{"id":14570,"date":"2023-09-21T17:00:57","date_gmt":"2023-09-21T15:00:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/?p=14570"},"modified":"2023-09-22T09:18:43","modified_gmt":"2023-09-22T07:18:43","slug":"can-the-green-deal-make-european-agriculture-greener","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sciencespo.fr\/research\/cogito\/home\/can-the-green-deal-make-european-agriculture-greener\/?lang=en","title":{"rendered":"Can the Green Deal Make European Agriculture Greener?"},"content":{"rendered":"

What are the foundations and goals of the European Green Deal? What impact will it have on agriculture and consumers? What are the obstacles to its implementation? Interview with Sandrine Levasseur<\/a>, researcher at the French Economic Observatory (OFCE).<\/p>\n

What is the European Green Deal? And what are its objectives?<\/h4>\n

Launched in December 2019, the European Green Deal is a European Union (EU) initiative aimed at making Europe the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050. In other words, by this date, human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and captures by natural sinks (oceans, soils, vegetation) must be balanced. This goal of carbon neutrality is fully aligned with the Paris Agreement signed in 2015 that seeks to keep global warming below 2\u00b0 C above pre-industrial levels.
\nThe Green Deal also sets an interim target of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels\u2009\u2013\u2009a target that must be achieved in less than 7 years! The magnitude of the task is even greater when one considers that since 1990, GHGs have been reduced by 33%: reaching the 2030 target will require tripling current efforts!
\nMore specifically, the Green Deal defines a set of mutually complementary climate and environmental objectives aimed at improving our health, nutrition and well-being. The cross-sector approach involves all EU sectors and players, including households.<\/p>\n

What is the specific role of agriculture in achieving the Green Deal\u2019s objectives?<\/h4>\n

Agriculture is both an important component and a key player in the Green Deal. The EU\u2019s agricultural sector accounts for around 12% of GHGs and, unlike other sectors, has not seen a decline in GHGs over the past decade. Since 1990, the decline of GHGs in the agricultural sector has been \u2018only\u2019 21%.
\nThe sources of emissions in agriculture are well known: just over 40% come from enteric fermentation or, more prosaically, the methane emitted by ruminants; just under 40% come from the use of agricultural land; the remainder (15%) is attributable to the production of effluents, mainly manure.
\nThe role of methane (CH4) is key, since in terms of greenhouse effect (i.e. warming power), it is 25 times more potent than carbon (CO2). Hence the somewhat simplistic idea that some have floated of killing cows to help address global warming!
\nWhile a less meat-based diet seems necessary to achieve our climate and environmental objectives, other levers need to be considered, ranging from a change in agricultural practices (i.e. less use of synthetic pesticides and fertilisers, diversification of crop rotation) to the reduction of waste via the development of technical and technological innovations (i.e. the use of new crop varieties and digital tools for precision agriculture). Only by activating all these levers is there hope of achieving the goal of carbon neutrality.<\/p>\n

How does the Effort Share Regulation (ESR) make sense for each European country?<\/h4>\n

Somewhat subtly, the EU has set GHG reduction targets for the EU as a whole, as well as for individual sectors (transport, industry, etc.). For some sectors, including agriculture, the EU has defined a contribution to the effort for each country based on its wealth as measured by GDP per capita (with the understanding that rich countries must contribute more) and a cost-effectiveness analysis (based on vaguer criteria that seek to maintain relative food security for each member country).
\nGHG reduction is neither economically nor socially neutral: it has a \u2018cost\u2019 and, beyond unequal living standards, EU countries also differ in their agricultural structures and practices. To put it simply, Western European agriculture is intensive, i.e. it heavily uses fertilisers and pesticides, is highly mechanised, and high- to very high-yielding. Conversely, in the Eastern countries of the former Soviet bloc, agriculture uses fewer chemical inputs and is more labour-intensive. Agricultural employment accounts for almost 15% of total employment in Romania and 9% in Poland, compared with 1.2% in Germany and 2.6% in France. Yields in Eastern Europe are not poor but are lower than in the West. Imposing the same GHG reduction targets in agricultural sectors operating at such different levels therefore would have disproportionately negatively affected the EU\u2019s Eastern members and jeopardised their food security.
\nUnder the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), the agricultural sector\u2019s target for reducing GHG emissions by 2030 ranges from 10% (Bulgaria) to 50% (Sweden, Luxembourg, Germany, Finland and Denmark), with France\u2019s target set at 47.5%.<\/p>\n

Isn\u2019t it paradoxical that the major agricultural countries in the EU are not necessarily those whose agriculture contributes most to global warming?<\/h4>\n

It is indeed interesting to note that the major agricultural countries are not necessarily those whose agricultural sector emits the most GHGs and, more generally, that there is a certain disconnect between a country\u2019s share of EU agricultural production and its share of GHGs from agriculture. For example, France and Italy each account for 18% of the agricultural value produced in the EU, but France emits twice as many GHGs as Italy! While this may be attributable to different agricultural practices, it is primarily specialisation in cattle herds that \u2018makes all the difference\u2019: France has 31\u00a0million head of cattle, compared with 12.2\u00a0million in Italy! In another example, Ireland is a \u2018small\u2019 agricultural power (8.5% of the EU\u2019s agricultural value) but a major GHG emitter since its cattle herd is equivalent to that of Italy. Because a significant share of Ireland\u2019s beef production is used to supply non-EU markets, notably the UK, the Green Deal will affect Ireland\u2019s export power. The situation in France is different, as the French consume more or less all their domestic production, and also import beef\u2026<\/p>\n

What about From Farm-to-Fork and Biodiversity strategies?<\/h4>\n

These two strategies operationalise the Green Deal in the agricultural sector. They define the quantitative targets that member states must meet in order to reduce GHG emissions in the agricultural sector and restore biodiversity: a reduction of at least 20% in the use of chemical fertilisers; a 50% reduction in the use of pesticides and antimicrobials; an increase in the area dedicated to \u2018organic\u2019 crops, so that they represent 25% of cultivated land; restoration of biodiversity on 10% of land, etc.
\nAlthough European consumers are increasingly concerned about access to quality food, current events show that the farming world is resistant to \u2018changing the playbook\u2019. In particular, the elimination of pesticide products such as neonicotinoids is a source of significant tension in France, as well as other EU countries. Similarly, data withholding (notably related to the use of chemical fertilisers) attests to the resistance of part of the farming world and their governments to the implementation of the Green Deal in the agricultural sector.<\/p>\n

Is the current inflationary context undermining the health and well-being of Europeans?<\/h4>\n

During the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak, Europeans were particularly concerned about their health. As a result, consumption of organic products rose sharply. In 2020, each French person spent an average of \u20ac188 on organic products, i.e. almost 6.5% of their food budget, and 11% more than in 2019. In the second half of 2021, however, consumption of organic products began to decline, due to a combination of two factors. The first is the decline of household purchasing power due to rising energy and food prices. The second is the proliferation of labels (i.e. \u2018sustainable\u2019, \u2018fair trade\u2019, \u2018eco-responsible\u2019, etc.(1)<\/sup><\/a>See in particular the results of research conducted at Sciences Po’s Center for the Sociology of Organizations written up for Public Health France in 2018 – “The sociologist’s perspective” on the controversy over nutritional logos. Controverse sur les logos nutritionnels \u00ab le point de vue du sociologue \u00bb<\/a><\/span><\/span>