The Arsenal and the Ballot Box: Scoping the Incompatibility of Nuclear Weapons and Democracy

This paper systematically explores incompatibilities between nuclear weapons and democracy. Based on a procedural definition of democracy, it argues that nuclear weapons’ relationship with democracy is defined both by inherent limitations stemming from the features of nuclear weapons and by assumptions about the requirements of nuclear strategy. It concludes that although ideas on the requirements of nuclear strategy modify the level of compatibility between nuclear weapons policy and democracy, none allow for sufficient compatibility. Excessive power concentration with executives, limitations on advance agreement on nuclear strategy, and secrecy can all be avoided with different assumptions about the requirements of nuclear strategy, in particular nuclear deterrence. However, the destructivity and speed of nuclear wars mean that they inherently cannot be subject to adequate control. Equally, they cannot be subject to control by a sufficiently inclusive demos. Thus, nuclear weapons are incompatible with democracy, but significant democratization of nuclear policy is possible.