Hybrid event (presential / zoom)

Room : Salle S1, 2e étage, 28 rue des Saints-Pères 75007 and also online via zoom

Organised as part of the seminar Nuclear Knowledges

Speaker:
Amir Lupovici, Tel Aviv University

Discussants:
Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI
Kjølv Egeland, senior researcher, NORSAR

Abstract:
NATO members have adopted a unique strategy towards Ukraine, which can be termed deterrence through delivery of arms. The deterrent message issued by NATO leaders through rhetoric and deeds was that they would continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine to deny Russia victory, thereby aiming to achieve deterrence by denial. This strategy shares certain characteristics with extended deterrence since it hinges on the involvement of a third party protecting a protégé. However, unlike other forms of extended deterrence, the threat is not based on the third party’s willingness to execute its capabilities. Rather, it relies on the protégé’s capability to fight and defend its territory, akin to cases of direct deterrence. Amir Lupovici suggests that the adoption of this unique strategy requires an explanation. His main argument is that this strategy emerged from the interplay of two opposing forces. On the one hand, NATO members feared a potential escalation if they were directly involved in the war, particularly in light of Russia’s nuclear threats. Consequently, they refrained from issuing direct deterrent threats to defend Ukraine. Conversely, given NATO’s characteristics as a military alliance, and its attachment to the practices (and rituals) of deterrence, it needed to issue deterrent threats. In other words, relying on deterrence by delivery of arms could thus internally and externally validate NATO self, addressing not just physical security needs but also ontological security ones.

La présentation sera donnée en anglais, cependant les questions en français seront également les bienvenues.

For more information visit sciencespo.fr/nk or follow us on Twitter @NKnowledges / If you would like to be added to the mailing list for the Nuclear Knowledges seminar, please contact sterre.vanbuuren@sciencespo.fr

Scientifics Coordinators : Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po-CERI and Sterre van Buuren, Sciences Po-CERI

The seminar will be held in person and also online via the Zoom platform. 

You will receive a confirmation email with login information after you register.