Amphibious Diplomacy. An interview with Earl Wang
Doctoral researcher and adjunct lecturer at the Centre for International Studies (CERI – Sciences Po/CNRS) Earl Wang is the author of a recent article published with the European Review of International Studies (ERIS), entitled “Amphibious Diplomacy: Bilateral Investment Agreement Negotiation between the European Union and Taiwan”. The author answers our questions on the notion of amphibious diplomacy with the case study on European Union (EU)-Taiwan relations.
Would you mind reminding us what the differences are between the One China principle and the One China policy? What are their consequences for Taiwan?
To avoid misunderstandings during our following discussions, let me perhaps start with a notice or footnote. On the one hand, there is what we usually refer to as China, whose official name is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC was founded in 1949, and has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since 1971. On the other hand, the official name of Taiwan is the Republic of China (ROC). Established in 1912, the ROC was a founding member of the UN, and had been an UNSC permanent member until 1971.
Now back to the question. The PRC demands states and other polities that have diplomatic relations with it to follow the One China principle. The said principle means that there is only one China in the world, the PRC’s government solely represents China, and Taiwan is a part of China (i.e. the one represented by the PRC). So under the One China principle, Taiwan is basically an inalienable part of the PRC’s territory.
States and other polities that maintain diplomatic ties with the PRC have adopted various versions of the One China policy. A One China policy affirms the first two items of the One China principle, but does not necessarily recognise the third (i.e. Taiwan being part of the PRC). In fact, only around 30 percent of all UN member states recognise the One China principle. Not to mention that, at the moment of talking, the ROC (Taiwan) still maintains diplomatic relations with (thus, recognised as a sovereign state by) 12 UN member states and the Holy See.
Under the One China principle, Taiwan can only be a paradiploamtic actor—meaning a non-central or subnational government of the PRC. However, under a One China policy, Taiwan may be a paradiplomatic actor or an actor within the intervals of diplomacy and paradiplomacy.
You coin the notion of amphibious diplomacy: What are the two worlds in which Taiwan lives?
Indeed, amphibious signifies, in a general sense, “living in two worlds or in two separate manners.”
First, Taiwan lives in the world of diplomacy as a sovereign state in the interactions with its diplomatic allies. Second, in its relations with countries whose One China policies adhere to the One China principle, Taiwan lives in the world of paradiplomacy as a non-central or subnational government under the PRC’s sovereignty . Third, in most of the cases, Taiwan lives as an actor in the intersections of diplomacy and paradiplomacy.
The notion of amphibious diplomacy was created to express this phenomenon. Naturally, I was inspired by fine existing literature by scholars who have studied Taiwan’s foreign relations and EU-Taiwan relations.1
Given this principle and the policy it entails, Taiwan has a unique position at the global level. Could you tell us what the position is and why maintaining amphibious foreign relations is a question of survival?
Connecting our discussions in the two previous questions, we can observe that Taiwan is an intriguing case that can correspond to three types of actors at the same time in IR and the study of diplomacy.
The closer a One China policy is to the One China principle, the more Taiwan serves as a paradiplomatic actor. The wider the gaps between the One China principle and a One China policy, the more Taiwan’s actorness is similar to a state’s.
If not given the absence of diplomatic relations and various versions of One China policy, Taiwan would surely carry out diplomacy as a state in its relations with countries and other polities around the globe. Taiwan has no choice but to pursue foreign relations with countries and other polities without diplomatic relations under the format of paradiplomacy and in between diplomacy and paradiplomacy. Serving as an amphibious diplomatic actor is, therefore, less about free choices, but a requirement for survival of Taiwan in foreign relations.
How does the EU manage to pursue bilateral negotiations with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations? Since when has the EU and Taiwan been carrying out negotiations on an investment agreement?
Thank you for bringing the EU to our interview as my area of research is certainly on the EU’s foreign policy.
The One China policy of the EU states that it “recognises the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China”. The EU does not touch upon Taiwan’s sovereignty issue. Meanwhile, the EU is also not a state by its nature, but a “unique economic and political union between 27 European countries”.
Nonetheless, both the EU and Taiwan have full membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This means that both actors enjoy the confirmed status of at least a “separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations”. WTO membership allows the EU and Taiwan to enjoy the legal basis of negotiating and concluding trade and/or investment agreements while bypassing political hurdles with China regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty issue.
For example, under the WTO mechanism, Taiwan has signed economic cooperation agreements respectively with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013, a bilateral investment agreement with India in 2018, and the first pack of deals of a larger trade framework agreement with the US in 2023. Formal negotiations on a foreign investment-related agreement between Taiwan and Canada have also been announced to begin in 2023. Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations with any of the five aforementioned countries.
In theory, the official negotiation of an EU-Taiwan bilateral investment agreement (BIA) could have started already under the WTO framework. However, in practice, the official negotiation is yet to begin. The official BIA negotiation being pending does not mean that nothing has been going on between the EU and Taiwan. Both sides have held EU-Taiwan annual consultations that allow exchanges between economic and trade senior officials. The highest level of this mechanism has been the “EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue” with the participation of the Director-General of DG Trade (European Commission) and Taiwan’s Economic Minister since 2022.2 To focus on the preparation for the BIA negotiation, the two sides have established the “EU-Taiwan Working Group on Investment” since 2017.
The EU and Taiwan both have the economic interests and the legal rights to negotiate and conclude trade and investment agreements. In the most ideal scenario, the EU and Taiwan would have started their negotiation on a more comprehensive agreement incorporating both trade and investment dimensions. However, the current situation on the ground is that the two sides have not yet launched their official negotiation on a bilateral investment agreement. In my article published with ERIS, I analyse some key factors explaining this situation, based on literature and interviews with relevant practitioners in Brussels.
Short bibliography
- Bartmann, Barry. "Between De Jure and De Facto Statehood: Revisiting the Status Issue for Taiwan". Islands Studies Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), pp. 113–128.
- Mengin, Françoise. "A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties". The China Quarterly, no. 169 (2002), pp. 136–153.
- Winkler, Sigrid. "Can Trade Make a Sovereign? Taiwan – China – EU Relations in the WTO". Asia Europe Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 (2008), pp. 467–485.
- Wunderlich, Uwe. "The EU – A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World?". (Paper presented at UACES 38th Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 1–3 September 2008).
Cover photo by Sean Yeh for Shutterstock.
