When friends become foes... and vice versa? The foundations of the Trump doctrine

Trump's spectacular operation in Venezuela gives even more relief to the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS), made public on 5 December 2025 by the Trump administration. Far from improvisation or transactional logic alone, the NSS reveals a coherent direction that redefines U.S. foreign policy priorities. Zaki Laïdi, director of research at CEVIPOF / Sciences Po, specialist in international relations and co-author of The Hedgers. How the Global South navigates sino american competition ? (to be published in 2026), analyses this major text in detail.

Article previously published on Conference in January 2026.

John Bolton, former national security adviser, is wont to say that it would be futile to seek coherence in Trump's policies. According to him, the latter is above all driven by changing moods, an impressionable character, an insatiable vanity and private interests. Proof of this is the striking dialogue that Angela Merkel's former diplomatic adviser once had with Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law. When he came to praise the merits of the Atlantic alliance, the latter coldly retorted: "We are not diplomats, we are businessmen. And in business, one day you're a friend, the next day you're an enemy. That's how we conduct our foreign policy." In fact, it seems difficult to grasp Trump's foreign policy without taking into consideration the business arrangements that his family and friends have made in less than a year with a considerable number of private or public players in the field of cryptocurrencies, AI, real estate or defense industries. The confusion of private and public interests is at its height. 

However, if this real estate vision of world relations permeates Trump's thinking, it does not fully sum it up. In this respect, a reading of the latest National Security Strategy (NSS) published in Washington is very enlightening. The NSS is a presidential policy document on U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, these reports were classified. Since 1987, they have been made public. Their quality is very uneven and the subject is not always innovative. Generally, each President publishes one per term. The only exception was Clinton, who published 7 in 8 years: a record. But this is due to the period: that of the post-Cold War adjustments (1994-2000) when American policy was looking for its way. Trump published one in 2017, during his first term. But its tone differed from that of today. Trump's former first vice president, Mike Pence, summed up the difference in approach between Trump 1 and Trump 2: "Eight years ago, in his now-distant first term, President Trump laid out a national security strategy recognizing the new world of great power competition. It was a welcome effort to articulate emerging global threats. The new strategy Mr. Trump released Friday is an all but explicit retreat from that competition. It will please China and Russia but discomfit America's allies." The report is both geopolitical and very ideological, which gives it considerable interest in addition to its coherence with the actions carried out by Trump since January 2024.

In 2017, Trump came to power for the first time without executive experience. At the time, he had few contacts within the American politico-military establishment1. He had entrusted, for lack of a better word, the post of national security adviser to General McMaster, who was on a traditional American line of hostility to China and Russia. However, in substance, his Atlanticist positions were very different from those of Trump. In 2025, Trump returns to power better prepared to take control of the political-administrative system. The latter is now locked both at the Pentagon, by Pete Hegseth, and by Marco Rubio at the State Department and the White House as National Security Advisor. The imprint of the latter, elected from Miami, a bastion of anti-Castroism, seems strong. 

The NSS is a report whose strategic novelty is based both on the priority given to the Western Hemisphere, which would therefore go from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego, and on the charge against Europe. "We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States; we want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; we want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations". J. D. Vance also seems to have been one of the inspirations for the report, because the entire charge against European liberalism seems to come from his famous Munich speech of February 2025.

Going into the details of the report, we find four singularities that are as many important inflections:

• a very clearly nationalist vision of the United States, somewhat on the model of Theodore Roosevelt's doctrine — that is to say, neither messianic nor isolationist;
• a priority given to the Western hemisphere, on the basis of a very strong continuum between domestic and foreign policy;
• a fundamentally illiberal project located at the antipodes of the European model, which is therefore a priority target;
• a marked accommodation with Russia, which is no longer seen as a strategic adversary, as evidenced by the shift in US policy towards Ukraine;
• a perception of China as a strategic competitor whose hegemonic control over Asia must be prevented without giving this struggle for influence a brutal or total character. The relationship is based on a more or less limited sharing of influence. Basically, Competitive Spheres means the US will prioritize countering China/Russia in the Western hemisphere, but only selectively engage them in the Eastern hemisphere. He expects (or hopes) these rivals will reciprocate, even if it means China controls East Asia and Russia controls Ukraine, the Caucuses, and Central Asia. Trump thinks his Competitive Spheres world order will be nice and neat so long as great powers remain in their respective corners of the Earth and don't challenge each other Trump's new NSS (...) believes in a spheres of influence approach to. There is therefore a relative discontinuity with Biden's policy in this respect, even if we must remain very cautious. The Sino-American rivalry is too structural to be overcome so easily. But it cannot be ruled out that Trump and Xi will find a reasonable accommodation that protects their respective interests. The United States dominates finance, China industry and on high tech they are more or less on equal footing. On the geostrategic level, the reality is more complex and all the trade-offs are far from being made, especially on the American side. Significantly, a RAND report advocating such a scheme was published before being withdrawn. On the Chinese side This hypothesis is supported by analyses close to official circles. It is also confirmed by Trump's decision to reversing U.S. policy on restrictions on semiconductor exports to China . All this naturally remains fragile and partially hypothetical. The United States will not easily accept the idea of Chinese control over the whole of Asia because it would weaken its global position. But a stabilisation of the Sino-American competition cannot be completely ruled out either. Thucidides' trap is not inevitable.

The primacy of nationalism

Trump defines himself in this report as a nationalist whose exclusive concern is based on the defense of American interests. He wants to roll back the erosion of American sovereignty: "We defend the sovereign rights of nations, we oppose the incursions of the most intrusive transnational organizations that undermine sovereignty, and we support the reform of these institutions so that they promote rather than hinder individual sovereignty and serve American interests." Even more interesting is the renunciation of any idea of political or ideological proselytism in the rest of the world inherited from the post-Cold War period: "After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests".

The report thus displays a predisposition to non-intervention considered a key principle of American foreign policy: "this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention."

Does this make Trump an isolationist? Nothing is less certain. The Monroe Doctrine, to which he refers and to which he adds the Trump corollary, in reference to the Roosevelt corollary of 1904, was never in reality an isolationist doctrine. It was enunciated at a time when the current American territory was mostly controlled by the European powers. It was therefore intended to drive Europeans out of North America. Reaffirmed by Polk in 1845, it was instead used to justify the conquest of new territories – whether Texas, Oregon or California – by preventing Europeans from resisting this expansion. America for the Americans actually meant America without the Europeans. 

The Roosevelt corollary of 1904 was also used to justify American interventions in Central and Latin America as an exception to the rule of non-intervention to prevent any European intervention. The Trump corollary takes up this idea: not to intervene a priori except when the direct interests of the United States are at stake. The toppling of Maduro confirms more than ever that the isolationist hypothesis does not hold . And we cannot exclude that if successful Trump will target the most symbolical catch : Cuba. Trump does not defend any messianism; But he is fascinated by strength and driven by well-understood material interests: "Profit and not democracy". 

In truth, the great constant of American foreign policy has never been isolationism, but rather unilateralism understood as the desire not to feel bound by any binding commitment as long as the interests of the United States are not at stake2. But this has often been misunderstood, which explains why most American interventions result from an underestimation of American reasoning: "The Kaiser in 1917 miscalculated the nature of American neutrality and its ability to mobilize quickly in response to unrestricted U-Boat warfare. […] Japan miscalculated in 1941 when it attacked Pearl Harbor in an effort to destroy America's Pacific Fleet. Kim Il Sung and Stalin miscalculated U.S. intentions in 1950 when in a speech Dean Acheson left South Korea out of America's defense perimeter. And Saddam Hussein miscalculated in 1990 when the State Department sent Ambassador April Glaspie to say that the U.S. did not want to interfere in intra-Arab issues."

The reassertion of political control of the Western Hemisphere

For domestic political reasons, Trump wants to emphasize control of the Western Hemisphere in order to fight illegal immigration and drugs. He intends to seal the southern border of the United States. And he knows that in this way he will satisfy his MAGA base. But he also wants to shift American value chains for critical raw materials back to the American continent and thus reduce the United States' dependence on China. The latter has acquired too much economic influence in their backyard: it is the first trading partner of almost all of Latin America. The latter is indeed very rich in rare earths and raw materials. The energy transition depends on four essential raw materials: copper, lithium, nickel and cobalt. Chile and Peru alone account for a third of the world's copper production. Chile, Argentina and Bolivia are home to at least 60% of the world's lithium reserves. However, 97% of U.S. lithium imports come from Chile and Argentina. Only cobalt is lacking in Latin America. This gives meaning to the major political involvement of the new administration in Congo, which alone accounts for 70% of the world's production. This reality is compounded by the fact that China buys these raw materials and then processes them on its territory, before reselling them in part to Western countries. China is thus the United States' leading supplier of 24 of the 49 minerals on which the United States is more than 50% dependent. The very recent military operation in Venezuela to topple Maduro confirms Trump full determination to use US power to get access to natural ressources with a total indifference to the respect of the principle of national sovereignty. Venezuela holds the most important reserves of oil in the world. And in spite of its poor quality ( heavy oil) it serves the interests of US oil companies. Those companies own, in Texas and Louisiana (two red states), the six largest refineries in the world, fully equiped to deal with heavy oil.

While containing Chinese economic influence, Washington wants also to outpace other competing powers, including Europe, which are highly dependent on the Chinese market and eager to invest in Latin America to escape Chinese dependence: "Last month I was supposed to go to Brazil to have talks about a mine where rare earth metals are extracted. Three days in advance we were told that the Americans had come by, put money on the table and bought up all production until 2030".

The NSS does not mention Canada or Greenland, which Trump still says he wants to seize. But there is no indication that this annexationism has been repudiated. The issue of Greenland and Canada was raised again by Trump. Especially since in the case of Greenland, everyone understands that while Europe will strongly protest against a possible American occupation, it has no concrete means of opposing it. Added to this is the feeling that we should always try to come to terms with Trump rather than oppose him head-on. The conundrum in this case stems less from the brutality of American conduct than from the need to resort to it. Indeed, Denmark is the first to accept the idea of a stronger American strategic presence on this territory. Washington could deploy all the forces it wanted there, even if no observer perceived a direct threat on this territory. It should therefore be seen rather as a reaffirmation of a very old hegemonic project and a form of political intimidation of Europe. Already in the middle of the nineteenth century, control of Greenland was already officially mentioned. Echoing this project, the latest report by the Danish intelligence services ranks the United States on the list of the country's strategic risks for the first time: "The United States uses economic power, including threats of high tariffs, to enforce its will, and no longer rules out the use of military force, even against allies". This is just one illustration among others of the particular nature of the times we live in. Because Europe is Trump's favourite target.

A full-scale attack on Europe

This targeting is being done on three fronts. That of political liberalism, that of its identity derived from its liberalism, and finally that of its strategic dependence on the United States. The whole point of the report is therefore to use this last lever to encourage or force Europe to "change course", to convert to a MAGA vision of the world. Basically, Europe is implicitly proposed to replace a strategic alliance with a civilizational alliance with nativist overtones: Make Europe White again! While the report is intransigent on the principle of national sovereignty, it announces its intention to oppose "elite-driven, anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties in Europe, the Anglosphere, and the rest of the democratic world". The Trump administration is repugnant to regime change, especially in the Middle East. But it would not be unhappy to contribute to it in Europe, which is, along with the United States, the only region in the world where the battle against liberalism can be waged successfully.

The NSS sums up its idea of Europe as follows: "this economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure. The larger issues facing Europe include activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence". Trump deliberately couples and confuses his criticism of European liberalism with European regulations that regulate both the unfair commercial practices of American high tech and the European imperative to moderate content that calls for racial hatred or discrimination. However, these two aspects are clearly not to be confused.

The EU's sanctions against US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are in no way political censorship. The recent $140 million fine imposed on X (formerly Twitter), which infuriated Trump officials, focused on transparency and violating consumer protection rules: a deceptive policy of verifying users of the platform, failure to provide advertising data, as well as its efforts to block access for researchers. By presenting these fines as proof of censorship, the NSS is repeating the claims made by Elon Musk, owner of X, that the European Union must disappear.

The message sent to Europe is therefore clear. You cannot fight American interests in the name of your values while demanding our military protection. You have to choose. In a charge of rare violence, US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Landau confirmed this point in a recent post on X for which "When these countries wear their NATO hats, he wrote, they insist that Transatlantic cooperation is the cornerstone of our mutual security. But when these countries wear their EU hats, they pursue all sorts of agendas that are often utterly adverse to US interests and security ... This inconsistency cannot continue." But when they "But when these countries wear their EU hats," they pursue agendas that are "often utterly adverse to US interests and security," including "including censorship, economic suicide/climate fanaticism, open borders, disdain for national sovereignty/promotion of multilateral governance and taxation, support for Communist Cuba." The NSS avoids these excesses, but largely reflects their spirit.

The NSS calls on the EU to reform its immigration and asylum policies, which it presents as a threat to Western civilisation. The European far-right parties, largely defined by their opposition to immigration, are thus encouraged: this is the case of Éric Zemmour proclaiming that "Trump is the only one to defend Europe civilization" but also of the new Czech Prime Minister.

A particularly enlightening, even intriguing passage from the NSS states that "Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter". Clearly, a less white Europe would seek less of an alliance with the United States... On this point, we can clearly see the mark of a very old American trait: nativism. Nativism could also be a force in the MAGA electorate that may be even stronger than populism, because it would be a more presentable mask for it.

The characteristic of politics and ideology in particular is to associate different realities in order to give them a new coherence. Trump intends to reconcile in the same movement his deep hostility to alliances, in particular NATO, and his nativism that appeals to White America. He will therefore use all the rhetorical and ideological arsenal at his disposal to justify a possible disengagement from Europe, while supporting the European political forces in line with his positions. From this perspective, the rehabilitation of Russia as an illiberal great power greatly serves its interests.

The rehabilitation of Russia

The NSS admits on this point that the United States is "at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war". He believes that the balance of power works in Russia's favour because the great can only devour the weak: "the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations". In other words, it would be futile for Ukraine to want to defeat Russia. The administration therefore aims to "reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states" The United States would thus no longer become an ally but an intermediary between Russia and Europe. This is a fundamental break with 1945.

However, such a vision is not aberrant in American history. Historically, the United States has kept its distance from the main regions as long as they are based on a balance of power. This is called the Offshore Balance,long advocated by the American realist school: "this approach [...] would aim to refocus U.S. foreign policy on maintaining the balance of power in three key regions: Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. L’Offshore Balancing […] would rely mainly on regional actors to preserve the local balance of power and would only commit its own forces when one or more of these balances were in danger of being disrupted."3.

As long as the balance of power within these great masses is not broken, America does not intervene. If it is broken, then it intervenes. This is what it did in Europe when Germany threatened the balance of power in Europe in 1917 and 1942, and then in Asia after 19424. Today, Trump is reintegrating Russia into the American off-balancing, in a large Euro-Russian entity. It is therefore no coincidence that the report speaks of the "great Eurasian mass" that goes from Brest to Vladivostok. The United States intends to create a balance between Europe and Russia5 of which it would be the guarantor. But where would the breaking point between Europe and Russia lie? In Ukraine? Obviously not. Will we have to wait for a Russian offensive in the Baltic countries for the United States to interpret it as a break in the balance point? Even more unlikely because as Treasury Secretary Bessent said: "Now Putin has started making incursions into the NATO borders," he said. "The one thing I can tell you is the US is not going to get involved with troops or any of that. We will sell the Europeans weapons." That being said, the prospect of a total American disengagement is far from likely. The most serious signal could come from a transfer of SACEUR command from the United States to Europe, with the risk of nuclear decoupling . The most likely hypothesis and in fact already applied is that of a form of strategic ambiguity, like the one they apply to Taiwan. Neither a formal guarantee of commitment, despite NATO's Article V, nor a guarantee of non-commitment. This would allow them to keep their hands free while having levers of influence over both the Europeans and the Russians. This corresponds quite well to the spirit of Trump, who had always said that his golden rule was to always be unpredictable. The United States does not want a Europe that is too strong to compete with them, nor a Europe that is too weak and which it would be forced to support. They do not understand why a Europe at least more than ten times more powerful than Russia would need them to defend itself.

Europe must therefore face a strategic break of the first order which must lead it to think about American policy in a new light. Not from the angle of an allied power that has betrayed it and that should be coaxed or brought to its senses, but as a power that has made a strategic choice in accordance with a part of its history. In the midst of this history, the Atlantic alliance has been a parenthesis, certainly a long parenthesis, but nevertheless a parenthesis.

Notes:

1. On the discrepancy between Trump's words during his 2016 campaign, where he said more or less the same thing as he does today, and what he did afterwards. See Steve Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), pp. 220-222.

2. Zaki Laïdi, Limited achievements; Obama's foreign policy , Palgrave 2012, p. 41-42

3. Steve Walt, The Hell of Good intentions, op.cit., p. 18.

4. In itself, this approach is not specifically American. Great Britain, although European, thought of the continent in the same terms.

5. On off balancing and the United States, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2007), chapter 7.