by Roland Marchal

Summary

The international debate sparked by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is paradoxical in several respects. Somaliland is the third entity in the Horn of Africa to claim statehood after Eritrea and South Sudan. No one questions the reasons for this region’s singularity, especially since the internal and regional performance of these young states is cause for concern. Too few experts are questioning the internal political dynamics, instead contenting themselves with the postcard images painted by Somaliland nationalists and their foreign sympathisers. This is as if claiming this recognition for 35 years has finally legitimized its achievement, both legally and politically.
 
However, while Somaliland may appear to be a haven of peace, the reality is more complexe. There is a huge difference between the state of mind of the population in 1991, when Somaliland announced its separation from the rest of Somalia, and the multiple divisions that emerged in the 2000s, tensions and divisions due to internal and regional factors. While peacebuilding has been relatively successful, the construction of a functional state based on clan representation has been much less so outside the capital city of Hargeysa. Two reasons are particularly noteworthy: first, the fact that Somaliland nationalism has gradually excluded minority groups, who are seeking opportunities to organise and administer themselves elsewhere, particularly in Mogadishu; secondly, the fact that this nationalistic narrative has been built on a narrow view of Somaliland’s relations with the rest of Somalia since the 1960s and during the civil war.
 
The fact that Israel recognises Somaliland and that the United Arab Emirates has contributed significantly to this, largely explains the regional divisions that immediately arose. It is not so much the adequacy of the Somaliland nationalist narrative with reality, as the security policies or ambitions of Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi that justify this decision and thus structure regional opposition. These contradictions are significant because they overlap with positions on other conflicts, in Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, as well as on the future of the Arabian Peninsula more generally, at a time when Iran is in a state of prolonged weakness.
 
Once again, the major Western powers are remaining silent, despite a very formal reminder of international law, so as not to upset the two major Gulf powers and Israel. Without strong initiative on their part, it is difficult to foresee anything other than an escalation of conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa, in which the armed protagonists will not always be mere proxies.

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