{"id":9429,"date":"2020-07-03T09:00:16","date_gmt":"2020-07-03T07:00:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/?p=9429"},"modified":"2021-07-01T14:42:38","modified_gmt":"2021-07-01T12:42:38","slug":"how-voters-respond-to-crime-control-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/how-voters-respond-to-crime-control-policies\/?lang=en","title":{"rendered":"How Voters Respond to Crime Control Policies"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><em>by Roberto Galbiati, Department of economics*<\/em><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_9548\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-9548\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-image-9548 size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506-219x146.jpg 219w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506-50x33.jpg 50w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506-112x75.jpg 112w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1030733506.jpg 500w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-9548\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">\u00a9 MikeDotta, Shutterstock<\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Many democratically elected governments around the world are probably wondering how voters will respond to the policies they implemented to face the COVID-19 crise. Some will expect voters\u2019 support to go up on ideological basis, others will anticipate a response driven by the immediately observable consequences of the policies. Health policies are not unique, the researcher that wants to predict their consequences faces the same obstacles of predicting the electoral impact of other kind of policies: we do not observe empirical counterfactuals. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In order to properly understand how and whether voters respond to government&#8217;s policies, the ideal experiment would require the government to randomly manipulate the content of a policy and then this random manipulation mapping into different outcomes. For example, to properly assess the voters\u2019 response to a tax increase or cut by the central government, it would be necessary to observe a random variation of its effects across lower levels of government, for instance municipalities. Or, given an emergency health policy, it would be necessary to observe locally random variation in its intensity. Such a local random variation would allow to identify the causal effect of the policy outcome on voters\u2019 electoral behavior conditioning on the ideological preferences of voters on these types of policies. In other words, causal responses of voters to policies can be correctly assessed only if we observe variations in the effects of the policy that are independent both from the voters\u2019 and the government&#8217;s characteristics.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4>\u00a0Criminal Justice: an Important Influence on Voter Behaviour?<\/h4>\n<div id=\"attachment_9555\" style=\"width: 360px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-9555\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-image-9555\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"350\" height=\"234\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630-219x146.jpg 219w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630-50x33.jpg 50w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630-112x75.jpg 112w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_284771630.jpg 500w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 350px) 100vw, 350px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-9555\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">\u00a9 Fresnel, Shutterstock<\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In a recent paper Drago, Galbiati and Sobbrio<\/span><span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_1');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_1');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_1\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(1)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_1\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Drago, F., Galbiati, R. and Sobbrio F. &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/jeea\/advance-article-abstract\/doi\/10.1093\/jeea\/jvz063\/5625579?redirectedFrom=fulltext\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment<\/a> \u00bb, <i>Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_1').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_1', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script><\/i>, <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">we address this issue by focusing on criminal justice. In this work, we focus on criminal justice because crime is perceived as a crucial social issue in most Western countries. In the Eurobarometer survey, for instance, crime ranks among the top five most important problems in several European countries<\/span><span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_2');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_2');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_2\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(2)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_2\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Mastrorocco, Nicola and Luigi Minale \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/abs\/pii\/S0047272718301270\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">News Media and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment<\/a> \u00bb, <em>Journal of Public Economics<\/em>, 2018.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_2').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_2', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script>. <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Accordingly, there is a widespread belief that criminal justice policies have a significant impact on voting behavior. Indeed, elected officials seem to believe that being soft on crime does not pay off<\/span><span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_3');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_3');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_3\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(3)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_3\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Levitt, Steven D. &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2951346?seq=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime<\/a> \u00bb,\u00a0 <i>American<\/i> <i>Economic<\/i> <i>Review<\/i>, 1997.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_3').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_3', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script>.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nevertheless, despite the importance of this issue for potential voters and the observed behavior of politicians, existing studies on the link between crime control policies and voters&#8217; behavior are mostly correlational and provide mixed evidence<\/span><span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_4');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_4');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_4\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(4)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_4\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Hall, Melinda Gann \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/3118123\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform<\/a> \u00bb, <i>American Political Science Association<\/i>, 2001 \/ Krieger, Steven A. \u00ab <a href=\"http:\/\/dspace.creighton.edu:8080\/xmlui\/bitstream\/handle\/10504\/40743\/07_45CreightonLRev131%282011-2012%29.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Do Tough on Crime Politicians Win More Elections\u2013An Empirical Analysis of California State Legislators from 1992 to 2000 \u202f<\/a>\u00bb, <i>Creighton Law Review<\/i>, 2011.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_4').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_4', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script>.<\/p>\n<h4><b>The Italian case study <\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The study exploits a natural experiment in Italy that allows us to have a proper counterfactual to evaluate the voters\u2019 response to the consequences of the policy keeping their ideology and the impact of the policy on ideological stands constant.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In July 2006, the Italian government implemented an (unanticipated) collective pardon due to a dramatic overcrowding in prisons at that time. As a result, a subset of the prisoners with less than 36 months of residual sentence were released and about the 30% of inmates in Italian prisons are release on August 1<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">st<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> 2006 (Figure below). <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Figure 1 : Incarceration rate before and after the collective pardon<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-9538\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-1024x746.png\" alt=\"Taux d\u2019incarc\u00e9ration avant et apr\u00e8s la gr\u00e2ce collective\" width=\"700\" height=\"510\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-1024x746.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-300x218.png 300w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-768x559.png 768w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-201x146.png 201w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-50x36.png 50w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1-103x75.png 103w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/roberto1.png 1732w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 700px) 100vw, 700px\" \/><\/p>\n<p><em><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">NOTE:\u00a0 The figure illustrates the variation in the incarceration rate (i.e., per 100,000 people) in Italy before and after the collective pardon bill.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The design of the policy was such that released prisoners who would recidivate within a five-year period, would be charged an additional sentence equal to their residual sentence at the time of their release. This created an incentive to refrain from re-offending for pardoned individuals that increases in the length of the residual sentence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_9557\" style=\"width: 360px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-9557\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-image-9557\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"350\" height=\"234\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097.jpg 500w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097-219x146.jpg 219w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097-50x33.jpg 50w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/shutterstock_1044915097-112x75.jpg 112w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 350px) 100vw, 350px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-9557\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">\u00a9 frankie&#8217;s, Shutterstock<\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Such an incentive, as shown in previous research<\/span><span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_5');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_5');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_5\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(5)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_5\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Drago, Francesco, Roberto Galbiati, and Pietro Vertova &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.1086\/599286?seq=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment <\/a>\u00bb , <i>Journal of Political Economy<\/i>, 2009.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_5').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_5', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">turns out to be exogenously distributed across released prisoners. Two identical individuals that entered the first time in prison with a sentence of 50 months, at the time of pardon in August 2006 may have two different residual sentences, and thus a different incentive to recidivate, because they entered prison in different periods. Since the date of entry into prison is plausibly exogenous to future criminal behavior, the Italian collective pardon provides a unique opportunity to evaluate voters\u2019 response to the realised effects (recidivism rates) of the pardon. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">(Figure below). <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Figure 2. Distribution of the Incentive to Recidivate over Italian Municipalities <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-9542\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"550\" height=\"709\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2.jpg 793w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2-233x300.jpg 233w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2-768x990.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2-113x146.jpg 113w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2-39x50.jpg 39w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/reoberto2-58x75.jpg 58w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 550px) 100vw, 550px\" \/><\/p>\n<p><em><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The figure illustrates the geographical distribution of the (standardised) average incentive to recidivate of pardoned individuals at the municipal level. A one unit increase corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in the incentive to recidivate (i.e., around 8.2 months less of residual sentence).\u00a0 <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This means that if you consider two municipalities with a difference of 1 in this scale the difference in the incentive to re-offend in the two communes is about 8.2 months of expected sentence.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_9559\" style=\"width: 410px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-9559\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-image-9559 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"400\" height=\"356\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w.jpg 400w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w-300x267.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w-164x146.jpg 164w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w-50x45.jpg 50w, https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/5473362018_7ed1f49cc8_w-84x75.jpg 84w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-9559\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">\u00a9 to the People All Power, CC BY-NC 2.0<\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Hence, by using the variation in the incentive to recidivate across municipalities we can assess to what extent voters respond to the effects of the crime control policy by holding all the rest equal. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In our study we first show that, as expected, municipalities where pardoned individuals had a higher incentive to recidivate experienced a higher recidivism.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Then, we document that individuals do take into account the observed effects of the policy in their voting decisions. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In municipalities with a higher incentive to recidivate voters \u201cpunished\u201d the political coalition who put forward such pardon (center-left) in the first post-pardon parliamentary elections. The effect is quantitatively relevant. An increase of recidivism of 15.9% led to a 3.06% increase in the margin of victory of the center-right coalition in the post-pardon national elections (2008) relative to the last election before the pardon (2006).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This shows that worse observable effects of the policy at the local level, imply worse electoral outcomes for politicians responsible for such policy.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> What are the mechanisms that drive this result?<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> We show that where the incentive to recidivate is higher, newspapers report more crime news on pardoned individual recidivating. Moreover, voters update their beliefs about the competence of the incumbent coalition to deal with crime. Importantly, a higher incentive to recidivate was not associated with individuals being more likely to perceive crime as the most important issue in Italy or in their city. This suggests that votes correctly associated the pardon with the recidivism of pardoned inmates and not with crime in general.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">General Lessons Beyond Crime Control Policies<\/span><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The capacity of voters to assess policies and reward of punish politicians accordingly is crucial for the health of political institutions. A few existing studies cast some doubts on ability by providing evidence of voters punishing\/rewarding incumbent politicians in the presence of events that are orthogonal to gover<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">nment\u2019s policies, such as shark attacks<span class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_6');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_9429_1('footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_6');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_6\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">(6)<\/sup><\/a><span id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_6\" class=\"footnote_tooltip\">Achen, C H, and L M Bartels &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/241470176_Blind_Retrospection_Electoral_Responses_To_Drought_Flu_and_Shark_Attacks\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Blind retrospection: Electoral responses to drought, flu, and shark attacks<\/a> \u00bb, Working Paper, 2004.<\/span><\/span><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_6').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_9429_1_6', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top right', relative: true, offset: [10, 10], });<\/script>, performance of local sport teams or lottery winnings. On the contrary, voters respond to the observed effects of a<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> public policy (both in terms of beliefs and behavior) in a way that is consistent with standard voting economic models of electoral accountability <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Or, at least, they see<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">m to be able to do so as long as they observe the effects of a policy, either through direct observation and word of mouth or, as we document, via news media. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In a historical moment in which ideological polarisation seem to be one of the main drivers of policies and voters\u2019 responses, these findings seem relevant for the political debate in Europe and abroad. The effects of policies matter over and beyond ideology since voter hold politicians accountable for the realised effects of public policies as long as it is possible to identify who is responsible for such policies.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><i>This project was supported by the ANR and the French government under the Investments for the Future program LabEx LIEPP (ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02) and IdEx Universit\u00e9 de Paris (ANR-18-IDEX-0001).<\/i><\/p>\n<p><strong><div class=\"idea_box\"><div class=\"icon\"><i class=\"icon-lamp\"><\/i><\/div><div class=\"desc\"> <\/strong><strong>Complementary References<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Galbiati R. &#8211;\u00a0 &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/spire.sciencespo.fr\/notice\/2441\/2pc3b0j07e93i9k3q4kn5b61o9#_ga=2.128282443.634700383.1592817022-1900527818.1585392096\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Evaluating Electoral Responses to Policies. What Do We Learn from Italian Incarceration Policies<\/a>&#8220;, <i>LIEPP Policy Brief<\/i>, 2020.<\/li>\n<li>Ashworth Scott &#8211;\u00a0 &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.annualreviews.org\/doi\/10.1146\/annurev-polisci-031710-103823\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work<\/a>\u00bb,\u00a0 <em>Annual Review of Political Science<\/em>, 2012.<\/li>\n<li>Besley Timothy &#8211; <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.oxfordscholarship.com\/view\/10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199283910.001.0001\/acprof-9780199283910\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government<\/a>,<\/em> Oxford University Press on Demand, 2006.<\/li>\n<li>Persson Torsten, Tabellini Guido &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/books\/political-economics\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"><em>Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy<\/em><\/a> , The MIT Press, 2002.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong><\/div><\/div>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<pre><a href=\"https:\/\/sites.google.com\/view\/galbiatir1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Roberto Galbiati<\/a> is a CNRS Professor (DR) in the Department of Economics at Sciences Po. His research interests are law and economics, political economy and applied microeconomics. He has studied extensively how laws and individual motivations affect cooperative behavior and compliance, the effects of law enforcement on illegal behavior and the emergence and stability of legal and political institutions.<\/pre>\n<div class=\"speaker-mute footnotes_reference_container\"> <div class=\"footnote_container_prepare\"><p><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_label pointer\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_9429_1();\">Notes<\/span><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button\" style=\"display: none;\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_9429_1();\">[<a id=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_9429_1\">+<\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/div> <div id=\"footnote_references_container_9429_1\" style=\"\"><table class=\"footnotes_table footnote-reference-container\"><caption class=\"accessibility\">Notes<\/caption> <tbody> \r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_1');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_1\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>1<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Drago, F., Galbiati, R. and Sobbrio F. &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/jeea\/advance-article-abstract\/doi\/10.1093\/jeea\/jvz063\/5625579?redirectedFrom=fulltext\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment<\/a> \u00bb, <i>Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_2');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_2\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>2<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Mastrorocco, Nicola and Luigi Minale \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/abs\/pii\/S0047272718301270\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">News Media and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment<\/a> \u00bb, <em>Journal of Public Economics<\/em>, 2018.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_3');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_3\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>3<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Levitt, Steven D. &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2951346?seq=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime<\/a> \u00bb,\u00a0 <i>American<\/i> <i>Economic<\/i> <i>Review<\/i>, 1997.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_4');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_4\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>4<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Hall, Melinda Gann \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/3118123\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform<\/a> \u00bb, <i>American Political Science Association<\/i>, 2001 \/ Krieger, Steven A. \u00ab <a href=\"http:\/\/dspace.creighton.edu:8080\/xmlui\/bitstream\/handle\/10504\/40743\/07_45CreightonLRev131%282011-2012%29.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Do Tough on Crime Politicians Win More Elections\u2013An Empirical Analysis of California State Legislators from 1992 to 2000 \u202f<\/a>\u00bb, <i>Creighton Law Review<\/i>, 2011.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_5');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_5\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>5<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Drago, Francesco, Roberto Galbiati, and Pietro Vertova &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.1086\/599286?seq=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment <\/a>\u00bb , <i>Journal of Political Economy<\/i>, 2009.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_9429_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_9429_1_6');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_9429_1_6\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>6<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Achen, C H, and L M Bartels &#8211; \u00ab <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/241470176_Blind_Retrospection_Electoral_Responses_To_Drought_Flu_and_Shark_Attacks\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Blind retrospection: Electoral responses to drought, flu, and shark attacks<\/a> \u00bb, Working Paper, 2004.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n <\/tbody> <\/table> <\/div><\/div><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> function footnote_expand_reference_container_9429_1() { jQuery('#footnote_references_container_9429_1').show(); 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jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight * 0.2 }, 380); } }<\/script>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>by Roberto Galbiati, Department of economics* Many democratically elected governments around the world are probably wondering how voters will respond to the policies they implemented<span class=\"excerpt-hellip\"> [\u2026]<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":9560,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[33,325,261],"tags":[121,117],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9429\/?lang=en"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/?lang=en"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post\/?lang=en"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3\/?lang=en"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments\/?lang=en&post=9429"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9429\/revisions\/?lang=en"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9763,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9429\/revisions\/9763\/?lang=en"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9560\/?lang=en"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/?lang=en&parent=9429"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories\/?lang=en&post=9429"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags\/?lang=en&post=9429"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}