraine was supposed to be a pearl in the Eurasian crown and its departure from Russia would put the whole project in doubt.

The Ukrainian factor in Kremlin’s foreign policy: opportunities and limits

The Ukrainian conflict has strongly affected Russia having gone not only through politics and economy but families and friendships. It split the Russian society into two unequal parts. The majority of the population supports Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine and Crimea’s incorporation looks quite legitimate in the eyes of the ordinary Russians. Official position to the effect that Russia is not part of this internal conflict is merely accepted by the Russian public as an understandable posture, dictated by “high politics”. However, there are two basic concepts that differ from the official position being deeply ingrained in the Russian mentality. The first is that Ukraine is obliged to Russia for its present state: it gained a huge so0uth-eastern industrial part of its present territory (“New Russia”) from Lenin in 1920 (because the dogmatic Bolsheviks wanted Ukraine to have larger proletarian population). It received a generous grant of Crimea from Khrushchev in 1954. It got its independence “free” in 1991, and since then up to 2013 it had been importing Russian gas by discounted price and had free access to enormous Russian market.  The second concept is like follows: if the United States considers itself entitled to using force to dismember countries and change foreign regimes thousand miles away (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Syria), Russia has the right to do the same in the immediate proximity to its borders, where Russian security, humanitarian, and economic interests are directly affected.
The overwhelming part of the population genuinely endorses Kremlin’s posturing, which is seen as a revival of national pride, independence, and grand-power ambitions after two decades of setbacks and humiliation. Anti-Western rhetoric is gaining momentum in Russia fueling neo-Imperial motives in part of the Russian political elite, which looks scary not only for Russia’s EU neighbours but also for Moscow’s allies in the CSTO and Eurasia Economic Union (EEU). 

Generally speaking, it is the CIS space where Russia still has the biggest potential to oppose those strategies that are viewed as a threat to its national interests. The Ukrainian crisis has increased the polarization of the Moldovan society, heightening both pro and anti-Russian sentiments The Riga summit on Eastern Partnership which took place in May 2015 has shown that both the EU and its eastern partner countries have to act with one eye on the Kremlin. At the same time, Crimea’s incorporation and different interpretations of the concept of “the Russian world” by Russian politicians encouraged Minsk and Astana to take a more equidistant position on the Ukrainian conflict. Neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan have joined the Russian embargo on products from the EU countries, Norway, USA, Canada and Australia, imposed by Moscow as a response to Western sanctions against Russia. It should be noted also that even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were cautious about the proposal of Russia to create a Eurasian Union as a new integrationist body modeled from EU with a single political, economic, military, customs, humanitarian and cultural space.

Political leaders of Belarus and Kazakhstan, being concerned about the problems of equality in the new Union, have repeatedly stressed that they are in favour of economic integration, but not the creation of supranational political structures, emphasizing that the participants of the EEU should remain independent sovereign States. As a result, the Eurasian project presented in the program article by Vladimir Putin "New integration project for Eurasia – a future that is born today"3 was narrowed to the Eurasian Economic Union. The level of integration of the EEU (also joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, mainly for political reasons) is higher than in the Customs Union but lower than in the Russian-proposed Eurasian Union.

The Ukrainian divide has emerged as a key issue for recasting a new balance of power between Russia and the West –EU and US/NATO. On the one hand, Moscow has been sidelined on the international arena and excluded from important international formats and forums. The G7 leaders decided on March 24 in The Hague to hold their own Summit in Brussels instead of Sochi without Russia for the first time since 1998.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted to suspend the Russian delegation's voting rights as well as the rights to be represented in the Bureau of the Assembly, the PACE Presidential Committee, the PACE Standing Committee, and the rights to participate in election-observation missions, after the Assembly condemned the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. This list can be developed further.

On the other hand, Moscow’s exclusion from G-8 and the postponed Western summits with Russia encouraged Kremlin to use the so-called euroskeptics in Europe, China and the BRICS group at large, Central Asian feudal regimes and Turkey to mitigate isolation by the West. The Russia-West divide over Ukraine started to take the form of geopolitical rivalry in line with “the foot-in-the door policy” of the Cold war time.

As for the so-called Euroskeptics countries in particular Greece and Cyprus in the EU, and Turkey in NATO, who are unhappy with Brussels’ policy, their political cooperation with Russia could extend only as far as a “partnership à la carte” on particular issues not of fundamental importance. As long as the Euroskeptics states stay in the EU and Turkey in NATO, there won’t be any fundamental change in their policy towards Russia.

Russia has also opportunities for strengthening its political and economic influence in the Western Balkans that still remain Europe’s soft underbelly. Aside from internal problems, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania are the main recruiting grounds in the Balkans for radical Islamists seeking fighters for the wars in Syria and Iraq4. The primary example here is Moscow’s efforts to establish special relations with Serbia and Macedonia. “Those in the EU who are skeptical towards further enlargement – and there are many – might even silently welcome the new power of Russia”5.  For various reasons (both economic and political), these countries did not support sanctions against Russia and seek to strengthen bilateral ties with Moscow”.

Aside from this Bosnia’s survival as a unified state cannot be taken for granted. As Bulgarian analyst Ivan Krastev has pointed out, Moscow’s decision to abstain in a UN vote authorizing a prolonged EU mission to the country leads many to believe that the Kremlin is seriously considering such a move. And this is a very new development, because until recently the Balkans was one of the very few areas where cooperation between Russia and the West in the 90s was quite productive6.   However, it should be noted that the current instability in Bosnia is not the result of Russian policy. Since the end of the Yugoslav war  Bosnia by its concept was an artificial state. It has been destabilized for many reasons – economic, political, constitutional – but the truth is that at this present moment Bosnia is at a very critical juncture, and the EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini called on Russia 5 December 2014 not to involve the Balkans in tensions between Brussels and Moscow over the Ukrainian crisis.

Whatever Russia’s foreign policy recourses, Moscow’s alienation in the international arena, the Western sanctions, deterioration of economic situation in Russia, stalemate in Ukraine and particularly uncertainties about the future of the Eurasian project have made Kremlin reconsider its foreign policy means. The continuation of “the foot-in-the door policy” in the situation of Russia’s international isolation has become counterproductive to the main foreign policy goal of Russia’s status rebuilding. It is all the more so, since Kremlin wanted to shape the world politics but not only to be a spoiler. The Syrian imbroglio has provided him with an opportunity to make a new foreign policy turn. It should be recognized that Vladimir Putin is a good tactician and every time the Russia-West relations hit the bottom, he creates new situations, which confront EU and the US with difficult political choices.
As for the EU, the growing tensions with Russia over Ukraine have created a very uncomfortable environment for the EU leaders who lived two decades after the end of bipolarity in a relaxed mode. The threat of a new split in Europe has forced them to seek a way out of this situation entrusting the difficult mission of a mediator between Russia and the US.

Syria:  a new window of opportunity
or a new apple of discord

With Russia’s intervention in Syria Western observers started to guess why Russia had become involved in the Syrian conflict, which had confounded everyone who had tried to influence it? Was it to defend an ally, al-Assad, and force the West to talk with him? To protect its own access to the Mediterranean? As part of a deal with Iran to tip the balance against Sunni rebel groups? Or because it wanted to join the international coalition against ISIS? There was speculation that Putin, in his UN address the UN General Assembly and private meeting that afternoon with Obama, offered his grand bargain with the West, in which he would likely call for cooperation against terrorism some sort of mediated settlement in Ukraine, and an end to Western sanctions on Russia7.

Russia has never kept a secret of its support to Assad’s regime. So, it is not so much the main goal but rather “a side dish objective” for Putin. The main goal of Russia’s involvement in Syria is to show that Moscow’s assistance may play a crucial role in the settlement of major issues like the Syrian conflict and international terrorism and to underline the point that ISIS is the greatest threat to the world and not Russia. In other words, it is again about regaining the great power status and raising Russia’s profile in the Middle East not by geopolitical rivalry but rather through counter-terrorism cooperation with the West- theoretically not a blameworthy objective. The logic of the Russian leadership is like follows. For the first time after the collapse of the USSR Russia is conducting a big military operation outside the post-Soviet space. Only the US is able to carry out such operations. Hence Russia is not a regional power but a world power. And it is not China but Russia who is the second world power equal to the US.

However, a great deal will depend on the outcome of Russia’s Syrian epopee.   In Syria the Russian leadership has proceeded from its successful cooperation with the West after 9/11, but since then the international situation dramatically worsened. Aside from this, unlike the Afghan counter-terrorism operation, the Syrian case is much more complicated because it has several military theatres and different relationships between the individual states involved in these theatres.

The good side of it is that Russia’s involvement in Syria is not anti-Western as it has been in Ukraine. The initial reaction of the US to Russia’s involvement in Syria was negative but since the Paris shootings and the Russian air crash Washington softened its position. French President Francois Hollande has expressed his readiness to discuss with Vladimir Putin how their countries' militaries might work together and persuade Barack Obama to participate in any unified effort against Islamic State.

There are signs that the recognition of a common threat could prompt more efforts to cooperate not only in Syria. The head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker wrote to President Vladimir Putin, suggesting closer trade ties between the 28-nation EU and a Russian-led economic bloc, linking them to progress on implementing a ceasefire in Ukraine. In the letter Juncker underlined the importance of good relations between the European Union and Moscow, "which to my regret have not been able to develop over the past year". He said he had asked Commission officials to study options for closer ties between the EU and the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union of former Soviet states.

At the same time the risks in Syria are also high. As it often happens, tactical successes will not lead to a strategic victory. If there is close military coordination between the Russian, European and American military – agreed distribution of targets, exchange of intelligence information, prevention of unintended incidents, joint pilots saving operations and etc,-  an operation against ISIS could bring tangible results and reduce the gap in the Russia-West relations. If not, Syria will become a new apple of discord. Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet is the most telling evidence to this risk.

There exist other challenges for Russia. The major risk is the terrorist threat facing Russia. Most vividly this has been proved by the crash of the Russian plane in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.  A protracted military operation could be very damaging for Russia. There are potential military losses and economic costs to be considered (the costs of the current operation, estimated at upwards of 1 billion dollars per year, appear manageable). And in the situation of the economic crisis in Russia a protracted military operation will distract resources from economic reforms. It won’t be an exaggeration to say that the stakes in Syria are really high. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that under the best scenario the meetings of the Normandy Four – Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany – will result in progress toward Russia’s aim – linking a settlement of the Syrian crisis to a settlement in Ukraine, lifting sanctions and revival of the Russia-West cooperation on arms control.

Untangling the knot

Regarding the future of European security, the first and urgent task is to stabilize and deescalate the conflict in the south-east of Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk accords of February 2015. In order to do it the truce should better not be just monitored by OSCE, but imposed by the UN peace-keeping operation. This would be conducive to fulfillment of political and economic provisions of the Minsk accords. For this purpose the USA should naturally join the peace process, possibly in a regular bilateral format with Russia.
The political structure of Ukraine is a domestic problem. But, certainly, the present arrangement should be changed, because devolution is always better than revolution. Much greater financial, social autonomy should be given to the rebellious regions. A great deal will also depend on the ability of the new Ukrainian elite to implement painful economic reforms, build robust institutions and end the system of corrupt political, economic, and criminal power.

On the macro level it would be important to come back to the unfinished job of the 90s and hold a big peace forum which would promote security arrangements in Europe, first and foremost in the post-Soviet space. Neutral status of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan should be guaranteed security, sovereignty and de-facto existing territorial integrity.  The rights of ethnic minorities must be safeguarded and legal provisions and procedures elaborated for peaceful secession as an extreme measure if preservation of territorial integrity proves impossible. Their economic development and association with the EU and other countries should incorporate Russian political, economic, and humanitarian interests. A future paradigm shift would be also contingent on the West defining a clear strategy vis-à-vis Russia, based on a careful balance between its values and realistic objectives as well as the lessons drawn from the past. The West should stop seeing any voluntary and mutually beneficial post-Soviet integration as neo-imperialism which should be thwarted at all cost. Withdrawal and reduction of military forces of NATO and Russia around them must be insured by new conventional arms control agreements and confidence building measures in addition to the Open Skies and Vienna Document regimes.

The Russia –West relations will probably never be the same unless Russia comes back to its European vocation. Yet, a peaceful solution would give the EU and Russia a chance to minimize the damage and at least save the key channels of interaction, which are essential for global and regional security. In light of the current political events, the idea that Russia and the West should cooperate on economics, security and arms control looks all but utopian, although it was perceived as quite natural and mutually beneficial just several years ago. Everybody should realize that peace should not be taken for granted. Its maintenance and enhancement require relentless efforts.

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