This article was originally published in “Understanding Our Timing” n°3

Hugo Micheron is a researcher in political science. At Sciences Po, he leads the seminar on AI, democracy and the information environment.

The current period is characterised by major, overlapping geopolitical transformations. This phenomenon, apparent in a series of intertwining crises, makes it tricky to contextualise. What all these dynamics have in common is that they raise questions, in one way or another, about Europe's place and role on the world stage, and its ability to establish itself as a major geopolitical player.

The wars in the Middle East and the “Astana-isation” of international relations   

The Syrian conflict was the last major crisis in the Middle East before the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 triggered new conflict and the ensuing war in Gaza and Lebanon. From its inception in 2011 to its partial resolution in 2019, the Syrian conflict marked a pivotal moment for the European Union (EU). During this period the EU went from being an active power in the region to a passive witness, profoundly and persistently affected by developments in the region. This was the case with the refugee crisis in the summer of 2015 and its far-reaching political repercussions in Scandinavia and Germany, including the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and, more broadly, the revival of far-right movements, now sympathetic to Russia or open to interference from the American alt-right. The same applies to the jihadism of Daesh, in which 6,000 Europeans took part, and which resulted in an unprecedented campaign of attacks in all the countries of Western Europe, starting with France. 
Europe's loss of influence in Syria is also the product of a strategy implemented by its rivals, mainly Russia and Iran, which invested heavily in the country with the goal of saving Bashar al-Assad's regime, and, in a different vein, Turkey. In September 2015, a year after the annexation of Crimea (which had been preceded by the special operation in Donbas), Russia intervened in the Levant, deploying troops on the ground and providing the Syrian leader with decisive air cover to protect him from the threat of regime collapse. Similarly, Iran and its supporters – Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, etc. – deployed an impressive military force to save an ally that was key to its regional influence. Meanwhile, Turkey, in support of the Syrian opposition, launched Operation Euphrates Shield in the summer of 2016 to halt Kurdish expansion, regain control of events affecting southern Turkey, and occupy part of the north of the country to this day. 
In the wake of their intervention, Russia, Iran and Turkey, in disagreement over the outcome of the Syrian crisis, met in Kazakhstan to sign the Astana agreement. Despite its importance, this deal went virtually unnoticed in Europe, and provides a valuable analytical framework for understanding the geopolitical retreat of the European Union. Despite their differences, a common ground immediately emerged between the three aforementioned countries: the exclusion of the EU from the framework for resolving the Syrian crisis and, by extension, the containment of its influence in the Middle East. Few observers noticed the importance of what was at stake for Europe in the capital of Kazakhstan.   
However, it did not take long for the agreement to translate into concrete action. The political pressure exerted against Europe intensified in all areas of strategic interest where it had      a historic role. From Libya to the Sahel and West Africa, and from Gaza to Ukraine via Armenia and Georgia, Europe's loss of influence over the course of events is striking. Meanwhile, Russia, Turkey and Iran are operating more openly in these crisis areas, a sign of the containment of the European powers and the reduction of their scope for intervention in world affairs. Thus, since 2018, the ‘Astana-isation’ of international relations – that is, the exclusion of Europe from the frameworks of intervention and conflict resolution – has spread to other parts of the world.
France, top of the list of countries that are targeted, is very often in the sights of Russian, Turkish, Iranian, Azeri and Chinese actors not to mention non-state players such as jihadist groups, which have not disappeared from global geopolitics.

The centrality of the periphery 

Few commentators have noted the importance of a geopolitical area that is at the heart of these reconfigurations: the Caucasus and Central Asia, located between Iran, Turkey and Russia. In addition to the formalisation of the Astana process, this area is also a place that lends impetus to other major movements. Despite their importance, the activities of Azerbaijan, a country in the Caucasus, still garner little attention in Europe. Hostile to EU action, notably because of its support for Armenia following the Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020, the Baku Initiative Group (BIG) originated here in 2023 with the goal of supporting the struggle of ‘poorly decolonised’ peoples. 
At its inaugural conference, BIG invited representatives of several French independence movements (Martinique, French Guiana, Corsica, New Caledonia and French Polynesia) to promote the idea of secession in these strategic areas by exploiting France's vulnerabilities and fault lines around identity and nationalist conflicts. For example, at the end of a new meeting in Istanbul in February 2024, BIG sent a letter to the French President asking him to account for the clashes then taking place in New Caledonia. The letter cast these clashes as a continuation of the Algerian and African wars of decolonisation. Through disinformation campaigns on social media, Azerbaijan amplified content hostile to the French State in New Caledonia, actively supporting the archipelago's independence and campaigning for the departure of what were portrayed as French occupying forces.   
The Caucasus and Central Asia are also areas where jihadist networks are regrouping between three major areas of interest for them: the Middle East (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), Central Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular) and Europe. Capitalizing on the destabilisation of Afghanistan since the return to power of the Taliban in 2021, jihadist networks in Central Asia and Chechnya are at the heart of renewed terrorist activity of the Islamic State in Khorasan (EI-K, a branch of the Islamic State active in Central and South Asia). Since 2023, these networks have been considered the main jihadist threat, and several attacks carried out or foiled in Europe in recent years have been the work of Caucasian networks (Chechen or Ingush), sometimes with the support of their Central Asian backers. An important point, and a sign that reconfigurations in this geopolitical region are not just the work of state forces but also the result of non-state group activities, is that the jihadist groups are not allied with Iran, Russia or Turkey. This does not, of course, rule out attempts for exploitation, but it should be noted that these three countries themselves were hit by large-scale jihadist attacks carried out by EI-K in 2024: in Kerman in Iran at the beginning of January 2024 (84 victims), in a Catholic church in Istanbul at the end of January 2024 (1 victim) and in the Crocus City Hall concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow in March 2024 (140 victims). In this respect, Vladimir Putin's media strategy, which included his kissing of the Koran during a visit to Chechnya in late August 2024, is significant, at a time when the war in Gaza is producing a backdrop that is extremely unfavourable for the West, facilitating the resurgence of Islamist activities in Europe and dividing European public opinion. At the same time, despite the EU's weaknesses on the international stage, particularly in the Middle East, the ever-present criticism of its external action has become inversely proportional to its actual presence on the ground. Europe's responsibility for developments in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia – a recurring subject of internal debate in democracies, diplomatic gatherings and, of course, the hybrid information space of the digital age – is discussed with a virulence that far exceeds the Old Continent's capacity for action.

Europe is faced with the weaponisation of information and intellectual insurrection 

By losing the ability to influence events in its immediate sphere, Europe is becoming the object of transformations unfolding within it. All kinds of geopolitical rivals and declared enemies of the West are now tempted to act directly within its democracies by exploiting the climate of intellectual insurrection that is increasingly apparent, and now exacerbated by MAGA (Make America Great Again) networks in Europe.
Using methods known as the weaponisation of information, and boosted by algorithmic amplification, state and non-state actors are trying to deepen the divisions identified in Western debates. Through multiple campaigns to manipulate narratives and tropes (distortions of meaning) expressed on social media, these actors are seeking to increase the fragmentation and polarisation at work in the political arena. Because of the very nature of democracy, which is by definition open to ideological exchange, the EU is particularly exposed to the battle of narratives. It is in a rather vulnerable strategic position. The EU does not yet have any real algorithmic sovereignty and is struggling to regulate the algorithms of foreign platforms. And yet, social media are the first places where the 15- to 25-year-old generation is becoming politically aware. This situation contrasts with that of major geopolitical and economic rivals with digital platforms (the GAFAMs for the United States, Telegram and Vkontact for Russia, not to mention China and its closed internet) or the technical means to exert their influence and defend their vision of the world and interests.
Contrary to their original vision, social media have not created a global virtual space for the exchange of ideas and intellectual emancipation. They are not fora for debate where opposing political views can be expressed freely. The social media jungle is a brutal environment, open to the four winds and swept by storms. Only the most powerful or most widely-reported stories make a lasting impression. As generative AI considerably reduces the costs of manipulating mass opinion and encourages its widespread use, Europe remains poorly equipped and ill-prepared for this information war.

The European Union vis-à-vis predators

The pressure that the United States is bringing to bear on Europe, through the hostility and predation of the Donald Trump, J.D. Vance and Elon Musk trio, in terms of trade (imposition of customs duties, tariff war), information (political and algorithmic interference in democratic elections by Musk, for example) and military (revision of US policy towards Ukraine in a way that is extremely favourable to the Kremlin's claims), is a major factor in European geopolitical destabilisation. At war on the eastern front in Ukraine, looping influence to the east and south of the Mediterranean, and exposed to the reconfigurations taking shape in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Europe is also now under pressure from its transatlantic hinterland and constrained within its natural and immediate sphere. 
In a world where the new technological order has partly redefined the attributes of power, Europe can, and must, address the accumulation of crises and their new forms of conflict. Europe must halt the desynchronisation of politics and technology, as the latter develops faster than the former's capacity to absorb and regulate it. It is therefore crucial that a group of influential countries within the European Union align their diplomatic orientations to rethink conflicts in all their strategic dimensions: political, geopolitical, military, commercial and informational. 

Hugo Micheron is a researcher in political science specialising in the Middle East and jihadism, and an Arabist. After completing his dissertation at the École normale supérieure, he pursued post-doctoral research at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University (2020–2022) and is a senior fellow at George Washington University's Program on Extremism. He teaches at Sciences Po, where he leads the seminar on AI, democracy and the information environment. He is the author of Anger and Oblivion. Democracies Facing European Jihadism (forthcoming), which was awarded the 2023 Femina essay award and the 2023 Brienne Geopolitics Book Prize.
 

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• Micheron, H. 2023. La Colère et l'Oubli. Les démocraties face au jihadisme européen, Paris: Gallimard.
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• Micheron, H. 2025 (forthcoming). Anger and Oblivion. Democracies Facing European Jihadism, Oxford: Polity Press.
• Micheron H. 2026 (forthcoming). Western Jihadism, From Europe to the Killing Fields of the Middle East and the Future that Lies Ahead Online and in Prisons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.