Deliberating Constitutions: Lotteries in Constituent Assemblies, Denmark in 1848 with Brenda Van Coppenolle, Department of Government, University of Essex

CEE General Seminar

This seminar will be held in Hybrid format : Sciences Po, Amphithéâtre Simone Veil, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris or Via Zoom, compulsory Registration (A valid health pass and mask are required to attend this event)

A constitution is the foundation of any democracy, and its wording shapes the path of democratic development. Yet how are constitutions drafted, and how does the structure of deliberation affect the final document? In the case of the 1849 June Constitution in Denmark, the draft constitution was deliberated in randomly assigned groups of legislators, to ensure equality and diversity in the debate. We exploit this natural experiment to test deliberative theories of mixed groups, in which prior research has found that bipartisan groups moderate polarization. We look at how the randomly assigned ideological composition of deliberative groups affects legislative behavior with respect to key constitutional amendments. Using a panel of constituent assembly members and roll call votes, we find little evidence for deliberative effects, on either voting behavior or party cohesion. Our results highlight the need to better understand the tools of deliberative democracy.

Speaker

Brenda Van Coppenolle, Lecturer in the Department of Government, University of Essex

Brenda Van Coppenolle obtained her PhD at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interests include historical political economy, electoral institutions, lotteries, legislative politics, political inequality, political careers, and political dynasties. Her research has been published in French Politics, the Journal of Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Political Studies, and World Politics.

Discussion

Jens Carstens, Sciences Po, CEE

Jan Rovny, Sciences Po, CEE & LIEPP

Chair

Caterina Froio, Sciences Po, CEE

Compulsory registration