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- Actualité Sciences Po
Etienne Wasmer, co-directeur du LIEPP, a invité le Prix Nobel d'économie 2014 à s'exprimer dans le cadre du cours donné aux étudiants de 1ere année du Collège universitaire le 25/11/2015. Jean Tirole s'est exprimé sur la COP21, à la veille de la réunion à Paris. (cf. vidéo ci-dessous)
3-4 December, 2015
- CC BY 2.0_Armel Le Coz_on_Flickr
STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTS THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING
a conference organised by
PADEMIA / Centre d'études européennes / LIEPP
December 3-4, 2015
Sciences Po , 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75007 Paris
During the two day conference, 25 scholars from all across Europe discussed the politics, features and evaluation of institutional reforms aimes at strengthening parliaments. Of many discussed topics were: Why do those reforms tend to be more numerous all around Europe? How are they developed, realized and implemented? And, what are their consequences? Case studies from many countries (Iceland, Israel, Spain, Finland, UK, France...) made clear that beyond idiosyncratic features, institutional engineering reforms face similar challenges and processes, especially the fitness between the reforms and good practices on the one hand, and MPs' individual interests on the other. Institutional development paths also matter for adopting successfully parliamentary reforms. In the end, the great interest of the workshop confirms that the issue of reforms in parliament and institutional engineering tend to be increasingly central to the attention of the scientific community.
Institutional Engineering refers to various changes in the organizational rules established with a precise aim. In the case of parliaments and parliamentary democracy, institutional engineering therefore accounts for the efforts made in order to strengthen parliaments. In most cases, the change of rules takes place at a constitutional level through amendments to the Constitution but it can also be realized at a lower stage such as ordinary laws or standing orders.
The workshop originates from the observation that many of recent or on-going institutional engineering reforms officially aim at empowering, if not restoring, parliaments within their institutional system. This has not always been the case. Throughout the 20th century, many constitutional changes aimed at strengthening the executive power decisional capacity by implementing various ways of rationalizing parliaments. Converging examples from the control over military operations to the budgetary powers of the parliament indicate that this is seemingly no longer the case. In developed democracies but also elsewhere, many institutional reforms officially aim at deepening parliamentary democracies. Yet, other institutional reforms can be driven by other aims, for instance controlling budgetary deficits, adapting to a country’s participation to regional organizations, strengthening judicial review or transparency, implementing better regulation agendas, etc. The multiplicity of agendas for institutional reforms inevitably raises the issue of the coherence and compatibility between them.
The workshop addresses classical questions to that trend: ‘why and how?’ ‘so what?’
1. With the ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ issues, we aim at entering into the politics of institutional engineering. Why are constitutional or standing orders reforms affecting legislatures launched? In which political contexts? Are those reforms more likely when national parliaments are comparatively weaker? What is the input provided by regional organizations, international treaties and transnational organizations from the OECD to the Inter-Parliamentary Union?
The point also requires to address the specific role played individually and collectively by MPs in the process. Are agendas for institutional reforms decided thanks to their pressure and initiatives? Or are they imposed by external actors such as ministers, judges, legal scholars, etc.?
2. The workshop also holds the ambition to assess the effects of institutional engineering. At the end of day, does changing the rules really impact on the legislatures’ role? We know that there could be many factors contributing to limit or cancel the effects of such reforms: the weight of inherited institutional routines, the lack of relevance of an institutional agenda from an MP interest based perspective, the lacking fit of institutional transfers given domestic idiosyncrasies, etc. Many claims can be put for explaining the absence of change. Yet, there are cases where a change of rules does impact on political behavior and even policy outputs even if it is sometimes the case indirectly or unexpectedly. Why do some reforms succeed and others not? Does their impact depend on the quality of the ‘engineer’ or on the capacity of MPs to adapt?
The evaluation of institutional engineering reforms can also be made from the perspective of the legislatures’ influence. Given the multiplicity of the official aims addressed by the reforms, and their possible inconsistency, which kind of reforms - or which mixture – eventually contributes to empower legislatures? Beyond the assessment of a specific case, is institutional engineering able to fight back against the centennial trend of domination of the executive power?
Conveners: Selma Bendjaballah, Olivier Rozenberg, Guillaume Tusseau.
- CC0 Public Domain
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) has made public its most recent data for 2014. LIEPP Assistant Professor, Jan Rovny, serves as a principal investigator on the project, the results of which have contributed to several projects under LIEPP's Evaluation of Democracy (EvalDem) Research Group.
CHES History: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) is an academic project started in 1999 at the Department of Political Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It collects policy and ideological stances of the leadership of national political parties for all member states of the European Union (EU), as well as for EU candidate countries, Norway, and Switzerland. The first survey was conducted in 1999, with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. The number of countries increased from 14 Western European countries in 1999 to 24 current or prospective EU members in 2006 to 31 countries in 2014. In this time, the number of national parties grew from 143 to 268. The data can be connected to previous surveys reaching back to 1984.
Objective: CHES data serve three main purposes. First, the surveys monitor the ideological positioning of parties on a general left–right dimension and, since 1999, also on the economic left–right and the social left–right dimension (‘new politics’ or green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) dimension). Second, the surveys bring together data on party stances towards the EU. Third, the data measure party stances on various specific policy issues, such as such as immigration, redistribution, decentralization, and environmental policy.
LIEPP & CHES: Closely connected to the aims of the EvalDem axis of LIEPP, CHES data have allowed researchers to investigate dynamic trends in party positions, and track the relationships between the ideological placement of parties, their position on European integration, and on other preferences on particular policy issues. Specific EvalDem publications have used the CHES data, for example, in evaluating the role of ethnic minority politics on the formation of democratic party systems in Eastern Europe, as well as in assessing the impact of immigration on party competition in Eastern Europe. Ongoing EvalDem projects are using the CHES data to estimate political responses to the economic crisis in Europe.
The core of the CHES questionnaire consists of five sets of items:
(1) general party positioning on the left–right dimension, (2) party positioning on economic left–right, (3) party positioning on the GAL–TAN dimension, (4) general party positioning on European integration, and (5) positioning on specific policy issues.
The current CHES research team consists of the following scholars:
Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova
For details and data, see: chesdata.eu
12 janvier 2016
- Actualité Sciences Po
Journée d’étude doctorale
de l’axe « Discriminations et inégalités sociales » du LIEPP
Mardi 12 janvier 2016
27 rue Saint Guillaume - 75007 Paris
Organisée par Morgane Laouenan (LIEPP/CNRS), Anne Revillard (LIEPP/OSC) et Mirna Safi (OSC).
Le 12 janvier, le Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques (LIEPP) organise une journée d'étude interdisciplinaire ouvertes à tous les doctorants de Sciences Po intéressés par les questions de Discriminations et d'inégalités. Le programme est en pièce jointe et les étudiants sont invités à s'inscrire en utilisant le formulaire suivant: http://bit.ly/JE-Discri
- Urban Economics and Urban Policy Challenging Conventional Policy Wisdom
Urban economics seminar: Session 8
Friday December 18, 2015
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris
Attendance is free, open untill full.
Interested participants should register on this link
(Emeritus Professor of Economic Geography, LSE)
Presentation title: "Iconic Design" as Deadweight loss: Rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office Market", joint paper with Gerard Dericks (University of Oxford & SERC-LSE)
An economist by training, Paul Cheshire is Emeritus Professor of Economic Geography at LSE. He is also an elected Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences and of the Weimer School. He has been Professor of Urban Economics at the University of Reading.
He has a strong interest in policy analysis and policy related fields like urban development, housing and land markets. His most recent book is Urban Economics and Urban Policy: Challenging Conventional Policy Wisdom, Edward Elgar (2014) together with Henry Overman and Max Nathan.
(Director of Economic Studies - Société du Grand Paris)
Presentation title: "Les enjeux économiques du Grand Paris Express", Revue de l'OFCE , n°143 , Novembre 2015