Nicole Grajewski is an Assistant Professor at the Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po. Her research examines Russia-Iran relations and the nuclear and military policies of both countries, with a particular focus on how doctrine, technology, and strategic culture shape nuclear decision-making and escalation dynamics.

Nicole is the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2026).

Previously, she was a Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. She has also held appointments at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, European Council on Foreign Relations, and Notre Dame International Security Center.

Nicole completed her PhD at the University of Oxford in the Department of Politics and International Relations.

Soviet and Russian Thinking on Limited Nuclear War: This project examines concepts of limited nuclear war, with a focus on Russian thinking about escalation management, war termination, and the controlled use of nuclear weapons in regional and theater conflicts. Drawing on Russian-language military doctrine, professional journals, and operational concepts, the research analyzes how Soviet and Russian planners conceptualize limited nuclear use alongside conventional operations, and how these ideas shape risk-taking, signaling, and escalation dynamics in contemporary conflict. Russian Counter-Space Capabilities and Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement: This line of research analyzes Russia’s counter-space capabilities and their implications for conventional-nuclear entanglement. The project assesses Russian military thinking on space as a warfighting domain, the role of counter-space operations in escalation control, and the risks these capabilities pose for strategic stability and crisis management. Iran and Deterrence in the Middle East: This project focuses on deterrence dynamics in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on Iran’s nuclear threshold status, missile forces, and regional military strategy. It examines the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in shaping Iran’s deterrence posture, as well as how regional conflicts, proxy warfare, and external intervention affect escalation behavior. The research assesses how deterrence operates in a fragmented regional security environment characterized by asymmetry, ambiguity, and increasing overlap between conventional, missile, and potential nuclear domains.

Nuclear Weapons and International Security (college)

Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine,Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2026 (forthcoming).

An illusory entente: The myth of a Russia-China-Iran “axis", Asian Affairs, 2022, 53 (1), 164-183.

 MENA at the Threshold? Proliferation Risks and Great Power Competition, Texas National Security Review, 2025, 8 (4), 95-103.

Russia and the Global Nuclear Order Center for Naval Analysis, CNA’s Occasional Paper, March 2024.

Iran and the SCO: The Quest For Legitimacy and Regime Preservation, Middle East Policy, 2023, 30 (2), 38-61 .

[with Karim Sadjadpour] Autocrats United: How Russia and Iran Defy the US-Led Global Order

[with Or Rabinowitz]Will Iran and Russia’s Growing Partnership Go Nuclear? Foreign Affairs, 28 January 2025. 

[with James Acton] The Forgotten World War III Scare of 1980, Foreign Policy, 9 June 2024.

Russia’s Updated Nuclear Doctrine Isn’ta Blueprint for Weapons Use. Its Primary Value Is Manipulation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 November 2024.