Interventions

03/04/2019
Une séance dans le cadre du séminaire de Nuclear Knowledges - Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité.
 
Saisir la possibilité de la guerre nucléaire autour de l'ouvrage de Jean-Pierre Dupuy : La guerre qui ne peut pas avoir lieu aux Éditions Desclée De Brouwer, 20 février 2019.
 

La guerre qui ne peut pas avoir lieu
Essai de métaphysique nucléaire
Jean-Pierre Dupuy

Nous sommes plus près d'une guerre nucléaire que nous ne l'avons jamais été pendant la Guerre froide, mais la plupart des gens sont aveugles à ce danger. Ils ont appris que les armes nucléaires ne servent qu'à une chose : empêcher que les autres les emploient. C'est ce qu'on appelle la dissuasion. Ils pensent aussi que ces armes sont trop destructrices pour qu'on soit tenté de les utiliser. Telles sont les illusions qui leur permettent de dormir tranquilles. Entre l'été 2017 et janvier 2018, nous avons plusieurs fois frôlé une guerre nucléaire que ses protagonistes, Donald Trump et Kim Jong Un, ne voulaient nullement, pas plus que ne la voulurent Kennedy et Khrouchtchev pendant la crise de Cuba.

 

 

 

Jean-Pierre Dupuy est professeur à l'Université Stanford.
Il est l'auteur de très nombreux ouvrages, parmi lesquels : L'Enfer des choses. René Girard et la logique de l'économie (avec Paul Dumouchel, 1979) ; La Panique (1991) ; Le Sacrifice et l'envie (1994) ; Pour un catastrophisme éclairé (2002) ; Petite métaphysique des tsunamis (2005) ; La Marque du sacré (2010) ; L'Avenir de l'économie (2012) ou La Jalousie. Une géométrie du désir (2016).

Discutants :
Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI

Nariman Shelekpayev, Sciences Po-CERI, Nuclear Knowledges

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI. 

07/02/2019

Dans le cadre du séminaire de Nuclear Knowledges - Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité.

"The Courtroom of World Opinion": Bringing the International Audience into Nuclear Crises

Speaker:
Debak Das, PhD candidate, Cornell University

Abstract:
What role does the international audience play in moderating nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor – the international audience. Two related reasons explain this. First, states care about their international reputation and want to be perceived as a ‘good community member’. Second, there are material benefits to states maintaining a good reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to condemn and sanction. States thus attempt to leverage this power of the international audience to apply diplomatic pressure on their adversary during nuclear crises. They also engage in costly signaling and strategic restraint to ensure that the international audience considers its actions legitimate during the crisis. Empirical evidence from the Kargil war (the only instance of a war fought between two nuclear states), the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1969 Ussuri Crisis between the Soviet Union and China support this conclusion. Incorporating the international audience as a critical third actor during nuclear crises has important academic and policy implications for the study of nuclear crises and their management.

Discussants:
Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI, Nuclear Knowledges
Thomas Lindemann, Université de Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines et Ecole Polytechnique

Les présentations seront données en anglais, cependant les questions en français seront également les bienvenues.

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI.
Retrouvez les actualités de la Chaire sur Twitter : @NKnowledges


17/09/2018

Le programme Nuclear Knowledges - Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité, en partenariat avec l'IDDRI présente la première séance du séminaire mensuel de l'automne 2018.

World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2018: présentation publique et discussion

The Nuclear Knowledges program in collaboration with IDDRI, presents the first monthly seminar of the Fall 2018.

"World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2018: public presentation and discussion"

Présidence et animation de la séance: Benoit Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI, fondateur du programme Nuclear Knowledges

Intervenants :
Mycle Schneider, consultant indépendant, coordinateur du World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2018
Dr Phil Johnstone, Université du Sussex, co-auteur du chapitre sur les interdépendances entre les infrastructures du nucléaire civil et militaire.

La séance sera conduite en anglais mais les questions en français sont les bienvenues.

Responsable scientifique : Benoit Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI

Rapport en haute résolution: https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20180902wnisr2018-hr.pdf
Faits marquants en Français: https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/resume_fr_2018_web.pdf

 

14/06/2018

Voir le programme




Benoît Pelopidas, Nuclear Knowledges : « Introduction »




Fabricio Mendes Fialho, postdoctoral research fellow, Nuclear Knowledges




Brian Rathbun (University of Southern California): « Greater Good, Lesser Evil?: Morality and Attitudes Towards the Use of Nuclear Weapons. »




Michal Smetana, Assistant professor, Peace Research Center, Prague (with Marek Vranka, on skype) « Moral Foundations of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons “Taboo” - Evidence from an Experimental Survey »




Fabricio Mendes Fialho, postdoctoral research fellow, Nuclear Knowledges : comments on the two papers and authors’ response




Benoît Pelopidas, Nuclear Knowledges : brief comments on the two papers




Brian Rathbun and Michal Smetana : replies to the discussants and Q&A

31/05/2018

Voir le programme (en anglais)



Introduction: Christine Musselin, directrice scientifique de Sciences Po

30/05/2018

Dans le cadre du séminaire de Nuclear Knowledges - Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité.

Why states choose nuclear restraint? An analysis of Sweden´s nuclear weapons plans during the cold war based on primary sources.

Why did Sweden choose, in the late 1960s, to abolish its long-standing nuclear weapons plans? A number of historical investigations have analyzed some aspects of this issue, particularly as it related to the public political debate in Sweden and the formulation of the Swedish defense doctrine in the postwar years. Taken together, these studies provide a far-from-complete picture of Sweden’s historical nuclear weapons plans. The main reason for this lack of a comprehensive picture has been the paucity of primary sources. Today, however, the end of the cold war and the declassification of large parts of the relevant documentary record, especially concerning the technical preparations for nuclear weapons production, have created the prerequisites for a more penetrating analysis.The purpose of this presentation is to summarize this research on Sweden’s plans to acquire nuclear weapons and discuss its bearing on theories of proliferation and non-proliferation.

The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War
Thomas Jonter, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016
For more information

Thomas Jonter is Director of Stockholm University Graduate School of International Studies, Sweden, and Professor of International Relations at the Department of Economic History. He has been visiting scholar at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stanford University, and Cornell University. Professor Jonter is also chair of Swedish Pugwash and served as advisor to the Swedish delegation to the 2015 Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the United Nations in New York.

Discutants:

Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI, titulaire de la chaire d'excellence en études de sécurité, Sciences Po.

Les présentations seront données en anglais, cependant les questions en français seront également les bienvenues.

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI. 

10/04/2018

Dans le cadre du séminaire de Nuclear Knowledges - Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité.

Are nuclear arsenals safe from cyber-attack? Could terrorists launch a nuclear weapon through hacking? Are we standing at the edge of a major technological challenge to global nuclear order?

We are proud to welcome Andrew Futter whose ground-breaking book about the cyber threat to nuclear weapons will be published by Georgetown University Press.

Hacking the Bomb provides the first ever comprehensive assessment of this worrying and little-understood strategic development, and it explains how myriad new cyber challenges will impact the way that the world thinks about and manages the ultimate weapon. The book cuts through the hype surrounding the cyber phenomenon and provides a framework through which to understand and proactively address the implications of the emerging cyber-nuclear nexus. It does this by tracing the cyber challenge right across the nuclear weapons enterprise, explains the important differences between types of cyber threats, and unpacks how cyber capabilities will impact strategic thinking, nuclear balances, deterrence thinking, and crisis management. The book makes the case for restraint in the cyber realm when it comes to nuclear weapons given the considerable risks of commingling weapons of mass disruption with weapons of mass destruction, and argues against establishing a dangerous norm of "hacking the bomb."

Discutants:

Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI, titulaire de la chaire d'excellence en études de sécurité, Sciences Po.

Camille Roth, Professeur associé, Médialab, Sciences Po

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI.

13/03/2018

Dans le cadre du séminaire de la Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité

How to Think about Nuclear Crises
Mark Bell, University of Minnesota, and Julia Macdonald, University of Denver

Abstract: How dangerous are nuclear crises? What dynamics underpin how they unfold? Recent tensions between North Korea and the United States have exposed profound disagreement among scholars and analysts.We reconcile these apparently contradictory views by showing the circumstances in which different models of nuclear crises should be expected to hold. Nuclear crises should be expected to have very different dynamics depending on two variables: the incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, and the extent to which escalation is controllable by the leaders involved. Variation across these two dimensions generate four distinct models of nuclear crises, which we label as the “staircase” model; the “stability-instability” model; the “brinkmanship” model; and the “firestorm” model. These models correspond to well-established ways of thinking about nuclear weapons, but no one model of nuclear crises is “correct.” Different models should be expected to apply in different cases, and we should interpret nuclear crises very differently according to which model is most appropriate. We demonstrate the utility of our framework using the cases of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1999 Kargil War, and ongoing U.S.-North Korea tensions.

Strategic Stability in Two Nuclear Posture Reviews
Professor Sharon K. Weiner, American University, Washington D.C. member of the advisory board of the chair of excellence in security studies.

Abstract: Deterrence is an ambiguous guide for translating presidential guidance into nuclear force structure and strategy. Although claims are made that these choices are linked to national security needs and threats, I bring in the context of bureaucratic structure. Using the 2010 Obama Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2018 Trump NPR as case studies, I show how both NPRs claim to justify essentially the same nuclear modernization plan, but this plan has significantly different consequences for strategic stability when seen within the bureaucratic and organizational contexts that will implement it under Trump.

Discutants: The two discussants will discuss each other's papers

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI.

02/03/2018

Dans le cadre du séminaire de la Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité

Nuclear Reach: Uranium Prospection and the Global Ambitions of the French Nuclear Program, 1945-1965

Avec : Dr Matthew Adamson, McDaniel College, Budapest
Discutants: Dr Roberto Cantoni, Université d'Augsbourg et Dr Sezin Topçu, EHESS

Abstract :
By the beginning of the 1960s, the French nuclear program was notable for its tangible presence around the globe—France’s nuclear reach. Weapons testing ranges, numerous scientific exchanges, a seat on the IAEA’s governing board, all characterized the program and its successes in the eyes of its leadership. Yet the most remarkable and curious reach of the program was something many in the program may not have been aware of: French uranium geologists, inspecting the prospects of the sands and soils of over two dozen different countries on every continent. This paper explores this phenomenon, and considers the link between this form of “nuclear reach” and the others aforementioned. Utilizing sources in France, the US, and at the IAEA archives in Vienna, it concludes that the status of uranium, dynamic and shifting during the first decade of the nuclear age, and the prospection of uranium by French geologists around the globe, reveal a great deal about the evolving ambitions of the French nuclear leadership; in the end, geophysics, geochemistry, and ore concentration techniques should be viewed alongside nucleonics and nuclear reactor design as lynchpin techniques of the nuclear age, and the diplomatic and commercial stakes involved as essential elements of the calculations of the French nuclear leadership.

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI.

25/01/2018

Dans le cadre du séminaire de la Chaire d’excellence en études de sécurité

"From the Perennial Nuclear Security State to Federated Powers of Shared Nuclear Responsibility"

Avec :

Professor S. M. Amadae, Associate Professor of International Political Economy, Department of Politics and International Relations, Swansea University Research affiliate, Program on Science, Technology and Society, MIT

Any political theory of legitimate governance and sovereignty that cannot address the nuclear security dilemma is null and void: specifically in a time of neoliberal and illiberal politics celebrating Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump. The current reconciliation of this nuclear dilemma emphasizes the credibility of deterrence through the preparedness to fight and win nuclear wars, escalation dominance, flexible response and coercive bargaining. Sustaining the credibility of nuclear deterrence is of the highest importance. The price for this is to relegate agency to unintended processes and to treat potential errors of judgment and technological accidents as instances of risk, both amenable to rational decision theory. To move beyond this stalemate of perennial nuclear saber-rattling and embrace of the likelihood of nuclear cataclysm, I turn to republican theory. Ian Shapiro (2017) and Daniel Deudney (2007) put forward two alternatives, the first shunning international government, and the latter embracing it as a means to achieve joint global nuclear security. In either case, I argue that the most critical step in jointly achieving freedom from the fear of nuclear domination is to go beyond strategic rational action.

References:
Deudney, Daniel H. 2007. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village. Princeton University Press. Shapiro, Ian 2017. Politics Against Domination. Harvard University Press.

Discutants:

Grey Anderson, chercheur postdoctoral auprès de la chaire d'excellence en études de sécurité, Sciences Po.

Benoît Pelopidas, titulaire de la chaire d'excellence en études de sécurité, Sciences Po

 

Responsable scientifique : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI.

Retrouvez les actualités de la Chaire sur Twitter @NKnowledges

 

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