Roy-ADRES Seminar Economic Theory
Portrait of René Roy and stylised equations
The aim of the Roy seminar is mainly the development of Economic Theory, in particular through its ramifications towards applied fields including Industrial Organization, Market Design, Insurance, Finance, Public Economics, Political Economy, Labour Economics and the dialogue with complementary methodologies (structural econometrics, experimental economics).
Monday - 17:00 to 18:15.
The Roy-ADRES Seminar is co-organised by Catherine BOBTCHEFF (PSE), Nikhil VELLODI (PSE), and Eduardo PEREZ (Sciences Po), under the direction of Olivier TERCIEUX (PSE).
Administrative correspondant: Sophie GOZLAN
To register for the ROY mailing list and receive the details of the sessions, the schedule and so on, follow this link.
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No.866274)
Winter/Spring Semester 2022
March 7th - Nick ARNOSTI (University of Minnesota)
Talk based on Lottery Design for School Choice and A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities
March 14th - Gregorio CURELLO (University of Bonn)
Incentives for Collective Innovation
March 21st - Annie LIANG (Northwestern University)
Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy
March 28th - Benjamin GOLUB (Northwestern University)
Taxes and Market Power: A Network Approach
April 4th - Hector CHADE (Arizona State University)
Multidimensional Screening and Menu Design in Health Insurance Markets
*POSTPONED* April 11th - Colin STEWART (University of Toronto)
Demand in the Dark
May 9th - Evan FRIEDMAN (University of Essex)
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications
May 16th - Bruno STRULOVICI (Northwestern University)
Can Society Function Without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective
May 23rd - Petér KONDOR (London School of Economics)
Cleansing by Tight Credit: Rational Cycles and Endogenous Lending Standards
May 30th - Shengwu LI (Harvard)
A Theory of Ex Post Rationalization
June 13th - Matt ELLIOTT (University of Cambridge)
Market Segmentation through Information
June 20th - Colin STEWART (University of Toronto)
Demand in the Dark
June 27th - Yeon-Koo CHE (Columbia University)
TBA
Fall Semester 2021
September 13th - Mohammad AKBARPOUR (Stanford)
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms
September 20th - Paula ONUCHIC (Oxford)
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects
September 27th - Zvika NEEMAN (Tel Aviv University)
Communication with Endogenous Deception Costs
October 4th - Ludvig SINANDER (Oxford)
Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking
October 11th - Jeffrey ELY (Northwestern)
Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence
October 18th - Andriy ZAPECHELNYUK (University of St Andrews)
A Model of Debates: Moderation VS Free Speech
November 8th - Francisco POGGI (University of Mannheim)
A Taxation Principle with Non-Contractible Events
November 15th - Andrea GALEOTTI (London School of Business)
Market Segmentation through Information
November 22nd - Roland STRAUSZ (Humboldt University Berlin)
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
November 29th - Takuro YAMASHITA (Toulouse School of Economics)
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
December 6th - Daniel F. GARRETT (Toulouse School of Economics and University of Essex)
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
