Le 14 octobre 2009, quatre hauts responsables politiques et militaires français ont publié dans Le Monde la tribune « Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération anarchique », appelant à un désarmement nucléaire mondial. Cette lettre de l'ancien président Jacques Chirac montre son retrait du projet. Il avait soutenu l'appel au désarmement, mais avait renoncé à exprimer publiquement son point de vue pour des raisons politiques.

Comme le décrit un des co-auteurs de l'article, le général Bernard Norlain, dans notre entretien :

« Et donc on a beaucoup discuté avec Michel Rocard sur [la question nucléaire]. Et il s'est trouvé qu'un beau jour, en 2009, il m'a appelé pour me donc signer parti signer avec lui et avec Jacques Chirac un article qui paraîtrait dans Le Monde sur le thème - [...]

Donc pour finir, Jacques Chirac s'est désisté, mais c'est Alain Juppé qui l'a remplacé.

Alors l'histoire telle que me l'a raconté Rocard, c'est qu’ils déjeunaient souvent ensemble Rocard et Chirac, il s'entendait très bien, surtout à un moment où ils étaient tous les deux dégagés de leur poste, l'un de président de la République, l'autre de Premier ministre. Et donc ils se voyaient souvent, ils s'entendaient très bien. Et donc Rocard a dû en parler à Chirac et l'autre, Chirac, en était tout à fait partisan. C'est ça qui est drôle quand on dit ça aux chiraquiens revendiqués, ça les étonne toujours. Et mais bon, j'imagine que l'entourage de Jacques Chirac a dû le dissuader de se lancer dans cette tribune. Mais j'ai d'ailleurs dans mes archives quelque part la lettre de Chirac qui dit « Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous, mais en raison des circonstances, je peux pas participer, ça sera Alain Juppé. » J'ai donc une lettre tout à fait signée, enfin c'est une photocopie, une lettre signée puisqu'elle était adressée à Rocard de Jacques Chirac. Donc c'est assez amusant. »

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Fösvarberedningen, Utkast till disposition av underlag till föredragningar 1. Och 5 mars 1956 (Draft outline of supports for presentation, 1 and 5 March 1956), February 2nd, 1956, Hemlig (Secret), SE/RA/321977, Riksarkivet, Marieberg

This document presents the rationale for Swedish nuclear acquisition as understood by the Swedish military in the Spring of 1956. It was produced in the context of the reunion of the Fösvarberedningen, an exceptional Parliamentary commission put together to invest important, and usually long-term, issues related to Defense in Sweden. The commission, composed of 12 representatives, began its work in the summer of 1955. It was tasked to examine and debate military programs for the 1955/56 to 1964/67 period, in response to a report delivered in October 1954 by the Överbefälhavaren (the Supreme Commander) of Swedish forces, Nils Swedlund.

Nuclear acquisition was only one, among many, of the issues discussed in this commission which also studied issues of military cooperation, rocket development, and other military procurement problems. Nuclear weapons, nonetheless, were the subject of discussion and the commission held two days of briefing on the topic, on March 1st and 5th 1956. The issue came up again in later sessions, but these dates are symbolic as they represent the first time when some Swedish MPs would be introduced to the military rationale for nuclear acquisition officially.

At this point, a Swedish nuclear weapons research program existed since at least 1949. Research and experiments were taking place inside the Defence Forces Research Agency, FOA (Fösvarets forskningsantalts).  Research had been undergoing secretly so far, with budgetary requests for FOA being approved by the government without direct information to the Parliament. No decision, however, had been made in that regard. A public debate emerged in 1954, following Nils Swedlund’s public call for nuclear acquisition, but no consensus existed either inside the leading Social Democratic party, or in the public opinion. The briefing given to the 12 MPs must be understood in that context of scarce information and uncertainty about policy choices. It was presented by three different actors : Major General Rickard Åkerman, Torsten Magnusson, the head of nuclear research at FOA, and Torsten Schmidt, the military representative at the Atomic Energy Commission. All three were, publicly or privately, in favor of nuclear weapons.
The document begins with a general section, presented by Åkerman, which attempt to assess the likelihood of nuclear weapon use in future conflict, a question which is not answered in any definitive manner. Potential barriers – notably in terms of International law – and incentives for nuclear use, as well as the possibility of “mistakes, errors, nervosity and sabotage” than can lead to “accidents”, are discussed, and the briefing concludes that the “possibility of major war and major war with atomic weapons appears undeniable, independently of which measures which are taken to reduce the risks”. If nuclear weapons can be used, and if their use can come with great speed, then “it is close at hand to draw the conclusion that a small nation like Sweden can be broken (brytas)” quickly.

To prevent such scenario, the military articulates an argument for the fielding of a relatively small force of nuclear weapons targeted at Soviet forces building up or advancing. The logic is the following: though Åkerman admits that a superpower can easily put Sweden in a “untenable position” if it uses all its forces, the likelihood of an all-out attack on Sweden is downplayed. Sweden’s geography and demography, notably, are presented as obstacles to a rapid and total victory even in such scenario. While “Sweden must survive and prevent invasion” a superpower must not only survive “but it must also strike the adversary so that the end resembles as much as possible to a victory”. Such situation is presented as rather favorable in presence of a Swedish nuclear arsenal: if Sweden presents itself as determined to fight and not “quickly subjugated”, then risks are high for a long war that could trigger nuclear use, and therefore would never remain a “local conflict”. Moreover, an adversary will have to disperse its forces, if it wishes to blunt the main effects of nuclear strikes, thus reducing the efficacy of an offensive. Not only would there be no quick victory – understood as the goal of a superpower – but the risk of this conflict turning into a world war would be great, reducing the Soviet incentives to engage in a local war over Sweden. Of course, because “a war with nuclear weapons entails significantly greater strains on the military than other types of war, it is natural that the military should be primarily designed for this kind of war”. “In summary”, notes the document “nuclear weapons are required so that we can fight our defensive battle in a modern manner (…). This capability is important when it comes to reducing the risk of local war against us and is of great importance for increasing the peacekeeping effect of defense.”

These arguments make clear that the Swedish military perceived nuclear weapons as deterrent thanks to their counter – conventional – force capabilities. The exact number of capabilities necessary for this mission is not mentioned, but it is hinted that this number would not be very high. Though it could not be “fixed once and for all”, it is assessed that “several dozens of atomic weapons with flexible use, well protected and that can be counted on to reach their goal without major loss” should suffice. A great deal of uncertainties is acknowledged: for a number of years, the number of weapons would necessarily be limited. Similarly, the dependence of aircraft for nuclear delivery comes with a lot of drawbacks: vulnerability of bases, risks of disruption in command and control, or even weather patterns. The military thus recommends the development of missile system – a tricky question, considering the dependency on US technology in that domain (Nilsson 2007) - as well as torpedo and artillery systems.

“Considerable” costs and efforts were to be expected. In the second presentation, Torsten Magnusson delved into the technical aspects of nuclear weapons production, focusing on the production of fissile material. It presents the work that has been going on secretly at FOA as “fundamental research into the design and function of nuclear weapons, which is necessary for ongoing studies into the effects of various nuclear weapons, protection against them, and other measures to reduce their effects”. This is not the whole truth: the more controversial question of how nuclear weapons could be developed had also been explored. A study on this topic had been concluded in 1953 but considered too secret to be presented to members of the Atomic Energy Commission.  It presents a timeline of possible nuclear production in Sweden: considering ongoing projects, fissile production could begin to be available by 1960, and the significant efforts would have to start by 1961. Magnusson had already identified what would be the key issue for the Swedish nuclear program: fissile material production. The difficulties encountered by the Swedish nuclear industry led its stakeholders to adopt reactor designs based on US-imported enriched uranium instead of natural uranium. Developing a new reactor based on natural uranium, as well as a reprocessing plant, would prove highly costly, and impossible to do so discreetly. Buying weapon grade material from abroad, an option discussed in the final part of the briefing by Torsten Schmidt, appeared close to impossible as well – as was the possibility of buying atomic weapons from the United States directly.

In the end, the Fösvarberedningen made no decision regarding nuclear weapons, dragging the issue to the military’s great frustration. Ambiguity persisted as debates were taking place behind semi-closed doors inside the Social-Democratic Party. In 1957, facing the deadlock of debates inside his party, Tage Erlander decided to put the issue before the full Parliament.

Bibliography

• Agrell, Wilhelm. 2002. Svenska Förintelsevapen: Utvecklingen Av Kemiska Och Nukleära Stridsmedel 1928-1970. Lund: Historiska media.
• Fraise, Thomas. 2023. “Restricted Democracies. Nuclear Weapons Programs, Secrecy, and Democracy in the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden (1939-1974).” Doctoral Dissertation, Paris: Sciences Po.
• Jonter, Thomas. 2016. The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Nilsson, Mikael. 2007. Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish-American Security Relations 1945-1962. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
   

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Ces données font partie d’une enquête menée par l'équipe Nuclear Knowledges et l'IFOP du 7 au 18 octobre 2024. L’enquête a été réalisée auprès de 1000 personnes en France et de 1001 personnes au Royaume-Uni. Ces échantillons sont représentatifs des différentes populations nationales âgées de 18 ans et plus. Pour plus d'informations sur la méthodologie, veuillez consulter cette explication de l'IFOP.

Pour protéger le pays, le gouvernement a le droit de prendre des décisions concernant l’utilisation d’armes nucléaires sans consulter les citoyens.

Pour protéger le pays, le gouvernement a le droit de prendre des décisions concernant l’utilisation d’armes nucléaires sans consulter les citoyens. Je soutiens l’utilisation des impôts que je paie pour financer le maintien de l’arsenal nucléaire du pays, même si cela se traduit par des budgets plus réduits pour les autres politiques.

Il est acceptable que les résidents de ce pays soient les cibles d’une attaque nucléaire menée par d’autres pays, puisque cela s’inscrit dans une politique de dissuasion nucléaire nationale.

Le risque d’être victime d’une explosion d’arme nucléaire accidentelle dans le pays où je vis est acceptable si la possession d’armes nucléaires protège le pays des attaques et des invasions.

Parmi les affirmations suivantes, lesquelles décrivent le mieux votre attitude vis-à-vis du débat actuel concernant l’avenir des armes nucléaires ?
 

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Ceci est un entretien avec Bernard Norlain, général d'armée aérienne deuxième section et vice-président d'Initiatives pour le désarmement nucléaire.

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These audiofiles are parts of an interview with Dr Sidney D. Drell (1926-2017) in his office at the Hoover Institution on August 6, 2013. Benoit Pelopidas interviewed him because he was an original member of JASON, a group advising the US presidents on nuclear weapons issues, starting in the 1960s and worked on arms control his whole life. In the 2000s he was crucial in setting the group of the ‘four horsemen’, advocating further nuclear arms reductions with a view to preventing nuclear terrorism. Dr Drell embodied a particular understanding of the role of scientists and their connections to politics and State authorities. In 2013, he received the national medal of science from US President Barack Obama. A narrative biography of Sidney Drell can be found in Philip Taubman’s book The Partnership. New York, Harper and Collins, 2012. A more analytical engagement with the ethics of science in Cold War America can be found in Paul Rubinson, Redefining Science. Scientists, the National Security State and Nuclear Weapons in Cold War America, University of Massachussetts Press, 2016.

Other parts of the interview will be published soon. I am grateful to the Drell family for allowing me to make this material available.

Une sélection d'articles de la presse francophone couvrant les bombardements de Hiroshima et Nagasaki, en août 1945. Les documents ont été calibrés pour permettre la recherche en texte intégral.

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