Roy-ADRES Seminar Economic Theory
Portrait of René Roy and stylised equations
The aim of the Roy seminar is mainly the development of Economic Theory, in particular through its ramifications towards applied fields including Industrial Organization, Market Design, Insurance, Finance, Public Economics, Political Economy, Labour Economics and the dialogue with complementary methodologies (structural econometrics, experimental economics).
Monday - 17:00 to 18:15.
The Roy-ADRES Seminar is co-organised by Catherine BOBTCHEFF (PSE), Nikhil VELLODI (PSE), and Franz OSTRIZEK (Sciences Po), under the direction of Olivier TERCIEUX (PSE).
Administrative correspondant at Sciences Po: Stéphanie Berrebi
To register for the ROY mailing list and receive the details of the sessions, the schedule and so on, follow this link.
Fall Semester 2023
September 11th - Giacomo LANZANI (Harvard/University of California at Berkeley)
Selective Memory Equilibrium
September 18th - In-Uck PARK (University of Bristol)
Information Sale and Trade
September 25th - Evgenii SAFONOV (Queen Mary University London)
Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing
October 2nd - Aditya KUVALEKAR (University of Essex)
Similarity of Information in Games
October 9th - Jean-Edouard COLLIARD (HEC Paris)
Algorithmic Pricing and Liquidity in Securities Markets
October 16th - Nick NETZER (University of Zürich)
Endogenous Risk Attitudes
October 23rd - Dmitry ORLOV (Wisconsin-Madison University)
Exchanging Information
November 13th - Jacob GOEREE (University of New South Wales)
A Synthesis of (Behavioral) Game Theory
November 20th - Shaowei KE (University of Michigan)
Decision Making Under Multidimensional Uncertainty
November 27th - Andreas BLUME (University of Arizona)
Meaning in Communication Games
December 4th - Christopher SANDMANN (LSE)
Market Structure and Adverse Selection
December 11th - David WALKER-JONES (University of Surrey)
Difficult Decisions
winter-spring semester 2024
March 4th - Itzhak GILBOA (HEC Paris, Reichman University)
Likelihood Regions: An Axiomatic Approach
March 11th - Henrique CASTRO-PIRES (University of Surrey)
The Effect of Exit Rights on Cost-based Procurement Contracts
March 18th - Pietro ORTOLEVA (Princeton)
When to Decide: Timing of Choice in Parallel Search
March 25th - Krittanai LAOHAKUNAKORN (University of Surrey)
Monopoly Pricing with Optimal Information
April 22nd - Ryota IIJIMA (Yale)
Multidimensional Screening with Rich Consumer Data
April 29th - Ariel RUBENSTEIN (New York University, Tel Aviv University)
No prices and no games: the case of matching problems
May 6th - David DILLENBERGER (University of Pennsylvania)
TBA
May 13th - Daniel HAUSER (Aalto University)
TBA
May 27th - Alessandro LIZZERI (Princeton)
TBA
June 3rd - Filip MATEJKA (CERGE-EI)
TBA
June 10th - Ce LIU (Michigan State University)
TBA
June 17th - Matias NUNEZ (CREST, École Polytechnique)
TBA
Archives 2022-2023
September 12th - Emir KAMENICA (Chicago Booth, School of Business)
Comparisons of Signals
September 19th - Rani SPIEGLER (Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University and University College London)
False Narratives and Political Mobilization
September 26th - Jorgen WEIBULL (Stockholm School of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics)
A Framework for Spatial Political Analysis
October 3rd - Peter BUISSERET (Department of Government, Harvard University)
Politics Transformed? Electoral Strategies under Ranked Choice Voting
October 10th - Kevin HE (University of Pennsylvania)
Learning from Viral Content
October 17th - Jan KNOEPFLE (Queen Mary University of London)
Should the Timing of Inspections Be Random?
October 24th - Vincenzo DENICOLÒ (Bocconi University)
Acquistitions, Innovation, and the Entrenchment of Monopoly
November 14th - Bruno STRULOVICI (Northwestern University)
Social Learning by Truth-Insensitive Investigators
November 21st - Tommaso DENTI (Cornell University)
Blackwell correlated equilibrium
November 28th - Mira FRICK (Yale)
Welfare Comparisons for Biased Learning
December 5th - Goncalves DUARTE (University College London)
Sequential Sampling Equilibrium
*exceptional scheduling* December 8th - Anne-Kathrin ROESLER (University of Toronto)
How Informed Do You Want Your Principal to Be?
December 12th - Tangren FENG (Bocconi)
Interim Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: Designing Simple Mechanisms in Complex Environments
March 6th - Benjamin BROOKS (University of Chicago)
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
March 13th - Alessandro PAVAN (Northwestern University)
Knowing your Lemon before You Dump It
March 20th - Bruno JULLIEN (Toulouse School of Economics)
Communication, Feedback and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers
March 27th - Stephen MORRIS (MIT)
Screening with Persuasion
April 3rd - Daniel GOTTLIEB (London School of Economics)
Market Power and Insurance Coverage
May 15th - Thomas MARIOTTI (Toulouse School of Economics)
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
May 22nd - Christian KELLNER (University of Southampton)
Timing Decisions under Model Uncertainty
June 5th - Joe HARRINGTON (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
Cost Coordination
June 12th - Sara SHAHANAGHI (Toulouse School of Economics)
Competition and Herding in Breaking News
June 19th - Geoffroy DE CLIPPEL (University of Brown)
Departures from Preference Maximization and Violations of the Sure-Thing Principle
Archives 2021-2022
September 13th - Mohammad AKBARPOUR (Stanford)
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms
September 20th - Paula ONUCHIC (Oxford)
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects
September 27th - Zvika NEEMAN (Tel Aviv University)
Communication with Endogenous Deception Costs
October 4th - Ludvig SINANDER (Oxford)
Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking
October 11th - Jeffrey ELY (Northwestern)
Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence
October 18th - Andriy ZAPECHELNYUK (University of St Andrews)
A Model of Debates: Moderation VS Free Speech
November 8th - Francisco POGGI (University of Mannheim)
A Taxation Principle with Non-Contractible Events
November 15th - Andrea GALEOTTI (London School of Business)
Market Segmentation through Information
November 22nd - Roland STRAUSZ (Humboldt University Berlin)
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
November 29th - Takuro YAMASHITA (Toulouse School of Economics)
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
December 6th - Daniel F. GARRETT (Toulouse School of Economics and University of Essex)
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
March 7th - Nick ARNOSTI (University of Minnesota)
Talk based on Lottery Design for School Choice and A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities
March 14th - Gregorio CURELLO (University of Bonn)
Incentives for Collective Innovation
March 21st - Annie LIANG (Northwestern University)
Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy
March 28th - Benjamin GOLUB (Northwestern University)
Taxes and Market Power: A Network Approach
April 4th - Hector CHADE (Arizona State University)
Multidimensional Screening and Menu Design in Health Insurance Markets
*POSTPONED* April 11th - Colin STEWART (University of Toronto)
Demand in the Dark
May 9th - Evan FRIEDMAN (University of Essex)
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications
May 16th - Bruno STRULOVICI (Northwestern University)
Can Society Function Without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective
May 23rd - Petér KONDOR (London School of Economics)
Cleansing by Tight Credit: Rational Cycles and Endogenous Lending Standards
May 30th - Shengwu LI (Harvard)
A Theory of Ex Post Rationalization
June 13th - Matt ELLIOTT (University of Cambridge)
Market Segmentation through Information
June 20th - Colin STEWART (University of Toronto)
Demand in the Dark
