By Alessia DI ROSA, Mara FELICE, Ornella FRESQUET, Claire OBERMEYER, Lola POTTIER and Emily VOGEL

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Leaving Someone Behind? The European Green Deal’s Social Dimension and Promise of Leaving No One Behind

Introduction: The Just Transition: Balancing Climate Goals and Social Policy

In a 2022 Eurobarometer survey, 88% of European Union (EU) citizens supported a “green transition that leaves no one = behind” [1]. However, only half of those surveyed believe that the European Union is taking adequate actions for fairness [1]. This is in contrast to the European Green Deal (EGD) that purports to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society,” [2] thus demonstrating a tension between the European Union’s strongly supported goal of “leaving no one behind,” enshrined in the EGD, and the perception of its effectiveness in practice.

The EGD targets areas that are principal for the environmental transition and proposes reforms, such as shifts in energy consumption and fossil fuel extraction. It has been praised for its ambitiousness as a “front-runner” in social policies, [3] as well as for its tangible impacts such as creating new jobs [4]. However, the act of promoting shifts in these areas can lead to adverse impacts on citizens, which creates “winners and losers, at least in the short term” [5] in areas stemming from prices, to employment, to transportation [6].

It is argued that populations that are already at risk disproportionately suffer adverse environmental impacts [7] and that EGD policies aiming to lessen CO2 emissions “will disproportionately affect people in vulnerable situations” [8]. The failure to properly address social impacts can be serious, and some claim they “will deeply disrupt the social order of European societies,” [9] which could lead to conflict, [6] cohesion concerns and even the questioning of governmental legitimacy [10]. The EGD’s social emphasis aims to “pre-empt []” tumult, [11] to address those ‘losing out’ from the transition through the principle of Leaving No One Behind. This ideal stems from the United Nations Agenda 2030 and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals [12,13,14] which the EGD pursues [15].

Leaving No One Behind “is grounded in the principle of ‘just transition’”, which pursues its targets “in a just and inclusive manner” [16]. In this, “the public” and “all stakeholders” have “‘involvement and commitment’” [17]. The EGD includes social considerations throughout the European Commission’s 2019 communication [18] and specifically through the Just Transition Mechanism, which consists of funding for “supporting regions that are most affected by the transition to a low- carbon economy” [19]. Social policy is an area of traditionally limited competence for the European Union [20], although formally is an area of shared competence between the European Union and its Member States [21].

Despite these social policy goals, questions surround effectiveness, specifically the risk that “…those already furthest behind will be marginalized even further” for those in certain regions or with specific socioeconomic statuses [22]. This paper aims to explore the tensions surrounding the EGD’s emphasis on the social dimension and what it looks like in practice. Therefore, considering the current scope of social policy mechanisms and their implementation within the European Green Deal, to what extent is the European Union fulfilling its promise of “Leaving No One Behind,” in light of the environmental transition?

After analyzing the mechanisms available and their strengths and limitations, we delve into two case studies of Spain and Romania, demonstrating concrete effects. Considering these cases, we argue that current European social policy measures through the Just Transition are both promising in their essence as well as pose concrete limitations in pursuing the European Green Deal’s promise of “Leaving No One Behind.”

The European Green Deal 2019 (Source: COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION) yellow box added

Crafting a Fair Future: Policy Instruments for a Just Transition

The concrete policy instruments defined to achieve the goal of a just transition consist mainly of four, the Just Transition Mechanism at the forefront, followed by the Social Climate Fund together with the Modernisation Fund and the 2022 Council Recommendation for a Just Transition to Climate Neutrality [23]. The Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), adopted in January 2020, guarantees the mobilization of around €55 billion over the period 2021-2027 to alleviate the socio economic impact of the transition, particularly for Member States and regions with a high dependence on fossil fuels, for people and citizens most vulnerable to the transition, and for companies and sectors operating in or including carbon-intensive industries. As a result of its broad scope, the Fund is structured in three pillars: the Just Transition Fund, the InvestEU Just Transition Scheme, and the Public Sector Loan Facility [24].

The Just Transition Mechanism three pillars explained (Source: European Commission)

As a first pillar, the Just Transition Fund (JTF), entered into force on 1 July 2021, constitutes a financial instrument to support the territories most affected by transition through a range of interventions, including support for productive investments in small and medium-sized enterprises, the transformation of existing carbon-intensive plants, the implementation of environmental remediation measures, and job search assistance and active retraining of workers [25]. Given the broad and ambitious range of aims, the fund is endowed within the overall framework of cohesion policy with €19.7 billion in current prices [26].

The second pillar, the InvestEU ‘Just Transition’ scheme, adopted in March 2021 as a budget guarantee under the InvestEU program, is expected to mobilize €10-15 billion in predominantly private-sector investments. Notably, the European Commission provides a budgetary safeguard to implementing partners to provide funding directly or indirectly to project promoters located in just transition territories with an approved Territorial Just Transition Plan (TJTP), 1 or to projects that contribute to achieving the development objectives set out in the relevant TJTP [27].

As a complement to the triad of pillars, the Public Sector Loan Facility, effective from August 2021, combines €1.3 billion of grants financed by the EU budget with €6-8 billion of loans from the European Investment Bank to mobilize €13.3-15.3 billion of public investment in a broader geographic or sectoral scope as for Pillar II, but only for public infrastructure that does not generate a sufficient flow of resources to be financed commercially [28].

The second key instrument to ensure a just transition, the Social Climate Fund (SCF), was adopted in May 2023 to support vulnerable households, micro-enterprises, and transport users in reducing their dependence on fossil fuels through structural measures and investments in energy efficiency, clean heating and cooling, and integration of renewable energy [29]. The SCF will combine revenues from the auctioning of European Trading System (ETS) 2 allowances, 50 million allowances from the current EU ETS, with the mandatory 25% contribution of Member States to their Climate Action Plans, mobilizing at least €86.7 billion over the period 2026-2032 [30].

The third and last instrument providing earmarked funding to the just transition is the ‘enhanced’ Modernisation Fund following the reform of the ETS Regulation in May 2023 as it is funded from revenues from the auctioning of 2% of the total allowances for 2021-30 under the EU ETS, achieving a total revenue of €25 billion. The just transition is one of the six priority areas to which more than 70% of this fund is addressed, yet it can only cover soft investments in training, upskilling, and job-seeking initiatives [31].

Finally, the last policy aiming for a just transition is the Council’s 2022 recommendation on just transition, which urges Member States to implement comprehensive and coherent policy packages, addressing employment and social aspects while optimizing the use of public and private funding [32]. (It is the approval of the Member States’ Territorial Just Transition Plans by the Commission (TJTP), the frameworks defining the development challenges and needs, and the targets to be reached by 2030 that identify the territories in which the transition funds will be deployed.)

The Just Transition: A Critical Look at Promises and Pitfalls

Do these instruments translate into tangible progress for social justice? There are at least three elements that operate in that direction. Firstly, JTM prospects are positive especially in promoting social justice within the European climate agenda. Many Member States have not yet adopted effective climate change strategies, remaining largely dependent on fossil fuels, coal, and mining [33]. As these regions are required to undergo fundamental shifts in their growth models, they are expected to make significant efforts [34]. In return, they receive enhanced financial and social support through the JTF [35]. Nearly 50% of the €19.7 billion of the Just Transition Fund for 2021–2027 including the European Recovery Instrument was allocated to four countries: Poland (around €3.8 billion), Germany (around €2.5 billion), Romania (€2.1 billion), and Czechia (€1.6 billion), fostering a crucial distributive impact to help most the regions in needs [36].

Secondly, dedicated online platforms were also implemented for optimizing fund use in just transition initiatives. Launched in 2020, the Just Transition Platform (JTP) aids EU regions in accessing JTM funds by fostering an “eco-system community” through events facilitating stakeholder knowledge-sharing [37]. The JTPeers program, with its JTPeers Exchange and JTPeers Experts services, connects experts, practitioners, and policymakers, supporting knowledge sharing across regions via a digital expertise database. This collaborative approach reinforces the “Leaving No One Behind” principle and highlights the importance of coordination among Member States to achieve shared transition goals [38].

Finally, the alignment of the JTM with international treaties also underscores its global significance and its role in bringing everyone on board. The “just transition” concept was already incorporated into the 2015 Paris Agreement’s preamble [39]. In the same year, the United Nations Sustainable Summit adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 17 SDGs calling for global partnership action. At COP24 in 2018, a declaration on just transition was issued. COP26 in 2021 and COP28 in 2023 also advanced this commitment by launching a work program to implement just transition pathways through international cooperation, including “Inclusive and participatory approaches to just transitions that leave no one behind” [40, 41].

However, while the JTM’s instruments may be promising in reaching their goal, there is much more to “justice” than what they target (skills, fossil fuels [42]). First, the EGD’s just transition omits some vulnerabilities that are impacted by both climate change and transition, such as gender [43, 44, 45], spatial location, ethnicity, age, disability [46]. For example, the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive defines vulnerability through disposable income alone, which is insufficient [47, 48, 49]. Second, the just transition does not account for intersectionality. While women, for instance, are disproportionately impacted by the green transition, they are even more disadvantaged when gender cumulates with another vulnerability [14]. This is not addressed in the JTM or the SCF [14] nor is it in other EGD directives [50]. Finally, the EU’s just transition focuses on distributive justice, which is essential to address inequalities caused by the transition, but falls short on procedural justice [46, 10, 51], mostly as regards to citizens [52]. In other words, while it is necessary to identify injustices and solutions, it is as important to involve affected stakeholders (NGOs, trade unions, inhabitants) in the process, to foster social acceptance [53, 10].

Moreover, the implementation of the Just Transition is jeopardized by two major weaknesses. First, the Just Transition is hardly translated into binding policies [54]. The ambitious Council recommendations have no legal value, whereas the SCF and the JTM have, but we demonstrated that their scope is limited. Some scholars think that legal obligations are necessary [10, 55], while others argue that better monitoring from the European Commission would suffice [46]. In any case, they suggest that the current framework may not be providing enough incentives for Member States to respect their commitments towards a just transition. Second, by using the broad and versatile term “just transition” to define its social goal, the EGD creates diverging understandings, which result in discrepancies in implementation and evaluation. A recent study showed that “just” is understood differently at European, national and local levels, but also between policymakers and NGOs [51]. Disparate meanings could complement each other, but the results indicate that this flexibility triggers a deficit of trust across governance levels. Besides, states are likely to adopt interpretations that match their uneven material and institutional limitations [10], which further increases discrepancies. Overall, we can fear someone might be left behind.

Case study: Leaving No Spaniard Behind

“We must show solidarity to ensure that the green pact becomes a reality” (Mr. TIMMERMANS, Executive Vice President of COM). For decades, Spain depended on fossil fuels imports due to its scarcity of local energy resources. In 2019, according to the International Energy Agency, 72% of the country’s energy consumption came from these fuels, placing Spain in 20th place among the countries most reliant on these energy sources [56]. Similarly, by 2022, Spain’s energy dependency rate stood at 69.9%, making it the 7th largest importer of crude oil. This dependence has made the transition to renewable energies a strategic priority under the EGD, especially as 30.1% of the total Spanish energy consumption is locally produced, with nuclear power as the main source (43.5%). Thus, following the 2021-2027 Partnership Agreement and the adoption of the 2022 Partnership Agreement, the JTF is supporting coal-mining regions like Asturias (which receive one-third of the JTF allocated to Spain), Castilla y León and Galicia to make a transition to a low-carbon economy. As one of the largest JTF recipients, Spain received €869 million which allowed the development of projects supporting local employment and economic diversification: retraining programs for 3,500 workers helped maintain local employment [57]. Similarly, through training programs for young people aged 18 to 29, Spain lowered its unemployment rate in certain regions and aims to create 6,000 jobs in the green industry by 2026 [58].

Furthermore, the JTM has enabled research and development needed for the energy transition, while addressing the social aspects. In Cádiz, innovations led to an 8% rise in green industries employment (2020-2023) reflecting the JTF’s role in the development of sustainable infrastructure and social programs. Also, the Alcúdia Tech Mar initiative promotes aquaculture and in Córdoba’s Guadiato Valley the agri-business is encouraged: two areas where coal-fired power plants were shut down [59]. Alongside industrial projects, the JTF funded cultural tourism projects in mining regions enabling the rehabilitation of industrial sites. Thus, investments to develop sustainable industries, prioritizing renewable energies and social inclusion, is bringing Spain closer to its target of producing 74% of its electricity from renewables by 2030 [59].

Moreover, Spain’s renewable energy expansion through the JTM reduces greenhouse gas emissions. In León, the renovation of public buildings improves energy efficiency, cutting emissions by 50,000 metric tons annually. In 2021, with €4.3 billion of funds from the Next Generation EU program, Spain launched an ambitious automotive sector initiative to support green vehicles production. This initiative aims to attract up private investment, repositioning Spain as a leader in sustainable mobility in Europe. Lastly, Spain’s commitment to gradual decarbonization is underlined by the 2023-2030 national energy and climate plan presented to the European Commission, which confirms full closure of coal mines by 2025 and nuclear power plants by 2035.

While Spain still faces challenges like global economic slowdowns and high energy costs, resulting in modest GDP growth (2.1% from 2023 to 2025) [60], investments from the JTM counterbalance these pressures and contribute to a resilient Spanish long-term growth. Ultimately, efforts enabled by the Leave No One Behind initiative should reduce Spain’s fossil fuels dependency by at least 70% by 2030, with the aim of reaching 80% renewables in electricity production, while strengthening local infrastructures and promoting social cohesion [56]. From a political perspective, European assistance helps to reduce local resistance to mine closures and reinforces the legitimacy of the energy transition based on a participatory and inclusive model. Spain’s transition is a successful example of the “Leave No One Behind” principle and demonstrates how green policies can drive economic growth while promoting social equity. Although Spain is an example of success, it is now important to demonstrate that it is not always the case for some other countries. The subsequent part will analyze the Just Transition in Romania.

San Nicolas mine: the last Coal-mining in Asturias (Source: The World)

Case study: Romania and Its Stumbling Blocks

Phasing out coal constitutes a main issue on the energy transition agenda of Romania, that aims to complete its phase-out by 2032 [51, 61, 62]. Romanian regions such as Gorj and Hunedoara seem particularly impacted by this endeavor [51, 62, 61]. The following sections will refer mainly to developments in these two regions. In this context, the Jiu Valley for instance represents a sensitive location within Hunedoara [62]. Romania is among the top EU Member States that are being supported through the JTM and both mentioned regions are supposed to profit from the JTF [62, 51, 61]. Despite the multitude of consequences (such as the loss of workplaces) that the coal phase-out entails for the regions, studies related to these Romanian regions suggest that the desired effect from the JTM is not materializing as it should [61, 62, 51]. As pointed out in a study on the Jiu Valley, “it might miss its mark of ‘leaving no one behind’” [63].

In Romania, a decisive hurdle for the just transition arises amongst others from the issue that locally existent administrative means and capacities are inadequate and weak, making it not only a challenge to access and secure relevant funds but also leading to difficulties with respect to policy implementation [51, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68]. This is particularly grave given the JTF’s envisioned key role in fostering a just transition and thus, implies that such local circumstances are not regarded enough [51, 62]. At the same time, insights from Jiu Valley demonstrate an overall sparse activity from local actors which is partially caused by the described capacity deficits [62]. Together, these local dynamics feed into coordination problems among authorities, especially with those on the national level [62]. This is critical since “financial instruments like the JTM rely on often overlooked vertical coordination between national and local authorities” [69].

The implementation of a just transition in Romanian regions is additionally complicated by diverging emphases and conceptions that are associated with the transition among different actors [51]. Such discrepancies are for instance reflected in the observation that while national actors underline the importance of general consultation channels, actors in the regions itself are concerned above all with explicit and locally prevalent circumstances as well as necessities – but are not convinced that these have been properly heard during consultations [51]. In a similar vein, having some common ground among crucial stakeholders is pointed out as indispensable for mastering a just transition [62, 51]. Nevertheless, establishing such a consensus is a daunting task when the involved parties envisage the path ahead very differently, as it is the case in Gorj and Hunedoara [51, 62]. In the Jiu Valley for example, a defining problem lies in the current situation where actors that would be in the position of fostering a common basis and advancing the transition seem dormant or reject the transition as a whole [62].

A closely interlinked issue becomes apparent in Gorj for instance, where only few forward-looking preparations are made by authorities as well as by the responsible company for the workers that will definitely lose their employment following the upcoming coal phase-out [61, 51]. For one thing, adaptive measures such as the offering of training that would prepare people in the region for other types of future jobs are missing [61, 51]. At the same time, also the mere outlook on how their future work life might look like remains blurred for locals [61, 51]. Overall, as explained by the authors of a study on Gorj, “[i]n the region, interviewees from all groups perceive the changes imposed by the EU as being unfair” [70]. This exemplifies once again why the just transition is advancing only haltingly and facing severe hurdles [61].

Conclusion: Beyond Promises: Making the Just Transition Truly Just

The Spanish and Romanian case studies demonstrate the concrete impacts of European Union social policies and reveal that, despite Romania and Spain sharing the goal of a rapid coal phase-out and benefiting from JTF support, they are facing contrasting approaches. Romania struggles with local governance challenges, hindering efficient implementation, whereas Spain capitalizes on training programs, social policies, R&D deployment and effective fund management to accelerate its transition. A significant funds’ use difference lies in the institutional capacity of Member States.

Originally linked to cohesion policies [71], this concept can apply here as well: Romania’s fragmented political and administrative actions and institutional weaknesses prevent an efficient transition. The lack of direct funding to regions and inefficiencies in public procurement obstruct optimal use of funds. Conversely, Spain’s more developed institutional structures and governance enable a robust and effective transition.

Indeed, most of these social initiatives reflect meaningful progress, signaling the EU’s recognition of pressing social issues, especially given that social policy is a shared competence between the EU and its Member States (Article 4 TFEU) [72]. The objectives and financial pillars present encouraging steps, but they represent only an initial move in the right direction. In light of the research question, it can be argued that the EU has developed a crucial mechanism to advance its commitment to “Leaving No One Behind” in the green transition. However, considering notable limitations, it remains uncertain whether this promise extends to ensuring that everyone is fully supported in the accompanying social transition. While notable efforts have been made and continue to be undertaken, they appear insufficient to guarantee a fair and sustainable transition for all.

This result should not be a surprise. It reflects the broader rationale of the EGD, which is first and foremost “Europe’s new growth strategy” [73]. In its core, the EGD posits that the market, through (green) growth, is the solution to the current climate crisis. Though it is a breakthrough that social policies are included in the EGD at all, they remain compensatory measures against eventual harms from the market and are not a pillar in themselves. Besides being a debatable choice of values, the problem with this rationale is that the EU finds itself imposing heavy environmental regulation while enforcing few social policies to accompany them. This bears the risk of undermining social support for the EGD, yet necessary to achieve the transition, and might even lead to euroscepticism [10]. The farmer protests that took place in January 2024 throughout Europe demonstrated that a heavy environmental regulatory burden without (perceived) social assistance could lead to anger towards the EGD and the EU [74]. Such sentiments have tangible consequences: already biodiversity measures have been delayed [75].

The EU needs to address this imbalance and take bolder measures to enforce an inclusive transition.

• First, it should ease, harmonize and monitor implementation of the existing just transition measures. Catchy but empty terms such as “just” need to be given an operational definition, so as to make implementation effective, coherent and equivalent across the Union and governance levels. Progress should be scrutinized.
• Second, the just transition should include people more, both in the decision-making process and in its policies. This involves expanding the definition of vulnerability beyond economic terms and developing more protective measures instead of productive measures, which prevail in the current framework [6].

By implementing these measures, the EU would go one step further to ensuring no one is left behind.

Artistic Visualization of the Just Transition (Source: NESTE)

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