State interventions and economies of violence provision: Evidence from Kenya

Organized by the Seminar: Africa: Citizenship, Violence and Politics

Why does violence become a persistent feature of elections in some countries but not in others? In her current book manuscript, Adrienne LeBas argues that different party structures during the transition to democracy resulted in different economies of electoral violence provision. In high-violence countries, violence specialists remained autonomous from politicians, gradually resulting in a proliferation of violence specialists and the emergence of criminal economies outside of election periods. In this talk, LeBas will discuss state attempts to regain control over these actors via repression, regulation, and cooptation. The talk will focus primarily on the case of Kenya with additional illustrations from fieldwork in Nigeria and Ghana. 

Speaker :
Adrienne LeBas, Department of Government, American University.

Discutant :
Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

Chair :
Laurent Fourchard, Sciences Po-CERI

Scientific coordinator: Laurent Fourchard, Sciences Po-CERI

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