Home>Younger generations faced with permanent crises, by Anne Muxel

Younger generations faced with permanent crises, by Anne Muxel

This article was originally published in “Understanding Our Timing” n°3

Anne Muxel is CNRS Emeritus Senior Researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF).


Crises, the source of a myriad of conflicts, have become familiar to younger generations in Western societies. These generations, who were born at the turn of the millennium – the intersection between of two centuries - have grown up against a backdrop of a number of successive, if not concomitant, crises: a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis, a labour market crisis, a political crisis, an institutional crisis, a democratic crisis, a crisis of values, an environmental crisis and, more recently, a  health crisis. These events form the fabric of young people's socialisation and define the range of possibilities for their integration into society. The crises have shaped their images of the world, their conceptions of citizenship, their fears and their hopes, both individually and collectively. Young people are affected by a ‘never-ending crisis’, to use the title of a book by the philosopher Myriam Revault d’Allonnes. This is compounded by the weight of social, economic and societal contingencies, which vary from one segment of the younger population to another. The omnipresence of these events leads to a unique salience and has a  differentiated impact on the trajectories of each individual. The young are   multi-faceted and can only be considered in their diversity. 

Nevertheless, young people are  evolving in a global environment where recurring crises are a constant, thus creating points of reference for a shared generational experience. Faced with this upheaval, young French people are finding it increasingly difficult to envision their future and to define themselves in a reassuring and predictable context. And yet, they are demonstrating tangible resilience and adaptability. Despite their pessimism about the future of our societies, they remain relatively optimistic about their own lives. Admittedly, only a minority of the under-35s (46 per cent) see the future in France as full of opportunities and new possibilities, but this is 6 points more than the French as a whole (40 per cent), according to the ‘France Divided’ survey conducted by IPSOS in 2024 for the Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF), the Jean-Jaurès Foundation and the Montaigne Institute. Young people stand out for their resourcefulness and the strength of their commitments, which allow them to grapple with the protean conflicts that are characteristic of our times. How do they approach these conflicts, how do they interpret them, and how do they respond? To answer these questions, we will look at some of the internal and external areas of conflict affecting French society that shape political debate for young people.

Democracy and republican values, yes but....

Attachment to democratic values is part of the political repertoire of the younger generation. However, among young people, as among the population as a whole, there is an emerging quest for direct democracy and greater citizen participation without the mediation of political organisations or institutions. This pertinent questioning of the workings of representative democracy and the emergence of a more critical citizenry can, on the one hand, strengthen democratic vigilance and, on the other, give rise to calls for authority and fuel populism of all types, inevitably contributing to the spread of this phenomena in democratic societies. To use the expression coined by Yasha Mounk in The People vs. Democracy, there are pronounced signs of ‘democratic deconsolidation’ among the younger generations , provoked and sustained by an erosion of confidence in representative political institutions. Thus, younger generations are more inclined to doubt the effectiveness of democracy than older generations. This deconsolidation may pave the way for new conflicts, particularly around support for authoritarian leadership, the democratic outcome of which is uncertain.

In their conception of citizenship, young people today place more emphasis on rights than duties, at the risk of undermining the latter. When it comes to voting, for example, they are equally divided between those who see it primarily as a duty and those who see it primarily as a right. Among the population as a whole, there has also been a weakening of the civic norm of the duty to vote, but to a lesser extent. According to a BVA survey conducted in 2021 for Radio Télé Luxembourg and Orange, more than six out of ten French people (63 per cent), and 75 per cent of those aged 65 and over, still support the first view – that of civic duty. At the same time, the value of voting is under question. While 84 per cent of those aged 65 and over consider it to be an effective political tool (and 48 per cent of those consider it to be ‘very effective’), this view is less convincing to younger people, dropping to 60 per cent among the 25 to 34 age group. The 18 to 24 age group is more likely to recognise its effectiveness (73 per cent), but with mixed results, as only 28 per cent of them consider it to be ‘very effective’, according to a survey on commitment values conducted in 2022 for the Jean-Jaurès Foundation. 
The new citizenship framework adopted by young people also redefines the way in which they interpret republican values as expressed in the French motto ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’. Freedom has taken precedence over equality, even among left-leaning youth. The role of the Republic is to protect individual freedoms above all else. In a world where borders have been blurred by globalisation, where people belong to a variety of groups, the combinations, norms and boundaries of living together are reconfiguring to define a Republic that is undoubtedly more open, but also more fraught than ever with cultural differences that can give rise to conflict. Faced with these new challenges, many young people are trying to reconcile respect for differences. While the Republic is ‘indivisible’, most of them believe it should not be exclusive. New generations are still more tolerant of immigration than their elders.

They are also more open to globalisation. Significantly more young people than their elders consider Islam to be compatible with Republican values: 55 per cent compared with 29 per cent of people aged 60 and over (40 per cent of French people overall), according to the ‘France Divided survey mentioned above. Nevertheless, certain segments of youth, affected by job insecurity and with lower levels of education, are more susceptible to a crisis of identity, which plays into the hands of far-right authoritarian leaders. Moreover, among young people of immigrant origin, adherence to some forms of communitarianism, including sectarianism and separatism, can call the universalism of the Republic into question. 
These rifts among young people bear the risk of conflicts of various latency and radicality that could undermine national cohesion. Young people in France are divided on the issues of diversity, integration and identity that are troubling all European societies. There are signs of a worrying return to nationalism, identity-based tensions and protectionism of all kinds, including culture and religion. In a global world where competition is growing and standards of living and lifestyles are clashing, cultural and religious cleavages may return to the fore and fuel conflicts. This is borne out by the fact that anti-Semitism is becoming commonplace in French lower and upper secondary schools, as highlighted by a recent IFOP survey on ‘How the French see anti-Semitism and the situation of French Jews in 2024’, carried out by the Institut français d’opinion publique (IFOP) for the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF). One in two students (52 per cent) admits to having heard negative things said about Jews in his or her circle.

Protest culture and extremism

Against a backdrop of strong mistrust of political representatives and institutions, a new norm of electoral behaviour has emerged. Characterised by intermittent voting and the legitimisation of abstention, this new norm is profoundly changing the way citizenship is practised in contemporary democracies. It can serve as a vehicle for a virtuous demand for democracy but can also lead to civic ‘anomie’ (see box). Widespread institutional distrust and the crisis in traditional political mediation are reconfiguring the content and forms of politicisation among young people. Our democracies have become more reflexive, and the relationship that citizens form with the political system is even more individualised than in the recent past. Party allegiances have weakened, political parties are struggling to reinvent themselves and the grand narratives have faded away, no longer providing a legible map of systems of belonging. Political reference points and ideological cleavages have become partly blurred; young people identify the extremes as the only political forces around which they can position themselves. According to data from the CEVIPOF French Electoral Panel, in the first round of the 2022 presidential election, one in two young people (51 per cent) voted for a candidate at one of the two extremes of the political spectrum, thereby contributing to strong polarisation. 
Young people have embraced a culture of protest that involves forms of direct intervention in the public arena (demonstrations, strikes, occupations of symbolic sites). They are taking their first steps as active citizens with a more critical and demanding attitude than their elders. The temptation of radicalism is now embedded in their psyche. In its protest dimension, radicalism has been embraced by a majority and has become commonplace, both in the streets and at the ballot box. But only a small minority embrace radicalism that uses or legitimises violence: between 10 and 20 per cent, according to a survey conducted with Olivier Galland of 7,000 secondary school students in 2018. This radicalism can spread more widely when young people, apparently indifferent to politics, allow their discontent, or indeed their rage to  explode.

The environment: an area of generational conflict

Environmental issues are at the forefront of concerns for younger generations, who consider the attitude of the boomers (children of the baby boom generation) to be outdated, revealing divisions about the future. Many young people are calling for a political paradigm shift at a global level and flagging the urgency of a new moral pact between generations to save the world from disaster. Since 2019, the Climate Walks have mobilised two million young people worldwide and several tens of thousands in France. One young person in five between the ages of 14 and 16 has already participated in one of these demonstrations, according to a study on generation Z conducted in 2021 by the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military Academy. 
In the more or less long term, the environmental ethos that permeates young people's political culture could also transform, if not traditional partisan balances, at least the issues and political dividing lines likely to mobilise citizens. The denunciation of institutional politics is becoming widespread in the political ecology of the younger generation. The phrase "OK Boomer", used to mock the older generation's denial of reality in the face of climate change, has been in vogue since 2019, when a New Zealand MP used the term to describe an older Member who opposed environmental measures. As a prelude to a heated generational confrontation, the term is also a response to the feeling of contempt and denigration that young people experience from their elders, as evidenced by the term ‘snowflake’, often used to dismiss the inconsistency and fragility of youth, at a time when young people are showing engagement and resilience, for example during the Covid-19 pandemic.
From the 1980s until recently, the generation gap gradually narrowed as the values, lifestyles and cultural practices of young people and their elders came closer together, according to a major survey of French values carried out three times, in 1981, 1990 and 1999. Today, the environmental issue, which is uniquely salient since the survival of the planet is at stake, is emerging as the main source of conflict between the generations. A survey conducted in 2022 by Martial Foucault among Sciences Po students, shows that this area of engagement and politicisation has spread and consolidated in recent years. The environment is the number one cause for which young people are prepared to fight: 26 per cent mention it, well ahead of the fight against inequality (16 per cent) or the defence of women's rights (15 per cent).

The return of war

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 raises the question of the younger generation’s attitude towards conflict in its ultimate form: war. Young people are aware of the risks of war, as well as its consequences for their own country. They cannot ignore the areas of armed conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, and current events constantly remind them of the intensity of the threats to which European populations are exposed. Recognising the potential for total destabilisation in a rapidly changing world order, they have also understood the hybridity and complexity of wars and power relations (open conflicts, exposure to new methods of disinformation, etc.). Terrorism, which has forged new representations of the enemy, is the most common form of aggression which they feel could threaten France. 
Young people appreciate the tragic dimension of war, without any form of idealisation. Where previous generations might have thought that war on European soil was a thing of the past, current younger generations now envision the possibility of fighting to protect their compatriots, their country and their values, as shown by a study on ‘Young people and war’ conducted in 2024 for the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military Academy. One young person in two anticipates the possibility of war on French soil, and the possibility of a nuclear conflict. The patriotism expressed – at least when intentional – is indicative of a lucidity that bodes well for their resilience in the event of a major, high-intensity conflict. Six out of ten young people, for example, say they would fight to defend their country, and four out of ten would even sacrifice their lives to do so.  

The rifts between generations concerning the concept of citizenship and, more broadly, the Republic, the role of protest in democracy, and environmental issues, are all critical issues. They are compounded by  defence and security threats, including war and terrorism, which young people  recognise and accept. These conflicts will undoubtedly reshape French politics over the next decade.      
 


Sociologist and political scientist, Anne Muxel is CNRS Emeritus Senior Researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF). She is an expert on the political socialisation of young people and focuses on the generational transmission of values. She has also created a new field of research in the sociology of intimacy. Her latest book is entitled Ils m’ont jamais lâché. Au coeur des quartiers avec les jeunes et leurs éducateurs de rue (Le Bord de l’eau, 2024).



References

  • Foucault, M. and Muxel, A. 2022. Une jeunesse engagée. Enquête sur les étudiants de Sciences Po 2002–2022, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
  • Galland, O. and Muxel, A. 2018. La Tentation radicale. Enquête auprès des lycéens, Paris: PUF, 2018.
  • Mounk, Y. 2018. Le Peuple contre la démocratie, Paris: Éditions de l'Observatoire.
  • Muxel, A. and Zulfikarpasic, A. 2022. Les Français sur le fil de l'engagement, Paris: Éditions de l'Aube/FJJ.
  1. Revault d'Allonnes, M. 2012. La Crise sans fin. Essai sur l'expérience moderne du temps, Paris: Seuil

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