



URBAN GOVERNANCE

Field study in Rabat and Casablanca

MASTER GOVERNING THE LARGE METROPOLIS
SCIENCES PO URBAN SCHOOL

2015

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EDITORIAL NOTE

n the 11th of January 2015, fifty-two Sciences Po students from the fifth cohort of the master's degree "Governing the Large Metropolis" took off for a one-week study trip in Morocco. Our mission was to examine the urbanization processes unfolding in the cities of Casablanca and Rabat.

20 degrees and palm trees. 1469 miles away from our cold and snowy Paris. An almost summer camp-like atmosphere... After landing, all of us hopped on the bus heading for our hotel in the center of Casablanca. Eyes wide open, probing the landscape from above, we felt carried away into another culture by the sight of shepherds guiding their herds, the young riding their patched-up motorbikes, and the numerous wanderers of the Mohammed V public square. Casablanca is considered Morocco's economic and business center. Yet, many battered building facades lined both sides of the road, contrasting with some of our preconceived ideas about the transformative power of economic development in a globalised and capitalist world. Within these seven days however, we learned to value these run down facades - the history they have witnessed, the power struggles they have endured, and most importantly, the lives they were shaping and sheltering.

During six intense days we met with several high-ranking officials from both cities - representatives from cultural associations, private agencies, real estate developers, researchers and various members from civil society. Over lunch and late at night, a few hours of spare time allowed us to engage deeper with the medina's maze of narrow lanes and its street vendors competing to catch our foreign attention. Not only were these informal moments necessary to recharge our batteries, but they were also crucial in our quest for information and local testimonies. Our professors had earlier suggested that most of what we would be looking for would be found in off-the-record discussions, debates and revelations. In this, Saint Exupéry's "Petit Prince" guided our steps, reminding us that "what is essential is

invisible to the eye” ...

Our efforts were thus aimed at finding a singular approach to build the report, by highlighting bridges and connexions between major themes which structured the visits (economic development, governance issues, culture, urban projects, etc.). Following this, we analyze the articulation between the policy choices made by, and for, the political and business elite of Rabat and Casablanca, considering the sometimes conflicting demands for economic development and claims for democracy -following the adoption of a new constitution in 2011. We also look at how the fringe of society characterized by partially informal lifestyles fits into this dialectic. What is the impact of the conflict between development and democracy, more specifically in the metropolization process of the Rabat-Casablanca region? How is the management of informality addressed within these competing narratives?

These questions are answered from various perspectives in the following pages. The first chapter presents an overview of Moroccan governance at large - its structure and inherent conflicts - together with an analysis of the factors leading to evolving ties between the metropolitan regions of Casablanca and Rabat. Chapter 2 evaluates the various attempts of the city of Casablanca to become an international trade and financial hub. The following chapter looks at the dynamics of land ownership and its impact on the socially disfranchised populations of both cities. The fourth chapter tackles social challenges and focuses on the governance of both poverty and the informal sector. Finally, Chapter 5 examines how cultural policies are embedded within the metropolization process occurring between the cities of Rabat and Casablanca.

Editor in chief

Paola Chapdelaine


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
Sources:

- Google maps
- Y. Berriane, Femmes, associations et politique à Casablanca, Centre Jacques Berque, 2013

- Visited sites
- Freeways and main roads
- Old Medina
- Business Center
- Villas / Buildings
- High Standing Villas
- New Medina Habitat

Scale: 2km

R A B A T



Source: Google maps

- Visited sites
- Freeways and main roads
- Rabat

Scale: 10km

Maps : Paola Chapdelaine
Julie Lannou



Photo : Nicolas Hrycaj

RABAT AND CASABLANCA IN CONTEXT

CHAPTER ONE

UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONS AND URBAN GOVERNANCE IN MOROCCO

by Roberto Lopez and Valentin Dubois-Guidoux

“ ‘ We are a democracy.’ These were the words used by Moroccan officials to qualify their regime. Despite Morocco’s low ranking in numerous global indexes of democracy, officials argued that Morocco was similar to other Western democracies. Yet this official discourse often seemed out of step with the reality we observed on the ground, suggesting that the Moroccan state walks a thin line between maintaining their political legitimacy at home and wooing Western trade partners abroad - which necessitates at least the appearance of a democratic mode of governance.

Since our study trip took place both in Casablanca and Rabat, we had the opportunity to analyze the Moroccan political system in both its national and local dimensions, as well as the state of relations between the two. Thus after presenting a critical description of the Moroccan political system we will attempt to illuminate the issues and stakeholders in Morocco related to urban public policies in particular. We believe such a division is relevant, as the former will help us trace the development and organization of Moroccan urban governance.

Separation of Powers in Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The central executive power belongs to a bicephalous government, lead by the Prime Minister under the King’s control. The bicameral parliament has held legislative power since 1996. It is composed of a house of representatives, elected by direct universal suffrage, and a house of councilors, elected by the representatives of the local authorities. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, whose members are appointed by the King, holds the judiciary power. At the local level too, Moroccan counties and cities are divided between an executive board appointed by the King (the wilaya, responsible for each of the 16 regions) and an elected representative or mayor. The two administrations are not outwardly competitive, yet they have their own prerogatives and street-level bureaucrats. Overall, Morocco is still very much in the early stages democratization. Indeed, according to the 2012 Democracy Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit), the country is ranked 115th out of 167, with particularly low scores in pluralism and electoral participation. Rule of law is limited in Western

Sahara, as well as for the lowest categories of the population and ethnic minorities living in slums.

The Supremacy of The King

The current king, Mohammed VI, has reigned since 1999. His role is central and his legitimacy partly comes from his religious and military power, as he is both the leader of the army and the "commander of the faithful". Practically he presides over the government and can dismiss ministers largely at will. Besides the Supreme Court, no political institution has any power upon him. The King, along with his advisors, has a robust ability to initiate and direct public policy. For instance, he can appoint all top-level officials and administrators or give dahir, a King's decree bypassing the Parliament. As a result, in every national or local project, the King is presented as a benevolent initiator. This omnipresence in national, local and even religious domains is reflected in the royal propaganda in Morocco.

The 2011 Constitution

After the protests of February 20th in early 2011, King Mohammed VI proposed a new constitution on March the 9th to be ratified by referendum, which was approved by 97.58% of the population on July 1st. The purpose of this text was to rebalance the separation of powers to reinforce the rule of law.

According to the text, the King's prerogatives have not been limited but rather clarified (for in-

stance, the administrators he can appoint are exhaustively listed). The field of legislation by the Parliament has been extended to new domains. The two houses are made equal in the legislative production process, yet the control by the representatives on the government is strengthened. The Prime Minister is now the appointed head of the Government, yet the King still rules over the Ministers' Cabinet. The government remains responsible to both the Parliament and, to some extent, the King, who can expel any Minister.

Urban Governance and Urban Policies in Morocco

The duality of Morocco's governance, composed of two branches - one political (elected by the citizens) and one administrative (appointed and controlled by the King) - also exists at the city level. This situation results from the fact that the King has launched a decentralization process, without fully renouncing its many powers and prerogatives, resulting in a situation still characterized by his omnipresence through local officials (Walids and Governors). Thus, while the presidents of city assemblies and regions are officially in charge of urban policies and projects, there is a gap between their budgets and their numerous prerogatives, subjecting them to central state authority and the King. Along with the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (a publicly-funded organization), the Walids (equivalent of the french "préfet", whose respon-



Photo : Mikhail Ermac

sibilities are the preservation of security and the promotion of economic development among their territory) handle most financial resources, enabling them to control local politicians and giving them the final word on many urban policies and projects. More recently, in order to accelerate and facilitate the implementation of long-awaited mega-projects, the King has created by dahir (royal decree) a certain number of urban agencies endowed with exceptional powers related to these projects. The latter benefit from an absence of control from local politicians or traditional urban agencies. It seems evident that this new type of agency leaves the traditional political frame aside since they are no longer held responsible by any local politician, despite the

fact that their policies directly impact the inhabitants these politicians represent.

This complex political architecture is essential to understand because it explains why most of the actors we met in Morocco defined their action as an application of the King's will. Moreover, such depiction of the political organization also shows the channels through which the King and the central state transmit their orders, and why these orders are so respected by local officials. Nonetheless, while Morocco's political organization and governance could seem rather unusual and not fully democratic (as we Western citizens conceive it) it should be noted that many aspects we have described are not unique to Morocco but rather

common among countries seeking to accelerate decision process and implementation. Indeed, similar configurations of sovereignty and rescaling of the state can be found in other Arab cities engaged in global competition to attract foreign investments, such as the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority, Mawared in Amman and Solidere in Beirut.

CASABLANCA AND RABAT: DEVELOPING TOGETHER OR DEVELOPING APART?

by Kwame Boye Frimpong, Marissa Potasiak, Naomi Fagla Médégan and Mikhail Anton Ermac

Comparing the differing trajectories of urban development in Rabat and Casablanca reveals much about relations between these cities and their place in the Moroccan state's development strategy as a whole. On the one hand, through the site visits, interviews and meetings with politicians, private developers, and civil society actors, we have noticed a complementary process of development in both cities. Massive investments have been made on projects such as the building of a new marina, the development of a new downtown in Casablanca, and the renewal of the old port and river basin in Rabat, which largely cater to middle and upper class Moroccans. These projects also share an international, outward focus aimed at projecting Morocco as a global city. However, despite these similarities these projects often employ different means of

achieving these goals, particularly with regards to their strategies of financing and their reliance on state authority. What do these similarities and differences say about the trajectory of urban development in both cities? More specifically, are Casablanca and Rabat developing together, separately, or in direct competition with one another? The answer to this question is rooted in a more fundamental distinction between the cities themselves, Rabat serving as the country's cultural and political capital, and Casablanca hosting its economic and financial activities - a historic distinction that continues to influence urban development in both cities today.

Competition

At first glance, several arguments seem to support the thesis of competition between the two urban centers of Casablanca and



Drawing: Clara Marcuard Fregonese

Rabat. The writings of Cuadra do-Roura and Rubalcaba-Bermejo¹ support this idea, asserting that cities have always specialised, producing a natural inclination towards a presumption of competition. In comparing Rabat and Casablanca, one notable area of specialization relates to each city's differing demographics. Casablanca has always been a city of migrants, while Rabat has historically been quite a bourgeois city. This demographic difference became particularly visible during the reign of King Hassan II, when both cities were marked by a certain opposition to the royal authority, yet expressed that opposition in highly dissimilar ways. In Rabat, the elite (mainly composed of civil servants) was very politicized and used the institutional channels available to them to shift the political agenda. On the other hand, Casablanca became the cradle of several riots (the most violent of which happened in 1981) aiming to improve the people's material conditions. Thus in Rabat and Casablanca opposition to the central government did not have the same goals, nor the same modus operandi - revealing little sense of unity between the two cities.

Second, when it comes to developing commercial activities and attracting foreign businesses, Casablanca and Rabat have a history of competition, each city seemingly trying to counter the other's influence. Several examples illustrate this point. Not long after the luxury group Cartier settled in Casablanca in 2004, Rabat

welcomed Rolex. One year later, after Rabat had inaugurated its MegaMall in Hay Ryad, Casablanca opened its O Gallery. Finally, Rabat's Arribat Centre, with its luxury hotel and shops, appears as a direct counter-attack to Casablanca's Morocco Mall, built in 2010. This would be in line with the argument of Gordon and Cheshire², who suggest that "the competitive ethos is, increasingly, affecting cities, obliging them to be more active in marketing themselves and in trying to identify and reinforce their assets."

This process of competitive development between the two cities may flow from the fact that there simply is not the kind of political infrastructure needed to achieve a joint metropolization process between Rabat and Casablanca. Therefore the development of new cities - as well as the rapid urbanization occurring along the road linking both cities - does not seem to stem from a carefully reflected project, but would rather follow a growing and dynamic private real estate sector which overtakes political dynamics, as emphasized by Dr. Mohamed Tozy, Dean of the School of Governance and Economics of Rabat. It thus seems that both cities are privileging their own development, regardless of whether it is done at the expense of the other. But does this impression still hold true when abandoning the local focus and shifting the scale of analysis to the national level.

1. Cuadrado-Roura, J. R., Rubalcaba-Bermejo, L. "Specialization and Competition amongst European Cities: A New Approach through Fair and Exhibition Activities". In *Regional Studies*, 32(2), 133-147. 1998

2. Cheshire, P. C., Gordon, I. R. "Territorial competition: Some lessons for policy". In *The Annals of Regional Science*, 32(3), 321-346. 1998

Complementarity

To better understand the complementary roles played by the two cities of Rabat and Casablanca, we needed to broaden our understanding of the subject by placing ourselves at a national scale. For one, evidence of complementary development can be found in the SOFA (Schéma d'Organisation Fonctionnelle et d'Aménagement de l'aire métropolitaine centrale), a document proposing to merge Casablanca and Rabat, as well as the surrounding towns, into a grand metropolitan area (INAU Field report). Written in 1998, it identified the key barriers to development plaguing both cities, barriers which in turn impeded the economic development of Morocco as a whole. The SOFA called for a metropolitan perspective to address these common problems, while ensuring that the state would continue to be the guiding force behind Moroccan metropolitan development. This is not to deny key differences between Casablanca and Rabat. The former is without question the economic, financial, and industrial capital of the country, coming in at number 78 in the Global City rankings (perhaps reflecting the city's aspiration to become the top financial hub of the African continent). The latter, on the other hand, is the political and cultural capital of Morocco, home to some of Morocco's most notable historic architecture and cultural sites. Yet the new goal of the Moroccan Agency for

Tourism Development (SMIT) is to make both Rabat and Casablanca "global destinations" for international tourism³. Thus it seems that each complements one another - offering both diversity and specialisation linked to their comparative advantage. Positioning Casablanca as a global city invariably allows Rabat to dominate domestic affairs. Textile, electronics, food processing and clothing industries of Casablanca supply the increasing demand for such products in Rabat. On the other hand, Rabat boasts a large number of higher educational institutions which supply the skilled human capital needed to propel the growth of Casablanca.

Integration is further achieved through the transportation networks linking both cities - be it by rail, road, air, or sea. Internally, both cities have seen huge investment in transportation infrastructure. The travel time between Casablanca and Rabat is one hour by train or road, falling within the accepted "one hour rule" of which urban dwellers are willing to spend commuting⁴. How does the transport network evidence complementary relations between the cities? Ac-

4. Batten, D. F. "Network cities: creative urban agglomerations for the 21st century". In *Urban studies*, 32(2), 313-327. 1995

5. Autoroutes du Maroc (ADM), 2003 (On Line:<http://www.adm.co.ma/adm/communication/pages/publication.aspx?p=5>)

3. Hemidach Amjad, "Rabat and according to the agency in charge Casablanca to Become "World of the construction, maintenance, Tourist Destinations"". In *Morocco and operation of state highway World News*. 2014 network, Autoroutes du Maroc⁵, Casablanca-Rabat has the country's most circulated Motorway (20.30% share of national traffic) with an average daily traffic of 49,543 vehicles. The high volume of traffic in part accentuates the exchange of goods and services between the cities; each being a

reciprocal consumer of the other's functionality.

In conclusion, answering the question of whether Casablanca and Rabat are developing in a competitive or a complementary manner; we find that the answer lies somewhere in-between, pointing to a kind of complementary-competition. At a national level, the competition between the cities seems inconsequential - a win-win situation for the state and the king, who have a vested interest in the development and prosperity of both cities.

What's more, the two growing cities stand to benefit from realizing the synergies of interactive growth. As affirmed by UN HABITAT⁶, national economic growth is harnessed by the heterogeneous functions of modern cities. However, it must be noted that competition generates negative consequences of being discriminatory with its patrons, hence perpetuating inequality and segregation. Efforts should therefore be made to mitigate the emerging negative consequences.

6. UN Habitat. Economic Role of Cities: Global Urban Economic Dialogue Series. 2012

Photo : Nicolas Hrycay





Photo: Nicolas Hrycaj

STRIVING FOR INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH

CHAPTER TWO

A MARITIME INTERFACE

by Adelaide de Couessin, Arthur Simon, Sofia Morgavi and Alex Aung Khant

Home to 3500 kilometers of coastline stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco boasts 38 ports handling approximately 98% of its internal exchanges. However, the country began only recently to take advantage of this strategic location. In 1912, Hubert Lyautey, then in charge of the Moroccan protectorate, was given the task to build the first modern port of Casablanca, which at the time was only a small fishing port.

Nowadays, the fishing port has been moved to the Roches Noires neighbourhood, four kilometers away from the actual port, which has tripled in size since 1912. As a result, the port of Casablanca handles over 33% of all shipping traffic to Morocco, a staggering number given that it is only 1 out of 38 ports.

Logistics on the port

The port of Casablanca is under the control of two official bodies. First, the National Agency of the Ports is a public agency endowed with a legal status and financial independence. It is however subject to financial control from the state. It plays a key role in regulating port activities, while technical

supervision is carried out by the Ministry of Equipment and Transport.

The maritime juridical framework changed in 2006, with reforms aimed at enhancing competition among other ports, adapting the provision of port services to an increasing demand and creating a powerful tool able to influence the economic performance of Morocco's private companies. To do so, conveyor chains were adjusted and competition was fostered thanks to the intervention of the private sector. A more strategic vision was thus necessary for Casablanca's port - a vision which failed to materialize. This is why the modernization project has yet to be successfully implemented, despite the reform's well-meaning intentions.

In the meantime, a ground-breaking simulation software program has been launched by the Ministry, used to train new recruits with managing and handling the container ships. The simulation software brings a modern approach to the development of the port and ensures that its employees work in accordance with ever-changing international standards. Infrastructure-wise, a new fourth terminal is also planned and will

be built with a deeper dock to accommodate larger container ships, with all the modern equipment required.

These new demands for logistics has also prompted a plan to build a new port zone in the north of Casablanca where there is ample space and less congestion. This zone is meant to handle all the port's logistics, and would also serve as a connection between Casablanca and the north, as well as with Rabat.

External and internal links

Historically speaking, the development of Casablanca was directly linked to the development of the port. With a workforce of about 30,000, it stands at the core of Casablanca's economy, employing not only locals, but also attracting national and international investors.


To foster the economy of the country, mainly based on maritime fluxes, there is now a major government project to make ports not only infrastructure used to transfer goods, but also the economic levers of the country. The fact that Rabat has effectively decided not to have its own industrial port is indicative of the complementary process of metropolization between the two cities. The development of Rabat's port is indeed more focused on leisure and tourism, whereas the development of the port of Casablanca is based on trade, with the aim of becoming an important hub between the Moroccan hinterland and the rest of the world, particularly

with regards to flows of cereals, minerals, and fishing ships.

However, the port of Casablanca is also orienting its activity towards tourism by building a pier which could host cruise ships and by investing in the touristic sector through a marina project and the opening of the port to the old medina. Focusing more on touristic activities would enable Casablanca to attract more visitors, potentially transforming Casablanca into a Moroccan economic and cultural capital.

To widen the extent of Casablanca's port's influence, various projects are underway such as the development of railroad activities from the port towards the hinterland, and the construction of a road between the port of Casablanca and the logistics zone of Zenata, 20 kilometers northeast. Zenata is a strategic place, located between Casablanca, Mohammedia and Rabat, and is crossed by several motorways and railway lines.

The port of Casablanca therefore not only aims at being Morocco's most important port, but also strives to hold a strategic place in the international maritime trade. At the moment, Casablanca is mainly an African hub, trading with its neighbours especially from the Maghreb region. However, the city ambitions to expand its trade to the Arabian Gulf and a clear indicator of this ambition is the Marina project. Next to the historical downtown of the Old Medina, offices, luxury apartments, a shopping mall and a marina are to be built, largely based upon the model of Dubai,



with the marina aiming to attract rich foreign investors to develop high-class tourism. The project is actually under construction, but has been considerably slowed down since the main investors, the Gaddafi family, stopped funding the project in 2011. Funding the Marina has been the main difficulty ever since and the project has been delayed numerous times, while the marina is yet to undergo construction.

It seems as though this project reveals the limits of Casablanca's ambitions; the main challenge is to be attractive enough to lure foreign investors. Yet competition is fierce in that sector and the future will show us if Casablanca have the means to live up to its ambitions.

Drawing: Clara Marcuard
Fregonese

ON CASABLANCA AND RABAT'S ENTREPRENEURIAL URBAN GOVERNANCE: MEGA-PROJECTS FOR WHOM?

by Jitka Molnarova, Lorena Figueiredo and Perrine Chauliac

In the 1980s a regeneration-based, project-focused type of urban planning emerged in the North-American and European framework¹, associated with a new model of urban governance, the "entrepreneurialism", in which city managers act as entrepreneurs fighting for investments, in competition with other cities². Today, not much has changed in the urban planning scenario, apart from a crucial movement of global expansion: "everywhere the city of enterprise has boomed and busted and then boomed and busted again". The most flagrant expression of the entrepreneurial model of urban governance are the numerous design-oriented, first-class mega-projects that spur everywhere — from London's Docklands, an abandoned industrial zone transformed into a dynamic residential and commercial area, to China's Shenzhen, the built-from-scratch, high-tech, service-oriented financial hub, passing through the public-private partnership for urban regeneration in Rio de Janeiro's harbour area (Porto Maravilha). Not surprisingly, Morocco has its own gems: the new Casablanca Finance City (CFC), the new commercial and residential Casa Marina center, also in Casablanca, and the Vallée du Bouregreg regeneration project in Rabat, which combines transportation infrastructure, environmental protection, and cultural equipments such as a theatre and a natural sciences museum. While Casablanca aims to become the "new financial hub of North Africa", Rabat seeks to promote itself as a "green city" and the "cultural capital" of Morocco.

Yet at this point one must wonder whether these efforts made by Casablanca and Rabat will truly suffice in attracting foreign investors that could turn the Moroccan metropolitan region into a new global city. And if so, how will it change the urban landscape of the two cities and the lives of their inhabitants? According to the latest rankings of the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), which measures the competitiveness of financial centres, Casablanca is currently positioned at rank 51³. Compared to cities such as Lagos or Istanbul (of which the recent growth might shake off the Moroccan ambition to host a new

1. Hall, Peter. 2014. Cities of tomorrow. West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. 4th edition

2. Harvey, David. 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler* 71.1, 3–17

3. QFC (2014), The Global Financial Centres Index 16

global financial hub) Casablanca, due to its many reforms and tax incentives launched in 2010 and its scenario of political stability, seems to stand bravely as a strong competitor moving quickly upwards in the GFCI statistics. It is therefore probable that the Casablanca Finance City (CFC) project will succeed and bring the expected foreign capital to the city.

However, the GFCI focuses on the quality of business environment, market access, skilled labour force and prices of real estate³, leaving social aspects such as inclusiveness, quality of housing stock or social welfare out of the ranking. The increasing potential of Casablanca to become a new financial centre thus reflects benefits the CFC would bring to international businesses, but little does it say about the benefits it would bring to the local population.

Consequently, the ambition of becoming a financial hub is translated in the urban landscape by iconic projects embodying the political willingness to brand Casablanca as the new gateway to Africa. In a globalized and competitive environment, urban planning and design are coupled together, to re-imagine and sell places⁴. A good example is the creation by the private agency ANfA of the CFC, a whole neighbourhood dedicated to financial activities, stretching out on 365 hectares at the heart of the city, which aimed to send a positive symbol to investors. In that sense, megaprojects reveal how much urban planning

has become market-oriented, promoting the city with the goal of attracting foreign investments. Thus, Casablanca as well as Rabat and its iconic project of Opera, designed by the star architect Zaha Hadid, implement a strategy of “city-branding” in order to reinforce Morocco’s attractiveness for business and posit the country in the Euro-mediterranean map⁴. However, it is unclear whether this strategy could turn Casablanca into a especially attractive location, as, in many ways, the project imitates existing financial hubs — for example, ANFA’s project of commercial towers resembles Dubai’s skyline. The risk of homogenizing urban landscapes and losing the Moroccan identity does exist; Casablanca’s governance is following a generic model of development, based on standardized international

4. Barthel, Pierre Arnaud and Planel, Sabine. 2010. Tanger Med and Casa Marina, prestige projects in Morocco: new capitalist framework and local contexts. *Built Environment*. 36.2, 48-63

5. Vainer, Carlos. Pátria, Empresa e mercadoria. In Arantes, O. Vainer; C. Maricato, E. A Cidade do pensamento único. São Paulo: Vozes, 3^a Edição 2004



Photo : Alex Aung Khant

rankings, such as the Quality of Living Index of Mercer, and recommendations of global actors, such as the consultant McKinsey, working on almost



Photo : Nicolas Hrycaj

every urban megaproject worldwide. Moreover, the lack of participatory processes in Casablanca planning, as underlined by Barthel and Planell⁴, may also contribute to the standardization of urban landscapes, as inhabitants are not granted the chance to preserve the specificity of their lifestyles. As international organizations like the GFCI, by measuring the global competitiveness of cities, end up giving little importance to the overall improvement of the local quality of life in their recommendations, the Moroccan government, seems to focus too much on improving the conditions for businesses and their employees, and too little on benefiting the Moroccan population. While seeking to place cit-

ies at an international rank, the government invests in “prestige urbanism” mega-projects that might not correspond to the real needs and expectations of the locals. This is intrinsically connected with the top-down model of governance by which these projects are implemented, via ad hoc private agencies like ANFA and the Agence d’Aménagement de la Vallé du Bouregreg, lacking democratic control mechanisms. But in a project like the ANFA one, which will create a new neighbourhood of expected 100,000 inhabitants in Casablanca, the absence of provision to build social housing is quite striking. When the ANFA representative stated that this neighbourhood would be a space “for everyone, by everyone” he probably meant

the consumers of the “city merchandise”⁵, that is, international investors, expats, and upper and middle class dwellers; not the urban poor, whom according to his discourse “would have to move elsewhere”. Certainly, the very positive side of ANFA’s project is the creation of jobs. However, the risk is that those jobs benefit mostly skilled workers and sideline one part of the population. The top-down entrepreneurial model of urban governance adopted in Casablanca and Rabat is thus implementing “prestige urbanism” mega-projects that seek to attract international investors in a competitive global scenario of cities, while neglecting local inhabitants’ needs and expectations of what a city “for everyone” should really be.

POLITICAL LANGUAGE: TWO TALES OF MOROCCO

by Clarissa Pelino and Marie Pla

I. Murray Edelman, Political language and political reality. PS, 1985, Vol. 18, N° 1, p. 10-19

“Political language, like all texts, can be understood as creating an endless chain of ambiguous associations and constructions that offer wide potentialities for interpretation and for manipulation.”¹ The vagueness of the political language used by Moroccan authorities, and more generally the actors involved in urban projects in Casablanca and Rabat, serves two purposes. One is to build consensus among citizens, through the use of a democratic lexical field; the other is to woo potential expatriates to the country by employing both images and a lexical field that appeals to the notion of a prestigious metropolis and general globalized urban norms. Words such as “democratic initiative” do not imply effective participative governance on a practical level, but nonetheless conjure the image of a government working hand in hand with its citizens. On the other hand, the imitative vocabulary of modernity and the global architecture of the Casablanca-Rabat projects is aimed at appealing to foreign investors.

This double discourse is rooted in the inexistence of reality as stated by Lacan: reality only exists when named. Therefore it is language that creates reality, con-

trarily to intuitive thinking. It is precisely through the ambiguity of words that Casablanca-Rabat developers build their discourse, which they use to talk both to the local population and to the foreign investors and clients they wish to attract, revealing “the openness of language to accommodation to varying situations and to the range of interests of speakers and audiences”.¹

The political discourse in Morocco is therefore articulated along two distinct narratives: a democratic discourse, addressed to the citizens and aimed at evoking an imagery of pluralistic, social, and participative governance; and a discourse of prestige, where the vocabulary is carefully chosen to fit international standards of modernity and progress.

We attempt to deconstruct the political discourse that we were exposed to in Rabat and Casablanca, not only by splitting it into two narratives, but also by contrasting both narratives with reality and to what has been accomplished on the ground.

A tale of democracy

A first narrative is that of a democratic government. Public agencies and political entities that we have met in Rabat and Casablanca strongly emphasize

their preoccupation with matters of social inequalities on the one side, and citizenship and democratic decision-making on the other. This orientation in their political discourse is essential for authorities to build consensus, by maintaining among the population a shared imagery of pluralistic governance working for the well-being of Moroccan citizens. Because it is difficult for civil society to counter political rhetoric (as most of them are mere recipients of it), vocabulary that is skilfully chosen and publicized by authorities can succeed in creating a correspondingly favorable image of government in the minds of citizens.

This democratic lexical field articulates around some key, generic words that are endlessly repeated. Their accumulation results into what sounds to us almost like a refrain: it penetrates people's minds while carrying no concrete meaning, and thus creates vague images that do not necessarily match reality, but that can be stronger than reality itself. The key words we have detected push forward the idea of a government where decisions are taken by the citizens and for the citizens. A strong emphasis is thus put, first of all, on the idea of "citizenship" itself, and we find this word - in all its possible declinations - in many speeches and brochures. Others include words such as "democracy," "society," "participation," and "empowerment." Below are some examples: To begin, the Agence pour l'Aménagement de la Vallée de Bouregreg describes itself as a

"democratic organization (...) which places social action at the heart of its development program and takes care of rehabilitating the space for citizens' well-being"².

In the speech he gave for the inauguration of the INDH, the King uses the words "society" and "social" twenty-four times, and he epitomizes the democratic narrative we are describing, saying: "We call on the government to adopt an action plan founded on principles of good governance, namely responsibility and transparency, rules of professionalism, citizen participation, integration and rationalization of public institutions' intervention, as well as the monitoring and permanent evaluation of its realizations"².

Note how phrases like "social action", "good governance", or "integration" are seldom accompanied by explicative content that completes their meaning. It is never explained what is meant by "social action," or what plans the agency has to put it into practice, so

no-one can be blamed for lack of social action (which itself is a vague concept), and no-one can be disappointed. The name of the agency, though, and its reputation, will remain linked in the public's mind to that faint idea of "social action" and of "citizen en-

2.Vallée du Bouregreg brochure

treprise," to that euphonic song of democracy, and that will be enough for its image to survive. In the vagueness of this vocabulary lies its political strength.

At the wilaya of Casablanca, we had the chance to hear about the development strategy for the Grand Casablanca, which gave us additional examples of a quite vague – and to some extent contradictory – discourse. As the Wali himself explained, the main concern is the "reconciliation of the city with its inhabitants," and one of the main pillars of this strategy is the creation of an "inclusive financial hub." But if we look at the conditions of poverty in which a good part of the population lives, it is hard to imagine how the most immediate priority of a city-government that wants to reconcile itself with its citizens could be the creation of a financial hub. In the meantime, we find it hard to imagine how such a hub can ever be "inclusive." Here, it seems like the word "inclusive" was added to the discourse in order to edulcorate, and somehow mask, the real expected outcomes of the policy.

Vocabulary referring to democratic practices is widely used by agencies and governments. At the Mairie de Rabat as well, we heard about "growth and solidarity," about "actor empowerment," and "active citizen." In the conference room of the Al Omrane agency the refrain kept playing, with phrases like "social habitat," "urban reintegration" and "social support (accompagnement)". But it is time to look away from rhetoric and talk, and to focus

more on what we could see with our own eyes, as we find that the democratic discourse staged by politicians and public agencies doesn't quite correspond to their philosophy of action.

When we looked for concrete



proofs of a government by the citizens, characterized by pluralistic decision-making mechanisms, we had trouble observing truly participative processes, as all public agencies respond to the central authority rather than to local needs and expressed preferences. Although authorities put a lot of emphasis on the existence of several independent agencies, a more thorough look at the processes unveils a very centralized power structure, where a monarch and an urban elite surrounding him are omnipresent in all decisions. At the same time, an impression of plurality contributes to a shared confusion about accountability. When looking for proofs of a

government for the citizens, we had the slight impression that decisions were pushed more, as we will see in the second part, by the desire to attract foreign investment than by a sincere concern for the local populations. Cases of displacement of local populations (done more or less subtly) are very common in Casablanca and Rabat. The Vallée de Bouregreg project, for instance, which is proud of "rehabilitating the geographical space for the citizens' well-being," focuses on the creation of high-income housing, that the fishermen previously living there will never be able to afford. More violent examples of displacement are slum removal projects, being carried out by governments as well as by real estate development agencies (such as ANFA, for the new downtown): informal dwellers living in central areas of the city are evicted, sometimes by police forces, and - when lucky - relocated in the peripheries. Such projects are often justified by authorities through rhetorics of social inequalities that need to be overcome.

A tale of international prestige

We have seen that the democratic and socially-concerned rhetoric does not match the urban policies undertaken in the Casablanca-Rabat conurbation, yet it is essential for the government to build consensus within Moroccan society. We understand this first narrative as a veil to the second discourse, addressed to foreign companies and actors,

aimed at attracting investments from abroad and potentially at housing expatriates.

The fact that Moroccan authorities posit themselves in a democratic rhetoric is also something that might appeal to foreign actors: the performative nature of language implies that the recipients of the discourse will not find it necessary to check what lies behind the discourse. The very fact that something is deemed democratic is often sufficient to satisfy people's need of information: vagueness is at the heart of discourses and allows for the actors involved to interpret them as what suits them best. In this sense, the address to foreign actors aims at creating an aura of modernity and prestige around the Casablanca-Rabat urban region (i) when reality is far from the Western standards they claim to meet (ii).

The Bouregreg Valley epitomizes this purpose. In the brochure, the Agency advertises for the Valley's future business district in these terms: "Al Saha Al Kabira's office spaces will welcome Moroccan and multinational companies seeking for a central location, high quality services and a pleasant work environment. They will be equipped with flexible rooms that meet the most prestigious business centers' norms, as well as with the best infrastructures, for maximum comfort"; "the business district will be strategically located in the Rabat-Salé agglomeration". In order to appeal to international firms, the Agency resorts to a lexical field of supposed international urban



norms ("répondant aux normes des centres d'affaires les plus réputés") and describe the infrastructures they provide as being at the forefront of such norms. However, these standards have no tangible meaning; they contribute to activating an imagery of modernity without giving a concrete definition of what "optimal" or "strategic situation" might mean. In order to attract not only foreign investors but also a population of expatriates, the Agency also praises the grand theater of Rabat: "designed by Zaha Hadid, a true symbol of contemporary urbanism", a "magnificent building with a futuristic design", "a real cultural symbol for the capital". Relying on both the lexical field of prestigious urbanism and of cultural pre-eminence in local authorities' concerns, not only do they base their discourse on the

idea that expatriates expect such infrastructures, but they feed it. It is in this sense that language contributes to creating reality: the Agency's discourse, by aiming at reaching expatriates, also designs the needs this population may have. However the imaginary of modernity and highly attractive metropolis that this discourse creates faces a challenging reality: for instance, people in charge of the Casa-ANFA project said "they [were] trying to make Casablanca the hub of Africa, and it [already was]!". Not only is it contradictory (why try and make Casablanca the hub of Africa if it already is?), but also it is wrong, as Lagos is already investors' major point of entry in Africa and concentrates far more foreign investment than its Moroccan competitor. Indeed, the Casablanca-Rabat urban region

is far from being investors' dream city and political authorities' alleged goal of turning the city into a point of entry to Africa for foreign investors remains still quite ambitious. a pipe dream.

The Marina of Casablanca has been under construction for over a decade but investments brutally dried up in 2011 when the Arab Springs paralyzed the region. Gulf countries that were responsible for a large share of the investments in this project put an end to their participation and construction stopped until the year 2014 – when everything was initially expected to be built by 2013. When we passed by the Marina, pictures of the future landscape were shown on large billboards, while guards made sure that bypassers did not enter the construction site. After negotiations, we were allowed to enter a showroom exhibiting plans, photos and videos of the future Marina: pictures were not allowed there or on the construction site itself. The guards did not seem at ease with our presence, which made us feel as if there was a discrepancy between the discourse and the reality in the Marina, implying that visits and pictures could end up contradicting the official story-telling. Indeed,

this project still holds on to the lexical field of prestige and international standards when it is actually ten years behind in terms of design, as buildings' architecture now dates back to the 1990s and is rather outdated: it strongly contrasts with the discourse that still tells the story of a modern and attractive environment for businesses to settle.

Moroccan authorities' and developers' discourses on a number of projects of the Casablanca-Rabat conurbation illustrate the political relevance of language and vocabulary. Its evocative power and openness to interpretation allow politicians to play with images and ambiguities, in an effort to build national consensus on the one hand, and to attract international investment on the other. Our analysis of Moroccan political rhetoric was inspired by Edelman's thesis that language can construct political realities, as we believe that – in politics – imagined, chanted visions of reality are often more vivid than reality itself, especially to the majority of eyes and ears. The two narratives we've analyzed should be understood dialectically, as they are two lines of the same long-term project, which aims at integrating Rabat and Casablanca in the global market for business and real-estate invest-

ment, by transforming urban space into a source of incoming flows of capital. This, unfortunately, could not be achieved smoothly if the people who would not gain from this policy were fully aware of it. Language turns out to be a toolkit, with which pol-



iticians can cut out paper castles and draw imagined realities, while behind the scenery there are unfinished construction sites and out-of-date luxury residential buildings.

Photo : Nicolas Hrycay
Drawings : Marie Pla

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LOCAL PROJECTS

by Danlu Chen

1. Cities Alliance. Cities without Slum Action Plan. (On Line:<http://www.citiesalliance.org/cws-action-plan>)

2. OECD (2013), State-Owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa: Engines of Development and Competitiveness?, OECD Publishing, Paris

3. UN Habitat, 2010, Al Omrane: Leading actor for Settlement Upgrading

4. Malcom Borthwick. Moroccan efforts to replace slums. In BBC News. 29/09/2009 [On Line : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8266403.stm>]

The inspirations of the King, the local governments and private investors from Morocco and overseas shape in many ways the national metropolization. Nevertheless, a variety of international organizations also play a significant role in the process. They serve as sources of finance, legitimacy and technical support in different types of projects that are expected to shape the urban future of Morocco. Since these resources are essential building bricks of the metropolitan governance, realized through projects, one cannot ignore international organizations when specifying who governs the Morocco metropolization.

The Villes Sans Bidonvilles (Cities without Slums) initiative emerged during the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 and found echo in the Millennium Development Goals¹. In 2004, the Moroccan government adopted the Program. Working with Al Omrane Group, a real-estate State-owned company, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development has eliminated or improved 46% of the country's slums². The slum upgrading and reduction projects in Morocco has been endorsed by UN Habitat as one of the best in Africa, and ranks second worldwide in slum improvement over the period 2000-2010³.

Morocco has been awarded the 2010 Scroll of Honour Award for its slum reduction and improvement programs³. In the meantime however, the affordability of upgraded housing makes many slum dwellers reluctant to leave⁴. When GLM students asked about the human rights issue, the General Director of SAO Rabat of Al Omrane would defend the project with the UN award. Clearly, UN Habitat has given the Moroccan slum reduction program positive recognition which could facilitate upcoming projects from the program, by providing it legitimacy.

The Bouregreg Valley project on the other side is conducted by the Agency for the Planning of the Bouregreg Valley. The urban planning agency is claimed to be a unique type of agency that takes in charge a three-fold task with PPP: environment protection, layout management and heritage preservation. It is in charge of the management and development of a 17-km long waterfront in Rabat. Among the 1-billion-euro budget granted to the project, 600 million euros come from international leasing agencies such as the BFD, World Bank and French Treasury. Similarly, the Port of Casablanca also has external funds from BAD (African Bank for Development) and European Fund. The World

Bank has conducted research on the project, which is considered as an evidence of the uniqueness and qualification of the project. In general, international leasing agencies are a key resource of financing and for technology facilitation, as it is in the development of Casablanca and Rabat's respective ports.

The National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), a social project initiated by the royal decree also received considerable supports from international agencies. The Word Bank launched a facilitating project from 2006 to 2011 with a total commitment amount going up to US\$ 100.00 million which represents 10% of the total project cost⁵.

Through these empirical examinations, we try to reach the conclusion that the urban development in Morocco is partially shaped by international organizations and their own perspectives and agendas.

5. The World Bank. National Initiative for Human Development Support Project (INDH). (On Line: <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P100026/national-initiative-human-development-support-project-indh?lang=en>)

Photo : Paola Chapdelaine



THE ROLE OF FRENCH INSTITUTIONS IN THE MOROCCAN ECONOMY

by Laura Grelet, Alexandre Reznikow, Gaëtan Müller

The past year has been a tumultuous one for relations between France and Morocco, both diplomatically and politically. On January 7th, the french newspaper Le Figaro reported that cooperation between France and Morocco had been severely curtailed on the antiterrorist front for most of the year 2014¹. Four days later, the absence of the Moroccan State Secretary, Salaheddine Mezouar, was much noted at the Republican March to protest the Paris terrorist attack. Although present in Paris, Mr. Mezouar declined to attend the march, suggesting that "blasphemous" images would surely be displayed. However, at the end of the month of January, Mr Mezouar indicated that France and Morocco had resumed their judicial cooperation². Indeed, the relationship between France and Morocco is crucial for both countries, who share a long history and complex demographic, cultural and economic links. In the context of the metropolization of Casablanca and Rabat, we thought that it was important to analyze the role of French actors, both at the industrial and institutional level. Does such metropolization present an interest for French firms?

Beyond the historical links be-

tween France and Morocco, we will see that many French actors are present in the country due to its advantageous geopolitical positioning. The kingdom represents a stepping stone for major companies such as Bouygues to access the wider African market, especially through French-speaking African countries.

The historical and structural presence of France

The French protectorate (1912-1956) completely transformed the political and economical structures of Morocco for the benefit of the French colonial economy. This period still affects the economical environment of Morocco, as France remains the country's biggest investor. French companies have increased their investments since the 2000s, especially in public infrastructures (public works and transportation) and large development projects. French influence can be noticed in other areas. While the Moroccan educational system has achieved autonomy from its former colonial master, Moroccan elites continue to study in French universities - first attending French high schools before going on to "classes préparatoires" and "Grandes écoles" in France.

1. Christophe Cornevin. "La coopération antiterroriste au point mort entre la France et le Maroc". In Le Figaro. 06/01/2015

2. Charlotte Bozonnet. "Le Maroc exige le respect, la considération". In Le Monde. 02.02.2015



French high schools in Morocco, such as the Lycée Descartes in Rabat and Lycée Lyautey in Casablanca, represent the largest contingent of students among all French high schools abroad. Because of these profound links at the educational level, French remains the commonly used language for the Moroccan political and economical elite. Morocco is also attractive to French investors thanks to its remarkable political stability, especially when compared with the larger region. Indeed, while other states such as Tunisia or Egypt are still in the revolutionary process ignited by the Arab Spring (2010-), Morocco has been able to preserve its institutional and internal stability through the constitutional reforms of 2011, which increased the power of democratic norms

and practice in the kingdom.

Photo : Lorena Figueiredo

Study case of Morocco's internationalization the new Casablanca hub

Moroccan and foreign investments in transport, services and very large development projects reflect a larger political willingness on the part of the state to attract new capital and turn Casablanca into a financial hub in Africa. In this process one of the main actors is the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), a national institution dedicated to the management of investments and urban development. The CDG was established in 1959 on the model of semi-public financing French institutions such as the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations. The main urban devel-

opment projects are conducted by the CDG through the establishment of private agencies such as l'Agence d'Urbanisation et de Développement d'Anfa.

While Bouygues seems to be present in many mega-project, other French corporations are also positioning themselves in strategic Moroccan infrastructural markets. In the Casablanca-Rabat metropolitan region, this tendency has existed since the first urban plans for Casablanca under the protectorate, with the participation of the Lyonnaise des Eaux for the city's water and sewage system. For instance, Vinci Construction has located numerous projects along the metropolitan axis. Cegelec is investing in Moroccan public lightning, Alstom is working on a tramway and a high-speed train, while Lafarge is currently working on the new airport. These groups are notably chosen for their international stature as well as their expertise - the "know-how" they have acquired and demonstrated on previous urban projects of the same nature (e.g Vinci with the Stade de France). Areva, the French nuclear company, has also been positioning itself in the phosphates business, a market that we know after our visit of the Casablanca port to be of tremendous importance for Casablanca's economy. Finally, French corporations are chosen even for the most symbolic endeavors, such as for the Hassan II Mosque (1993), one of the biggest Mosques in the world, which was constructed by Bouygues according to the plans of a

French engineer.

Morocco's as a gateway for the wider African market for French firms

Morocco is also an essential gateway for French firms wanting to develop their activities on the African continent. In this sense, Morocco, and particularly Casablanca and Rabat, are becoming a financial and economic hub for Africa. Bouygues Immobilier, a real estate developer, has started a major project in Casa-Anfa. According to the director of Bouygues Immobilier Maroc, his company is willing to work with African countries in order to develop its activities on the continent. Morocco is also one of the first African sites of investment for Alstom, who also just signed a contract in South Africa. The same can be said about Lafarge, who is involved in the renovation of the Rabat airport. Moreover, by uniting the Nigerian and South African branches, Lafarge has become the largest concrete producer in Africa. Finally, Areva has started a partnership with the Moroccan firm Buzzichelli, who will be in charge of maintenance in Areva's uranium mines in Niger. French companies enjoy the relative political stability of Morocco, using the country as a starting point for wider business development in Africa. Casablanca, and to a lesser extent Rabat, are becoming important hubs for French investment in Africa. French private interests thus match the Moroccan interests in trying to make Casablanca the

most important financial hub in Africa.

To conclude, we have seen that France is very present in Morocco for historical and structural reasons. French firms are largely responsible for both metropolization and the creation an international investment hub in Casa-Rabat. Such a strategy enables them to have more weight in the African continent, particularly with regards to the growing presence of China. Nevertheless other actors are also active in this market, such as Dubai and Saudi Arabia.

P O R T




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Photos : Alex Aung Khant
Paola Chapdelaine
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




Photo : Nicolas Hrycay

LAND USE AT THE HEART OF POWER RELATIONS

CHAPTER THREE

LAND OWNERSHIP AND POWER RELATIONS : LEGAL STRUCTURE OF USE AND ABUSE

by Leire Irigoyen, Sofia Ramos Díaz, Alberto Garcia Picazo and Ivan Marquez

Casablanca's Medina is one of those spaces where the urban structure contrasts starkly with its neighbouring areas. Surrounded by avenues, twentieth-century colonial buildings and the commercial Port, the Medina appears like a labyrinth, secluded in the middle of Casablanca, as the "new city" develops around. The land here belongs to the State; yet, the houses are privately owned, as explained to us by our guide Soraya El Kahlaoui, from the Jacques Berque Research Centre: a real legal patchwork!

The Medina is a place apart in the city, and has its own internal divisions: as we walked from the "intra-muros" Medina to the surrounding area, we noticed a similar layout pattern; yet the buildings of the "extra-muros" Medina appeared a lot more degraded. The Rehabilitation Project of the Ancient Medina launched in 2010 by the King Mohamed 6th only targets the "intra-muros" Medina, the classified zone, to be preserved and restored. Here, the land status seems to be working in favour of an intense regeneration process lead by the King and using several instruments such as the National Initiative for Human

Development (INDH). Suddenly, in the extra-muros Medina, a street leads to an open dusty space where houses were demolished or had simply collapsed without being replaced. The slumification process occurs precisely because of the often ambiguous land status: as the buildings do not belong to the state, the land is acquired by letting the edifices deteriorate on their own. Inhabitants without the financial means to stop growing degradations thus face a slow process of indirect eviction. Even the programme Villes Sans Bidonvilles has the green light to clean this area, while the Medina a few meters away is being preserved. The Royal avenue project is itself planned to pass through this derelict area. This example illustrates the complexity of land status in Morocco and how equivalent land status and contexts can lead to two completely divergent outcomes. The overlapping of complex legislative status creates, both in Casablanca and Rabat, situations of vulnerability for some, and of benefit for others.

A complex mix of land statuses

The legal context framing land

I.Raffaele Cattedra, Casablanca : la réconciliation patrimoniale comme enjeu de l'identité urbaine, in Patrimoine et politiques urbaines en Méditerranée, vol 16, 2003

use issues explains a considerable part of the struggle. Numerous rules converge creating a system filled with as many conflicts as opportunities. Together with privately owned parcels, collective lands are probably the most common type of property in Morocco. Traditionally used by a group of individuals or families, collective lands legally belong to the State, even if inhabitants do enjoy their usufruct. However,

the houses built on those plots do (mostly) belong to their occupiers. These overlapping legal frameworks create an ambiguous and malleable terrain for legal disputes, as there can be opposing interests over the same piece of land. In this context, various actors try to leverage their position, which often ends with the defeat of those with less influence and less able to enforce the law.



Drawing : Marie Pla

Political turmoil : a short reappropriation of space

On the 20th of February 2011, a massive social movement occurred in Morocco. Inspired by the previous events in Tunisia, the population claimed for more democracy. Yet it must be noted that the legitimacy of the monarchical system was not contested. In response to this movement, King Mohammed VI gave a "historical speech" on the 9th of March, announcing a reform of the Constitution, such as free parliamentary election, reducing the monarch's power in response to the popular demands.

This speech was indeed "historical" when we analyze it in relation to the issue of land property. In fact, the loosening of the government regarding land control led to a sort of "laissez-faire" that triggered an accelerated construction of informal housing. Some towns at the periphery of Casablanca consequently experienced an explosion of new informal settlements. For instance, the number of houses in Douar Llota, raised from 100 in 2011 to

over 1000 by the end of 2012! This was due to a high demand from people who lived in rural areas and wanted to get closer to the city, as well as urban dwellers unable to afford the city center any longer. Many seized the opportunity to settle near the city, in a property of their own. If informal houses used to be built at night, with the exchange of bribes away from prying eyes; it was tolerated at daylight during the revolutionary period, without entailing corruption. With the permissibility of the State after the February 20 movement, the informal construction became more feasible in financial terms, but more complicated in legal terms. In fact, this apparent "freedom of construction" and reappropriation of space ended with the revolution. A stronger state control began by a denial of the new properties illegally built, and no official papers were given to the house owners built a year after the 9th March 2011 King's speech. Actually, the popular interpretation of the royal speech created a blurry legal framework whereby the poorer citizens felt allowed to build houses and start a better life. The weak legal structure of the periphery combined to this phenomena of land appropriation unfortunately made the new settlers more vulnerable towards an official legal system that do not recognize their self-made property. In fact, these constructions might be tolerated by the authorities, who acquire power to pressure these families at any moment, making the situation all the more tricky for

newcomers.

Regain of control by the state

The Villes Sans Bidonville program emerged in 2004 as a continuity of the Moroccan national fight against substandard housing and the social claim for better housing rights. This program aims to control the accelerated growth of Moroccan cities generated by the expansion of urban informal settlements experienced in Morocco after the independence. The main objective of the Villes Sans Bidonville program is the eradication of urban poverty and the reinsertion of deprived urban areas within the urban fabric. The program also promotes the cooperation between governmental actors of various institutional levels and the local authorities. The plan is based on the implementation of three basic intervention strategies which are restructuration, rehousing and relocation of informal settlement communities, through the development of a "City Contract" (contrat de ville). After the acceleration of informal housing construction following the royal speech of 2011 the program has been implemented as a legal mechanism to control the emergence of irregular settlements within moroccan cities. The implementation of Villes Sans Bidonvilles begins with changes in the legal status of the land. This dynamic of land reassessment could sometimes be considered as a way of re-appropriation by the State of land control.



The main objective of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program is the upgrading of informal and unhealthy housing settlements which are falling in ruins. Yet, political and economic interests may take precedence over urban issues, which could foster the implementation of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program as a legitimate legal framework to expropriate parcels with purposes other than slum upgrading.

The complex legal status of land and de-facto informal use of public space in Morocco are the result of historical overlapping processes: while common land can be inherited from pre-colonial times, it can also be the direct consequence of the French hybrid system implemented to deal with old and new types of urbanization. In this context, urban development processes in Casablanca and Rabat are constantly challenged by ambiguous situa-

tions. Very often however, when a project implies significant interests over a particular spot, actors must find strategies of land acquisition and development. These strategies, we argue, are not always at the disposal of everyone. Various examples of urban development projects include legal mechanisms to acquire land and evict locals. Yet even if these instruments are in fact legal, actors have to arbitrate between one of the many legal layers at stake. Inhabitants rarely have the same tools or legal knowledge to propose alternative options to strong corporations and operators. The use of the INDH or Villes Sans Bidonvilles therefore become instruments for a one-way interpretation of entitlement. Metropolization processes become, at the image of the Casablanca Medina, a series of dense, intricate layers of legal material, policy and interests.

Photo : Danlu Chen

THE BOUREGREG VALLEY AND MEGAPROJECTS IN THE URBANISATION OF MOROCCAN CITIES

by Joséphine Hébert & Emeline Dutheil

Sustainability is a complex notion, as it involves on the one hand an environmental dimension and on the other a social (and cultural) one. Sustainability refers to both diversity and endurance (also called resilience) which must both be maintained in biological and social systems in the long term. Socially, a sustainable environment should be available for both future generations and the current population, without any economical, social or spatial discrimination.

Here, we explore the dynamics at play between Moroccan modernization and environmental sustainability. In fact, while national policies such as decentralization drive the modernization process, the latter is also carried out by urban projects that may take the form of "megaprojects", involving a huge area of the city is involved and bringing together private and public actors. The project of the Bouregreg Valley in Rabat and to a lesser extent, the Anfa project in Casablanca, seem to conform to this model and will be our objects of analysis here. Focusing on the Rabat case in particular, we find that its environmental dimension and high-profile nature make it a unique example of a mega project focused on issues of sustainability. Moreover, even though we

will focus on environmental sustainability, we will also discuss the social implications of the implementation of environmental policies, revealing the ways in which social and environmental sustainability are closely intertwined.

Greening in megaprojects : the Bouregreg Valley

The King Mohammed VI has initiated the renovation project renovation for the Bouregreg Valley in 2004. Situated between the two cities of Rabat and Salé, its territory is of 6.000 hectares contains an area of preserved environment, as well as 540.000 m² of luxury urbanism close to the city centre. The project is managed by the Agency for Planning of the Bouregreg Valley, a public agency placed under the State's control. The main reason given for the project has been the rehabilitation of a deteriorated environment: in fact, the project is presented as enabling the "protection of the environment", as showed by the foreword given by the general directors of the Agency. Moreover, the agency posits as a success the dismantling of the informal discharge that had been in use on the Bouregreg bays for decades, and its replacement by a public discharge, "respecting the international norms", according to the



same directors.

Nevertheless, the official discourse, as represented in the speeches of Rabat's mayor Oualou, also presents the initiative of rehabilitation as a "project of modernization and "bringing-up-to-standard of the city", which includes the 'fight against slums, the cultural policy and the 'green spaces' policy'. In this perspective, focusing on environmental sustainability allows to fulfil international standards of a 'global city' that offers a high standard quality of life and urbanism. In this context, housing with upper-middle class standards are built, along with analogous commodities and prestige infrastructures, such as the Great Rabat Theatre's project.

On the other hand, if the project

of rehabilitation aims, according to Bouregreg development agency, to the "improvement of local populations' living conditions", the slums are dislocated to peripheral locations, sometimes even without planned social housing. Then, if environmental rehabilitation is certainly a reality and a motivation for the mega-projects, the housing type reveals that it is addressed to a special kind of upper middle-class population and that consequently, the "greening" goes along with favouring the upper-middle class. So, the discourse on environmental sustainability in the Moroccan mega-project of the Bouregreg Valley is one of the means used to promote a specific kind of urbanism, which meets the demand of a globalized middle and up-

Photo: Nicolas Hrycaj

per-middle class, constituted not only by expatriates but also by well-off Marrocans, who seems to be sensible to international standards of living. This also fosters cities' capacity to compete on the international scene. The objective of the Anfa Project in Casablanca, that aims to become the financial hub of Casablanca, so as the residential area of an international clientele, is another illustration of the Moroccan wish for international competitive cities. In this mark, the preoccupation of environmental conditions in which deprived populations live becomes secondary because the geographical displacement of urban poor to the periphery turns the question of poverty less visible. Urban renewal policies, that come along with modernization and environmental preoccupation, and social housing policies are treated as two independent questions. Thus, the discourse on sustainability is addressing international standards of living more than sustainability. These international standards contribute to often prioritizing the creation "modern areas" for the middle and upper-middle classes.

Jiha Tinou as a local initiative for sustainability

Besides urbanisation through megaprojects, which are implemented in a top-down logic, another type of environmental policy is implemented nationally in the mark of the decentralization process in Morocco. Launched in 2012, "Jiha Tinou" ("My Region" in Arabic and Amazigh) is the national territorial strategy

designed to promote sustainable development at the local level in Morocco. It aims at providing incentives for municipalities to manage their energy resources and design their policies in a sustainable way. Contrary to the top-down logic at play in megaprojects, Jiha Tinou consists in the accompanying of local actors in the evaluation of their needs, their performance and their possibilities. Sustainable cities are rewarded by the attribution of a label called MENA Energy Award, elaborated on the basis of the European Energy Award (EEA), a European label. The cities of Agadir, Chefchaouen and Oujda were selected to trial the guidance project towards a better sustainability. Finally, the design and implementation process is coordinated by a national public agency, the Agency's Territorial Strategy for Sustainable Energy Development (ADEREE).

At first sight, Jiha Tinou appears to be a coherent national strategy, respecting and incentivizing the local involvement of municipalities and citizens. Yet the results are quite mixed. In two years, from the three trial cities that experimented the program, none of them are major Moroccan metropolises, while the city of Casablanca has not even applied to partake in the program. Indeed, Jiha Tinou's major weakness is that it counts on initiatives to spread thanks to emulation, in a country where local initiatives are still under the control of the central authority. Moreover, the issue of sustainability of the new cities that are spreading in Morocco can barely fit with this participative approach. This induces

two major limitations: first, only cities interested in a European benchmark are really eager to get involved in the program. This makes sense for the touristic Agadir or for smaller cities looking for a particular image, but not for a booming Casablanca willing to position itself as the new African financial hub. Second, sustainability is promoted in small, technical and management issues of the administrative body, and not on a larger scale of building a sustainable city for the future. For instance, the installation of solar panels in Agadir city hall's rooftop is presented by the IDE-E as an important realization, while it tells nothing about bigger challenges for sustainability such as quotas for energy reduction or improvement of water management, which are indeed important concerns for Moroccan cities.

Then, although *Jiha Tinou* is the official national policy for sustainability in Morocco, it appears that it doesn't have enough weight to induce any major change in the way Moroccan cities are addressing environmental issues.

Punctual megaprojects show the lack of an environmental policy plan on the long term that would be articulated around the notion of sustainability. At the contrary, the policies and projects are designed and implemented in an isolated way, which limits drastically the possibilities of a larger impact. Hence, the megaprojects do not address the issue of sustainability but rather incorporate some environmental concerns meant to raise quality of life standards and thus to contribute to the modernization process destined to the upper-middle class.

Photo : Alberto Garcia Picazo



THE COLLECTIVE LANDS THREATENED BY THE CURRENT POLITICS OF URBANIZATION

CASE STUDY: GUICHE LOUDAYA LANDS

by Elise Roy & Suzanne spooner

If you were taking the highway to Rabat on February 2014, you would have seen a group of women on the fringe. On their banner you would have seen the king's photo and one claim: "The inhabitants of Douar Ouled Dlim, living on the land title number R22747, ask for the royal arbitration against the Ryad Development Corporation that evicted the rightholders of the Douar, forcing them to live in makeshift camps"¹

The reduction of collective lands in a context of high urbanization of Moroccan cities raises debates and contestations among the Moroccan society. In fact, if on the one hand public authorities and developers work towards the modernization of the Moroccan urban environment in accordance with international standards; others can question the coherence of such strategies. Therefore, we will first see how the story of Douar Ouled Dlim reveals how the actual housing policies threaten the durability of the Moroccan collective lands. Secondly, we will question the coherence of such strategies, showing the paradox of urbanizing historical farming lands, along with policies of sustainability aiming to build 'Green cities'.

THE PRIVATIZATION AND URBANIZATION OF MOROCCAN COLLECTIVE LANDS IN THE NAME OF MODERNITY

The Guish lands : a Moroccan specificity facing growing challenges

In Douar Ouled Dlim lived about 120 families, which were part of the guiche community of Rabat: Guich L'Oudaya. Members of the guiche tribes were historically soldiers who served in the army of some of the earliest Moroccan sultans of the Alaouite dynasty. In exchange for providing troops, the guiche communities were given a certain amount of land. To indicate an order of magnitude, the lands of the guiche communities in Morocco reached about 768,000 hectares before the country fell under the control of the French in 1912². In this sense, this legal status constitutes a Moroccan specificity and heritage. Those lands are however facing growing challenges. On the one hand, their management encounters difficulties due to the demographic evolution of the rightholders which creates inaccuracies in the lists of the beneficiaries of the lands. Yet on the other hand, it is mainly the ongoing urbanization processes which constitute the main challenges for those lands' sustainability. In fact, these farming lands are gradually integrated into the

1.Soraya El Kahlaoui, « Habitants sans ville » au Maroc - Expulsés au nom de la modernité, Orient XXI, 11/12/2014

2. Samia Errazzouki, Descendants of Morocco's Veterans Face Violent Evictions, The Huffington Post, 02/11/2015

urban environment, therefore exacerbating the economic and property interests of developers and urban planners.

The modernization strategies of the housing sector

As far as Douar Ouled Dlim is concerned, it is because the land became located on the outskirts of the wealthy Hay Riad neighborhood in Rabat that it had become interesting to privatize it. Therefore and similarly to many of the former Moroccan collective lands, the Guich land has been sold by the public authorities at very low prices to commercial and real estate developers, for the sake of 'modernization'. A recent article published in The Huffington Post explains the underlying interests: "The role of the Ministry of Housing is primarily financial through its collaboration with other ministries and companies, including Groupe Al Omrane, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry

of Education. 'Our role is to provide financial resources distributed from the Fonds Solidarité Habitat', explained the official. The Fonds Solidarité Habitat was established in 2001 following a royal decree intended to 'combat unsanitary living conditions.' The 'Villes sans Bidonvilles' ('Cities without Slums') program justifies therefore the different evictions and their use of derogations for the development of public-private partnerships in the construction of new urban dwellings. It is then thanks to public policies that private developers can contribute to the urbanization of farming lands.

THE PARADOX OF THESE STRATEGIES

Rabat branded as "the green city" of Morocco

The city of Rabat is labeled as the "green city" of the Kingdom of Morocco. The city has a geographical advantage regarding Casablanca. Indeed, Rabat has 230 hectares of green areas. The

3. Marot Christelle, 2010, "Rabat ville première pour la Journée de la Terre", Jeune Afrique.

4. Entretien avec Fathallah Oualalou réalisé par Jihane Gattioui, «Rabat devient la capitale de la culture, du savoir et de l'éologie», 19 mai 2014 - Le matin

Photo: Alberto Garcia Picazo



“ceinture verte”, a wood of 1036 hectares that expands from Rabat to Temara, is also the pride of local governors. Since 2010, the City of Rabat has developed strategies to bring forward this “environmentally friendly” specificity. The Earth Day Network has chosen Rabat to organize the 40th anniversary of Earth Day in 2010. This event generated a political concern on environmental issues and the development of many related projects³. In June 2010, Morocco elaborated and signed the National Charter of the environment and sustainable development. This new ecological trend reveals the will of Morocco and of Rabat in particular to be seen as an “ecological capital”⁴.

The collective land and urban agriculture ahead of time

The Guiche collective lands situated around the city of Rabat could have been considered by the public authorities as an ecological strength. In fact, according to the agrarian census of 1973, the Collective Lands represent an area of 10 millions of hectares across the country. While 1 009 900 hectares of arable land is reserved to individual farming, 9 000 000 is reserved to collective farming⁵. After sedentarization, the Guiches mainly lived on agriculture. Rather than dividing the land in individual plots; the Guiches' used to exploit the land collectively according to their customs and traditions.

These cultivated lands would yet have needed some environmental protection. Indeed; the complexity of the land tenure of the Guiche Lands - who only have the right of usufruct - did

not allow them to make agricultural mid-term or long term investment in the collective lands. Taking in account that the surface of cultivable land is considerably decreasing in Morocco, a political intervention to protect this ecological strength would have been useful. Why didn't the “green city” protect it?

An ambiguous ecological capital : a green city for whom?

In the context of environmental policies, the Guiche Lands could have been labeled as an ecological Moroccan specificity or as an urban agriculture ahead of its time but this has never been done so. On the contrary, despite the Law n°12-90 aiming at preserving the peripheral farmland, the Guiche lands and the specific agrarian “savoir faire” associated to it are in danger of extinction⁶. In fact, instead of using the already existing strength of the city to turn Rabat into an environmental friendly capital, public authorities paradoxically prefered to create new green areas in accordance with international standards while urbanizing the historical farmlands. In this sense, the “green” Rabat seems to prioritize the needs of the moroccan middle classes and expatriates while excluding from the economic growth and modernization processes those who can be labeled as the ‘unwanted inhabitants’ of the city. Guiche tribes, through their resistance, are in fact considered by public authorities as one of the main obstacle to the construction of a modern capitalist city, whose implementation requires the purchase of their agricultural land.

5. Abouhani Abdelghani, 2001, « Le conflit entre agriculture et urbanisation dans le périmètre irrigué de Tadla », Options Méditerranéennes : Série A, n°44, p. 161-170.

6.Bensouda Korachi Taleb, “Towards private landownership: the state's role in the modernization of land tenure in Morocco”, Fao corporate institute, 2010



Photo: Paola Chapdelaine

DEVELOPMENT CHOICES AND THE URBAN POOR

CHAPTER FOUR

GOVERNING THE INFORMAL

by Catalina Ramirez Palau & Lou D'Angelo

1.Perry,G. (Ed.).(2007). Informality: Exit and exclusion. World Bank Publications

2. Frug, Gerald E (2007). "A Rule of Law for Cities"

3. Elyachar, J (2003). Mappings of power: the state, NGOs, and international organizations in the informal economy of Cairo. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45(03), 571

The concept of informality emerged in the 1970s, under the initiative of the International Labour Organization, as a necessity to define the new forms of activities brought by major transformations of labour markets and increasing urban poverty. More recently, the World Bank defined informal activities as the « activities and incomes that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation, and observation », and which can be divided into two features: on the one hand, the « coping strategies » of individuals having scarce “earning opportunities”, and on the other hand, the « unofficial earning strategies » resulting from a “rational behavior of entrepreneurs that desire to escape state regulations”. This definition enhances the multiplicity and heterogeneity of informality, which covers a wide range of socio-economic realities, from informal housing to unofficial structured flows of goods and services. In that sense, informality can be studied from two different angles : on the one hand we can understand parallel activities as an exclusion from formality, suffered by the individuals who cannot “afford” it; one the other hand it can be seen as the consequence of a cost-benefit analysis of individuals and private actors, which Hirschman would call “exit”, that is, a situa-

tion when opting out of formal institutions follows what we call a « rational choice ». This exit implies a « blunt societal indictment of the quality of the state's service provision and its enforcement capability »¹. Whether perceived as a nuisance by the State - by implying unpaid taxes, unprotected employment and unloyal competition for formal enterprises - or described more positively by scholars as a structural sector providing employment for marginalized population and reducing urban poverty, the informal sector has triggered ongoing debates over the past decades. Notwithstanding, informality is never totally disconnected from legality and law since the legal system, by setting up the rules of formality through « licenses to operate businesses, building codes for housing, zoning laws, taxation schemes »² actually draws the limits of formality. Moreover, informality does not necessarily mean illegality and contains some form of legitimacy: “When practices that violate laws are accepted as the norm, and have a legitimacy that is not the state's, they are often called informal practices”³. In other words, the institutional context along with governmental choices and economic public policies have a significant role in the nature and importance of informality. Taking this in account and

relating it to the different private or public actors we met in Casablanca, what can be the role of the state in the emergence, the expansion and the regulation of informality?

Emergence and extension of the informal sector in Casablanca

The informal sector is, by definition, difficult to estimate accurately. Nonetheless, according to the National Survey of the Informal Sector⁴ the Moroccan informal economy represents a yearly revenue of 279,916 millions of dirhams (that is, 14% of the Moroccan GDP), and has been significantly increasing since 1999. One can relate the expansion of informality to the intense rural exode and urbanization process that have been taking place in Morocco since the 1960s, which made the urban population jump from 29% in 1960 to 77% in 2002 (AFD), and which generated an overwhelming rise of housing/labour demand in urban areas still in transition. Informality is, as a matter of fact, closely related to the city and is highly concentrated in urban areas. The "Grand Casablanca" for instance concentrates 14,3% of the informal production units of the territory, and 69,8% of informal production units are located in urban areas. The origins of informal economy have long been debated between neo-liberal and socialists. According to neo-liberal economists, it is the direct expression of an excessive presence of the State, which imposes too much constraints on the free market

and induces strategies of dissimulation (ex: black markets). The socialist argument rather insists on the lack of state protection and financial support to help low-income agents to stay in the formal system. The two approaches, far from invalidating each other, actually provide complementary perspectives, which Perry summarizes in those terms : "from poor regulation to oppressive or exclusionary measures" the State ends up "forcing agents, who perhaps are inclined toward compliance under the ideal state, to cope by defensive evasion"⁵. The exponential multiplication of slums and insalubrious housing in Morocco since the 1960s illustrates the socialist argument, enhancing the State's difficulties to provide enough social housing, and to answer the needs of deprived population who adopted informal "coping strategies" to survive. Informality in this case is not a choice, but rather the result of the population's incapacity to afford formal housing, added to the lack of public support. The adjustments also concerned small economic units, which relied on informal activities to cope with everyday economic pressures. In 1988, 83% of the chief units questioned in the Survey of the Informal Sector⁴, covering 12 moroccan cities and 1513 informal units, invoked "survival reasons" for choosing informality. Yet, informality cannot be solely defined as the « residue » of economic growth and transitions, irremediably related to the state's lack of financial support. Informal economy can also be perceived,

4. Haut comissariat du plan, Enquête nationale sur le secteur informel 2006-2007. Rapport de synthèse (version française), <http://www.hcp.ma/>

5. Perry, G. (Ed.).(2007). Informality: Exit and exclusion. World Bank Publications

6. Rajaa Mejjati, "microentreprises informelles et cadre institutionnel au Maroc", 200

to some extent, as the result of a rational cost/benefit analysis of private agents, in response to a certain institutional context. The micro-entrepreneurs, even when looking for survival strategies, are supposed to react as "homo economicus" following the path of rationality, and thus calculating the "costs of formalization"⁵. This cost is directly linked to the institutional context and public policies, as they set up the business environment. And "when appropriate investment environment is lacking, alternative solutions emerge to respond to existing market distortions"⁷. For instance, amongst the most recurrent reasons evoked by Moroccan informal chiefs of units for not formalizing their activity, fiscal pressure represented one of the most significant (75%), as well as the limited opportunities existing in the formal market (79,8%) and the socio-economical pressure they had to face (70,5%)⁴. The consequences of this rational choice is perfectly illustrated by the exploding informal micro-entrepreneurship and black markets that kept growing since 1999. Nowadays, international private actors willing to integrate local businesses are irremediably led to deal with the informal sector. This is the case of Kaymu, a fast growing marketplace of online sales that we visited and which allows private agents to sell their products online, for free. Kaymu has been largely used by local street sellers and informal wholesalers, who find there an opportunity to expand their own business online. Initial-

ly aimed at private buyers and sellers, Kaymu rapidly ended up running business with informal wholesalers (from Derb Ghalef and Derb Sultan grey markets of Casablanca for instance). It represents now an important business venture, fed by local and informal private agents coming from more than 30 Moroccan cities such as Casablanca, Tanger, Marrakech, Rabat etc. Based in more than 30 countries, including 17 African markets, it was launched in Morocco in September 2013 by the Sciences Po Alumni and Managing Director Fanny Ponce, and has become within the two last years the first market place of the region. This success actually sheds light on the booming moroccan informal economy, and its capacity to provide resources for low-income population. This parallel economy, coming from the street level, escaping from state regulation and taxes, translates the survival strategies of a significant part of the population for whom the "cost of formality" is too high. However, the notion of « choice » in the cost/benefits analysis has to be nuanced, since every rational choice is made under economic pressure and constraints. That is why, informality, far from being an attractive pole of economic opportunities, mainly remains a «place of refuge»⁸. The State, through its political intervention and public policies, is at the core of the informal sector's emergence and expansion. But what can be the possible responses to the evolution of this parallel economy?

7. Alaoui Moutain, F Z (2004) Market distortions and the informal economy: the case of Morocco. Working Paper. The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

8. Rajaa Mejjati, "microentreprises informelles et cadre institutionnel au Maroc", 2000

9. Bogaert, Koenraad. The Problem of Slums: Shifting Methods of Neoliberal Urban Governance in Morocco. *Development and Change* 42(3): 709–731. 2011. International Institute of Social Studies. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK



The authorities' response : from restructuring policies to non-regulation

"One response (...) is the idea of extending the formal legal system to everything that now is located in the informal system. This would mean bringing all housing and economic transactions within legal requirements – regulating them, bringing them up to code, subjecting them to taxation, giving them the rights of property owners" ². In Morocco, those attempts were accelerated by security concerns following the 1981 riots and the 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca, both involving slum dwellers⁹. The formalizing agenda is partly implemented through policies of slums upgrading, and property owners programs. We could see this policy at work when we visited Al Omrane's projects that aim at integrating the anarchic urban fabric lacking all kinds of equipments to the formal city. In Kenatra, in Rabat's suburbs, Al

Omrane operates different kinds of projects according to the informal settlements' situations. In the case of neighborhoods built in proper material, Al Omrane chose restructuring: they brought equipments in order to upgrade them and make them properly recognized by the State.

Roy qualifies those upgrading policies as a "welcome change from previous policies that sought to eradicate informal settlements or relocate them to urban peripheries"¹⁰. However, this type of response is still visible in some Moroccan programs. Analyzing the "Villes sans bidonvilles" program launched in 2004, one can see that formalizing can take a very different discourse: while slum upgrading policies aim at turning informality into potential through integration, slum clearance policies perceive informality as an impediment to modernity that should be eradicated. Morocco was awarded by UN-Habitat in 2010 for "delivering one of

Photo: Paola Chapdelaine

10.Roy, A. (2005). Urban informality: toward an epistemology of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 71(2), 147-158.

11. UN-Habitat website:
[http://mirror.unhabitat.org/
content.asp?typeid=19&
catid=827&cid=8816](http://mirror.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=827&cid=8816)

12. Bartoli, S (2011). "Eliminer les bidonvilles = éliminer la pauvreté ", ou les charmes pervers d'une fausse évidence, *L'Economie Politique*

the world's most successful and comprehensive slum reduction and improvement programmes", as the UN estimated the slums to have been reduced by 45.8%¹¹. However, the policy has also been criticized. The AFD evaluation underlines that the infrastructures such as schools and health facilities lacked skilled employees to maintain them, and that the displacement of population far away from their former informal settlement and initial activity made them economically more vulnerable. Bartoli¹² therefore uses the Moroccan example to show that slum reduction does not necessarily mean poverty alleviation. On top of that, the VSB program created new social and spatial inequalities. Indeed, Toutain¹³ showed that it reinforced the social inequalities between the slums dwellers, as a result of targeting issues: many households are not concerned by the operations, or in a transition or waiting period, living in temporary dwellings. They are incapable of financing housing, as their situations of economic and social precariousness does not allow them to access credit, and no financing solution is adapted to them. It also created new spatial inequalities between the relocation sites that are close to the city and more integrated to it (above all in terms of transports and public services), and the far-away neighborhoods. The AFD report underlines the political dimension of the project, launched to contain the risk of terrorism and riots in informal areas, in the context of the 2003

suicide bombings. However, the report concludes that because of the program's perverse effects that we underlined, the project could actually nourish additional social contests, even though it was supposed to calm them, as the satisfaction surveys showed a mixed picture. The 20 February movement, during the Arab Spring, therefore marked the government's failure to slow down social claims¹⁴. Both programs aim at formalizing the informal, yet very different different responses to informality could be observed. Informal activities in Casablanca represent about 70% of economic activities. Unsurprisingly, the State's answer is thus non interventionist in terms of juridical regulation. As the lines between the legal and the illegal remain blurry, the local parallel economy grows, and is tolerated by the State because of its scope: "The government simply does not have the resources or capacity to create a totally formal world. [...] because of its inability to create an economic system that provides enough jobs that the growth of the informal economy has been so substantial"¹⁵. International companies such as Kaymu can therefore capitalize on the vibrant "grey economy", and make it grow as the company gives more sales opportunities to street vendors. While such initiatives enable informal workers to increase their revenues, the State's position leaves them unprotected. The situation is such that "the state is basically absent and a social contract is basically broken".

Informality stems from a broken relation between the state and the citizens, whether it results from the exclusion of citizens from the formal system, or from rational choices made by the government. The authorities' responses are diverse, and influenced by economic, social and political factors. Some programs aim at formalizing housing, and are pushed by social and economic motivations, but one should bear in mind the political dimension, as slums make poverty visible, and foster riots. The VSB program unquestionably improved the living conditions of the 50000 households who could benefit from it, and showed ability to innovate with the financial practice oWwf the tiers associés. However, because of the negative externalities of the program, we could see that leaving the slum had an ambivalent impact on the well-being of the households. Contrasting with this program aiming at formalizing the informal, authorities do tolerate the informal economy as it lacks resources to formalize the system.

13. Toutain O., Rachmuhl, V. (2013). "Le programme "Villes sans bidonvilles" au Maroc : un bilan social questionné dans un contexte urbain sous tension" in Quartiers informels d'un monde arabe en transition, Réflexions et perspectives pour l'action urbaine, AFD report.

THE GOVERNANCE OF POVERTY IN RABAT: THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE GUICH L'OUDAYA TRIBE

by Mireia Lozano

Why does the cemetery of an old military Moroccan tribe, the Guich L'Oudaya, disappear under the construction of a building complex? Who is recognised under the beautifying program Ville sans Bidonville in Morocco, and who is not? How is it possible that the tribe from Guich L'Oudaya is being cyclically harassed by police forces to implement displacement? The bus stopped on the side of the road, in front of us stood a silver metal wall. Behind it the sky was syncopated by tall building complexes. We had arrived at the bidonville of Douar Ouled Dlim in Rabat.

Soraya El Kahlaoui, Doctorate in sociology at the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), working at the Centre d'étude des mouvements sociaux and associate at the Centre Jacques Berque de Rabat, she introduced us to the issue of the « guich » land. In 1838, the sultan Moulay Abderrahmane gave the walled lands laying in front of us to the Guich L'Oudaya, in compensation for their loyal military services. Nowadays, the ambiguous status of these lands had resulted in the displacement of this tribe. Guided by El Kahlaoui, we advanced towards the wall, to en-

counter the last remnants of an opposition to their displacement. On December 22nd of last year, the lands were completely freed after 10 months of pressures and harassment. The forceful displacement was the result of the signature of a contract between the Minister of the Interior and the private developer Ryad, always under the patronage of the King Mohammed VI.

After our arrival, a troubled man asked to be photographed when kissing a Moroccan flag, which stood next to a protest banner. He wanted me to document his respect and love for his country, although in my eyes, Morocco was not recognising him nor his rights as citizen. What was surprising was the tribe's belief that King Mohammed VI had nothing to do with their fate and had no understanding of their current situation.

The « guich » lands were considered to fall under the zoning status of collective land. However, after 1919's royal decree these lands did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior. Therefore their situation fell in a legal limbo that was utilised by the authorities' and the private sector's interest in development. Ms El Kahlaoui accounts that 126 families have



been displaced without any kind of compensation. A fraction of them has stayed by the side of what were once their -and their ancestor's- lands.

On the one side, the policy that is being implemented seems to look for the effective displacement of the whole tribe. On the other side, the last members of this ancestral tribe are against the idea of moving elsewhere, more now than before since, as a woman explained, they had lost everything and thus had nothing to lose. Having fallen into a legal hole, these Moroccan citizens are left on the streets without any voice, and no one is liable for their difficult situation. It is an example of poor policy design, one that is not even able to compensate all subjects affected by the new housing development. Furthermore, the status quo is also proving the absence of real policy evaluation since 126

families were left on the streets, while others were relocated. What is interesting is to consider this situation from an economic perspective. In fact, the costs of this current situation both for the Moroccan government and for its police force are striking. According to many residents, police forces are constantly present in vans that survey day and night the bidonville. Perhaps, a new policy that would integrate these citizens to Rabat's society could be a much better option economically. Nevertheless, the complexity and obscurity of data available on budget allocation and, more generally, on Moroccan governance makes such economic arguments hypothetical. A process of mediation between these families and the government, whereby both their interests are identified and sought is necessary, if at all, a solution wants to be brought to the table.

Photo: Alberto G. Picazo

SAFETY VALVES FOR A CONTESTED METROPOLISATION

by Paul Tristan Victor and Elsa Cardona

The metropolisation process of Casablanca and Rabat is highly unequal. The lower classes are under constant pressure from both the private and the public sectors, particularly as a result of mega-projects and state-sponsored slum removal policies - which too often lead to their eviction or displacement. This pressure has the potential to boil over into outright conflict over the process of metropolization in these cities - a fact that has not gone unnoticed by the government, which has undertaken action in order to offer relief from it, particularly by targeting the lower-classes. Thus it seems in this case that the Moroccan monarchy is rather flexible (see Tozy, 2000, for a case study on the "fight" against corruption)¹, with Mr. Tourabi, the chief editor of the moroccan newspaper Tel Quel, describing its mode of negotiation as "Nothing under pressure, Everything under pressure" - suggesting that the monarchy's goal is to avoid conflict by making necessary, yet minimal, policy adjustments. To better understand the metropolisation process in Rabat and Casablanca, it is necessary to take into account the mechanisms aimed at limiting protests against it. These safety valves were emphasised by numerous actors we met during the trip. One such ex-

amples is the INDH (Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain), launched by His Majesty the King in 2005. The initiative aims precisely at improving the living conditions of the lower classes, notably through citizen empowerment. There is evidence that the INDH is also implemented in areas close to, or targeted by, mega-projects. The Vallée du Bouregreg for instance is both the site of a mega-project (which will inevitably displace some informal neighbourhoods) and a cluster of initiatives from the INDH program. In these poor neighbourhoods, local social safety nets have traditionally been provided by radical islamists (notably salafist) groups², who exchange social services - such as providing food or monetary resource - or security for political legitimacy. The INDH is targeted at this same informal population, perhaps as an official alternative to these Islamist groups after the shock of the 2003 Casablanca attacks. These neighbourhoods have suffered from relative disenfranchisement and a sense of "loss" of citizenship, which the INDH is aiming to resolve. The King himself is also using the INDH as a means to strengthen his image as "King of the Poor" (Tozy, 2000); thus those who work on the project claim the title of "Chantier de Règne," or project representative

1. Hibou Béatrice, Tozy (Mohamed), " La lutte contre la corruption au Maroc : vers une pluralisation des modes de gouvernement ? ", Droit et société 2/2009 no. 72, p. 339-357, 200

2. Alonso Rogelio, Garcia Rey Marcos, "The evolution of jihadist terrorism in Morocco". Terrorism and political violence ,(0954-6553), 2007

of his rule). Overall, one can view the INDH not as a neutral effort to help the poor, but as a royal project to reconquer the politically-minded salafi fiefdoms.

Additionally, the way the INDH selects the projects it finances is somewhat controversial. Speaking off the record, one official responsible for the project stated that the INDH goals must be consistent with the city's overall metropolitan strategy, narrowing inclusionary development in Morocco by not making lower class people a priority. Therefore it is possible that some projects which have the potential of improving living conditions for the poor are not implemented because they do not fit this strategy. Although it is debated, this argument puts the program's social and political efficiency into question.

A second kind of safety valve lies in the state's tolerance of the informal sector. The latter is estimated to represent one fifth of Morocco's GDP, serving as a substantial safety net for the lower-class population by providing jobs and opportunities³. This informal sector is left undisturbed by the authorities, despite their legal ability to regulate it further. By contrast, Mr. Tourabi stated that there were more policemen in front of the American Embassy than in Carrières Centrales, one of the biggest slums of Casablanca - suggesting that foreign interests absorb the bulk of the state's attention. Representatives from Kaymu, a start-up e-commerce company which often serves as an online marketplace for the informal, so-called "grey economy" in cities like Casablanca and

Rabat, emphasised the ease with which the authorities could use Kaymu's database of sellers to halt this informal activity. Yet, little is actually done. Such a large scale tolerance reveals a kind of political equilibrium between the grey economy and the authorities (Tozy, 2000). Mohammed Tozi stated further that the substitution of the grey economy as a safety net for the lower classes allows the government to implement once unthinkable policies, such as dismantling price controls on bread. We can thus consider this blind eye to the informal economy as another kind of safety valve, similar to the INDH. This fragile balance between the state's presence and absence in the lives of the lower classes is key to understanding how the one-sided metropolisation process is made acceptable for the lower classes. More so than widespread corruption or indifference, it seems that there is a political strategy behind this apparent state tolerance of the informal¹.

To conclude, this strategy of using targeted "safety valves" to reduce the pressures facing the lower classes of Rabat and Casablanca has its limitations. Although progress has been made towards the improvement of poor neighbourhoods through the INDH and Villes sans Bidonvilles, the protests of 2011 showed that these policies require more implication from decision makers; the unequal development of Morocco was indeed at the heart of the protest, 6 years after the start of the INDH. Furthermore, the 2011 protesters were especially concerned with

3. AKSIKAS (Jaafar), "Prisoners of Globalization: Marginality, Community and the New Informal Economy in Morocco", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 249–262, July 2007

James Liddell, "Notables, clientelism and the politics of change in Morocco", The Journal of North African Studies, 15:3, 315-331, 2010

fighting widespread corruption, perhaps explaining why moderate Islamists came to power, who targeted their campaign around the fight against corruption – much in AKP's fashion. As a result, this strategy – a strong top-down metropolisation with a few safety valves, such as those described by this article – seems ineffective under these circumstances. The viability of this unequal development rests on a fragile equilibrium between state authorities and the coalition of those at the bottom of Moroccan society. These authorities can be challenged, but the flexibility of these safety valves ensure that some leeway is created so as to enable a seamless implementation of these policies.

Photo: Marissa Potasiak





Photo : Lorena Figueiredo

CULTURAL FACTORS AND METROPOLISATION PROCESSES

CHAPTER FIVE

CULTURAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

by Clémentine Chazal, Lisa Gerbal, Camille Lavoipierre and Daniela Pascual

Racines is an association advocating for structural changes in cultural policies and practices in Morocco. In 2010 it launched a massive project on the "General State of Culture in Morocco," an unprecedented survey project whose aim is to register existing artistic and cultural infrastructures at the national level. This initiative does not aspire to be exhaustive, but could rather be considered as an innovative tool for cultural policy design. This "first time exercise" unveils the current lack of both data and cultural strategies in Morocco' decision-making arena. Focusing on the metropolitan scale, one could wonder: what is today's state of cultural service provision both in Casablanca and Rabat? Is there a concrete cultural strategy for and from the metropolitan level of governance?

This paper aims to grasp the main dynamics of cultural policies in the context of the Casablanca-Rabat region. Our purpose is to emphasize the paradox between the will to develop "international cities," the desire to protect local creative industries, and the need to answer the demands of civil society.

We will begin with Casablanca, Morocco's economic capital of 3 million inhabitants (and 5 million in the region of Grand Cas-

ablanca), which contains only a few places dedicated to culture. When we asked about cultural activities and where these take place in the city, we were immediately referred to Les Abattoirs of Casablanca. An ancient slaughterhouse reconverted into a space dedicated to the arts and culture, it has organized several national festivals in music, cinema and the fine arts - including les transculturelles - in the past few years. It is also a welcoming arena for local initiatives such as underground music bands. This «fabrique des arts» resulted from the 2009 convention signed between the city and Casamémoire, a local association that has aided - along with others - in the reconversion of Les Abattoirs. Notably, while the mayor helped with its foundation (in the context of his re-election campaign) no follow-up has been conducted by local authorities ever since. Altogether, 250 events and activities have been organised in Les Abattoirs without any public funding, and the future of the institution remains highly uncertain. Les Abattoirs is the first initiative of the kind in Morocco, and probably in the Maghreb. Today it faces a double challenge: bargaining with city government for its survival and finding the means to expand its audience and programme in order to consolidate its position

as a key cultural institution in the city.

Moreover, Les Abattoirs' story highlights one of Racines' biggest concerns regarding cultural infrastructure; it reveals Casablanca's still-long path to achieving a comprehensive cultural circuit. Currently Casablanca is the site of only isolated and punctual initiatives. There is a clear lack of data and expertise within public authorities, an essential component to improving the general situation. While in 2011 the Ministry of Culture acknowledged the necessity of efforts such as Racines', and expressed interest and support for the "General State of Culture," relations between local governments and cultural structures remain poor. Grand Casa has over 18 spaces dedicated to culture, the vast majority of which struggle to remain alive.

On the other hand, Morocco's administrative and political capital of Rabat has recently been given the title of "Ville lumière" ("City of Light") and designated as the country's upcoming cultural headquarters. Rabat was granted in 2012 a place on UNESCO's world heritage list, which has undoubtedly contributed to the development of its cultural strategy. The Museum Mohammed VI of modern and contemporary art, which opened in 2013, is a direct result of the will to provide the city and Morocco with cultural institutions in tune with international standards. Moreover, the balance between modernity and tradition has been at the core of cultural planning, as illustrated by the National Library and

the National Institute of Music. Today, the most significant projects are the Grand Théâtre of Rabat and the National Museum of Archeology and Natural Science, which are both organized according to the framework of the Wessal Bouregreg Megaproject. The theatre, with its futuristic layout designed by Zaha Hadid, is expected to become an icon for Rabat and a worldwide point of reference. It thus appears that the future development of prestigious infrastructure is the main focus of cultural development policies in Rabat.

Indeed, if we take a closer look at such projects, they all include the edification of large scale cultural institutions, most of which result from the dynamics of governance themselves. Decision making is done at the national level, as megaprojects are the direct initiative of his Majesty the King Mohammed VI. At the metropolitan level, the figure of the Wali and heads of private agencies are responsible for executing part of the plans. This governance constellation leaves little room for local authorities in the design or proposal of cultural initiatives. Taking into account the debate between decentralization and democratization, we argue that the current state of cultural policy reflects a decentralization limited in scope, and a controlled democratization where every decision must be negotiated with the Palace.

What remains unanswered is to which extent this gap between institutional programs and local needs manifests itself in urban

landscape. Cultural strategies emanating from such top-down approaches are likely to create a worrisome two-tiered city in both Casablanca and Rabat. Indeed, we are witnessing the transformation of these metropolises into “Global Cities” at the cost of neglecting local creative industries’ needs and development.

Without doubt, the flourishing cultural plans in Casablanca and Rabat are the probative illustration of the government’s will to target the wealthiest and, among them, the new and growing expat class. Cultural policies are used as a tool to compete for international recognition. The use of the MasterCard index for Global Destination Cities (in which Casablanca appears among the top 5 most visited cities in Africa, with just under one million visitors per year) as a reference in city planning is a great example of this political statement. Moreover, as suggested above, megaprojects in the two cities dedicate a great part of their budget to the development of cultural infrastructures. Parallel to the Grand Théâtre of Rabat, whose opening is planned for 2018, Casablanca has started the construction of a theatre in its city center; at the Mohammed Vth plaza, which could represent potential competition for its counterpart in the capital. Further on, the Wessal Casablanca Port project’s ambition is to create a culture and leisure center for the city, with a Museum of Sciences and a library open to the public. The underlying aim of

these enterprises is the promotion of economic wealth through the realization of great iconic cultural projects. However, it seems that this ambition for economic development is being advanced at the expense of citizen participation, as the Hassan museum and archive located nearby the Marina are today largely devoid of local Casablanca residents. This leads us to question the existence of an effective geographical and qualitative assessment of demand for cultural facilities by Casablanca’s population. If the lack of proper infrastructure is a major impediment in the unfolding of cultural practices, as exemplified above with the city of Casablanca, we argue that the imagined developments for these two Moroccan cities are disconnected from both social reality and pressing urban needs. As a matter of fact, royal interest today is focused on international competition and this national concern is illustrated at the metropolitan level by the construction of cultural icons. There is however no guarantee that the activity of these centres will succeed in developing the curiosity for culture and the arts among wide sections of the population. Instead, it seems they could easily become imposing ghosts brought to life sporadically for major cultural events. Everyday practices with limited scope, which are more fundamental to a city’s cultural development, are treated as lesser priorities.

We are witnessing in Rabat and (most blatantly) in Casablanca a lack of evaluation and incorpora-

tion of the right to cultural offerings for the general population. To a certain extent this reveals a top-down (be it political or economic) approach to cultural service provision, and a lack of structured assessment and distribution of such services to citizens. This results in the neglect of local needs for cultural and educational offers, be it in terms of form or content. As a matter of fact, 25% of the population of the Grand Casablanca region suffers from illiteracy today, but the improvement of education does

not seem to be a primary goal of established cultural programs, nor is the promotion of local creative industries. Instead we find a blind strategy from the government, widening the already existing gap between local initiatives and institutional programs. Alternatively, a more bottom-up approach - an approach which the Racines association already employs - has the potential to close this gap, exposing the wider Moroccan population to meaningful, and accessible, cultural education. Question remains, however, as to

why the public authorities have yet to adopt this approach themselves, and whether or not they can be compelled to do so in the future.

Drawing : Camille Lavoipierre



CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CASABLANCA IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

by Juliette Delaveau, Clara Lange, Charlie Mitchell, Melina Spiga

The 19th and 20th centuries marked the emergence of Casablanca as Morocco's economic capital, facilitated in particular by the French expansion of the city beyond the historic medina. In 1915, Henry Prost proposed the city's inaugural Master Plan, modernizing Casablanca with an economic focus advocated by Général Lyautey. In 1947 a second Master Plan was implemented, this time the brainchild of Ecochard. The impact of these various plans - each with their own distinct conception of the city - can be seen in a short walk through the city's streets, revealing a true hodgepodge of architectural styles: neoclassical, neo mauresque, traditional, Art Déco and functionalist.

Nevertheless, this architectural richness is currently threatened by demolitions due to a simple fact: cultural heritage in Casablanca is still not considered an important element for the touristic development of the city, nor for the collective memory of the inhabitants. Linked with the French colonial legacy; this architecture is thus not claimed, nor perceived by the inhabitants as their own.

A different story can be seen in Rabat, where large parts of the city are now listed as UNESCO World Heritage sites. This city emerged from an important intellectual exchange between Arabic-Islamic antiquity and Western modernism. The heritage of the city comes from both the French Protectorate - particularly its royal and administrative areas, residential and commercial developments, as well as the botanical and leisure oriented Jardins d'Essaies - and the older parts of the royal capital dating back to the 12th century, including the Hassan Mosque, the Almohad ramparts, and the traditional city gates.

Two disjointed trajectories can therefore be drawn. On the one hand, Casablanca emerged as the country's main economic centre, experiencing rapid urbanization and liberal economic growth. On the other, Rabat remained stable as the political, and therefore historical, capital of the country. Nevertheless, Rabat's heritage could also be threatened by upgrading and development projects. In this article, we will try to understand if Moroccan cultural heritage is at risk in the context of rapid urbanization and me-

tropolisation.

There is an increasingly evident tension between the dramatic economic development (and subsequent urbanisation) of Casablanca and the preservation of its cultural heritage. In recent years, a pervasive neoliberal paradigm has galvanized economic and urban development in this region, with the ultimate aim of transforming Casablanca into Africa's primary economic and financial hub - the cornerstone of African economic development. Yet an inevitable result of this process has been the advancement of a "laissez faire" discourse, one which is conspicuously evident in metropolitan building management and the deterioration of cultural heritage. In a feeble attempt to halt the wreckage of sites of cultural heritage, the Wali forbade the destruction of historic buildings. Nevertheless, many buildings in Casablanca were lost and it remains a city of business and finance, concerned more with attracting developers and investors than preserving cultural emblems. Today, Casablanca seems to physically embody the expression "out with the old and in with the new".

Heavy building destruction occurred - sometimes city-government sponsored - to allow firms to redevelop the land. The effect of this is all the more perilous when the role of property owners is taken into consideration. Indeed, many private real estate owners, conscious of the potential profits to be made in selling their properties, but unable to

expel renters, instead allowed their buildings to degrade steadily until the state intervened. Thus state expropriation of land for commercial purposes represented a tool used by landlords to expel and displace poor tenants. Through this process, the degradation of cultural heritage sites adopted a new socio-economic facet which exacerbated pre-existing inequalities, ghettoization, segregation and class conflict. However, in recent times the Wali, local authorities and civil society have collaborated and begun to act. Organizations are pushing to preserve and concurrently to legitimize cultural heritage in Morocco. This duality of aims is exemplified by the impressive Casamémoire organization, which is working in the short term to protect buildings and areas of cultural significance in the city, and in the long term, to make Casablanca a UNESCO World Heritage city. An important tool used by this organization is public education, which is carried out primarily through open-days such as "les journées du patrimoine".

Despite this piecemeal positive response, many obstacles to the protection of cultural heritage remain. One nuance that emerges is the question of whether nascent political willingness in Casablanca to both foster and safeguard cultural heritage could be seen as a political manoeuvre to catch up with Rabat. This would allow Casablanca to compete in the sphere of cultural capital. Such a development would be logical; the stimulation of a cul-

tural life in Casablanca would improve the “amenities” available to foreign investors. Indeed, the idea of cultural heritage, of “patrimoine,” is a very western-centric and European idea.


In urban development projects in both Casablanca and Rabat, it appears obvious that most of the upgrading is not directed at poor populations, but instead is targeting very specific social groups: elites, expatriates and recent European investors. Therefore, as previously suggested, perhaps the meagre will and attempts not only to protect historical (European) buildings, but also to create a form of social consciousness around the notion of cultural heritage, could be an attempt to attract even more Europeans and to conform to “european standards.” This ironically links the protection of cultural heritage and history to globalization, liberalism and economic develop-

ment, as well as the marketing of Casablanca as an economic and international hub.

Like in many countries across the world, the attempts to “educate” civil society” are not enough to include citizens in the decision-making process and the latter remains excluded from definitions of what is worth protecting and preserving and what is not.

An important conclusion therefore arises: cultural heritage preservation in Moroccan cities can go hand in hand with rapid economic development and urbanization, as long as it is desired by elites and wealthy foreigners. This has crucial implications for the judgements made about which sites to destroy and which to preserve. Such judgements inevitably overlook the political and socio-economic needs of the city's poor and destitute citizens.

Photo : Paola Chapdelaine



STRIPPING THE STUDY TRIP

by Massimo Hulot and Simon Chabas

Even before boarding the plane for our week-long study of metropolization in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, we knew that our position as students, researchers, and, perhaps most importantly, outsiders, would bring with it a host of unique challenges. Landing in Casablanca's Mohammed V International Airport with a complex research question, stepping aboard our bus with 51 other students - all from different backgrounds - and finally reaching the lobby of the Ibis Hotel close to the port of Casablanca, we began our investigation, many of us experiencing Morocco (and indeed the African continent) for the first time.

We quickly found our position to be more tenuous than expected, lying somewhere between that of researcher and visitor. As Sciences Po students, we benefited from privileged access to high-level institutional actors in both cities, thanks to the personal contacts of current and former GLM students and to wider institutionalized relations. While we received warm welcomes (and sincere condolences for the recent Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris), many of the pre-prepared presentations we listened to were not directly linked to our research question. Perhaps this was to be expected; our meetings were often arranged


last-minute, with influential individuals working under severe time constraints, and it was in their interests to talk about the issues they saw as important, even if they did not always match our own.

The size of our group sometimes complicated our research; our party of fifty-two students and three professors drew attention as we navigated through the narrow streets of the medina. We felt this visibility acutely, and not just from people on the street, but from the actors we met with and from our professors as well. Thus we began to regulate our behavior - learning to adopt a certain attitude and to ask pointed questions with diplomacy and tact, working hard to present a truly professional image, somewhat regulated by our teacher's guidance. The reality of our professional profile went even more tangible, when during one of our last site visits - to the e-commerce start-up Kaymu - the company's CEO enthusiastically encouraged us to leave our resumes. Thus throughout this experience we simultaneously filled the roles of students, researchers, and members of a highly visible - and highly scrutinized - group. Just as we were trying to analyze the dynamic forces at stake in Rabat and Casablanca, Casablanca and Rabat were observing us. Our fieldwork and meetings with

the stakeholders were colored by this internal and external regulation, yet the impact of the clock proved just as important. With each passing day we progressively discovered just how little time we had, particularly in light of the ambitious goals of our collective research. Our study trip agenda seemed torn between the necessity of being together and the practicality of dividing the group into smaller units. In certain cases, while the visibility of the group was sometimes a burden, our large numbers allowed for the exchange multiple perspectives and debates, thereby enriching our reflections. Alternatively, when our official presentations ended with the more relaxed enjoyment of mint tea and pastries, only few students could benefit from informal, off-the-record discussions with our new contacts. We then shared this precious information with our fellow students, particularly with the non-French speakers among us. For these students the language barrier proved to be a challenge (as the majority of our meetings were in French) and when it came time to collect street-level information among the locals, this was largely accomplished by those of us who spoke French. Yet even among French speakers collecting such information and interacting with locals proved difficult, as only a minority of Moroccans speak French. Therefore, while English is often one of the most important languages in academics, the study trip reminded us of the necessity of speaking local languages in or-

der to achieve quality fieldwork. Overall, perhaps our group's size and diversity proved to be a strength, forcing us to collaborate (and to translate) for one another in a manner that improved our understanding and challenged our pre-conceptions of urban development in Morocco. On the other hand, during our visit to a slum at the edge of Rabat (Kenatra), many felt uncomfortable with the distance

Drawing : Clara Marcuard Fregonese



between the 'visited' and the 'visitors', physically symbolized by the "tour bus" window. Concerning this visit, some of us criticized its "miserabilist" view from up high. Disembarking the bus, many of the students felt ashamed of this flashy transportation and not at ease in this environment differing from theirs. Such a reaction can be explained as the projection of these students' own perceptions and worries, in particular feeling like we were disturbing people, that this visit could not be understood by the "visited".

In parallel, a little group of students escaped the group - who were listening to the speech of a representative of Al Omrane - to have a discussion with a dozen of slum-dwellers standing nearby and observing the scene. What followed was a casual discussion about the local living conditions and the evolution of the road works in progress. Yet this interaction could not be fully developed because of different constraints: one being linguistic (the concerned students did not speak the local dialect and only one slum-dweller spoke French) and the other being our lack of time. Thus, an invitation to visit the slum with them had to be declined in order to respect the agenda of our study trip.

Overall, if this week was dedicated to research, it nonetheless remained a trip, bringing most of us to African soil for the first time. This travelling experience took a very singular form, as our time limits meant we gained only a restrained experience of Casablanca. As we spent most

of our time on the bus or in a conference room, our urban "phenomenological" experience mostly happened on our own, when we deviated from the daily routine of the Ibis hotel breakfasts and the bus journeys. Most of us wandered mainly in the surroundings of the medina and the downtown, usually by night and rarely earlier than 8:00pm. Hence, we mostly approached the city when the streets were less animated, emptied of most of its inhabitants and shop-keepers, leaving us with a feeling of disconnection from the city's rhythm. The contrast appeared strikingly during the short lunch break and free morning we had the last day in Casablanca, when the intense activity of the market bubbled throughout the medina lanes, between the tables filled with the fried seafood and the smell of the delicious tangerines that followed us until Paris.



Photo : Nicolas Hrycaj

CONCLUSION

LOOKING AT CASABLANCA AND RABAT BEYOND THE CONTRACTUAL

by Côme Salvaire

The study trip to Casablanca was for all of us an opportunity to open up and make good use of the conceptual toolbox acquired during the first semester. These new tools spurred a collective attempt to understand the specificities of governance structures in the Casablanca-Rabat region. We felt empowered in our capacity to get a good grasp of the main governmental dynamics.

Looking back on the study trip, we must nonetheless keep questioning our understandings of urban development processes in Casablanca and Rabat, and engage with the delicate analysis of the frontiers of our analytical space(s) during and after the trip. What have we seen, where haven't we looked?

We can perhaps conceive this collective analytical space as being defined by three points. The first one is that of institutions and the political sociology component present in the majority of our articles. We refrain from depicting them as uniform and do take into account their specificities. The second point is that

of spatial restructuring, in the face of which we have notably developed political economy analyses. The last point lays in the attention paid to policies themselves, in particular in the governance of poverty, as well as those addressing the cultural sector. Most of our analyses occupy distinct positions within this triangle, combine and give different weights to these three analytical anchor points.

The idea of the trip surely was to be able to focus on the key structures of governance, without running the risk of diluting our analyses, in a limited time. The analytical limits we ran into still deserve to be pointed out. Broadly put, I suggest that our analytical triangle lacks depth: our understandings are too often confined to the level of the social contract, a notion whose hegemony we fail to escape. Building our analyses on the basis of a preexisting contract between institutions and citizens does not enable us to conceptualize properly the edges of governance and cuts us from engaging the lived reality of the city, what goes on beyond the

contract. Too often, we limit ourselves to seeing the social from the perspective of governing bodies. Further, we do not go far enough in taking into account the agency and contingency of institutions. Can we - reasonably, and without losing sight of our main goal, that of understanding governance - follow Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall's lead in their critique of scholarship on Johannesburg - a city with many parallels to be drawn with Casablanca -, where they emphasize the need to move our understanding of the social from "order and contract" to "experiment and artifice" !?

Although very useful in many contexts, the contractual notions of citizenship, rights and resistance can in many instances become important epistemological obstacles to our understanding of the social dynamics at play in the city. When introduced by Soraya El Kahlaoui to burning questions of slum displacement and land confiscation, particularly in the case of the struggle of the Guich L'Oudaya tribe in douar Ouled Dlim², it seemed quite important to turn to such notions. They are necessary in order to conceptualize the conflicts and injustices they suffer, along with their attempts to reestablish their rights. Yet, such a blatant example of op-

pression/resistance was, in a sense, all we were hoping for: a straightforward example of flouted rights, dismissed citizenship and resistance for survival. The notion of resistance becomes problematic when it hides the more complex processes at play in the city. Although Western scholars tend, ironically, to project it onto postcolonial thinkers, the latter have long been engaged in its critique, and attempted to develop alternative, more dynamic concepts, such as hacking, pirating³, or, in the case of De Certeau, *braconnage*⁴. When we always resort to resistance, we are unable to ask ourselves questions that are key to our understanding of the metropolization process in the Casablanca-Rabat region: what tactics and strategies are enacted by inhabitants to access the city, improve their life conditions, amid institutional constraints? Thinking with the triptych rights-citizenship-resistance enables us to understand the governmental choices made regarding urban development, who wins and who loses, but veils the choices made on the ground by inhabitants regarding their own development.

As Abdoumaliq Simone eloquently puts it, "So called modern cities have always taken the energies, experiments, and styles of their dif-

4. De Certeau, Michel. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Trans. Steven Rendall. Berkeley: U of California, 1984. Print.

1. Simone, Abdoumaliq. "The Politics of Urban Intersection: Materials, Affect, Bodies." *The New Blackwell Companion to the City*. Ed. Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. 357-66. Print.

2. El Kahlaoui, Soraya. "Droit à la terre : quand une tribu guerrière marocaine se révolte." *Le Monde Afrique* 19 Feb. 2015. Web.

3. Simone, Abdoumaliq. "Pirate Towns: Reworking Social and Symbolic Infrastructures in Johannesburg and Douala." *Urban Studies* 43.2 (2006): 357-70. Print.

ferent human and non-human inhabitants and “contracted” them, both in the sense of truncating these practices and establishing contractual relationships defining the rights and responsibilities of urban citizens”¹. When necessary, we must be able to put our contractual triptyc on the side so as to look beyond the contracted selves, into the lived reality and all the choices made in the city.

We have struggled with the rationale behind economic development choices and the massive investments made into mega-projects centered on finance and highly-skilled labor. Many times, such economic reasoning appeared to

be hardly more than a coding of policy choices made for other reasons. Was it interests? The Marina project and the turbulences it has been going through has even questioned the viability of some choices for the dominant class. An idea-based explanation was then often our last resort: we ran into the notion of “imitation”.

Such a concept proved useful in making sense of the sometimes apparent irrationality of certain policy choices. As such, the notion of imitation enables us to look outwards, at how the Casablanca-Rabat region attempts to conform to international standards of economic opening and financial appeal, to attract foreign

5. Mbembe, Achille, and Sarah Nuttal. “Writing the World from an African Metropolis.” *Public Culture* 16.3 (2004): 347-72. Print.

Photo : Alberto G. Pcazo



investments and labor. Surely, imitation is part of the explanation, but we ought not to neglect the agency of local institutions, which are not solely implementing a policy package designed elsewhere. In every act of imitation, there is a translation, and we need to look at how certain policy packages are used in this specific context. Behind every act of *mimicry*, there is an operation of *mimesis*, through which the imitated gets transformed, and something original is invented⁵. Insisting on the capacity of mimesis of local institutions, and thus on their agency, can enable us to look at how “imported” policies such as mega-projects are used not only in the international arena as vectors of homologation, but also within the metropolitan region itself for specific purposes. Mega-projects are not simply imported abstract policies and global financial centers rankings, nor are they built solely to satisfy directly the economic interests of small elite groups. If they are agents, institutions are also contingent, temporary. The Anfa and Marina projects in Casablanca are good examples of an imported policy transformed by political authorities into a source of internal legitimization. They aim, at two different levels, at neutralizing the political language

that could be carried by urban counter-elites, and intervening in the scenographic space of the city.

In order to grasp the articulation of mega-projects and legitimization in Morocco, a parallel can be drawn with Jean-François Bayart and James Ferguson's analyses of the use made by political authorities of “development projects” in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of Lesotho, Ferguson argues that the main purpose of development projects is not to alleviate poverty, nor is it to serve capitalist interests, but rather to reinforce political authority “by casting political questions of land, resources, jobs or wages as technical ‘problems’ responsive to the technical ‘development’ intervention”. Thereby, development projects, whether they fail or not, are used by political authorities as instruments for the de-politicization of language. In Casablanca, it appears that the symbols of globalization and finance are used in a similar fashion, as an “anti-politics machine”⁶, that will, further, encourage potential urban counter-elites to co-opt to the authorities' discourse⁷, notably through the jobs offered to them in the finance industry.

Mega-projects, as physical objects, are also to be seen as

6. Ferguson, James. “The Anti-Politics Machine, ‘Development’ and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.” *The Ecologist* 24.5 (1994): 176-81. Print.

7. Bayart, Jean-François. *L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre* (2nd ed.). Paris: Fayard, 2006. Print.

8. Elyachar, Julia. *Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo*. Durham: Duke UP, 2005. Print.

9. Shipley, Jesse Weaver. *Living the Hiplife: Celebrity and Entrepreneurship in Ghanaian Popular Music*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2013. Print.



Photo : Lorena Figueiredo

interventions in the “moral economy” of the city⁷. They carry values of wealth and cosmopolitanism, particular lifestyles and aesthetics, that they imprint in the fabric of the city. Although the urban middle class might not benefit economically from mega-projects, the representations they carry can become new horizons, a promise, that will also reinforce the legitimacy of political authorities. We are here, in a way, coming back to a basic understanding of the politics of mega-projects, which seek to reinforce political legitimacy through signaling, within the fabric of the city, new horizons and promises.

Looking beyond the social contract, at the agency and contingency of institutions, can enable us to develop analyses more in tune with the lived re-

ality of the Casablanca-Rabat region. Similarly to citizens, institutions do not only exist as contracted entities. They develop within the symbolic and physical reality of the city.

Questioning the citizenship-rights-resistance triptych as well as the concept of imitation, I want to show the necessity to reconnect our understandings to the lived reality of the city. We must sometimes step away from the background notion of social contract that can become an obstacle in making sense of the main dynamics of a city or region. We need to look at how bodies move, make choices, attempt to advance their condition, create, at how institutions transform and develop, within the urban scenography.

Do such considerations really matter outside of heated academic debates, to the professionals that most of us will become? My conviction is that they do, for two reasons in particular. First, we must find ways to account for the social creativity constantly at play in large cities, the “hacking” of inhabitants, or we will keep leaving it at the mercy of a neoliberal discourse^{8 9}, a vulture more than happy to jump onto any sign of initiative in the city, and from which the notion of empowerment has not been protected enough. Second, because it is necessary to account for all the regimes of development coexisting in cities in order to keep deconstructing the linear modernity implied by developmentalist approaches to public policy.

AFTERWORD

The graduate programmes of the Sciences Po Urban School are characterised by a precise learning process in the social sciences in addition to practice in the field through professional experiences and study trips.

Hence, the GLM study trip in a large metropolis is an important building block of the pedagogical project of the master's programme, which takes place during the first year of the curriculum. This experience provides a unique opportunity to blend on-site visits with meetings with the economic, political and social actors in the city or region.

The 2015 GLM trip in Casablanca and Rabat has been prepared in advance through conferences and seminars as well as through required readings. Putting what is learnt in class up against the reality of the field leads to fruitful analysis. This report, entirely written by the students, is the result of their observation and reflection on current urban dynamics in the Casablanca-Rabat region.

The Urban School and the GLM programme in particular would like to thank all the colleagues and local actors who have kindly helped with the preparation of the trip and have welcomed the students: Agence pour l'aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg, Agence d'Urbanisation et de Développement d'Anfa, Abdelaziz ADIDI, Al Omrane SAO Rabat, Ambassade de France au Maroc, Association Racine, Association des anciens de Sciences Po au Maroc, Marwa BELGHAZI, Mehdi BENSAID, Abderrahmane BOULOUD, Bouygues Immobilier, Casamémoire, Abdallah CHATER, Soraya EL KAHLAOUI, Abdelmoumine EL MADANI, Ruth GROS RICHARD, Institut développement et environnement, Institut National d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme, Fanny PONCE, Kaymu, Hind KHEDIRA, Sébastien LINDEN, Youssef NEJMI, Fathallah OUALALOU, Port de Casablanca, Khalid SAFIR, Victor SAID, Otmane SERRAJ, Benjamin TOIX, Abdellah TOURABI and Mohamed TOZI. We would also like to thank the student team which helped prepare the organization of the trip: Dickel BOKOUM, Perrine CHAULIAC, Lou D'ANGELO, Juliette DELAVEAU and Gaëtan MULLER. Finally we would like to express our gratitude to the cartography department of Sciences Po, and especially Mr. Savina, whose advice has been of great help in elaborating the maps.

Photo : Paola Chapdelaine

The GLM team : Catherine Bacheter, Régine Serra and Tommaso Vitale
The Sciences Po Urban School: Brigitte Foulland and Patrick Le Galès





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Report released in May 2015

