Is Religious Radicalism at the Heart of Global Change?
Religion is making a strong comeback on the global stage. Alain Dieckhoff has edited a book entitled Radicalités religieuses. Au Coeur d’une mutation mondiale (Religious Radicalism: At the Heart of Global Change) (Albin Michel, 2025), which provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary religious radicalism and offers valuable insights into the complex relationships between the state, ethnicity, nationalism, violence and religion. Written by leading experts in the field, including several researchers from CERI, this collective work reflects the current dynamism of research on religion in France. In this extensive interview, Alain Dieckhoff, the editor, and Denis Lacorne and Stéphane Lacroix answer our questions, offering their informed perspectives on the current global transformations of religion.
Questions to Alain Dieckhoff
How can we explain the resurgence of religion in forms that you describe as “radical and uncompromising”, even though many saw modernity as marginalising religion and secularisation as a linear and irreversible concept?
Alain Dieckhoff: Let's start by looking at a few recent events: President Donald Trump's establishment of a "White House Faith Office" to protect religious freedom, which he claims has been under attack by previous Democrat administrations; the designation by Israeli army rabbis of the war in Gaza as "ordained by God", while Hamas echoes this by extolling its struggle in the name of "faith and belief’"; Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ritual bathing at the confluence of sacred rivers during the great Kumbh Mela, a huge pilgrimage in northern India; repeated invocation of Europe's Christian identity by certain populist leaders... What do these facts tell us? That religion is making a strong comeback on the national and international scene and that it is, more than ever, intertwined with politics.
This renewed visibility of religion should lead us to take a more complex approach to the question of secularisation, as José Casanova urged us to do thirty years ago.1 There are three facets to secularisation: the differentiation of spheres, i.e. the separation of political, economic, and social activities from religious institutions and norms; the decline of religious beliefs and practices; and the privatisation of religion, i.e. its relegation to the inner life of each individual. While secularisation as differentiation is a powerful, universal dynamic, the decline in religious affiliation is a more fragmented phenomenon, essentially European, while the privatisation of religion is not a significant structural factor of modernity. On the contrary, we are witnessing a relative deprivatisation of religion, i.e. the abandonment by certain religious leaders of their previous stance of withdrawal in favour of an offensive stance in the public sphere, on societal issues (contraception, marriage for all, etc.), as well as on purely political issues.
At the same time, many more political leaders are turning to religion in their speeches and even their practices, both for instrumental reasons and out of conviction.
How can the various strategies of "withdrawal from the world" or religious "reconquest" be interpreted?
Alain Dieckhoff: I should add that our book does not focus on mainstream religion, which is often closely linked to large ecclesiastical institutions and still plays an active role in the daily lives of many believers. It focuses on movements that advocate a more assertive, more absolute form of religion and which are currently gaining momentum.
The religious movements we study in this book, from Salafism to evangelism, militant Buddhism and Hinduism, ultra-Orthodox Judaism, identitarian Catholicism, and others, claim to be returning to the roots and foundations of their religion. Hence the adoption of the term “radicalism”.
However, it is important to distinguish between two types of radicalism. One is pietistic, seeking to defend the "true" faith and strict observance of religious practices. It does not formulate a political agenda. Catholics defending pre-conciliar rites, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and most Salafists fall into this category. A second form of radicalism, which can be described as activist, also seeks to defend the virtues of rigorous orthodoxy, but by intervening energetically in the public sphere, with the ultimate goal of building a "religious" state: this is the case with the Muslim Brotherhood, religious Zionists, and many American evangelicals who have engaged in entryism, particularly within the Republican Party. That said, there are bridges between these two types of radicalism, generally in the transition from pietism to activism, as in certain forms of Salafism that have given rise to groups advocating global jihad (Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, etc.).
What you call "religious nationalism" is a particularly active form of this phenomenon. What is it?
Alain Dieckhoff: This expression, which was popularised by the American scholar Mark Juergensmeyer,2 refers to the intertwining of the national and the religious, which is indeed undeniably very common today. It refers to two processes that can, in fact, be complementary. On the one hand, there is the mobilisation of religion by political actors, a remarkable example of which is the tribute paid to the political activist Charlie Kirk, a Christian nationalist from the radical right who was assassinated in early September. We saw President Trump call for the "return of religion to America, because without borders, without law and order, and without religion, we no longer have a country". The second process is the involvement of religious actors in politics in order to place religion at the centre of society.
Here, we find religious Zionist rabbis who want to build a state governed according to halakha (Jewish religious law); there we find sheikhs who advocate a state governed according to Sharia law; and elsewhere we find monks working to consolidate a Buddhist state. The religious traditions may differ, but the goal is the same: to create a religious state.
What are the manifestations of religious radicalism in Israel?
We clearly observe the two types of radicalism mentioned above. On the one hand, ultra-Orthodoxy is experiencing continuous demographic growth (currently 17% of the Jewish population). It is primarily interested in preserving the autonomy of the communities that claim to belong to it. For the ultra-Orthodox, the State of Israel has no religious significance, even though it is expected to provide financial support for their institutions. On the other hand, there are the religious Zionists, i.e. practising Jews who attribute religious significance to the State of Israel and even see it as an active agent of messianism. They therefore advocate a clear political commitment, in particular to increase the number of Jewish settlements in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). It is the question of messianism that fundamentally separates the two movements: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is not relevant at the moment; for religious Zionism, it makes perfect sense today.
However, as Gershom Scholem, a leading Israeli specialist in Kabbalah, noted in a prescient warning in 1980: "As soon as messianism enters politics, it becomes very dangerous. It can only lead to disaster".3
Christian Nationalism in the United States
Questions to Denis Lacorne
What is the relationship between Christian nationalism and the political and religious vision of power under Donald Trump's presidency, and how does this relationship challenge the traditional principles of separation between Church and State in the United States?
Denis Lacorne: I would like to refer to Olivier Roy's concept of Christian identity politics, as expressed in the book Radicalités Religieuses, edited by Alain Dieckhoff. This is indeed what is at stake in Trump’s America: the explosive mixture of Christianity (especially in its Protestant variants) and an ethnic, if not racial, conception of the nation’s identity. The national narrative favoured by Trump and his supporters is rooted in nostalgia for a “Christian” past, established by the first Anglo-Saxon colonists and formalised in foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution of 1787, and the Bill of Rights. These documents are supposed to be inspired by the Bible, particularly the Old Testament.
However, this reconstruction of a Christian past is largely mythical. The Declaration of Independence asserts the equality of all individuals and introduces the post-Christian concept of the sovereignty of the people. The concept of a divine being is only fleetingly referenced, with the entity being portrayed as a deist "Creator" who relinquishes authority to humanity and underpins governance by "the consent of the governed". With regard to the Federal Constitution, it is noteworthy that it lacks any reference to a supreme being, as outlined in Article VI, which prohibits any “religious test” for the holders of the highest public offices. According to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the oath taken by all new presidents does not mention God or the Creator. It is a secular oath that most presidents have folklorised by adding, orally, a reference to God.
With regard to the separation of powers, the First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the “establishment” of an official church. For Jefferson, the country's third president, this implied the existence of a genuine “wall of separation” between Church and State in the new Republic. In his work The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, Jefferson reinterpreted the Gospels, portraying Jesus as a significant philosopher akin to Socrates. However, he removed all references to miracles and resurrection.
For Trump and his associates, these are unacceptable facts, even though they are true. The founding texts of the American Republic are said to have biblical origins; to further cement this reconstruction of America's past, Trump published the God Bless the USA Bible, which combines the Protestant Bible, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of 1787, accompanied by the lyrics to Lee Greenwood's song, “God Bless the USA”—A book which rejects the notion of a separation of Church and State.
The Christian nationalism advocated by Trump and his advisers is inextricably linked to a new Protestant movement inspired by Dominion theology. This neo-Calvinist theology, first developed by the Californian pastor Rousas Rushdoony, author of The Institutes of Biblical Law, now influences three major evangelical movements: Christian reconstructionists, Christian charismatics, and Pentecostals. The objective of this theological approach is to re-Christianise key areas of social and political life by applying biblical precepts inspired, among other things, by Leviticus and Deuteronomy. These key areas are considered to be the “seven mountains” to be conquered, including government, arts and culture, education, business, media, religion, and family.
The most enthusiastic proponents of this evangelical movement within the Trump administration are Russell Vought (Director of the Office of Management and Budget); Pete Hegseth (Secretary of Defence); and Paula White (Director of the Office of Faith, which is based in the White House itself). They defend the views of Doug Wilson, a Presbyterian pastor and founder of a neo-Calvinist movement (The Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches), a church (Christ Church), and a small university (New Saint Andrew's College) in Moscow, Idaho.
In what ways does the pessimistic and xenophobic vision of Christian nationalism, particularly the rhetoric surrounding the "great replacement", contribute to the formation of a national identity based on ethnic and religious criteria? What impact does this have on contemporary social dynamics in the United States?
Denis Lacorne: Doug Wilson has just established a new church in Washington D.C., the “centre of power”, whose influence continues to grow. The Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, was present at its inauguration. For Wilson, democracy is “heresy” and secularism a “failed experiment” that only Christian nationalism can correct by establishing a new theocratic order designed to end America's cultural decline. To achieve this, public schools must be replaced by Christian schools or Christian home schooling; laws prohibiting abortion and same-sex marriage must be reinstated; women must be made more submissive to their husbands, and their right to vote must be revoked; no-fault divorce must be prohibited; and Muslim immigration must be halted. At the National Conservative Conference in September 2025, Wilson said that we do not want the border between Ohio and Michigan—a state with a large Muslim community—to become “the Indo-Pakistani border”.
This illustrates the attachment of Christian nationalists to Renaud Camus's “great replacement theory”, which is often promoted by followers of this ideology. According to a New York Times investigation, Tucker Carlson, a journalist close to Trump, has referred to the "great replacement" theory 400 times in 1,150 episodes of his Fox News programme. This is a record for a topic that has been publicly discussed by other close Trump advisers, such as Steve Miller (the White House deputy chief of staff); Tom Homan (the White House Border Czar); and Russ Vought (Director of the Office of Management and Budget — OMB). “Project 2025”, a 900-page document prepared by members of the Heritage Foundation (including Vought), denounces the "conspiracy" of the Democratic elites, who, by opening the borders to the Global South, seek to "replace" the native white population with people of colour, including many Muslims, in order to win future elections.
Different shades of fundamentalism in Islam: Building a typology of radicalism
Questions to Stéphane Lacroix
Although Salafism and Islamism both refer to early Islam, their historical genealogies and grammars of action are very different. Could you tell us a little about this?
Stéphane Lacroix: Salafism and Islamism are two forms of Muslim fundamentalism that are distinct in both discourse and praxis, or what I call “the grammar of action”. Both emerged from the reformist movement that appeared in Egypt and the Levant at the end of the nineteenth century. In Egypt, these two traditions became institutionalised in the 1920s: Islamism with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, and Salafism with the formation of the Association of Supporters of the Prophetic Tradition (Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya) two years earlier in 1926.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s programme aims to rebuild the state in the form of an “Islamic state” (dawla Islamiyya), i.e. a modern state that applies Sharia law rather than European-inspired secular law. Therefore, their project is primarily political, even if religion is its foundation. In contrast, the Salafis' approach is fundamentally religious and theological. They advocate “purification and education” (al-tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya): the purification of the Muslim corpus to reduce it to its most conservative interpretation, inspired by Hanbalism and its Wahhabi offshoot, and the dissemination of this corpus to a new “community of believers” through preaching.
Their methods diverge significantly: the Muslim Brotherhood is building a social, political, and religious organisation, which they claim is intended to influence all areas, including the political sphere. They have been seeking to enter parliament since the 1940s. To this end, the Muslim Brotherhood avoids theological disputes, including the Sunni–Shia dispute (at least initially), in order to unite as many Muslims as possible under the banner of a common political goal. In contrast, the Salafis are obsessed with theological orthodoxy and devote some of their writings to denouncing those they consider “deviant Muslims”, for example Sufis, Shiites, and followers of the Ash'ari school of theology, which was predominant among Sunnis until the twentieth century. Conversely, they steer clear of politics, convinced that only “Islamisation from below” (or “Salafisation from below”, if you will) can bring about change.
In what ways has the tension between “modernising Islam” and “Islamising modernity” influenced contemporary Muslim intellectual thought?
Stéphane Lacroix: This question has been present since the beginning of the twentieth century in debates about Muslim reformism, which emerged a few decades earlier. The whole issue of Muslim reformism was to question why the Muslim world was lagging behind Europe, with the idea that the “solutions” could be found in Islam. The question of how to approach “modernity” as understood by Europeans then arose: should it be adopted, adapted, or rejected?
The most liberal thinkers of the time leaned toward the first option, but on the condition that “Islam be modernised”, i.e. that religious interpretations be produced in line with modernity, drawing on the most rationalist Islamic traditions. A more conservative faction refused to go that far, advocating adapting rather than adopting modernity. Anything that did not pose a religious problem could be adopted as it was, but the rest had to be “Islamised”, or adapted to the requirements and prohibitions of Islam. This faction gave rise to Islamism. A good example of this is their flagship concept of the Islamic State: adopting the structure of the modern state implies breaking with traditional political structures in Islam, but with the law being replaced by Sharia. Ultimately, the Salafis are the only ones to dismiss the question of modernity, replacing it with that of theological purity.
Interviews by Corinne Deloy
- 1. Public Religions in the Modern World , Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- 2. The New Cold War ? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State , Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.
- 3. “The Threat of Messianism. An Interview with Gershom Scholem”, The New York Review of Books , 14 August 1980.
