From Military Victory to Diplomatic Expansion: Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy Strategic Evolution

Interview with Altay Goyushov.

What is Azerbaijan’s regional and international profile? What are its areas of influence, and how has its foreign policy and diplomacy evolved in recent years? Altay Goyushov, a visiting scholar at CERI,  has contributed to the recently published Etude du CERI with a contribution entitled “Les ambitions de l'Azerbaïdjan après la victoire de 2020 au Karabakh”. We discuss these issues with him in the following interview.

Can you briefly introduce us to Azerbaijan’s foreign policy since its independence from the soviet union in 1991?

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has long been characterised by a pragmatic balancing strategy shaped by the authoritarian nature of its political system and the ruling elite’s primary objective of ensuring the survival of the regime. Since regaining independence in 1991, the country’s leadership has sought to maintain workable relations with all major geopolitical actors, including Russia and Western states, while avoiding firm alignment with any single power centre. This approach was particularly evident following the signing of the so-called Contract of the Century, which brought Western energy companies, most notably BP, into Azerbaijan’s oil sector, paving the way for closer political and economic ties with the West.

By engaging with Western institutions, including joining the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan formally pledged to gradually liberalise its politics, respect human rights, and uphold the rule of law. In practice, however, these commitments were only selectively implemented. While domestic reforms largely stalled, the Azerbaijani leadership continued to affirm its obligations in principle, often citing regional insecurity, unresolved conflicts, and societal or cultural constraints as reasons for limited progress.

Has Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia reshaped this foreign policy trajectory?

Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war significantly reshaped its foreign policy by reinforcing its self-perception as a capable regional power. The outcome of the war emboldened Baku to pursue a more assertive and self-confident foreign policy, expanding its ambitions beyond conflict management to include building regional and international influence.

Despite its relatively small size and the presence of powerful neighbours such as Iran, Turkey, and Russia, Azerbaijan has used the post-war environment to “punch above its weight.” Its strategic partnerships have become more explicit and interest-driven. Long-standing tensions with Iran have encouraged closer cooperation with Israel, while Europe’s search for alternatives to Russian energy sources has increased Azerbaijan’s importance as a gas supplier and transit state. Overall, the 2020 victory has shifted Azerbaijan from cautious, status-quo-oriented diplomacy towards a more proactive and assertive foreign policy posture. This evolving rhetoric and policy orientation raise important questions about the transformation of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and its implications for relations with both Western and non-Western actors alike.

Azerbaijan’s diplomatic approach has traditionally been based on three pillars: energy diplomacy, geopolitical balancing, and engagement with developing countries. How have these pillars evolved in the current geopolitical climate?

For more than three decades, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has indeed rested on three pillars: energy diplomacy, geopolitical balancing, and engagement with developing countries. While these pillars remain intact, their relative weight and operational logic have evolved.

Energy diplomacy continues to underpin Azerbaijan’s international relevance, but declining oil production and limited gas reserves have exposed structural vulnerabilities. Efforts to diversify the economy have yielded limited results due to governance issues and corruption. As a result, Baku is placing greater emphasis on its geographic role as a transit state rather than solely on its energy production.

This shift has strengthened Azerbaijan’s focus on becoming a key East-West transportation hub. Investments in infrastructure—such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the Baku International Sea Port—aim to connect China, Central Asia, and Europe. The long-discussed but unrealised Trans-Caspian pipelines remain central to this vision, promising both economic benefits and reduced regional dependence on Russia and China.

Geopolitical balancing remains the second pillar. Azerbaijan has managed to attract cooperation from competing powers, including the West and China, by presenting itself as a pragmatic and reliable partner in major economic projects. However, in the postwar period, this balancing act has grown more assertive, at times generating friction with neighbouring states as well as major powers such as France, the United States, and Russia.

Finally, the third pillar—engagement with the Global South—gained new prominence after the 2020 war. Azerbaijan’s leadership was encouraged to seek influence beyond its immediate region by military success, combined with shifting global power dynamics following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Precisely, what diplomatic and strategic instruments does Azerbaijan use to expand its international influence, particularly among Global South countries and Turkic states?

A key instrument has been Azerbaijan’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) from 2019 to 2023. During this period, Baku used its position to build political alliances in the Global South and soften criticism from the West, particularly regarding human rights and conflict-related issues. 

The emergence of the Baku Initiative Group should be understood primarily in this context. As mentioned, Baku sought to use its position to cultivate political alliances in the Global South and to counter criticism. Initially, the Group responded to criticism from European states — most notably France, the Netherlands, and later Belgium — regarding Azerbaijan’s conduct during and after the war in Karabakh. In these cases, criticism focused on conflict-related issues and was met with explicitly anti-imperialist and anti-colonial rhetoric that framed European positions as illegitimate interference rooted in neo-colonial attitudes. Over time, this rhetoric also came to encompass Western criticism of Azerbaijan’s internal authoritarian governance and human rights record, even though such criticism was institutionally distinct from concerns relating to the war. 

By contrast, Azerbaijan’s more recent targeting of India reflects a similar strategic logic but relies on a different narrative. Azerbaijan’s criticism of India has primarily focused on India’s alleged military cooperation with Armenia and is further shaped by Baku’s close alliance with Pakistan. Accordingly, in India’s case, Azerbaijan has largely avoided anti-colonial rhetoric and instead foregrounded India’s treatment of minorities as the basis for its critique—despite Azerbaijan itself being repeatedly criticised on similar grounds. This selective deployment of normative arguments highlights the instrumental nature of the Group’s rhetoric, which adapts its framing according to the identity and vulnerabilities of specific critics rather than reflecting a coherent and principled normative position.

At the same time, Azerbaijan has strengthened its ties with Central Asian states through economic cooperation and cultural diplomacy. The increasing adoption of a pan-Turkic narrative, carefully framed to avoid overt ideological confrontation, has introduced an identity-based dimension to these relations. Hosting the 2024 informal summit of Turkic states in Shushi, a city recaptured during the Karabakh war, carried significant symbolism, linking post-war territorial control with Azerbaijan’s broader regional ambitions. Beyond celebrating restored territorial control, the choice of Shushi signalled Azerbaijan’s ability to shape regional alignments and influence the geopolitical choices of its partners, particularly as Central Asian Turkic states—such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) alongside Armenia. Their neutrality during the war and subsequent participation in the summit highlighted the limitations of Russia-led security institutions and highlighted the declining effectiveness of the CSTO as a geopolitical tool. Together, these instruments have helped Baku to establish itself as a key player within both the Global South and the Turkic world.

To what extent are Azerbaijan’s ambitions to become an energy and logistics hub constrained by regional tensions and internal structural weaknesses?

Azerbaijan’s ambition to become a central energy and logistics corridor faces significant external and internal constraints. As mentioned, assertive foreign policies have periodically strained relations with neighbouring countries such as Iran and Russia, while domestic authoritarianism and military actions beyond Nagorno-Karabakh have complicated Azerbaijan's relations with Western states, including the United States and France.

Despite these tensions, however, major powers have generally avoided isolating Azerbaijan, driven by competing geopolitical and economic interests. This rivalry among larger actors has allowed Baku to preserve strategic autonomy and enhance its international standing. At the same time, Azerbaijan typically adopts a pragmatic approach to repairing strained relationships, avoiding prolonged diplomatic crises.

A major source of regional tension is the proposed Zangezur Corridor, intended to link mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory. Disputes over sovereignty, control, and security have drawn in external actors, including Russia, Iran, and the United States. While recent U.S.-mediated negotiations—during which the passage was formally named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), underscoring its intended role as a mechanism for regional stability and economic cooperation—have raised expectations for progress, unresolved disagreements and shifting regional dynamics continue to pose significant risks.

Internally, Azerbaijan’s structural weaknesses—particularly corruption, limited economic diversification, and weak institutions—remain serious obstacles. Without meaningful reforms, especially in governance and transparency, Azerbaijan’s long-term ability to sustain its role as a reliable energy and transit hub will remain uncertain, regardless of short-term diplomatic or geopolitical gains.

Interview by Éléonore Longuève, CERI