Power, deservingness and programme-to-policy linkages. A theoretical framework

POLICY STATE CONVERSATION (SEMINAR OF THE KEY THEME THE STATE AS PRODUCER OF PUBLIC POLICIES)

Sciences Po, 1 place Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, 75007 Paris

How far do electoral promises shape public policy? This chapter examines the apparent paradox between the strong linkages described in literature on pledges, and the more limited role commonly attributed to pledges and elections by public policy scholars as well as lay citizens. By considering the unequal effects of election pledges on different target groups, I shed light on this paradox and reveal important variations in the linkage between policy and pledges. Powerful groups are often best placed to secure beneficial policy outcomes, but elections can also create incentives for representatives to address groups perceived as "deserving", regardless of their power resources. The varying ability of different groups to attract pledges and have them fulfilled shapes the relationship between electoral promises and policy. Programme-to-policy linkages can be expected to be strong when groups have congruent levels of power and deservingness, but tensions are likely to arise when (1) representatives have little incentive to campaign on policies for powerful groups that are not perceived as deserving, or (2) target groups perceived as deserving attract beneficial pledges, but lack the leverage to have them fulfilled after the election. Representatives may use ambiguity to manage these tensions, but this risks disappointing voters and exacerbating the perception of a mismatch between promises and policy. This theory contributes to understanding when and how pledges shape public policy, and the implications for representation.

Speaker

Isabelle Guinaudeau, Sciences Po, CEE, CNRS

Chair

Philippe Bezes, Sciences Po, CEE, CNRS

Information 

philippe.bezes@sciencespo.fr