Home>#European Affairs: Europe’s Geopolitical Relevance a Year Into Trump’s Second Presidency
29.11.2025
#European Affairs: Europe’s Geopolitical Relevance a Year Into Trump’s Second Presidency
On November 24, 2025, the Sciences Po American Foundation hosted a timely edition of its #EuropeanAffairs webinar series, focusing on Europe’s geopolitical relevance a year into Trump’s second term. Moderated by Anthony Saracco, the discussion featured Mario Del Pero, Professor of International History at Sciences Po, and David Cadier, Senior Research Fellow at IRSEM, who examined how Trump’s second term is reshaping transatlantic relations and pushing Europe to redefine its geopolitical role.
Del Pero began by identifying sovereignty as the anchor of Trump’s foreign policy. In Trump’s view, international institutions, alliances, and interdependence constrain American autonomy. Restoring sovereignty therefore means acting unilaterally, privileging bilateral deals over working with established multilateral institutions, and treating even close allies in transactional terms. This approach marks a sharp departure from decades of U.S. rhetoric about shared democratic values binding the transatlantic community. Under Trump, Europe appears less a partner than a subordinate (or even a strategic competitor), especially when EU regulatory power affects U.S. tech interests. The atmosphere, Del Pero noted, feels “almost imperial” in its logic of great-power bargaining- far removed from the cooperative framework many European leaders still reference.
Turning to Europe, Cadier argued that the continent’s geopolitical awakening stems from two shocks: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and strategic uncertainty surrounding Trump’s return to the White House. The Ukraine war exposed Russia’s aggression and willingness to take risks, forcing the EU to confront hard-power realities. Since 2022, Europe has financed weapons for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, begun training Ukrainian soldiers, framed EU enlargement (especially for Ukraine and Moldova) as a geopolitical necessity, and seen major national policy shifts, from Germany’s “Zeitenwende” to Nordic countries joining NATO. These moves signal a genuine geopolitical shift. Yet, Cadier cautioned, geopolitical does not necessarily mean strategic. Europe still struggles to define long-term goals and align resources with them. Its continued dependence on the U.S. security umbrella makes consensus difficult, especially at a moment when Washington’s reliability is increasingly uncertain.
Cadier referenced EU High Representative Kaja Kallas’s metaphor, saying that trust in the U.S. now resembles a broken vase: repairable, but never fully restored. Trump’s unpredictability, combined with deeper structural shifts in U.S. priorities, suggests Europe must prepare for a future in which American engagement is neither automatic nor comprehensive.
Audience questions brought out another key theme: Europe’s internal political fragility. Populist and sovereigntist parties- some ideologically close to Trumpism- complicate efforts to forge coherent EU foreign policy. Del Pero emphasized that these movements stem from domestic factors such as inequality, institutional distrust, and the sense of losing control in globalization. External propaganda may amplify them, but it does not create the underlying grievances. Their rise threatens Europe’s unity, even as the Ukraine war has generated unexpected coordination.
Cadier added that populism’s main effect on foreign policy is the “domestication” of diplomacy: international decisions increasingly serve domestic political optics rather than long-term strategy.
The conversation also addressed technological power as a key battleground. Del Pero pointed to the influence of “global plutocrats” (ultra-wealthy tech leaders) whose power can challenge democratic sovereignty. Both experts argued that developing European capabilities in digital industries, defense tech, AI, and cyber will be essential for any future geopolitical autonomy.
One area of continuity across U.S. administrations, they noted, is China. Both Trump and Biden have encouraged strategic decoupling and pressured Europe to reduce dependencies. The Ukraine war has accelerated this shift: China’s support for Russia has reshaped European perceptions, making Beijing seem less a distant economic competitor and more a direct geopolitical challenger.
The webinar ended with a forward-looking question: can Europe articulate an independent vision of global order? Del Pero was skeptical, arguing that no single actor (Europe, the U.S., or China) currently has the legitimacy or structural capacity to rebuild a multilateral system in crisis. Cadier argued that Europe’s immediate task is more concrete: defining the future European security order as negotiations over the Russia-Ukraine war evolve. Choices made now, he said, will shape Europe’s geopolitical landscape for decades.
One year into Trump’s second presidency, it is clear that Europe stands at a critical juncture. The continent must prepare for a world in which security, technology, and stability are no longer guaranteed by others; where Europe must increasingly rely on its own capacity, coherence, and creativity.