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The Reconfiguration of the Egyptian Army

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Paris School of International Affairs, Fall 2013

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The Reconfiguration of the Egyptian Army

The Political Sociology of the State in the Contemporary Arab World: Stéphane Lacroix

Paris School of International Affairs
Sciences Po, Fall 2013

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1. Introduction

Egypt's current provisional military government, and the military's role in throughout the uprisings ousting both Mubarak and Morsi, point to the centrality of Egypt's military in the history of the country's ongoing formation. The centrality of this institution has not always been clear and has changed in congruence with the continuing developments and events in the country. What does seem to be somewhat constant, however, is the decisive character of the military's involvement in moments when the country's executive leadership has been challenged.

Beyond historical events, inspecting the very reconfiguration of the military within the country can elucidate the dynamics inherent to this paradoxical and fluctuating positioning. Doing so permits situating the events within a wider scope, which can uncover the nature of the underlying processes of change in the political form. This allows identifying a concrete issue with institutionalization, and elucidating the nature of the issue and institutionalization itself, thereby exposing the dynamics inherent to this process. This research paper sets out to create such a theoretical framework, and test its validity empirically. The guiding research question for the project therefore reads;

“How can the evolution of the military in the configuration of the Egyptian state be understood?”

The current proposal is inspecting the evolution through a paradigm created by a fusion of Gilles Deleuze's ontological apparatus and the political sociology of Carl Schmitt. Analyzing the events and developments through this perspective elucidates a dynamic of constantly reconfiguring institutions, whose trajectories are contingent on concurrent developments. These make up systems of connections, whose infrastructure determine the possibilities of the individuals embedded in the various positions.

1.1 Disposition and methodology

In order to understand the development, then, the first step is to explore the mechanisms behind political forms' metaphysics. The metaphysical foundation provided by Gilles Deleuze followed by an account of Carl Schmitt's theory of how a state of exception relates to the development of the sovereign, and the inherent change of institutions. What will be done in creating this analytical framework, then, is traversing from the most abstract order, to a concrete view of institutionalization. The complete framework is presented and represented as a model, allowing for the empirical test to begin.

The empirical data being drawn upon is situated in an existing body of research, and its presentation framed by the corresponding perspective. For this reason, I allude purely to historical events and their contents, rather than the analytical and/or theoretical findings the respective authors present. This is especially the case for the reading of Hazem Kandil's "(...) *institutional realism*"¹. Thus, the historical data will be integrated into the proposed framework, with the purpose of testing what perspective provides a better oeuvre for uncovering the dynamic of institutionalization.

While I do not rely on the theoretical contributions of the empirical material, there is one notable exception, namely the understanding of *institutions*. Following Steven A. Cook, when discussing institutions and the military as such, I have in mind entities, which are created, reformed and hollowed according to the dominant parties in the given political form². As such, *institutionalization* is understood as the process by which these institutions obtain stability, and is contingent on its adaptability to change. It is through this scope the history and functioning of the military will be presented and analyzed.

Basing a framework on Deleuze requires adopting a related conceptualization of *power*. The current understanding of power is therefore not a judicial or liberal one, where an entity *has* power over others. Power is a relational phenomenon between connected points, and a position of power is therefore something that can be assumed through connectivity and thus contingent on these, not an absolute phenomenon³. This understanding of power relates to the understanding of institutionalization, where productive process of power is used to solidify a given position.

¹ Kandil 2012:2

² Cook 2007:6

³ Deleuze 2006:VIII

2. Theoretical framework

When venturing into understanding dynamics of change through a novel framework, alluding to the highest level of abstraction is necessary in order to prove the nature of what is being inspected. Without such a fundamental grounding, sociology would be left deprived of a coherent framework for examining the evolution of institutions.

2.1 The metaphysical foundation – why and what?

Aiming to understand the development of the Egyptian military in changing political and cultural evolutions requires inspecting it as something embedded in this environment, yet with a capacity for acting on its own. This capacity therefore implies that the practice of the army is an expression of the army's given state, and can therefore not be essentialized into a fixed or transcendent category. Such an understanding requires a view of the immanent processes of the observed entity, rather than recourse to what it isn't⁴. Observing through a specter with fixed categories presupposes these defined forms, and blinds the framework from completely uncovering the processes in motion. Deleuze's ontology therefore provides an oeuvre through which one can inspect the reconfiguration of an institution by acknowledging its full movements, without confining observations to predefined concepts or strategies⁵. This central point, which is the point of departure for the entire investigation, similarly requires that Carl Schmitt be slightly altered, as his concepts express to transcendental reasoning.

While the importance of the metaphysical foundation cannot be stressed enough, it can appear redundant to reconfigure and fuse other theories with it, as a purely Deleuzian analysis would seem in order. However, the strength of Deleuze's ontological apparatus is simultaneously what cripples a more directly concrete approach; *"I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered centre (...)"*⁶. This unstable conceptualization is a horribly futile outset for any sociologist looking to apply a Deleuzian concept directly to an entity.

While lacking possibility or strength of applying Deleuze directly is the reason for its confinement to the foundation of the framework, its flexibility allows for the integration of other theories into the

⁴ Deleuze 1991:138

⁵ Boundas 1996:85

⁶ Deleuze 1994:XXI

basis. All that remains to be done in such a theoretical venture is to *intensify* the given concepts to suit the processual perspective inherent to Deleuze's thinking, thereby creating stable analytical tools, which can illuminate the full processes of the scrutinized object. In order for the proposed contest between Foucault and Schmitt's analysis to be applied to the Egyptian army with any sociological relevance, it must be able to accommodate concrete analyses of the military's evolution. As will be clarified in the following presentation of Deleuze's *intensive materialist* schema, this facilitates a materialist approach, while situating it in a framework capable of elucidating its trail of evolution.

2.2 Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze's breed of materialism is founded in his radical constructivism. As mentioned, the notion of predetermined categories is a stranger to this framework, and instead focuses on the constant positioning and repositioning of entities⁷. Therefore, the world must be understood a constant flux of becoming of copies, which are created through a repetitive dynamic of internal differentiation. These copies are also flows, whose constant developments through actualization territorialize the space of multiplicities.

The multiplicity

The concept of the *multiplicity* is central to Deleuze's framework. It is defined as; "(...) *things that could be determined in terms of their dimensions (...)*"⁸. This alludes to the framework's general rejection of transcendental logic's predetermined forms, as the dimensions in a multiplicity are always in motion, and always creating new forms. The exterior of a multiplicity does not transcend its whole or impose itself over other dimensions. Consequently, regardless of the amount of dimensions in a multiplicity, there is never a constant or eternal dimension⁹. The internal dimensions form tangents, which can connect to other multiplicities, thereby changing the nature of both multiplicities. Multiplicities are therefore contingent on other multiplicities and the trajectories flowing from these.

⁷ Deleuze 1994:XIX

⁸ Deleuze 1991:39

⁹ Deleuze 1994:183

Flows are the very foundation of society, and must therefore always be the first focus when analyzing the evolution of states and institutions¹⁰. As the multiplicity is defined by the connections and dimensions it contains, it necessarily changes in function and nature when it changes in dimensions. When investigating a social phenomenon, then, investigating the flows in multiplicities and their process is the outset.

Virtuality and actuality

The realms of the *virtual and actual* are central to understanding the evolution. Separating the two registers can seem redundant as they are; “(...) *two inseparable planes in reciprocal presupposition*”¹¹. The register of actuality is what is directly exposed as tangible, or material, but is in constant interplay with the virtual. There is therefore no opposition, but mutual dependence between the two realms. By analytically acknowledging these registers and the flows between, it becomes possible to identify and scrutinize the dynamic of constant becoming, or *actualization*.

The virtual is; “(...) *real without being actual, ideal without being abstract*”¹². The virtual is the idea structure of an entity, without being an idealist concept. The idea structure changes along with the constant change in the actual, i.e. material, entailing that the continuous interchange between these two registers accounts for the flows of the becoming of any entity. When this structure appears materially, it is through a process of *actualization*. This alludes to the multiplicity, as it necessarily follows that in the event of a change, their new becoming is entirely new. Multiplicities are thereby both virtual and actual structures, as the tangents developing are the actualizations from the virtual structures. Observing the mechanisms that create the material reality provides an insight into the flows founding society.

2.3 Carl Schmitt

Studying the dynamics of states and their fluctuation requires conceptualizations of the elements in the change. Carl Schmitt’s investigation of the alteration of a sovereign in a political form in a state of exception provides such components, which can be used to expose the interrelated mechanisms of sovereignty and institutional change.

¹⁰ Deleuze & Guattari 1987:219

¹¹ Ibid.:109

¹² Deleuze & Guattari 1994:156

Sovereignty and the state of exception

A central component of Schmitt's work is his theory of the sovereign and the state of exception in a political form. The sovereign of any political form is the party who decides on the state of exception¹³. This state of affairs is a fracture in society, where the ruling ideas and authorities are scrutinized and challenged, and the sovereign as well as the political form is confronted with this social emergency¹⁴. For these two reasons, the sovereign is always intricately linked to the state of exception, and the sovereign must always battle a counterparty for sovereignty¹⁵.

A state of exception cannot be confined to previous codifications of conduct or norms, and thus always leads to a radically new future. This entails that the institutions supporting the sovereign alter in accordance with the change in political form and sovereign. Institutions therefore support the sovereign, as their composition and function depends on the outcome of the state of exception. The action of institutions, however, is constant, as they constantly serve to empower the sovereign. Schmitt holds the exception elucidates the intensity of society otherwise disguised by the normalcy of stable society¹⁶. Any materialist theory of change in political form must therefore take into account the exception, as it is the opening for change.

The space of sovereignty is not tied to a specific person, but is characterized by who decides in the state of exception. The new actualization of the sovereign entails that it is recreated with novel institutions, or institutions primed to the new conditions. There is thus a sovereign inherent in the political form. However, this is not a transcendent entity, but rather one that evolves in congruence with the political form. Applying Schmitt's concept of the sovereign and state of exception for analyzing the evolution of the Egyptian military without compromising the immanent apparatus.

2.4 The King is Dead - Long Live the Sovereign

The definition and metaphysical characteristics of the sovereign provided by Schmitt are sufficiently broad to encompass a perspective inspecting it as also being a virtual entity. The state of exception serves as the point where the sovereign is actualized in this window of becoming. When

¹³ Schmitt 2009:25

¹⁴ A discussion of the differences between state of emergency and state of exception and their different factors, and the distinction between their judicial and political elements, is omitted from the current discussion, as what is relevant at this time is the transformative potential of these states.


¹⁵ Schmitt 2009:26

¹⁶ Ibid.:34

material circumstances change, the virtual sovereign reconfigures accordingly. Therefore, it reconfigures internally, constantly adapting to the material setting, simultaneously conditioning the possible actual developments.

In the state of exception, the virtual sovereign reconfigures in order to maintain the idea of a sovereign, while the actual sovereign will be either severely challenged or removed. What this implies, then, is that the structure of a sovereign may shift in form and guise, but creates a new space for itself through actualizing according to the actual developments. A new actualized sovereign, also embedded in the connections of multiplicities, then occupies the vacant space following a state of exception.

A sovereign's materialized expression must reconfigure in order for it to function in the same way in different conditions. The sovereign can therefore actualize in infinite guises, corresponding to the societal developments.



Model 1: The continuum of actualizing sovereigns and institutionalization

Model 1 depicts the continuum of the theoretical framework devised to understand the dynamic of changing sovereigns and institutionalization. The virtual structure of a sovereign is analytically detached from the actual in its structure, yet joined through both actualization during the moment of exception and the interaction between the actual results and the virtual sphere. Therefore, depending on the state of exception and its aftermath, the sovereign position can be occupied by another entity. The ideational position itself, however, remains in tact. This spectrum thereby allows for a materialist approach to the actual events through the lens of Carl Schmitt, and for the contingency of these actual events to be exposed by situating them within Deleuze's intensive framework.

3. The Egyptian Military's Configuration

Throughout the following, I present central components in the history of the Egyptian military. This will be done by focusing on the processes emanating from and leading to monumental moments in history, and identifying the contingencies of the institution's evolution. The fact that Mubarak had declared a state of emergency from 1981 till his overthrow does not figure as a central element or a sign of exception, as this prolonged period proved very stable¹⁷.

Three central historical points are highlighted and analyzed individually through the presented paradigm in order to test whether it can advantageously uncover the full processes of configuration of the military in congruence with the state. In line with the institutional focus on the military's evolution, the ensuing analysis focuses on the military institution as a sovereign, exposing the dynamics of its development.

3.1 The Legacy of Egypt's Founding Fathers

Under King Farouk's British supported reign, the Egyptian army was confined to very few responsibilities and capacity. Overthrowing the king and forcing his heir into exile following the 1952 coup by the Free Officers necessitated instating and institutionalizing a new political form with not only a new sovereign, but also a new structure. By ousting the king and subsequently assuming the position as Prime Minister and later President in 1953, General Gamal Nasser moved to create both formal and informal institutions to consolidate this position as the newly declared republican's leader¹⁸. The new regime legitimized its existence through the creation of democratic initiatives, however much of a façade this turned out to be. Through notions of nationalism and other cultural invocations, the new military regime successfully created a connection between the liberating military and the freed people¹⁹.

The clandestine conception of other institutions has proven to have significant impact. Egypt's constitution of June 1956 declared the republic democratic, the people sovereign and the state was to ensure "*liberty, security, safety and equality of opportunity*" for all Egyptians²⁰. In 1958, however, Emergency Law 162 was passed. This law extends military rule, and its activation

¹⁷ Williams 2006

¹⁸ Cook 2007:9

¹⁹ Ibid.:26

²⁰ Cook 2007:65

invokes censorship on media, suspension of the right to assembly and, increasingly since 1992, provides the possibility of trying civilians under the Supreme State Security Court. When this law is invoked, democracy is officially suspended, and the military courts are not confined by the same civil rights respected by civil courts²¹. While Egypt's new military-created government was apparently liberating, protecting and democratizing its people, it created an underlying but overruling system of laws, securing its own rule.

3.2 1952 Coup as a State of Exception

Overthrowing the sovereign and the monarchal political form he represented required the creation of a new political form, i.e. the republic, and accordingly a new constitution. As the military was the institution creating the new political form and drafted its constitution, Schmitt's understanding of the mutually defining state of exception and sovereign seems to provide a highly suitable lens for understanding the developments. Characteristic of the state of exception is the radical change occurring during and is evident upon its seize. In this case, the fundamental structure of the Egyptian state was altered by the military's actions, entailing a completely new configuration of society. Accordingly, Naser's assumption of power, democratic and undemocratic initiatives and installing military personnel in the government show a new sovereign was actualized, and actualization of the virtual structure, by defining the contents and duration of the state of exception.

Following the reconfiguration of the state as a multiplicity, the military institution readdressed itself correspondingly, assuming a new position as a political point of power. Connecting far more extensively than under the monarch, the military acquired a fundamentally new position, establishing itself as the actual sovereign. Through rhetorical strategies creating military-lauding and nationalist narratives, the reconfigured institution's connections spread to include the people of Egypt, solidifying its position. The void created by removing the old constitution and developing a new judicial system simultaneously permitted the military to territorialize this system and create laws enabling the institution to sustain power.

The paradigm of the actualizing sovereign is therefore adept in elucidating how the military positioned and consolidated itself after a state of exception, and actualized as the sovereign in the void after the coup. New trajectories within the military institution itself became increasingly

²¹ Ibid.:71-72

influential, which meant that the previously interconnected state and military institutions were at a bifurcation.

3.3 Sidelining the military

Further institutions created to consolidate the military included a significant increase in surveillance organizations, both civil and military. While the coup had been created by the military, Nasser moved to create surveillance institutions that could inform him of potential coup attempts from the military, and essentially created the *Mukhabarat*, or General Intelligence Service, state²². This and other institutions infiltrated both each other and other institutions, in order to support the country's ruler's position by creating a web of intelligence. Given the powerful national narrative of being the father of the nation, though, the leader of the army, General Abdel Hakim Amer, retained a strong position publicly²³.

This power in the rhetoric of pride in the army vanished quickly following the 1967 defeat to Israel. Before this event, however, there were signs that the state's executive, Nasser, was reconfiguring the supporting institutions in order to maintain his position against an army, whose loyalty lay with Amer. This entailed decreasing the amount of officers in the cabinet from 51.6% in 1961 to 36.6% in 1964, while establishing other narratives of Arab nationalism connected closely to the "Arab Socialist Union" founded in 1962²⁴.

The institution's political significance further diminished when fellow Free Officer Anwar Sadat inherited Nasser's position upon the latter's death in 1970. Sadat renamed the "Arab Socialist Union" to "National Democratic Party", but with similar effect for the military – namely keeping the institution politically at bay. Moreover, Sadat increasingly depoliticized other institutions, by excluding the heads of these from the locus of power, with the effect of centralizing power in an executive group, rather than institutions²⁵. Sadat's *Intifah* program from 1974 aimed at privatizing large portions of previously public and military run subsidiaries ran down the military's budget, which had also been taken out of their control. Similarly, Sadat opted to exclude any military personal in the American-led negotiations of the military relation between Egypt and Israel at the

²² Kandil 2012:21

²³ Ibid.:51

²⁴ Ibid.:50

²⁵ Stacher 2012:45, 52

Camp David Accords²⁶. The army's positioning as a political institution wielding power for the sovereign was decreasing as central as it had been during the first years of Naser's reign.

This tendency continued, despite a vindication of the Egyptian army in the public following the (initially) successful strikes on Israel in 1973. Previous developments had however rendered the military obsolete in internal affairs, and the institutional infrastructure of the state created in the wake of '67 remained²⁷. The assassination of Sadat left the presidency for General Hosni Mubarak, who continued to rule the same way Sadat had. Further, the authority embedded within his capacity as president allowed him to appoint the key positions in the military, continuing system that befitted the rest of the strategy²⁸.

Despite this tactic of depoliticization and distance from executive power, the ties between the military and the leaders of the country remained close. One very clear signifier is that despite the shifting direct reliance on the military as the chief institution for consolidating power, but for Mohamed Morsi's relatively short period in office, the country's chief executive has had a military rank since the 1952 coup. Celebrations of "Military Day" continue to take place yearly, proving the cultural convocations of the military are still intact²⁹. Further, despite Mubarak's maintenance of Sadat's privatization program, the military has been afforded leniency to keep control over their remaining subsidiaries, and has controlled potential uprisings through these corporations³⁰.

Although subdued in direct influence during four decades, the military has been a constant figure in the evolution of the Egyptian state.

3.4 The Reconfiguring Giant

On the surface, the politically withdrawn role of the military that had begun in the years leading up to the 1967 defeat to Israel and lasting almost 41 years could insinuate the complete reconfiguration of the military, having lost all significant connections to the multiplicity of the sovereign. With the simultaneous growth in the amount and size of intelligence services, to the extent Egypt was referred to as an intelligence states, the sovereignty of the military appears to have been severely challenged.

²⁶ Ibid.:69

²⁷ Cook 2007:76-77

²⁸ Stacher 2012:85

²⁹ Cook 2007:74

³⁰ Cambanis 2010

The question thus becomes whether the 1967 war qualifies as a state of exception in the proposed framework. Sadat's continued efforts to marginalize the military, and other institutions, in order to protect his position were a trajectory of action that he continued from Naser. The radical changes inherent to the state of exception, however, demand the complete restructuring of institutions, which isn't evident. There has undoubtedly been a persistent reconfiguration of institutions' positioning around the executive elite, yet the military ties to the positioned sovereign were not completely severed. The connections in the multiplicity meant a greater territorialization by the intelligence services, which condition the trajectories of the military. Within this framework, 1967 therefore doesn't qualify as a state of exception and the actualization of a new sovereign.

1973 gave the military a slight vindication, but the structuration of the multiplicity at this time meant that the military couldn't connect more closely to the locus of power, as it had done in 1952. Although some more significant through their spectrum of connections, all trajectories and tangents of the multiplicities are contingent on each other. Through this spectrum, therefore, it is possible to understand how the effect of a victory against a historical archenemy was contingent on the remaining elements in society and the path dependency of the previous and concurrent development. As states of exception are moments where the intensity inherent in stable society, the events of 1967 and 1973 thereby testify how institutionalization can contain a state of exception with the same dynamics that create and structure these states.

The institutionalization of the executive leaders through the structuring of the state multiplicity entailed the continuation of military personnel in the sovereign position, yet a sustained distancing of the military institution. As Mubarak stepped into this configuration and worked to sustain it, the events and weakening of this institutionalized entity ensuing the public revolts against his regime provided the opportunity for the military to establish further connections with the people.

3.5 2011 and Current Government

The Egyptian chapter of The Arab Spring was initially met with severity from the police and security institutions of the state, provoking further uprising. As this further mobilization grew in size and organization, so did the response from the state. However, the longevity of the protests forced Mubarak to call on his military for assistance in allaying the uprising. The military's response was not to follow this command, stating *"To the great people of Egypt, your armed forces, acknowledging the legitimate rights of the people (...) have not used and will not use force against*

the Egyptian people"³¹. While the military didn't operate directly against Mubarak or the police, their relative pacifism is evidence of a conscious choice to abstain from interference. Following Mubarak's subsequent resignation from office on February 11th 2011, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took command of the Egypt, declaring a state of exception until their promised democratic elections within six months³². The initial reaction of this council was to reinstate large parts of the previous regime without election along with further failure to produce the promised change, resulting in a new wave of protest and corresponding police response³³.

Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood's inauguration in June 2012 was initially seen as an end to the SCAF rule, and time for democratic progress. Throughout this period, he drafted a new constitution and extended his own power, practically making himself immune from the judiciary systems. This move heralded large opposition within courts, the public and increasingly also the military, whose influence was decreasing again. By July 3rd 2013, a prolonged period of anti-Morsi and pro-military protests leads to the oppositional parties and the military calling for vast changes, including his resignation³⁴. This led to General al-Sisi, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, announcing; "*The Armed Forces, based on its insightfulness, has been called by the Egyptian people for help, not to hold the reins of power, yet to discharge its civil responsibility and answer demands of responsibility*"³⁵. This effectively meant the removal of Morsi, the suspension of his constitution and redrafting of a new constitution by the courts Morsi had sought to exclude and establishing a provisional government, until new elections can be held. As of this moment, General Al-Sisi serves as the Deputy Prime Minister in a government created through military intervention, headed by acting President of Egypt and President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour³⁶.

3.6 2011 and 2013: Developing States of Exception

The weakened structure of Mubarak's state meant the institutionalization of the executive leaders was weakening, and their stabilizing institutions fatigued. While the possible connections of the sovereign thereby diminished as the revolution wore on, the military's connection with the

³¹ Doucet 2011

³² Kandil 2012:226-228

³³ Middle East Media Research Institute 2011

³⁴ El-Sharnoubi 2013

³⁵ Al-Sisi in Aljazeera 2013

³⁶ Masr 2013

protesters allowed it to assume to space of a sovereign. It is therefore clear that the military, as a whole institution, once again territorialized the space of the sovereign. The actualization of this followed the breaks and creations of new multiplicities, and rendered the previous order inapplicable. As in 1953, a new political form was declared, and Egypt was to become a democracy after a period of military-controlled change.

Signs of a state of exception and change in sovereign are therefore apparent, yet the deeper dynamics of the reconfiguration convoke notions of continuance. The continuation of specific members of the previous regime alludes to the practice of sovereignty not having changed in an equally radical fashion. This fact highlights an absolutely central point in the evolution of the military in conjuncture with the state. The relative ease with which the military could assume power, along with the appointment of previous staff, point to the military's existing territorialization of the sovereign space. Mubarak's resignation, evidently influenced by the military's (lack of) action, left a space of connections, which the military could occupy. Through this paradigm, therefore, it is clear how the infrastructure of sovereignty remained intact after the overthrow, and the connections defining the multiplicity could continue developing along the same logic of actualization.

A new sovereign is still contingent on their connections with the people. The public outrage following the continued appointment of personnel from the overthrown regime, exposing the dissatisfaction with a lacking actualization of a change in the virtual sovereign, which had prompted the evolution into a new political form. This military-led intermezzo came to an end with the election of Morsi. The contingency of this actual sovereign on its connectivity with the people became apparent, and at the dawn of the new political form, therefore, there was to be a new sovereign. The instatement of Morsi proves the contingency of the actual sovereign, which necessarily requires a shift in the virtual sphere.

The actualization of this shift and its radically transformative events occurred gradually following Morsi's inauguration. A new constitution was drafted, including substantial changes to especially the judicial system. A change in the configuration of the space of sovereignty is therefore evident, and the institutions surrounding this space reconfigured accordingly. The SCAF retained their position as sovereign throughout the period until the elections, calling an end to the state of exception and opened for a fundamentally new system. The infrastructure of the multiplicities that

had been increasingly institutionalized around the locus of power since the 1960'ies was thereby also removed, allowing for new trajectories to populate the space of sovereignty.

While Morsi, as the President of the democracy, thereby seemingly had free reigns to reorganize the state within the democratic possibilities, inspecting the ensuing events elucidate the contingency of these on the previous developments. Sidelining paramount institutions such as the judiciary system and expanding power of the presidency is an active reconfiguration of the sovereign's position, similar in kind to the acts performed by the military predecessors. Beyond the surface view of the reaction to Morsi's power expansion provided by the e.g. institutional realist view, through the proposed spectrum it is possible to elucidate how the previous organization of dimensions in the sovereign and state multiplicities conditioned Morsi's possibilities.

General al-Sisi's declaration of the SCAF's adherence to the popular protest against Morsi earlier this year similarly expresses the actualization of a new sovereign following the decomposition of Morsi's position. Lacking institutionalization of the sovereign's new connectivity eventually lead to breaks from it, leaving a void, which the military-nationalism connectivity had the potential to territorialize. It is therefore clear that the trajectories of the military institution have once again populated the space of the sovereign, along with the connection with the population. While there are still promises of democratic elections, the provisional military rule has redrafted the constitution, and thereby influenced the possible connections.

4. Conclusion

The framework thereby elucidates how the military institution has reconfigured along a logic of connectivity and contingency, developing along the concurrent processes of the state. By viewing the military institution as a multiplicity contingent on other multiplicities, the connections and evolutions that condition it are elucidated. The coup in 1952, the long military rule before the introduction and expulsion of Morsi from the space of sovereignty and the SCAF's current positioning expose the embedding of the actual sovereign in existing multiplicities. A state of exception changes society, radically so, yet the existing institutions, i.e. multiplicities, still have their trajectories. When a sovereign is rejected by the system, it is an expression of the virtual structure's conditioning of the actual. One or more institutions can and will assume the actual space in accordance with the idea of the sovereign, as it evidenced by the current SCAF-judicial government.

There may appear to be a weakness in the scope of the framework in these central moments of Egyptian military history. The wars in 1967 and 1973, and the Camp David Accords, are highly significant events, yet their importance is limited when inspected through the current scope, as there haven't been the radical changes inherent to the state of exception. As the rulers remained during and after the two wars, it signifies the degree of institutionalization and contingency of the sovereign without belittling the relevance of the events.

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