The 'Immigrant Bargain' Revisited: Exploring the Subjective Social Mobility of Immigrants in France.

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The urge to be "elsewhere" inhabits the minds and bodies of human beings… Few are the people who do not project themselves onto another place.

(Recchi & Safi, 2024)

Mémoire présenté pour le Master en Sociologie

Thesis Director: Ettore Recchi

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I owe thanks to the director of this thesis, Ettore Recchi. Throughout the process of writing and, in fact, throughout the masters' program, Ettore has offered invaluable feedback and support, reinforcing my own belief in the project, standing as a voice of reason and pushing me onward. Working for Ettore as a research assistant in the first year of my degree provided me with experience that has served to be invaluable. I can only hope that the influence of Ettore's own work on the intersections of social and spatial mobility in the conceptualisation of this thesis is clear in the final product – to have this be the case would be a great compliment.

Second, I wish to thank Dasha Ilina without whom I would not have gotten to this point. Her drive, her passion and her confidence have, over the last eight years been an endless source of inspiration for me - one that has allowed me to strive far beyond what I thought possible. One day I hope to repay the effort, kindness and patience that supporting me through this degree has required, and until then I have only the deepest gratitude.

Third, no single person has read quite as many pages of my writing over the last two years as Mary Berman. Berman is not only the clearest writer I have met but has stood as a voice of reason and a critical eye whose insight and clarity in this and other matters has kept me grounded. We have spoken at length about this project, and her contribution to ironing out the knottiest conceptual problems cannot be overstated. There are few others I would be happier to turn to for advice. I will be eternally grateful for her willingness to sift through half chewed ideas, and I am perpetually amazed at her ability to extract sense from nonsense.

Fourth, no acknowledgement would be complete without recognising the invaluable contribution of Christopher Edwards. Without his support, the three years of study leading up to this project would not have been possible. I cannot offer enough thanks for making sure I got a fair deal.

Abstract

The socioeconomic mobility of migrants has been a core topic of sociological research since the Chicago School of the early 20th century. Since this time, the numerous structural disadvantages faced by immigrants have been described in great detail. Although many migrants move on the basis of economic aspiration, immigrants are typically faced with downward mobility and disadvantage on arrival. However, the question of how migrants perceive their socioeconomic trajectories – their subjective social mobility – and how this correlates with objective outcomes remains an open question. This thesis explores the subjective mobility of migrants and its relationship to objective intergenerational mobility; occupational and educational. Drawing on multiple surveys – Trajectoires et Origines 2 (TeO2) the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Life in Transition Survey IV (LITS IV) – it first attends to the immigrant population in France, before replicating these findings in a cross-national context. In so doing, it describes two consistent phenomena.

First, migration background itself is consistently associated with higher rates of subjective social mobility. Although migration is typically understood as a means to an economic end, the findings of this thesis attest to a more complex entanglement of migration itself with emic conceptions of upward mobility. Whether we compare migrants with non-migrants in place of origin or in the destination country, migrants are, all else equal, significantly more likely to report being upwardly mobile than are non-migrants. What's more, this gap is present across practically all migrant populations in France. Moreover, it is irreducible to macro and microeconomic conditions. Migration background, then, is itself a consistent correlate of subjective mobility. Second, migrants' subjective mobility is less associated with their objective trajectories than are non-migrants. In terms of occupation, the predicted alignment between intergenerational mobility and perceptions thereof is significantly weaker for migrants than non-migrants. In terms of education, migrants who are upwardly mobile see no significant increase in their subjective mobility. Taken together, these findings attest to a significant gap between etic and emic conceptions of social mobility, one that is particularly strong for migrants. In line with contemporary migration scholars, these findings suggest that it is essential to take migration seriously as an act with its own intrinsic social logics, shaping individuals' sense of success and mobility in and of itself.

1. Introducing the Immigrant Bargain

Questions regarding social mobility have been central to migration studies for much of the last century (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969). Although the pursuit of upward social mobility is an oft-cited motivator of migration (Ferry & Ichou, 2024), migrants' socioeconomic trajectories are typically more complicated. Despite being positively selected on educational and occupational resources (Ichou, 2014; Feliciano, 2005), first generation immigrants often experience immediate downward mobility both relative to their own socioeconomic status pre-migration and relative to the status of their parents (Gans, 2009; Papademetriou et al., 2009; Recchi & Ciornei, 2020). As such, though upward social mobility is understood as a core motivation for migrating, downward mobility tends to be the rule. Yet, how immigrants perceive their social trajectories remains an open question.

To explain why immigrants – particularly those who move in pursuit of upward mobility – both move initially and subsequently remain in destination countries despite disadvantages of which they are often already aware, scholars have invoked the notion of an *immigrant bargain* (Smith, 2006; Louie, 2012; Alba & Foner, 2015, Ichou & Ferry, 2024; Ichou & Caron, 2024). Grown out of ethnographic research (Smith, 2006), this theoretical framework extends the link between social mobility and migration by positing that expectations of social mobility not only influence migration decisions but structure many migrants' experiences of (typically downward) social mobility. Crucially, the *immigrant bargain* thesis emphasises the extent to which migration is conceived of as a long-term economic project. Acting in the interest of themselves and their descendants, migrants are suggested to willingly accept low status jobs in more prosperous regions "even when [they] arrive with [social attributes] that brought significant status in their home societies" (Alba & Foner, 2015, p. 47). Having successfully resettled in regions perceived as offering more opportunity for upward mobility, migrants are meant to remain optimistic about their mobility "regardless of [the]…actual economic gains or losses" incurred in moving (Louie, 2012, p.1), on the basis that the migration decision will pay off with time (Alba & Foner, 2015).

By positing that immigrants (more so than natives) accept downward mobility, the *immigrant bargain* offers an implicit comparison. If downward mobility and low-status position resulting from migration is associated with future prospects (a necessary stepping stone to upward mobility), individuals would be less likely to perceive socioeconomic penalties incurred in the process of moving as downward mobility - provided these penalties are in fact temporary. Consequently, the relationship between subjective social mobility (SSM: or assessment of one's own social trajectory as upward, downward, or horizontal) and objective

social mobility would differ systematically between migrants and non-migrants – immigrants being more likely to perceive themselves as upwardly mobile even when they, in etic terms, are not.

However, the association between SSM and migration has never been explicitly tested. Studies of the conditions under which individuals see themselves as socially mobile are generally rare (Gugushvilli, 2021), yet their absence in migration studies is particularly notable. Beyond the *immigrant bargain*, both empirical and theoretical literature emphasising the cultural dimensions behind migration decisions suggest the two may be linked (Carling, 2002; Pajo, 2008; de Haas, 2021). In certain cases, the very act of migrating has become intrinsically associated with notions of status, social mobility and personal success (de Haas, 2006; Pajo, 2008). Moreover, on arrival, many immigrants' perceptions of success in life are strongly linked to perceived self-determination and autonomy linked to having migrated (López and Williams, 2024).

We have reason to expect a significant association between migration and subjective mobility, then. Yet, despite the broad use of socioeconomic mobility as a lens through which to understand migration decisions (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Robin, 2019; Atterberry, 2025) and extensive study of the extent to which migrants' social mobility projects are successful (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969; Hum & Simpson, 2007; Ichou, 2014; Alba & Foner 2015; Zuccotti *et al.,* 2017; Abramitzky *et al.*, 2021), questions regarding the relationship between migration itself and subjective social mobility have remained largely absent from the literature.[1]

In this thesis I target this gap. Employing survey data produced by the French National Institute of Demographics (INED) and the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) – namely, the 'Trajectoires et Origines 2' (TeO2) survey (Beauchemin et al, 2023) – the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Life in Transition Survey IV (LITS) conducted by The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, I explore the following questions:

[1] Although these do not address the question of subjective social mobility per se, a few exceptions to this rule can be found in studies estimating the relationship between various aspects of migration and subjective positions: Firstly, Engzell & Ichou (2020) estimate the effect of status inconsistency on immigrant subjective social status. Secondly, Caron & Ichou (2024) estimate the effect of social mobility on subjective social status among immigrants in France. Lastly, although they do not attend to social mobility, a handful of ethnographic studies offer a phenomenological account of migrants' conceptions of success (cf. López and Williams, 2024; Kyeremeh *et al.*, 2021).

Q.1 Does SSM (operationalised as subjective *inter*generational social mobility - i.e. success in life relative to parents) differ between those who have, and have not, migrated?

1.1 Does the alignment of objective social mobility with subjective social mobility differ between migrants and non-migrants?

1.2 Are differences between migrants and non-migrants a feature of migration in general, or a feature of certain types of migration, or certain migration trajectories?

1.3 What is the effect of long-term stagnation in occupational mobility on subjective social mobility for migrants whose migration *was* marked by downward mobility?

Q.2 Do these differences owe to the act of migrating itself, and not:

2.1 To likely selection into migration for those with higher subjective social mobility?

2.2 To systematic differences in life chances (as determined by macroeconomic conditions) between origin and destination countries?

I. Estimating subjective social mobility

If - as per the *immigrant bargain* - those who migrate for economic reasons are in fact more accepting of low-status positions than non-immigrants because they see low status jobs as temporary necessities for facilitating future mobility and long-term prosperity (Alba & Foner, 2015), we would expect a weaker correlation between objective social mobility and subjective upward mobility for migrants than non-migrants. Specifically, we would expect this to be the case for those who migrated for economic reasons or from less prosperous regions. Moreover, we would expect gaps in SSM between migrants and non-migrants to be largest for these groups. Further, if the positional downgrade experienced by these immigrants is expected to be temporary (Alba & Foner, 2015, p. 47), it follows that the SSM of downwardly mobile migrants would be lower if socioeconomic positions did not subsequently improve – a function of individuals reevaluating the promise of the immigrant bargain and the permanence of the downward mobility they've experienced. Finally, we would expect that this gap is, in large part, dependent on broader macroeconomic differences between receiving and sending places

- such that these factors account for differences between migrants and non-migrants in SSM, reducing any residual effect[2] of emigration.

Table 1: *Measures of Subjective Social Mobility (SSM) for TeO2, LITS, & ISSP*

Subjective social mobility Crosswalk: TeO2, LITS & ISSP				
Survey	**Variable**	**Prompt**	**Levels**	**Condition**
TeO2 (2020)	Considering your own success in life relative to that of your parents:	Would you say that you are?	More successful As successful Less successful	More successful
LITS (2022)	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	I have done better in life than my parents	Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree	Agree Strongly agree
ISSP (2021)	In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale which runs from top to bottom [1:10].	Q.1 Where would you put yourself now on this scale? Q.2 And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?	Q.1 Numeric 1:10 Q.2 Numeric 1:10	Q.1 > Q.2
Harmonized variable	[Do respondents percieve themselves as upwardly mobile?]		Yes No	•

Drawing on multiple data sources (TeO2, LITS IV and ISSP: cf. table 1) this thesis examines whether international migration correlates with subjective intergenerational mobility beyond traditional measures of social mobility (specifically education and socioeconomic status)[3]. Focusing first on immigrants in France, I compare estimates to non-immigrants in France, then to non-emigrants in their region of origin. In so doing, I show a consistent, robust gap in subjective mobility. Migrants are consistently more likely to perceive themselves as upwardly socially mobile, all else equal. This gap between migrants and non-migrants is largest for individuals who have experienced downward occupational mobility relative to their parents. However, it is not conditional on downward mobility, nor to particular migration trajectories. Although the cross-sectional nature of the data used eliminates the possibility of establishing a truly causal estimate, I further show that SSM is unlikely to be a significant predictor of migration intentions.

France is a major receiving country of migration in Europe (OECD, 2024), making it an appropriate case for the bulk of our analysis. Moreover, TeO2 (which only covers France) provides the best possible source of data for testing the association between socioeconomic mobility and subjective mobility. However, to establish the relationship between migration and

[2] Crucially, the term residual effect here (as in subsequent portions) is used to distinguish causal effect from the statistical sense of the term. At no point can the methods employed in this thesis provide a truly causal estimate. The term residual effect is used to describe the variance that remains unaccounted for by controls and is therefore attributed to our primary independent variables.

[3] Although these variables appear to target the same phenomenon, it is essential to note up front that we cannot assume that they are comparable. Given the differences in format and wording, the extent to which estimations from different sources can be placed in direct comparison will be explicitly tested. These results will be briefly discussed in the methods section below. The full analysis can be found in the methodological appendix (a).

SSM I also reproduce findings using LITS IV, a cross-national survey of low to middle-income transition economies. With this I show that these results also hold for individuals moving between countries of macroeconomic equivalence.

In sum, the results suggest that migration itself is a correlate of subjective social mobility. In line with the *immigrant bargain* thesis, migrating appears to serve as a buffer between downward intergenerational mobility and subjective assessments thereof. However, finding that this gap only rarely dependent on downward mobility, consistent across migrant groups in multiple origin and destination places, in addition to being apparently enduring over time even when migrants' conditions do not improve, leads me to suggest that the act of migrating itself, and intrinsic links between emigration, social status and success (de Haas, 2006; 2021, Pajo, 2008) serve as a more complete explanation for the residual gap in SSM. Implicit in much quantitative migration research is a conception of migration as a means to the end of socioeconomic mobility (Pajo, 2008). This idea is central to the *immigrant bargain* thesis. However, I suggest this framework overlooks the role that migration itself plays in individuals' perceptions of their own social mobility and success. Based on my results, it seems likely that migration is itself an act associated with success, social mobility and status, and that this dynamic creates a significant gap between etic (researcher-defined) and emic (migrant-defined) notions of social mobility.

To this end the text can be divided into 8 sections. I begin by laying out the state of the art, discussing the growing literature on the relationship between objective and subjective social positions. I argue that although research on subjective social class and status has grown significantly in recent years, there is a gap in the literature on subjective social mobility – one which is particularly notable in migration studies. In the second part of this literature review I link theories on the mechanisms behind migration with literature on post-migration outcomes. Specifically, I lay out the long-standing relationship between migration and socioeconomic mobility in sociological research - describing the pre-eminence of socioeconomic outcomes as a measure of migration success and its relation to classical theories of migration. I argue that in prioritising etic frameworks for success in the form of socioeconomic outcomes, the literature has largely overlooked migrants' own perceptions of social mobility. Consequently, although the extent to which migrants are 'successful' in socioeconomic terms is a central paradigm of migration studies, a major part of the empirical puzzle is missing – migrants' own perceptions of mobility and the alignment between this and 'objective' measures of socioeconomic mobility. As a final point in this section, I discuss problems pertaining to reference groups in measuring subjective social mobility. Particularly I emphasise how, in the context of migration, assuring a relevant comparative case for social mobility and social status

is critical. Without fixing a definitive reference group we cannot understand the role migration plays in individuals' perceptions of social mobility. This means the *intra*generational approach taken by previous studies of migrants' subjective social mobility, though empirically fruitful, is limited – offering no consistent reference group, nor ability to compare migrants' SSM to that of non-migrants. As such, I provide a full justification for my own focus on subjective *inter*generational mobility.

In the following chapters I turn to my own empirical contribution. First, I outline testable hypotheses drawn from the concept literature outlined in the preceding chapters. Next, I describe the data and measures in more detail, before turning to my results. Here I examine the relationship between subjective intergenerational mobility, objective intergenerational mobility, migration intentions and migration background. This analysis unfolds across three main chapters, each divided into subsections addressing a set of key research questions.

In **section 1** I use rich data from TeO2 to assess whether a gap exists between migrants and non-migrants in terms of subjective social mobility. I compare migrants in France to non-migrants in France, examining how this gap varies across levels of objective socioeconomic mobility, regions of origin, or different reasons for migrating. I also estimate the influence of two factors – migration background, and the moderating effect of migration background on the relationship between objective socioeconomic mobility and SSM. Finally, I consider whether the gap can be said to close as a function of time since migration (for those who see no improvement in their socioeconomic status) following a migration-related downgrade. In **section 2** I use the ISSP and TeO2 together to bolster these results. Here I evaluate the extent to which particularities of our comparison case (French non-migrants) can be considered responsible for the gap described in section 1. Having done so, I proceed to compare EU migrants in France with to non-emigrants in their region of origin using propensity score matching to create a sample of equivalent EU residents in the ISSP. In **section 3**, I use LITS to address alternative explanations for the gap. Firstly, I consider the question of migrant selection, examining whether the perceived effect is likely to be endogenous - a feature of migrant selection on dispositional traits (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Specifically, I explore whether our data allows us to suggest there is a significant association between intentions to migrate and SSM. Finally, I consider whether the findings in France are likely to be generalisable to emigrants elsewhere, i.e. whether they appear to be a feature of migration as such (i.e. international mobility followed by long term settlement), or rather a feature of migration to France - a desirable, high income destination country (OECD, 2024). Using LITS for this purpose allows me to compare directly emigrants with non-emigrants in their region of origin while taking into account macroeconomic change over the life course - the thought here

being that the difference in SSM may be driven by origin-destination country differences in economic prosperity which has knock-on effects on individual assessments of their social mobility.

I conclude with a discussion of these results, placing them in relation to existing theoretical work on migration in addition to empirical work on both subjective outcomes associated with migration and the expectations tied into migration decisions. Critically, there is a clear case for understanding migration in and of itself as a key contributor to emic conceptions of social mobility. Migration may serve as a particular form of status attainment (Haller & Portes, 1973), one that has been sorely overlooked. For this reason, I argue that there is a significant and pervasive disconnect between etic (researcher-defined) frameworks of social mobility and emic (migrant-defined) understandings of social mobility. Not only does migration consistently predict perceptions of upward social mobility (over and beyond objective social mobility), but a significant portion of our results suggest a moderating effect of migration for the association between objective occupational and educational trajectories and subjective social mobility.

Yet, while this project lays out a novel finding, I suggest that far more research is necessary to understand the specific mechanisms that underlie this relationship. I suggest that more quantitative analyses should attend to the living conditions and post-migration trajectories that moderate the relationship between objective and subjective social mobility for migrants. However, while the quantitative approach as taken in this thesis is novel, I suggest that qualitative research can help better understand the intricacies of post-migration career trajectories at a smaller scale. Moreover, a qualitative approach would be able to better flesh out the experiences and frames of reference that account for the difference. Finally, I close by discussing significant limitations to my own approach, highlighting the regrettable lack of longitudinal data - eliminating the possibility of establishing whether this relationship is truly causal and inability to separate out cohort, time since migration and mobility as distinct factors affecting migrant SSM - the lack of precise origin-country estimates for immigrants in France and the varied comparability of survey questions.

2. Types of social status: Objective and Subjective

Social stratification research (the subfield of sociology dedicated to studying social mobility) attends to the conditions under which individuals transcend their own social background or, conversely, reproduce inherited positions. Often distinct from Marxist class

analysis, which accentuates positions relative to modes of production (Marx, 1990[1867]), much of this work operates within a Weberian framework (Oesch & Vigna, 2023). Herein, social class is conceived as multidimensional - a question of life chances as determined by market position, occupation and general access to economic and cultural goods (Weber, 1978 [1922]; Giddens, 1973).

In the three subsections section below, I start from this basic understanding of social stratification as a question of life chances. In so doing, I outline the relationship between objective and subjective measures of class, status and social mobility in the existing literature, illustrating a notable and significant gap in the literature with regards to the subjective social mobility of migrants.

I. The subjective / objective mismatch, a case of life chances?

In the mid 20th century, stratification scholars often relied on measures of subjective social status and subjective class (cf. Centers, 1953; Jackman & Jackman, 1973). Yet, by the end of the century, these measures fell out of favour (Oesch & Vigna, 2023). A pervasive misalignment of objective social positions (as defined by academics) and individuals' subjective perceptions led many to believe that individuals are simply unreliable assessors of their own social position (Evans & Mellon, 2016; Sosnaud et al. 2013; Evans & Kelley, 2004; Andersen & Curtis, 2012; Savage et al, 2010). Evidence of this "mismatch between objective life chances and people's subjective awareness" (Savage et al., 2010, p. 118) tends to emerge regardless of how subjective social position is measured. Provided with a categorical class scale, most survey respondents in the UK identify themselves as middle class, regardless of their occupational position (Evans & Mellon, 2016). Similarly, measures of subjective social status – typically assessed using a sliding 10-point scale, also known as the MacArthur scale (Adler et al., 2000) - tend to converge at positions four, five and six, flattening variance in objective life conditions (Evans & Kelley, 2004).

In exploring this misalignment, scholars tend to draw on a combination of two theoretical mechanisms. The first of these is 'reference group theory' (Evans & Kelley, 2004). From this point of view, when individuals assess their status, they do so relative to others in their immediate social network. Due to the homophilic nature of social relations, individuals' own lives come to appear middling. This limited frame of reference creates an inconsistency between objective conditions and subjective social status, pulling responses toward a common mid-point (Evans & Kelley, 2004). The second explanation suggests that mismatches owe to cognitive dissonance (D'Hooge et al., 2018) - compensation for a misalignment between how people view themselves, the world they experience and what they believe about that world. For

instance, Adair (2001) suggests that prevailing egalitarian norms in the United States discourage self-classification as upper or lower class. Survey respondents, due to dissonance between these beliefs and their lived experience may then "inflate" or "deflate" (Sosnaud et al., 2013) their "real" socioeconomic positions such that they coalesce around middle class self-identification (Adair, 2001).

However, in recent years it has been suggested that inconsistency between objective and subjective measures may just as easily arise from a failure of academic categorisations of class position to capture relevant aspects of life chances as from individuals' misconceptions (Oesch and Vigna, 2023). In fact, subjective social positions, despite their bad name, do capture aspects of life chances that objective measures do not. For instance, while objective categorical class encompasses individual characteristics, subjective class better reflects economic conditions at the household level (both wealth and income) (Oesch and Vigna, 2023). In the same manner, subjective social status aligns with geographical inequalities (Vigna, 2023) and often predicts physical, and mental health outcomes (McLeod et al., 2005; Hoebel & Lampert, 2020; Präg, 2020) over and beyond objective social position. Academic conceptions of social class and socioeconomic status therefore reflect individual position in an edified social structure, accurately describing life chances in this sense. However, subjective measures may encompass life chances and living conditions in a broader manner, capturing critical features that objective occupational and economic measures cannot.

II. Subjective Social Mobility

Despite growing interest in subjective social positions (class and status), subjective social mobility (SSM) has remained marginal. Social mobility is typically operationalised as change in occupation, income (Barone et al., 2022), or educational achievement (cf. Engzell & Ichou, 2020) that takes place either over the life course (*intra*generational mobility), or across generations (*inter*generational mobility). Research on the outcomes associated with objective social mobility suggests that it affects individual attitudes and dispositions – including life satisfaction, mental health, and redistribution preferences (Chan, 2018; Jaime-Castillo and Marqúes-Perales, 2019; Dolan & Lordan, 2020).

Yet, the conditions under which individuals *perceive* themselves as socially mobile has remained understudied. Instead, social mobility is frequently assessed from an etic perspective - as objective positional changes in the social structure. This is notable since the mechanisms by which social mobility is meant to produce many outcomes suggest that what matters is the experience of said mobility (Gugushvili et al., 2019; Gugushvili, 2021). In this sense, it is often assumed that individuals who are socially mobile *necessarily recognise themselves as such*

(ibid.). However, there is no reason to believe, particularly given the persistent mismatch between objective and subjective measures of social position, that the factors used by sociologists to assess social mobility are the same as those used by laypeople to assess their own trajectories.

Though few and far between, existing studies of the conditions underlying subjective social mobility confirm that non-academics are unlikely to think of their own social trajectories in purely occupational, economic or educational terms (Gugushvili, 2021; Duru-Bellat & Kieffer, 2008; Kelley & Kelley, 2009). As Duru-Bellat and Kieffer (2008) show, most individuals report that other factors (interpersonal relationships and leisure activities) are at least as important as occupational achievement and labour market status in determining whether they are upwardly mobile relative to their parents. Additionally, the probability of perceiving oneself as upwardly mobile is dependent on broader cultural, historical and macro-economic changes over the lifecourse (Gugushvilli, 2021). Notably, studies attest to a 'tunnel effect' whereby experiences of widespread macroeconomic improvement over the life course affect individual perceptions of their own social mobility regardless of whether their own conditions have changed at the micro level (Kelley & Kelley, 2009; Gugushvilli, 2021). On this basis, it is unsurprising that rates of subjective upward mobility do not only vary the individual level, but also at the national level (Meraviglia, 2017). In sum, emic conceptions of social mobility do, on the one hand, align with education and occupation (Gugushvili, 2021). On the other, they include much broader contextual changes to individual life conditions, remaining tied to macro-level determinants of life chances.

III. On the Subjective Mobility of migrants

Drawing on these findings, migration may also play a significant role in determining how individuals understand their own intergenerational trajectories; the idea this thesis explores. Moreover, though not explicitly broached by migration scholars, existing theoretical and empirical work supports this suggestion.

First, moving between countries may profoundly reshape life chances. Most migrants move from less to more economically developed places (Rumbaut, 1994). As such, migration, despite the downward mobility with which it is often associated (Hum & Simpson, 2007; Alba & Foner 2015; Ichou, 2014; Abramitzky *et al.*, 2021), provides access to more prosperous macro-social climates, thereby fundamentally migrants' life conditions and prospects (de Haas, 2021). If, as evidenced by both Gugushvili (2021) and Kelley and Kelley (2009), changes in macroeconomic conditions over the life course significantly predict subjective social mobility (in sum, the 'tunnel effect'), we would have reason to believe that migrants - particularly those

who move from less, to more prosperous regions - would see themselves as upwardly mobile. In fact, we may in expect this to be the case regardless of downward mobility associated with moving – provided migrants move upward in macroeconomic terms.

Second, ethnographic and theoretical work attests to an intrinsic alignment of general social aspiration and migration (de Haas, 2006). A 'culture of emigration' in certain regions has led to an enmeshing of migration into existing behavioural and cultural repertoires (Massey, 1998) - such that aspirations toward social mobility become aligned with migrating itself (de Haas, 2006). As de Haas (2006; 2021) argues, although the decision to migrate cannot be disentangled from the objective promises of improvements in life conditions associated with moving, many people aspire to migration itself, reaching for a form of *"the social prestige"* (2021, p. 32) with which it is associated. This implies that migration may both be a 'means-to-an-end' of socioeconomic mobility - a paradigmatic conception of migration I will discuss in section 3 of this thesis - *and* a correlate of emic conceptions of success and social mobility in and of itself. Simply, regardless of whether people tend to more economically prosperous places (eg. Rumbaut 1994), economics are not the only factor at play. When deciding whether or not to migrate, individuals do not consider this question " [only] in relation to personal gain" (Carling, 2002, p. 17). For some, migration is a necessity. For others, it is a rite of passage, a social expectation, or something they aspire toward - not only for economic reasons but because of the ways migration itself is valorised (de Haas, 2021). Consequently, without suggesting that migration is an end in itself - since it seems implausible that people migrate for the sake of migrating - voluntary migration, as a decisive action taken in search of 'the good life' (ibid.), may itself contribute to individuals perceiving themselves as upwardly mobile.

In a similar manner, Pajo (2008) suggests that those who migrate often see geographical locations as holding different attributed value in moral terms. Movement between places, from this point of view, is a process shaped by a "social imaginary of the world as a hierarchy of countries" (p. 192). This 'socioglobal mobility', argues Pajo (2008), lies at the very core of emigration, and undergird emigrants' "strategies for carrying on" in the face of disadvantage (p. 192). On the basis that migration is paradoxical - i.e. migrants are understood to move for upward mobility, often know of the disadvantages and downward mobility that awaits them, but move anyway - Pajo (2008, p. 192) argues that "the willed pursuit of social demotion involved in much contemporary international migration" may be explained by "the desire to advance from a location envisioned as relatively low in the world hierarchy towards one envisioned as higher". From this point of view, *migration* constitutes a transformation of one's place in the social hierarchy, a pure case of upward mobility *in itself* (Pajo, 2008). Whether or not migrants are upwardly mobile in etic terms (i.e. in education or occupation), then, these

frameworks, often drawing on ethnographic work, would suggest migrants understand themselves as upwardly mobile by virtue of their migration. Consequently, where academics characterise migrants' trajectories as marked by downward mobility, this may well be inconsistent with migrants' own perception of their mobility (Pajo, 2008).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in a study of internal migrants in China, Lu (2021) shows that while rural populations have lower subjective social mobility than urban populations (despite higher rates of objective social mobility), this does not apply to those who left rural areas. Rural-urban migrants were, all else equal, significantly more likely to consider themselves upwardly mobile relative to their parents than were stayers. Although this effect was mediated by changes in subjective economic conditions, internal migration appears as its own distinct correlate of subjective *inter*generational mobility (Lu, 2021).

However, these existing streams of research leave open certain questions. The above cited theoretical and ethnographic work is overwhelmingly focused on the construction of migration in sending places. As such, it only rarely draws on post-migration perceptions of social mobility in the receiving country - i.e. whether migrants in the receiving country do, in fact, see themselves as upwardly mobile. Consequently, this raises a pressing question - while we might know there is an intrinsic association between migration and social mobility in some sending places, to what extent do people who *have* migrated see themselves as upwardly mobile? What's more, the methodological approach taken has not allowed for an analysis of the alignment between objective and subjective mobility. As such, it also leaves open a second question: how does this relate to their 'objective' social trajectories as defined by academics? This final question also holds for Lu (2021) who, due to a lack of data, was unable to compare objective and subjective mobility. For this reason, their analysis could not rule out the possibility that the objective, migration-related social mobility achieved by rural-urban migrants (nor objective changes in macroeconomic conditions between regions) account for the difference between leavers and stayers in terms of their subjective social mobility. Moreover, no analyses equivalent to that of Lu (2021) have been found in the context of international migration. Although both pertain to variants of residential mobility, internal and international migration do not necessarily produce the same outcomes. Internal and international migrants face different challenges in relocating - language barriers, discrimination and issues of legal recognition – which, though not absent for internal migrants, are less prevalent (King & Skeldon, 2010). Whether there is an association between migration and subjective mobility for international migrants therefore remains an open question - as is the question of how this relates to their socioeconomic trajectories.

These gaps in the literature are particularly notable given that, as I outline in the following section, the analysis of how migrants' objective socioeconomic positions been a topic of sociological research since the Chicago school (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969). On the basis that migration decisions are at root strategic economic decisions (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970), migrant's social mobility has long been used as a metric for whether migration delivers on its underlying economic promises – and thereby whether migrants are ultimately successful (López & Williams, 2024). A handful of studies consider the subjective *intra*generational mobility of international migrants. However, this is used only as an independent variable to predict the subjective well being of migrants (cf. Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018). Consequently, the question of how international migration is itself associated with *subjective* social mobility as an outcome in its own right has remained unexplored. The same is true regarding the role migration may might play into these emic conceptions of social mobility. Yet if the expressed goal is to assess whether migration projects pay off, how migrants assess their own social trajectories is an essential piece of the empirical puzzle.

3. Migration and Socioeconomic Mobility

To understand where the theoretical and empirical contribution of this thesis fits into the literature it is imperative we consider the way in which migration has typically been understood and studied in the social sciences. Below I lay out canonical theories of migration which, despite their underlying differences, share a paradigmatic conception of migration – framing this as a reflection of economic aspiration. This conception is pervasive, ultimately underlying sociological research both on motivations for migration (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Piore, 1979) and on the extent to which migrants are ultimately successful in their endeavour (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969; Zuccotti et al., 2017). However, as I will argue, this framework has often overlooked migrants' own frame of reference for social mobility.

Following this line of thought, I frame my own approach to subjective *inter*generational mobility against the existing literature on subjective and objective outcomes for migrants, arguing that this offers empirical insight that both etic measures of social mobility and *intra*generational measures of subjective mobility previously used by migration scholars do not.

I. Migration, an economic project

As a pioneering theory in the field, neo-classical theory approached migration in structural functionalist terms (cf. Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Herein movement between regions was understood as an outcome of disparities in income and opportunity between origin and destination places. As such, migration decisions – whether individual or taken on the part of a family unit (Stark, 1991) – were a means of utility maximisation or economic risk mitigation. In sum, individuals are understood as moving to a geographical location with better economic-professional prospects for their own economic stability and prosperity.

Although differing in their account of the aggregate effects of migration flows, later historical-structural theories — e.g., Piore's *Dual labour market theory* (1979) and Wallerstein's *World systems theory* (1974; 1980) — share a conception of economic conditions and economic aspiration as primary factors fomenting migration. Where neo-classical authors saw rational cost benefit analysis, these scholars argue that *unrealistic* expectations of socioeconomic conditions abroad motivate migration. Since these expectations are suggested to be propagated by institutions with an interest in creating a source of cheap labour – i.e. the state and corporations (de Haas, 2021) these authors reframe migration as working against migrants' own interests. Migration, from this point of view becomes a key factor in deepening existing geographical inequalities facilitating the exploitation of the vulnerable (Piore, 1979). On the one hand, this constitutes a radical shift from earlier theories. Where neoclassical theorists saw individual migration decisions as coalescing to systemic equilibrium – the movement of people resulting in an ideal allocation of resources (labour and income), and therefore an elimination of the need or want to migrate (Massey et al., 1998) - historical-structural accounts saw individual migration as further reinforcing the geographical inequalities and exploitative dynamics the drove individuals to emigrate in the first place. On the other hand, historical-structural theorists retain an economics-based rational choice framework for understanding migration. In fact, migration remains a *rational* economic decision from this point of view, only a decision made based on bad information and under duress.

In sum, though neoclassical and historical-structural frameworks are in many ways diametrically opposed to one-another, they share an underlying conception of migration. At the macro-level - the level at which they primarily operate - economic imbalance, and structural inequality facilitating capitalist exploitation, are understood to drive migration. At the micro-level, migration is seen as motivated by perceptions of economic opportunity. Whether or not

promises of stability and/or social mobility in receiving countries are cynically propagated and work against the interests of migrants is, for this purpose, neither here nor there. Migration is conceptualised as an economic project in reaction to economic aspiration and, by extension, a project of socio-economic mobility.

However, in addition to economic and structural predictors of migration, we know that migrant populations are selected on individual characteristics. Studies of migrant selection not only attest to higher levels of academic achievement among migrants than non-migrants (Ichou, 2014), but suggest intended migrants tend to be from more, rather than less, stable economic backgrounds (Domozetov & Yossifov, 1991). What's more, migrants self-select into migration on personality traits (Boneva et al., 1998; Frieze et al., 2006). Repeated evidence that those who migrate tend to have higher achievement orientation (Boneva et al. 1998) in addition to being more open, and sociable (Jokela, 2009) has lent credence to the notion that there is a 'migrant personality', i.e. a set of features that under certain conditions render some individuals to migrate while others stay put (Boneva & Frieze, 2002; Polavieja et al. 2018).

Contemporary theorists of migration, then, have moved away from these mechanistic 'push-pull' models of migration to adopt a more flexible approach. This encompasses both individual traits and capabilities, as well as the essential dimension of individual aspiration to explain why people migrate (Massey, 1999; de Haas, 2021). Yet, research on migration *outcomes* still tends to operate on a similar economic paradigm.

II. Does migration deliver the goods? The purpose of the immigrant bargain

For much of the last century, sociologists have used the economic standing, occupational status and social mobility of immigrants as benchmarks for their success (cf. Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969). Today, an extensive literature attests to immigrants' relative disadvantage in receiving countries (Hum & Simpson, 2007; Alba & Foner 2015; Ichou, 2014; Abramitzky *et al.*, 2021). Being likely to have experienced, relative to their parents, and relative to themselves pre-migration, downward mobility (Li & Heath, 2016; Gans, 2009; Recchi & Ciornei, 2020), first generation immigrants tend to fare worse in the labour market than natives (Büchel & Frick, 2005; Kogan, 2006) – often holding low status jobs (Fellini & Guetto, 2019) for which they are frequently overqualified (Siar, 2013). Further contextualising these achievements, academics have shown how subsequent social trajectories are fundamentally shaped by law, racism and segregation in the destination society (e.g. Portes & Zhou 1993; Telles & Ortiz, 2008).

The notion of an *immigrant bargain* serves as a frame for findings regarding immigrants' relative disadvantage. Similar to Pajo's (2008) notion of 'socioglobal mobility'

discussed above, this framework suggests that immigrants persist (both in their decisions to migrate and in decisions to stay) in full awareness of the structural disadvantages they will face. However, the immigrant bargain does not do away with the economic framework. Rather, authors suggests that acquiescence and persistence in the face of disadvantage grows out of a belief that outcomes will eventually even out in their favour (Alba & Foner, 2015).

Studies of migration intentions by and large confirm that the *perceived promise* of migration often has primacy over actual known prospects. As Groenewold et al. (2012) show, subjective expectations of economic gains associated with migrating may be more important in predicting migration intentions than actual financial conditions in destination countries. Although those with knowledge of destination countries were more likely to aspire to migrate, individuals who expected to see higher incomes following migration - regardless of knowledge of actual conditions - were much more likely to intend to migrate (ibid.). It is plausible then, as Alba and Foner (2015) suggest, that downgrades in socioeconomic status may be accepted on the expectation that migrants can, with time, recoup status losses incurred in the process of moving - short term losses being seen as the price to pay for moving to higher income, more prosperous places with greater perceived promise. From this point of view, downward mobility in the short term is not a failure of migration-related social-mobility aspirations, but a necessary step. In fact, despite initial disadvantages many immigrants *do* eventually gradually regain lost social positions (Chiswick et al., 2005; Duleep 2015). Yet, the extent of this subsequent upturn in occupational status varies significantly as a function of origin, destination, legal status, and individual demographic factors (Zorlu, 2016; Grönlund & Nordlund, 2020; Fellini & Guetto 2019). Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that immigrants integrate into middle or upper-middle class positions. Rather, many are held back even in the second generation by the reproduction of existing structural inequalities in the receiving country (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Paired with decreasing rates of social mobility in major receiving countries, the evidence suggests that the promise of migration as a means of social mobility is tenuous, and that pay offs from accepting the *bargain* are far from guaranteed (Alba & Foner, 2015). Rather than upward mobility, many immigrant groups face direct penalties in socioeconomic status followed by long term disadvantages relative to non-migrants in the receiving country.

From an etic point of view, stagnation and an increasingly unsure bargain would suggest that the socioeconomic project of migration often *does* fail and that immigrants do not achieve their desired goal of upward mobility. However, the extent to which migrants perceive themselves as upwardly mobile, and how this correlates with their objective mobility trajectories has been overlooked. If the explicit goal is to assess the payoff of migration projects (typically on the basis of migrants' social trajectories), understanding how migrants assess their

own mobility, and the associations between their assessments and those evidenced by academics is key.

III. Of Success and Satisfaction

This is not to say that subjective measures are absent from studies of migration outcomes. In fact, a wealth of research shows that migration - and the concomitant struggle to establish one-self in a new place – is likely to have adverse effects on well-being and happiness (Safi, 2010). Similarly, Engzell and Ichou (2020) show that migrants, at the same level of educational achievement as natives, perceive themselves as lower in the social hierarchy. This, they argue, is a result of status inconsistency between origin and destination places. Migrants, selected on high educational achievement relative to their country-of-origin peers (Ichou, 2014) tend to occupy a lower relative position in the distribution of educational achievement in the destination relative, to origin, country. This downward *intra*generational mobility in relative terms in turn moderates the positive effect of higher education on subjective social status in the receiving country.

In a similar sense, questions of subjective social mobility *have* been broached by migration scholars (cf. Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018). However, this existing body of work uses subjective social mobility only as an independent variable – an indicator of the relationship between the downward *intra*generational mobility – 'status inconsistency' as discussed by Engzell and Ichou (20202) - faced by many immigrants and affective outcomes. In so doing, these studies show that perceptions of downward *intra*generational mobility associated with resettlement have significant adverse effects not only on migrants' subjective well-being, but also on mental health (cf. Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018). However, while these existing studies of migrants' subjective well-being, and subjective mobility have provided significant advancements to the literature, illuminating the struggles associated with immigration and settlement experiences, the relationship between migration background and subjective mobility as such, rather than subjective mobility and other outcomes, remains unexplored.

IV. Intra or Intergenerational mobility: The trouble with reference groups

To fill this gap, however, it is insufficient to take up the tried and tested *intra*generational approach. Where surveys measure the subjective social mobility of migrants, their concern is typically with *intra*generational mobility. These are questions regarding status inconsistency - whether the subjective social status or class (self assessed position on a sliding scale or identification with a position in a class hierarchy) of migrants in the place of origin is

incongruent with perceived status in the receiving country (cf. Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018). However, surveys rarely consider whether respondents see themselves as *inter*generationally mobile – i.e. socially mobile relative to their parents (Gugushvili, 2021). Yet, the inherently comparative nature of subjective status and class measures renders this approach problematic and limiting for migration research. In assessing their living conditions and social position, individuals look to relevant others as a means of comparison (Hyman, 1960). Who these others are has a significant impact on their evaluations (Stouffer et al., 1947). When the reference group is less advantaged, individuals' evaluations of their own lives tend to be more positive and vice-versa (ibid.). In the case of *intra*generational mobility and migration, these dynamics pose certain problems:

First, the *intra*generational approach assumes that non-migrants in the receiving country are the relevant point of comparison for immigrants. At face value it makes intuitive sense to assess one's status to the society in which one resides. However, migration does not entail estrangement from place of origin (Sayad, 1991). The transnational turn in migration research shows us that many immigrants maintain deep ties to their place of origin (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). Moreover, it shows that migration trajectories are not necessarily unidirectional, permanent moves from point A to point B, but that many migrants ultimately intend to return to their place of origin (Cassarino 2004; Dustmann & Gölach 2016). For these reasons, place of origin and non-emigrants therein are likely to remain, if not *the* relevant point of reference, then at least *a* relevant point of reference for migrants when assessing their life trajectories and social mobility (Zuccotti et al., 2017). Consequently, comparing subjective positions in sending relative to the receiving country perpetuates receiving country bias (de Bree et al. 2010). Fixing the end point of mobility in the receiving country assumes that the comparison of relative positions in origin and destination is *the* comparison migrants themselves make when making assessments of their own social mobility. This assumes that changes in relative position from origin to destination are the sum total of immigrants' social trajectory.

Second, assessments of relative position in two different places (pre- and post-migration) are not necessarily equivocal – they pertain to two *fundamentally* different reference groups. Consequently, discordant subjective positions are just as likely to reflect perceived shifts in the reference group (a shift that is a feature of survey question wording rather than changes to immigrants' own reference group) as they are to reflect respondents' perceptions of their life trajectories as upward or downward. Quite simply, this approach does not recognise the theoretical possibility of seeing oneself as having a lower relative position in the receiving society than one did in country of origin while all the same seeing oneself as upwardly mobile

in absolute terms. Such an apparently dissonant position might reflect a multitude of factors. As the *immigrant bargain* would suggest (Alba & Foner, 2015) it might reflect wider changes in perceived prospects for future upward mobility. Yet it may also be a question of changing life chances afforded by migrating (de Haas, 2021) or, in fact, status associated with migration itself (de Haas, 2006; Pajo, 2008). As such, the intragenerational approach assumes migrants compare themselves to receiving country peers when assessing their trajectories. However, where migrants see themselves as standing relative to origins (social and geographical) may be a more salient question and a stronger measure of subjective *mobility*.

Finally, on a practical note, the measurement of *intra*generational mobility precludes any comparison of migrants and non-migrants in terms of subjective social mobility. By its very nature, a pre-migration subjective social status (from which we can extrapolate subjective *intra*generational mobility) can only exist for those who have migrated. We not only lack a coherent and salient reference group for subjective social mobility, then, but a comparative case (non-migrants, whether in country of origin or destination). This renders us unable to say anything about the relationship between migration itself and SSM.

For all these reasons, although sociologists have studied the relationship between objective social mobility and migration (Li & Heath, 2016; Zuccotti et al., 2017; Ferry & Ichou, 2024) and know the effects of objective post-migration status inconsistency on subjective social status (Engzell & Ichou, 2020) *and* subjective status inconsistency on the wellbeing of migrants (Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018) we know almost nothing about how migration itself relates to subjective social mobility.

As noted, *intra*generational measures can provide crucial insight into the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as disadvantaged relative to others in the receiving country. This serves to inform sociologists about the challenges of *immigration* and of occupying a lower relative status in the receiving society – a common experience of migrants, and one which causes considerable distress (Nicklett & Burgard, 2009; Vaquera & Aranda, 2017; Alcántara, Chen and Alegría, 2014; Euteneuer and Schäfer, 2018). However, the comparison of relative positions in two distinct places tells us little of perceived life trajectories and the extent to which migration interacts with these perceptions. From square one, this approach assumes that the fact of having migrated is largely irrelevant to subjective social mobility - since change in relative position from one country to the next are considered the sum-total of immigrants' social trajectories. Yet, as noted in section 2 of this memoire, both

empirical and theoretical work gives reason to believe this is a flawed assumption (de Haas, 2006; Pajo, 2008; de Haas, 2021; Lu, 2021).

For all the above-cited reasons, the study at hand concerns itself with subjective *inter*generational mobility - whether individuals see themselves as more successful than their parents. In this way, this project not only holds steady the reference groups against which respondents are comparing their trajectories (though people move between countries with distinct social structures their parents do not change), it assumes that immigrants are likely to think of their life trajectories in terms of where they came from (both socioeconomically and geographically), rather than in terms of relative positions in the receiving country (Zuccotti et al. 2017). In so doing, it can also compare the relationship between objective and subjective mobility for both migrants and non-migrants (in both country of origin and destination country). In this way it attempts isolate the correlation between *migrating* and subjective mobility specifically, contributing a new angle to an extensive and established literature on the relationship between spatial and social mobility in migration studies.

In sum, studies of objective occupational mobility have long been dominant in the field. This has meant that migrants successes have been assessed almost exclusively from an etic standpoint - occupational trajectories defining the extent to which migrants are successful (López & Williams, 2024). As such, the migration literature leaves a significant gap in terms of immigrants' own perceptions of social mobility.

However, though likely to be a primary factor, the identified gap in research on SSM and migration does not only owe to retained etic frameworks for migrant success (and the concomitant focus on objective measures of mobility in migration research). Rather, the gap can also be traced to a tendency (when subjective mobility *is* broached by researchers) to consider subjective *intra*generational mobility over subjective *inter*generational mobility. This has meant a focus on questions of immigration experiences, rather than migration as such. While measurement of subjective *intra*generational mobility (due to both theoretical and empirical limitations) offer insight into *the immigrant experience*, in considering *inter*generational mobility, this study approaches the question at a more fundamental level, capturing residual associations between *migration background* and perceptions of social mobility.

4. Hypotheses

Existing research into subjective social mobility shows that emic conceptions of what it means to be upwardly mobile go beyond the etic frameworks used by academics (Duru-Bellat & Kiefer, 2008; Gugushvili, 2021). A long-standing and pervasive paradigm in social science sees migration as a project of socioeconomic mobility (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969; Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Drawing on this conception, sociologists have long measured migrants' social mobility (Ferry & Ichou, 2024). Yet, despite theoretical constructs that ultimately build on notions of migrants' perceptions of mobility (Pajo, 2008; Alba & Foner, 2015) these streams have yet to converge.

Consequently, the question of how migrants actually *do* perceive their social trajectories has remained under explored by sociologists. Moreover, the question of what role migrating itself has in these perceptions has, despite evidence from ethnographers (de Haas, 2006) and promising findings regarding internal migrants (Lu, 2021), has remained untouched by quantitative sociologists. Yet we have significant reason to expect that migration itself will have a residual effect on subjective perceptions of social mobility (Lu, 2021) *and* that there will be significant variation in the correlation between objective and subjective mobility for migrants and non-migrants (Alba & Foner, 2015). To bridge these existing bodies of work, then, I outline a set of testable hypotheses from the literature.

In concordance with the findings of de Haas (2006) and Pajo (2008) regarding an intrinsic association between conceptions of social mobility and *international* migration, Lu (2021) shows a strong correlation between *internal* migration itself and subjective mobility. As such, I expect:

H.1) A residual effect of migration background on subjective social mobility evidenced by a gap between migrants and non-migrants in favour of migrants.

Additionally, Pajo (2008) suggests many migrants who are downwardly mobile select into this position on the basis that being in a higher status society compensates for downward mobility:

H.2) This gap will be largest for migrants who are downwardly mobile - subjective mobility remaining comparatively high despite objective losses.

Moreover, the *immigrant bargain* thesis suggests that migrants who move for upward social mobility make a conscious trade (a *bargain*), exchanging present position in the country of origin for a lower position in more prosperous regions on the basis of that they will regain lost status with time. This means immigrants willingly take lower status jobs in wealthier

economies in the short term, remaining optimistic about their position regardless - on the precondition that this downward mobility is temporary (Alba & Foner, 2015). As such:

H.3a) Residual effects of migration background itself on subjective social mobility are strongest for migrants who move from less prosperous regions, or who move for economic reasons.

H.3b) Residual effects of migration background on *the alignment between subjective and objective mobility* are strongest for migrants who move from less prosperous regions, or who move for economic reasons.

H.4) The protective effect of migration for downward intergenerational mobility will be lower if expected returns on investment in migration have gone unrealised (the *bargain* has not paid off and migration-related losses in socioeconomic status have persisted).

H.5) The gap between migrants and non-migrants is primarily a feature of improved life chances and socioeconomic opportunity structures - when controlling for macroeconomic conditions, or comparing between similarly developed contexts, any residual effects of migration will be significantly reduced.

Finally, as Pajo (2008) argues, migration itself is the constituent part of perceived upward trajectories. It is not the case that migrants are *a priori* predisposed to seeing themselves as upwardly mobile. For this reason:

H.6) There will not be evidence that the subjective mobility gap can be attributed to *selection* of migrants on this characteristic i.e. that SSM correlates with intention to migrate.

5. Data & Measures

To test these hypotheses, this thesis draws on individual level survey data from 3 sources: the 'Trajectoires et origines 2' (TeO2) survey conducted by the French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) in 2019 and 2020 (Beauchemin et al., 2023) the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) – specifically the social inequality module constructed in 2019 - and the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) conducted in 2022 by The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and The World Bank.

In the following section I will describe each survey in turn, offering a brief justification for their use. I then outline how these are employed in the analysis. Finally, I describe in detail the primary variables used.

I. Data

TeO2 provides the primary data for this thesis. An update of TeO1 - a survey widely used by migration scholars over the last decade and a half (Beauchemin et al., 2010) - TeO2 (Beauchemin et al., 2023) provides a representative cross-sectional sample of the adult population residing in metropolitan France in 2019-2020 (N = 27,181). By intentionally oversampling certain populations, TeO2 provides a representative picture of both immigrant populations in France (including migrants from French overseas territories) and the French population without a migration background. Although immigrants can be identified in several other national and cross-national surveys and TeO2 is by no means the only survey of its kind[4], it serves the purposes of this memoire well. TeO2 was developed for the express purpose of studying the extent to which people's origins (geographic and socioeconomic) affect their subsequent place in society. To this end, it provides a significant sample of immigrants with a variety of origins and reasons for migrating in a major receiving country, France. Moreover, the TeO2 questionnaire is particularly rich, covering a multitude of topics, including employment history, educational background, residential patterns, migration history and intentions, family formation as well as subjective life conditions[5]. By providing detailed data not only on respondent's current occupation, but also their occupation before migrating, their first occupation in France and their parent's occupation, TeO2 provides significant insight into changes in socioeconomic status across the life course and across generations. Moreover, TeO2 provides data on the educational achievement of parents and respondents. Most importantly, although, due to anonymisation procedures, place of origin data in TeO2, as I will discuss below, is less precise than in other surveys of its kind, TeO2 is set apart from other surveys of the same kind since it fields multiple questions regarding *subjective* social positions, notably including a specific question regarding subjective intergenerational mobility – ones that, with the exception of the three surveys used in this analysis are rarely included in large-scale surveys (Gugushvili, 2021).

[4] A non-exhaustive list of similar projects includes the UK Understanding Society panel study (Platt *et al*., 2020), and Sociocultural Integration Processes Among New Immigrants in Europe (Diehl *et al*., 2016).

[5] For a full description of the survey and questionnaire see Beauchemin *et al.* (2023)

In addition to TeO2, I use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Two waves of the ISSP contain the measure of subjective intergenerational mobility used for the analysis at hand (2009 and 2019). Of these I use the 2019 social inequality module. The 2019 module of the ISSP provides cross-national data for 27 countries. Of these, 24 were surveyed on all our relevant independent and dependent variables (Parental occupation, respondent occupation and subjective intergenerational mobility). Each country in the ISSP provides a representative sample of the adult population. The size of these samples varies between countries, after removing invalid observations from our independent variables, these samples fall between 294 and 2793.

Though developed in 2019, much of the fieldwork for ISSP 2019 (both in France and elsewhere) was conducted only a few months after the end of TeO2 (in 2021 – cf. Frédéric *et al.*, 2021)]). this reason, we can compare across surveys and estimate the extent to which the different variables for subjective social mobility used across these two surveys measure the same construct without having to account for potentially significant period effects[6] - a factor Gugushvilli (2021, p. 6) shows has a remarkable influence on subjective intergenerational mobility. We cannot use the 2009 wave in the same manner. The equivalent estimate of subjective intergenerational mobility across 24 additional countries allows me to compare immigrants both to non-immigrants in France and non-emigrants elsewhere (an approach I discuss this in more detail below). In addition to subjective social mobility, relevant data in the ISSP includes detailed information on parental occupation, as well as current respondent occupational status and level of education.

Finally, I draw on LITS IV. Conducted in 2022, LITS IV provides a representative sample of the adult population across 37 countries, each with a sample size of approximately 1000 respondents. LITS covers Central and Eastern Europe, North Africa and Central Asia. Much like the ISSP, and TeO2, LITS is one of few surveys to offer data on subjective intergenerational mobility. However, unlike the ISSP it has the additional benefit of surveying countries that are both rarely included in cross-national survey programs (Gugushvili, 2021), and major sending countries for migrants - both to France and elsewhere (OECD, 2024).

LITS provides imperfect data on objective social mobility (we cannot estimate socioeconomic mobility as we will with our other two sources but are limited to intergenerational educational mobility). Additionally, as discussed below, LITS provides estimates of subjective mobility that are not directly comparable with those of our other two

[6] For a complete description of how consistency of measurement between surveys is assessed please see the methodological appendix.

surveys (see section '4.II Measures' & methodological appendix a). Nonetheless, the purpose of LITS for this thesis is twofold. Firstly, LITS provides the best source, for our purposes, of data on migration intentions. Covering multiple major sending countries (to France and elsewhere) we can estimate whether it is likely that migrants are selected on subjective intergenerational mobility - allowing us to address hypothesis 6. Secondly, LITS serves to expand our findings, allowing us a) to compare emigrants to non-emigrants in their specific country of origin, and b) to address hypothesis 5 regarding the influence of macroeconomic conditions on the migration-SSM relationship. In this sense, LITS IV fills gaps left by TeO2 and ISSP. Finally, and most importantly, the use of cross-national survey data allows us to estimate whether the correlation between migration and subjective upward mobility is generalisable to other destination countries outside France.

II. Measures

II.I Dependent variables

Subjective intergenerational mobility

As noted, these different surveys provide distinct measures for subjective social mobility. To recap, TeO2 respondents were asked: "Considering your own success in life relative to that of your parents, would you say that you are: 1. More successful 2. Less successful 3. As successful", LITS respondents were asked: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? I have done better in life than my parents" - to which possible responses are "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree" and "strongly agree". ISSP respondents are provided with two 10-point MacArthur scales (Adler et al., 2000) on which they estimate the social status of their parents' household when they were children, and their own status now.

Table 2: *Subjective social mobility operationalisation*

Subjective social mobility

Crosswalk: TeO2, LITS & ISSP

Survey	Variable	Prompt	Levels	Condition
TeO2 (2020)	Considering your own success in life relative to that of your parents:	Would you say that you are?	More successful As successful Less successful	More successful
LITS (2022)	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	I have done better in life than my parents	Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree	Agree Strongly agree
ISSP (2021)	In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale which runs from top to bottom [1:10].	Q.1 Where would you put yourself now on this scale? Q.2 And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?	Q.1 Numeric 1:10 Q.2 Numeric 1:10	Q.1 > Q.2
Harmonized variable	[Do respondents percieve themselves as upwardly mobile?]		Yes No	•

In all cases I create a dichotomous variable. All respondents are classified as having said they are either more successful than their parents (i.e. upwardly mobile) or not.

This is not to say that these variables, though clearly measuring a similar concept, necessarily measure this in the same way. Nor is it to suggest that these measurements are commensurable. To estimate the extent to which this is the case requires its own methodological approach. To this end, I use logistic regression models. Essentially, I assess whether, after accounting for relevant covariates, there are significant differences in survey predictions that can be suggested to arise from differences in survey questions. These are presented in methodological appendix a.

In sum, the results indicate that estimates from ISSP and TeO2, despite differences in variable construction, are directly comparable and highly correlated ($r > 0.75$, see figure 1), showing no statistically significant difference ($p > 0.05$)[7]. None of the models used, suggested that significant variance in the outcome can be attributed to differences in the variable itself.

***Figure 1**: Cross validation results for French respondents (TeO2 & ISSP).*



***Note:** Fitted values from logistic models trained on TeO2 and ISSP data respectively - x-axis shows prediction of models trained on ISSP, y-axis shows prediction from models trained on TeO2. From left to right: fitted on pooled data (1), TeO2 data(2) and ISSP data (3)*

This does not mean that these variables share the same correlation with migration, the primary interest of this thesis. As discussed in section 3.III, measures that provide two scales of relative social position from which to derive social mobility (as is the case for the ISSP, see table 2) are likely to provide significantly different results for immigrants than are measures that ask explicitly about life course mobility. Moreover, since ISSP does not provide any means by which to clearly distinguish migrants from second generation immigrants we cannot ascertain whether this is the case. Nonetheless, for the population overall, the results provide all the reason to believe that these survey measures (TeO2 and ISSP) can be placed in direct comparison with one another.

[7] Please see appendices for regression tables.

On the other hand, data from LITS IV, although highly correlated in terms of SSM, cannot be considered directly comparable. In all cases, models comparing LITS to ISSP within overlapping countries (all surveyed between 2021 and 2022) show a significant positive bias[8] ($p < 0.05$). This appears to owe to differences between survey questions themselves. While we can use LITS to make internal comparisons between migrants and non-migrants, and as a means of estimating the relationship between subjective social mobility and migration intent (since despite a positive bias, the variables are highly correlated), predictions based on the LITS respondents cannot be placed in direct comparison with either TeO2 or ISSP respondents.

In sum, I construct a binary variable for subjective intergenerational mobility in each survey. This takes the value 1 when respondents indicate seeing themselves as upwardly mobile. I consider estimates from ISSP and TeO2 to be commensurable. LITS, however is treated separately.

Migration intentions

A lack of longitudinal data means we cannot totally isolate the effect of migration on subjective social mobility. Nonetheless, the use of multiple surveys allows us to address a major potential source of bias – the extent to which subjective social mobility is an outright predictor of migration intentions. As discussed in the relevant section below, intentions are not actions, meaning we cannot directly extrapolate from these variables to real migration patterns (Carling, 2002). Nonetheless, measurements of migration intention provide an effective and reliable approximation where data on actual migration flows is lacking (Tjaden et al., 2019). If there is a clear correlation between the SSM and migration that does not owe to having migrated, I argue that this fact would become apparent when our dependent variable is migration intention.

Measures of migration intention can be found in two of the three surveys used – TeO2 and LITS. In either case, respondents are asked whether they intend to migrate, and, subsequently, where they intend to migrate to. In LITS these variables take the following form: 'Do you intend to move abroad in the next twelve months' and 'Where do you intend to go?'. TeO2 migration intentions are assessed as a broader aspiration: 'Are you planning to settle one day in a DOM, TOM or country other than France?' and 'Where do you plan to go?'. I code as

[8] Although we cannot assert categorically that this is the case, positive bias in the LITS survey may very well owe to the positive wording of the question. Asserting that individuals are more successful than their parents as a statement with which to either agree or disagree is likely to provide a higher rate of positive responses than a question that does not presume subjective upward mobility to be the norm (cf. Lehman *et al.*, 1992).

intended migrants only those who both respond in the affirmative to the question of intended migration, *and* who provide a specific intended destination. Individuals who responded maybe, don't know or who responded yes without specifying a destination were removed from the main analysis – their responses were ultimately considered uncertain.

II.II Primary independent variables

Socioeconomic mobility (Relative ISEI)

The primary measure used to assess objective intergenerational mobility is the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). With a minimum of 16 (professional cleaners) and maximum of 90 (judges), ISEI aims to provide a standardised, internationally comparable measure of occupational status. ISEI scores are a composite of the education and income associated with a given profession. In this sense, they are distinct from occupational prestige scales – say, Treiman's (1976) 'Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale' (SIOPS) - which consider subjective assessments of a job's symbolic position in society as rated by survey respondents. I use ISEI over prestige scales on the basis that literature linking spatial and social mobility speaks primarily of desired improvements in socioeconomic conditions. Mentions of social prestige are not absent from this literature, but they are conceptually distinct from the question at hand.

I use ISEI over other measures of social stratification (particularly class-based approaches - eg. Oesch, 2006) as its continuous nature allows both for heterogeneity (in terms of income and educational requirements) within occupational categories (Gazeboom et al., 1992) and for parent and respondent scores to be combined into the continuous indicator of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility (Relative ISEI) described below.

Relative ISEI

Respondent and parent ISEI can be found in both TeO2 and the ISSP. To create an estimate of socioeconomic mobility using ISEI I do the following: I transform the professions of respondents and their parents first from the French-standard PCS (Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles - ISEE, 2022) to international standard 4-digit ISCO codes for TeO2 using the SocialPosition R package (Falcon, 2015). Subsequently, in both ISSP and TeO2 I transform these three-digit ISCO profession codes for both parents and respondents into ISEI-88 scores (Ganzeboom et al., 1992).

Figure 2: *ISEI Distribution (TeO2 Effective sample, weighted): Socioeconomic status of Immigrants, non-immigrants and their parents in France.*



Having done so, I construct my own measure of social mobility by taking the mean of parents' ISEI (in cases where only one is available, this single score is used without division) and subtracting this from the respondents' own score.

$$RelativeISEI = \left(RespondentISEI - \frac{(Parent1ISEI + Parent2ISEI)}{2} \right)$$

With a theoretical maximum of 69, and minimum of -69 this simple metric indicates the absolute change in socioeconomic status from parental household to respondent, wherein 0 indicates no mobility. Rather than exclude the currently unemployed, I use previous employment status when no current job is available, adding a categorical variable to all models that denotes current employment status.

Typically, estimations of social mobility rely on the dominance approach (comparing respondents' position to their highest achieving parent). In this case, however, I adapt my approach to the primary dependent variable. Our SSM measures ultimately prompt a response regarding parents' plural, rather than the household's highest earner. I take this to reflect household socioeconomic status, rather than the occupational status of the highest earning parent.

The resulting distribution of socioeconomic mobility is approximately normal with a slight skew toward upward mobility. As we'd expect from the literature reviewed in section 3, this skew toward upward social mobility is stronger for natives than for immigrants in France (figure 3). The distribution for immigrants skews slightly stronger toward downward mobility. The data in figures 1 and 2 is from TeO2 as this is our main source of data and, therefore, the

reference point against which we compare the other surveys. However, similar distributions can be obtained from each country surveyed by the ISSP. These do differ by country but retain a similar grouping around 0 (see graphical appendix a).

***Figure 3**: Relative ISEI distribution - Socioeconomic mobility of respondents (Effective sample, TeO2, weighted): Immigrants and non-immigrants in France*



In sum, the primary models in the analysis employ an absolute measure of socioeconomic mobility relative to parents - rather than the relativised ISEI measure employed elsewhere (cf. Raitano & Vona, 2015). Relativised measures show positions in the marginal distribution of ISEI scores in a given country and year. This approach is preferable in cases where occupation data is less precise (requiring researchers supplement ISEI scores with additional information to build a smooth distribution), or where the intent is to relativise individual scores to broader macro-social trends toward upward mobility such that the relationship between socioeconomic mobility and a third outcome (say income) can be normalised without capturing effects of general upward mobility in society (Raitano & Vona, 2015). In our case, however, since this variable is meant only to reflect changes in socioeconomic status at the household level (and the dependent variable specifically pertains to within family changes in social conditions) a relative measure does not provide necessary additional information.

Educational mobility

Although the economic framing of migration accentuates income and socioeconomic status, it is by no means the only possible measure of social mobility. In additional analyses I

also consider educational mobility. Ultimately, this approach is necessary for us to use LITS IV, since, In the case of ISSP and TeO2 we rely on socioeconomic mobility.

To estimate mobility in education, I code education levels (both parent and respondent) based on slightly regrouped ISCED codes, according to levels presented in table 3. Using the dominance approach, I compare the higher of the parent's two levels of education to the respondent's education level as a means of assessing intergenerational educational mobility. From this I construct a simple 5-level categorical variable for educational mobility (see figure 4). This variable denotes the position a respondent's education level provides them relative to that of their parents (up to two rank orders above or below). With five levels from negative 2 to positive 2, this variable indicates the distance between parents' highest level of education and the respondents' highest level of education, 0 denoting no educational mobility[9].

Table 3: *Education levels for mobility estimation (LITS IV)*

Education levels for mobility Defined for both parents and respondents	
ISCED code	**Life in Transition Survey IV**
ISCED 0: less than primary	No degree / No education
ISCED 1: Primary education	Primary education
ISCED 2: Lower secondary education	Lower secondary education
ISCED 3: Upper secondary education	Upper secondary
ISCED 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education ISCED 5: Short-cycle tertiary education	Post-secondary non-tertiary education Tertiary education (not a university diploma)
ISCED 6: Bachelor's or equivalent	Bachelor's degree or more
ISCED 7: Master's or equivalent ISCED 8: Doctoral or equivalent	Master's degree or PhD

To ensure that more complex models have sufficient data at all levels I set a cutoff at 2 levels above or below. Respondents are therefore categorised as equal, one education level from their parents or two or more levels from their parents - either up or down. If a respondent's parent has primary education or lower secondary education, and a respondent has tertiary education this is recorded as educational mobility +2. If, on the other hand, parents' highest level of education is post-secondary non tertiary (ISCED 4/5) and a respondent has an undergraduate degree (ISCED 6), this is recorded as +1. If both parents and respondents have undergraduate degrees, this is recorded as 0. Crucially, this is an ordinal measure, I do not

[9] A relative educational percentile approach (cf. Gugushvili, 2021), might, all things considered, be preferable. However, the overlap between countries covered by LITS and sources of macro-data on educational achievement by country and cohort is limited. This means such an approach would reduce the effective sample by over 40%. For this reason, I remain with a simplified categorical approach.

assume that the distance between these categories is equal but rather include these levels as dummies in the relevant models.

To disaggregate the effects of individual education from relative educational attainment I also construct a much simpler variable for respondent educational achievement across all surveys. This has only 3 levels (primary or below, secondary and tertiary or above). I use this simple variable to avoid absolute collinearity between relative educational achievement and absolute educational achievement. A coarser measure for individual achievement ensures variation in relative achievement within categories i.e. most respondents with tertiary education will have either a higher level or equal level of education to that their parents. However, this approach assures that some will not, thereby allowing my models to estimate separate effects.

Figure 4: *Distribution of educational mobility in LITS IV countries (weighted estimates).*



A summary of the variables described in this section can be found in table 4.

Table 4: *Dependent and independent variable summary*

Primary measures				
Variable	**Survey**	**Definition**	**Initial.Measure**	**Derived.Measure**
Dependent Variables				
Subjective Intergenerational Mobility	TeO2 (2020)	Considering your own success in life relative to that of your parents: Would you say that you are?	Ordinal (More successful / As successful / Less successful)	Binary (1/0) 1 = More successful
	LITS IV (2022)	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? I have done better in life than my parents	Ordinal (5-point Likert scale)	Binary (1/0) 1 = Agree or Strongly Agree
	ISSP (2021)	Below is a scale which runs from top to bottom [1:10]. Q.1 Where would you put yourself now on this scale? Q.2 And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?	Ordinal (2x 10-point MacArthur scale)	Binary (1/0) 1 = Response Q.1 > Response Q.2
Migration Intent	TeO2 (2020)	Do you think you will ever live in a DOM, a TOM, or another country other than France? If so, where?	Categorical (Yes/No/Maybe) & Categorical (Destination)	Binary (1/0) 1 = Intention to migrate & destination stated
	LITS IV (2022)	Do you intend to migrate within the next twelve months? If so, where?	Categorical (Yes/No/Maybe) & Categorical (Destination)	Binary (1/0) 1 = Intention to migrate & destination stated
	ISSP (2021)	-		
Independent Variables				
Migration background	TeO2 (2020)	Respondent not born in mainland France	Binary / Categorical (place of birth)	Binary (1/0) / Categorical (place of birth & reason for migrating)
	ISSP (2021)	-		
	LITS IV (2022)	Respondent not born in survey country X	Categorical (place of birth)	Binary (1/0)
Occupational Mobility	TeO2 (2020)	Respondent ISEI & Parent ISEI	Continuous	Relative ISEI = Respondent ISEI - (Parent1 ISEI + Parent2 ISEI) / 2
	LITS IV (2022)	-		
	ISSP (2021)	Respondent ISEI & Parent ISEI	Continuous	Relative ISEI = Respondent ISEI - (Parent1 ISEI + Parent2 ISEI) / 2
Educational Mobility	TeO2 (2020)	Respondent Highest level of Education & Parent Highest Level of Education Achieved	2x Ordinal (7-levels)	Ordinal 5-point relative scale (-2 to +2)
	LITS IV (2022)	Respondent Highest level of Education & Parent Highest Level of Education Achieved	2x Ordinal (7-levels)	Ordinal 5-point relative scale (-2 to +2)
	ISSP (2021)	-		

II.III. Additional variables & Controls

The models also include several control variables. I summarise most of these below (see table 6). However, I describe in more detail the more important. First, models drawing on TeO2 control for change in subjective economic conditions at the level of the household. To do so I combine two complementary variables (table 5) from which I construct a 3-level categorical variable indicating whether respondents think their conditions are the better, the same or worse than those of their parents' household:

Table 5: *Household Economic Change (TeO2)*

Household Economic Change (TeO2)	
Variable	**Levels**
Actuellement, pour le ménage, diriez-vous plutôt que financièrement ?	1. Vous êtes à l'aise 2. Ça va 3. C'est juste, il faut faire attention 4. Vous y arrivez difficilement 5. Vous ne pouvez pas y arriver sans faire de dettes
Durant votre jeunesse, avant vos 18 ans, diriez-vous que, dans votre famille, financièrement?	1. Vous étiez à l'aise 2. Ça allait 3. C'était juste, il fallait faire attention 4. Vous y arriviez difficilement 5. Vous ne pouviez pas y arriver sans faire de dettes

Built using cross-national surveys, the implicit assumption of the ISEI scale is that, although there may be between-country differences in the socioeconomic position afforded by a given job (the same job does not necessarily offer equivalent conditions in two different economies), professions largely maintain the same position relative to each other. This works well for within country comparisons. However, when tracing social trajectories across countries, the internal coherence of the scale as a measure of socioeconomic conditions is likely to be lost. An ISEI of 45 will always pertain to the same occupation but may not afford the same conditions or social position in country A as in country B. In controlling for this factor, models aim to separate out objective socioeconomic mobility, from household economic conditions from subjective upward mobility. In so doing, I attempt to equalise the SES scale used (relative ISEI) by accounting for the fact that occupations (though denoted by the same ISCO code and thereby given the same ISEI score) might afford vastly different levels of economic comfort depending on place of residence. Moreover, controlling for subjective economic change reduces the concept measured by the subjective intergenerational variable to more diffuse notions of intergenerational mobility - pertaining to status and success rather than objective changes in economic condition.

Second, models estimating subjective social mobility using data from LITS IV control for changes in macroeconomic conditions over the life course. Following from Gugushvili (2021) I subtract GDP per capita (expressed in purchasing power parity) at the time of the survey from GDP per capita in the respondent's birth year and country of origin. This serves as a control for the 'tunnel effect' (reviewed in section 2) - whereby respondents are likely to have a more positive assessment of their life conditions when society as a whole is becoming more prosperous, regardless of whether their own material conditions improve (Gugushvili, 2021). In our case, we are controlling for whether immigrants consider themselves more upwardly mobile because they have moved from countries with worse economic prospects – migration fundamentally altering life chances. Change in GDP is calculated based on data from the Madison project (Bolt et al., 2020). This source provides historical estimates of GDP expressed in PPP as far back as 1950 for all countries in our LITS sample.

Finally, LITS IV gathers admittedly coarse data on individual profession, recording occupations only at the two-digit ISCO level. Although it is theoretically possible to derive ISEI scores based on these two-digit codes, there is far too much within-group variation for these to be meaningful. For instance, ISCO08 groups 22 'Health Professionals' varies from nursing professionals (ISCO = 2221; ISEI = 42) to general medical practitioners (ISCO = 2211; ISEI 89). For this reason, models using LITS include a simple categorical control for individual profession by sector. Following from Gugushvili (2021) I regroup the available ISCO codes with labour market positions into 7 categories, using these as a control where models primarily rely on educational mobility. ISCO group 1 and 2 are categorised as white collar, 7 and 8 as blue collar, 5 and 6 are categorised as agricultural labour, 9, 4 and 3 are categorised as service professionals. Respondents who are not currently in employment grouped into three distinct categories - retired, inactive and unemployed.

To further address the lack of precise data on socioeconomic status in LITS IV I include a measure for equivalised household income. I use the modified OECD equivalence scale. Here each member of the household is first assigned a value: 1.0 for the respondent; 0.5 for each subsequent person of 14 or more years of age and 0.3 for each person under the age of 14. Net household revenues are then adjusted for this value (Eurostat, 2025). I subsequently convert this equivalised measure into purchasing power parity (PPP) such that income estimated can be compared cross-nationally. Conversion estimates are drawn from the international monetary fund (IMF, 2025).

Although controls will be specified alongside models in each section of the results, please see table 6 for a summary of all control variables.

***Table 6**: Control variable summary (LITS, ISSP, TeO2)*

Control Variables			
Variable	**Availability**	**Levels**	**Definition**
Age	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	Continuous	
Sex	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	Binary (1/0)	
Education level	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	Primary or Below Secondary Tertiary or above	
Marriage Status	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	Unmarried Married Widowed/Divorced	
Subjective Social Status	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	10-Point Scale	Subjective position in society (TeO2, ISSP) Subjective economic position in society (LITS)
Employment status	TeO2, LITS, ISSP	Employed Unemployed Inactive (Out of labour market) Retired	
ISEI	TeO2, ISSP	Continuous	Respondent ISEI
Minority Group	TeO2	Binary (1/0)	Does repondent report being a member of a group (based on origin or ethnicity) that is discriminated against in society?
Parental Place of Residence	TeO2	Binary (1/0)	Have respondent's parents also moved to France?
Household economic change	TeO2	Better The same Worse	
Life satisfaction	LITS	5-Point Scale	
Risk taking	LITS	10-Point Scale	Self-assessed willingness to take risks
Recieves Remittances	LITS	Binary (1/0)	Does the respondent's household recieve remittances from abroad?
Emigrant Household	LITS	No Yes Yes, since returned	Have others from the respondent's household emigrated in the past?
GDP change (PPP)	LITS	Continuous	Birth year and country to survey year and country - absolute change in GDP per capita Expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) - Madison Project estimate (Bolt et al. 2020)
Household Income (PPP)	LITS	Continuous	Total household net reources of household equivalised to household size (OECD,) Expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) - Exchange Rate per Intrnational Monetary Fund (IMF, 2025)
Profession	LITS	White Collar (ISCO 1 & 2) Blue Collar (ISCO 7 & 8) Agricultural (ISCO 5 & 7) Service Professional (ISCO 9, 4 & 3)	

IV. Survey Operationalisation

Although it complexifies the methodology, using multiple surveys to answer our research questions serves several functions.

First, combining TeO2 and ISSP (having verified the comparability of estimates in either survey as discussed above - evidenced in methodological appendix a), allows me to consider both whether individuals who have migrated have higher subjective intergenerational mobility than non-migrants in France, non-migrants elsewhere and non-migrants in region of origin. Thereby I address the question of whether gaps arise from migrants moving from populations with an overall higher rate of subjective intergenerational mobility and whether the comparison to French non-migrants is ultimately reliable. Only through the combination of surveys do we have reliable estimates on occupational mobility and subjective social mobility that we can use to compare migrants in France with non-migrants across several countries.

Second, using both TeO2 and LITS provides a better basis on which to estimate the correlation between subjective intergenerational mobility and migration intentions. First, the LITS question regarding migration intentions is more specific and temporally limited than the equivalent TeO2 question. Thereby it provides a better estimate (Tjaden et al. 2019). Moreover, if we are to have any passable estimate of selection, we cannot measure solely on the migration intentions of the French non-migrant population (as we would with TeO2). Rather we must consider whether intended migration from other majority sending countries is significantly predicted by subjective upward mobility.

Third, the use of LITS allows me to overcome limitations placed on the analysis by aggregation of region of origin data in TeO2. With LITS I can compare emigrants directly with non-emigrants in their specific *country* of origin (where with TeO2 and ISSP I am limited to a regional comparison). Moreover, LITS allows me to do so across countries that are more similar in terms of opportunity structures and macrosocial conditions than France and most sending countries. Specifically, LITS covers middle to low-income transition economies and provides a large enough sample for us to reduce the migrant cohort to those who have moved only between countries that are also surveyed in the same wave of LITS. In sum, LITS helps me address the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the relationship. France is a desirable, high-income country. Most migrants move from low- to middle income countries (Rumbaut, 1994). Models using TeO2 control for perceived differences in household economic conditions, doing so is not necessarily sufficient to assess the effect of economic factors. Even

in the case of downward mobility, moving to a higher income country can significantly improve life conditions (de Haas, 2021). Moreover, because migrants typically move from countries with lower levels of economic development to higher income countries (in our case France) what is an ambient and gradual change in macroeconomic context over the life course for non-migrants in France might, for migrants, be a drastic change in life conditions and lived context. According to the 'tunnel effect' discussed above (Gugushvili, 2021), if an individual, due to the fact of having migrated, finds themselves in an overall more prosperous macro-economic context than the one in which they grew up they would be likely to perceive themselves as better off. The 'tunnel effect' suggests this is likely to remain true regardless of differences in their own socioeconomic status *or* their immediate economic conditions. Dramatic differences in change over the life course (changes that will be greater for migrants in France than for non-migrants) might account for the gap. Using LITS to retest our findings under radically different conditions allows us to assess the extent to which these macroeconomic factors do in fact account for any gaps between migrants and non-migrants in SSM.

In sum, the three surveys are used both to answer distinct research questions tied to the broader thesis of this thesis, and to verify the reliability of our findings.

Sample size & Sample restrictions

Across all surveys I remove respondents who are currently in full-time education. I do so on the basis that individuals who are still in education are both unlikely to perceive their social mobility in the same manner as those in the labour force – their socioeconomic status being a potentially poor representation of their resources and social position – and likely to have markedly different dispositions toward the potential for living in another country (King & Raghuram 2013; Williams et al. 2018). Moreover, in models where we use education as an alternate measure of social mobility (i.e. for LITS IV), individuals who are currently in education must be removed since their highest educational level is unlikely to be representative of the level of education they will achieve (Engzell & Ichou, 2020).

Where possible (ISSP & TeO2) I also remove second generation immigrants from the sample. I do so for three reasons: first, we might expect the second generation to have particular dispositions toward their social mobility due to the strength of inherited norms and expectations of upward mobility (Ferry & Ichou, 2024; Ichou & Caron, 2024). We know for instance that the second generation tend to have more faith in traditional paths toward social mobility

(Engzell, 2019) and are likely to take into account difficulties their parents faced in migrating when assessing their own life conditions (Abdelhady & Lutz, 2022). As has been previously shown (ibid.), separate projects could be dedicated to the question of intergenerational differences in SSM for migrants. However, accounting for intergenerational differences is beyond the scope of this Thesis. Secondly, the second generation are, overall, more likely to intend to migrate than individuals with no migration background (De Jong, 2000; Kandel & Massey 2002; Bernard & Perales 2023). If the second generation are potentially non-representative both in terms of their subjective social mobility, and in terms of their migration intentions, their inclusion is likely to confound the analysis, providing false positives regarding the relationship between migration intentions and subjective social mobility that are actually due to a third factor - the relationship between each of these variables and being of immigrant descent. Third, in the ISSP the data does not allow us to distinguish the second generation from the first generation. Consequently, for measurements to be equivalent, and to have an estimate regarding regions outside of France without confounding by including international migrants we must remove both first and second generation.

Precise samples vary by section. Consequently, I include tables in the supplemental materials for each portion of the analysis. These describe the sample, including summary statistics on the key dependent and independent variables.

Statistical approach

This thesis relies on a combination of logistic and modified Poisson regression models. The prevalence of subjective upward mobility in our samples is typically high (> 50%). Although is could, in theory, rely on logistic models entirely, logistic models are liable to overstate the importance of independent variables when the outcome in question is common. Modified Poisson regressions solve this issue (Zou, 2004). As described by Gugushvili (2021, p. 12): for a theoretical study in which Y = 1 for 70% of the control group and the corresponding proportion in the treatment group is 80%, the odds ratio as predicted by a logistic model would be 1.72. This implies suggesting 72% higher odds of Y = 1 associated with being in the treatment group. The prevalence ratio produced by a Poisson regression under the same circumstance is only 1.14, i.e. a 14% increase in the rate of X for the control relative to treatment group. This is a more conservative and reliable estimate of how individual variables affect outcomes common outcomes (Zou, 2004). For this reason I rely on poisson regressions.

Yet, since our outcomes are binary, Poisson regression must be modified. Typically used for count data, Poisson regressions assume that variance is equal to the mean of Y. This assumption doesn't hold for binary outcomes. Although coefficients remain reliable estimates of the prevalence ratio (or probability in the case of a binary outcome), assumptions regarding the variance invalidate the calculation of our standard errors. The use of robust clustered standard errors adjusts for this issue, meaning we can interpret p-values as we would for a standard logistic regression (Zou, 2004). As such, Poisson regressions (reported with robust clustered standard errors) are more appropriate for identifying the relative influence of individual variables on subjective social mobility, providing more conservative and robust estimates (Barros and Hirakata, 2003; Zou, 2004). This approach is consistent with previous studies of subjective social mobility facing the same issue (Gugushvili, 2021).

I resort to logistic models in a few cases. First, where the data does not provide an appropriate level at which to cluster standard errors we cannot rely on the standard errors estimated by way of a Poisson regression. Second, I rely on logistic models when visualising cumulated differences at the group level – i.e. where the factor of interest is not a specific covariate. I do so on the basis that, by modelling around a sigmoid rather than linear function, logistic models constrain predicted probabilities between 1 and 0 - a theoretically possible and meaningful range. This means we can effectively compare probabilities of subjective upward mobility between groups as a result of their cumulative characteristics (visualised by way of fitted values). Although this doesn't help us distinguish separate effects from the data, it helps us to look at systematic differences in subjective social mobility overall between groups. Third, I use logistic models for migration intentions. The rate of positive responses here is significantly lower, eliminating the risk of overstating variable importance for the outcome. Moreover, on a practical note, this portion of the analysis will rely on mixed effects models. Since all analyses are performed in the R coding language, and there is no straightforward way of producing robust clustered standard errors for a mixed effects Poisson regression model (keeping in mind that the standard errors produced of modified Poisson regressions are only reliable for binary outcomes when standard errors have been clustered), I remain with a logistic model.

Ultimately, logistic and Poisson regressions produce results that, in terms of variable significance, are mostly interchangeable. The primary difference between the two is an inflation of effect sizes when using logistic models to estimate the influence of individual variables on subjective social status. Where models deviate in terms of their prediction, this is

explicitly discussed. I describe precise specifications of all models used in more detail in their relevant sections below.

Robust clustered standard errors

Where analyses rely on data from TeO2, respondents' place of residence is only recorded at the NUTS 1 level (region). This is not only geographically unspecific, but provides an insufficient number of clusters at which tp reliably cluster standard errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Consequently, I create a unique clustering variable. While regional clustering accounts for broad geographical differences, it does not capture within-region heterogeneity in residual dependence, nor in outcome correlation. Unobserved sources of outcome dependence may not only align with administrative regional boundaries but also with the type of place respondents live in. For this reason, I combine region with a variable denoting whether respondents live in a rural area or not (as defined by INSEE[10]). Each administrative NUTS 1 region in France, then, is divided into rural / non-rural respondents. This approach assumes that variation is likely to correlate with both large-scale geographical patterns and within-region residential patterns. By using fixed effects and clustering my standard errors at this level I enhance robustness by better accounting for intra-cluster correlation patterns. Moreover, I increase the number of clusters for more reliable inference. Where the analysis draws on LITS, I cluster at the level of countries of which there are already a sufficient number.

Diagonal reference models - DRMs

Measuring the effect of social mobility often calls for the use of diagonal reference models (DRMs) (Sobel, 1985). This method is meant to account for non-independence between variables denoting origin, destination and mobility (the distance between social origins and destination). DRMs are typically used in cases where social position is determined through categorical variables and mobility through the interaction between origin and destination. DRMs allow the weight applied to destination and origin to be augmented such that the effect of mobility itself. In theory, DRMs might be suitable for our analysis. However, I do not present DRMs in this this thesis for the following reason:

Unlike the categorical measures of mobility for which DRMs are typically used, the use of a continuous variable (relative ISEI) allowed me to reproduce identical analyses using only my measure of intergenerational mobility (i.e. distance from parents to respondent

[10] An unité urbaine of less than 2000 inhabitants.

measured in the form of relative ISEI) without measures of destination or origin socioeconomic status. Having done so, I can assert that the inclusion of individual socioeconomic status neither affects the significance from relative ISEI, nor significantly changes the estimated effects of socioeconomic mobility. This suggests that the potential non-independence of these variables does not interfere with predictions. Removing individual ISEI, on the other hand, reduces overall model performance and predictive power. Although individual and relative ISEI are moderately correlated (r = 0.61) raising a risk of multicollinearity, our key factors of interest (relative ISEI and its interaction with migration background) remains unaffected by the inclusion of respondent ISEI. Although DRMs could be envisioned for this project they would add a level of complexity to the following analyses without offering obvious benefits.

6. Results

If migration is intrinsically tied to notions of social mobility, we would expect a residual gap between migrants and non-migrants' subjective social mobility (**H.1)**. However, we do not expect this alignment to be equally strong for all groups (**H.3a)**. Rather, we expect this to be stronger for immigrants moving from less prosperous regions or for those who cite economic motivations as underlying their migration decisions. Moreover, if immigrants consciously settle for downward mobility in the short term - in exchange for improved life chances associated with living in a more promising macroeconomic climate (Alba & Foner, 2015) or living in a higher status location (Pajo, 2008) - they would be more likely than non-migrants to report upward mobility at lower rates (or even negative rates) of objective social mobility **(H.2)**. As above, this gap should not apply equally to all immigrant groups **(H.3b)**. Moreover, if the disadvantage incurred in migrating (downward mobility) has endured (**H.4)**, or if immigrants move between equivalent macroeconomic contexts *and* we account for life course changes in macroeconomic conditions (**H.5**), any relationship between migration and subjective social mobility should be significantly weaker. Finally, if this gap is a feature of having migrated, we would not expect migration intentions to be significantly predicted by subjective upward mobility (**H.6**).

In the following chapters, I test these hypotheses. They proceed as follows:

First, I consider whether there is a significant gap in subjective intergenerational mobility between individuals who have migrated and individuals who have not in the receiving country. Using data from TeO2, I compare immigrants and non-immigrants in France. In so doing, I show that immigrants have a higher probability of reporting upward social mobility

when controlling for objective changes in socioeconomic status and intergenerational changes in household economic conditions. Using fixed effects logistic regressions and modified Poisson regressions I show that this gap appears to owe to two factors - a migration-related premium in subjective social mobility *and* to a weaker correlation between objective and subjective social mobility. Although results differ between models, I show that these factors do not vary systematically between migrant groups. Subsequently, I estimate residual effects of time since migration on SSM for individuals whose migration to France was marked by downward mobility and who have not seen increases in their socioeconomic status following this initial status loss. In doing so, I find no statistically significant evidence of lower SSM for those whose occupational trajectories stagnated or declined following a post-migration decrease in their socioeconomic status. However, a null result from this model limits our ability to interpret the relationship.

Second, I compare estimates for both immigrants and non-immigrants in France (respondents to TeO2) with estimates for countries surveyed by the ISSP. In so doing, I show that the systematic differences between populations evidenced in the first section are not a function of low estimations for non-migrants in France. Additionally, mirroring the results from the previous section I show that my findings regarding a migration related SSM premium can be reproduced when comparing EU immigrants in France to non-emigrants in their region of origin.

In both these cases, since the immigrant bargain framework would suggest that this gap is largest when respondents have experienced downward mobility, I present evidence in three forms: marginal means expressed as probabilities of subjective upward mobility at the reference level, line charts expressing subjective upward mobility as a probability distribution across objective rates socioeconomic mobility (i.e. a logistic regression on the fitted values of respondents), and regression coefficients expressed in terms of the prevalence ratio (interpreted as probability) or odds ration (depending on the type of model used) of upward mobility[11].

Having estimated the gap between migrants and non-migrants, the final chapter aims to address alternative explanations for these results. To this end I use LITS IV. Here I show that the gap is unlikely to owe to self-selection into migration of individuals who already perceive themselves as upwardly mobile. The estimated relationship between migration

[11] Tables for the regressions on which graphical representations are typically based, where absent from the text, are included in supplemental materials.

intentions and subjective upward mobility is negative, although not significant. Finally, I show that a similar effect on subjective upward mobility holds when we look beyond France as a single destination country. Specifically, I replicate the main model used to test model (**H.1)**. on migrants who have moved to countries which are similar, in terms of macroeconomic conditions, to their origin country. In so doing, it will be shown that the gap between migrants and non-migrants in terms of subjective upward mobility does not owe to major improvements in macroeconomic conditions over the life course.

I. The French case: Estimating the gap (TeO2)

The aim of this section is to estimate whether there are systematic differences in SSM between migrants and non-migrants in France. Subsequently, it explores residual effects of migration itself of interactions between migration background and objective social mobility on these differences. To do so I use iterations of the following modified fixed-effects Poisson regression model:

a)

$$log(E[Y_{ic}]) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 \ \ Migrant_i \ + \beta 2 \ \ Relative\ ISEI_i \ +$$
$$\beta 3 \ \ (Migrant_i \ * RelativeISEI_i) + \beta 4 \ \ Respondent\ ISEI_i \ \ +$$
$$\beta 5 \ \ (Respondent\ ISEI_i \ * Relative\ ISEI_i) + \beta x \ \ Controls_i + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_i$$

In this model, the dependent variable *Y* takes value 1 when respondents they perceive themselves as more successful in life than their parents. Subscript *i* denotes individuals, while α_c denotes region level fixed effects for regions in France. The inclusion of fixed effects allows me to account for systematic differences between regions - notably the fact that both being an immigrant and perceiving oneself as upwardly mobile or of high social status are likely to correlate with certain geographical patterns. $\beta 2$Relative ISEI shows the absolute distance in socioeconomic status (ISEI) between parents and respondent *i*. $\beta 3(Migrant * \beta 2$Relative ISEI) gives me the differing relationship between subjective upward mobility and objective socioeconomic mobility for migrants relative to non-migrants. $\beta 4 \ Respondent.ISEI$ is distance between respondents' socioeconomic status and the sample mean (41). $\beta 5(Respondent.ISEI * \beta 2 Relative\ ISEI)$ allows the effect of intergenerational mobility to vary by socioeconomic status and vice versa. Finally, $\beta x^{(m)T} Controls$ is a vector of sociodemographic and attitudinal control variables. Here I include age (centred at the mean) as well as age mean squared (to account for potential non-linearity in the relationship between

age and subjective upward mobility). Additionally, models control for, sex (reference level set at male), education level (set at secondary), minority status (whether respondents see themselves as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in society on the basis of origin or skin colour), subjective social status (the MacArthur scale briefly discussed in section 2 of this thesis, centred at 5), whether respondents think their household is more economically comfortable than that of their parents (with the reference level set to equally comfortable) and whether respondents' parents currently live in France (reference level set to yes). From these models I report robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the bespoke rural/non-rural region and variable described in section 4.

Coefficients from Poisson regression are not immediately interpretable. Outputs do not report the impact on the probability of $Y = 1$, but on the natural logarithm of the expected rate. To make these coefficients more comprehensible I exponentiate them. This means that my results are expressed in terms of the prevalence ratio. When the outcome of a Poisson regression is binary and standard errors are clustered, this can be interpreted as probability (Zou, 2004). Consequently, in the text speak of percentage changes to the probability of reporting upward mobility under different conditions. In subsequent representations of my results, I present outcomes as estimated marginal means and probabilities over the distribution of relative ISEI such that one can compare the underlying likelihood of subjective upward mobility between groups under different conditions.

Table 7: *Fixed effects modified Poisson regression results – Estimated effect of dependent variables on probability of reporting subjective upward mobility (expressed in prevalence ratio) weighted estimates from TeO2, RCSE at the level of region divided by rural/non-rural residents. Model specification a - For sample summary statistics see methodological appendix b.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Immigrant	1.502***	1.283***	1.278**	1.308**
	(0.031)	(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.108)
relative.ISEI (Occupational mobility)	1.011***	1.022***	1.025***	1.019***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ISEI.m (socioeconomic status)		0.987***	0.986***	0.989***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Primary Education (or below)		1.041	1.018	1.071
		(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.052)
Tertiary Education		1.220***	1.214***	1.120*
		(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.051)
Parent place of residence (Abroad)		1.114*	1.030	1.029
		(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.064)
Immigrant*Parent place of residence (Abroad)			1.196	1.239+
			(0.151)	(0.136)
Immigrant*relative.ISEI (Occupational mobility)			0.992***	0.992***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Relative.ISEI*ISEI.m				1.000
				(0.000)
Household economic conditions - Better				1.904***
				(0.087)
Household economic conditions - Worse				0.610***
				(0.038)
Num.Obs.	11215	11215	11215	11215
R2	0.023	0.050	0.051	0.102
AIC	18713.6	20181.4	20153.0	19086.4
Std.Errors	by: region.rural	by: region.rural	by: region.rural	by: region.rural
FE: region.rural		X	X	X
Controls: Demographic controls (eg. Age, Sex, Marriage Status, Minority status)		X	X	X
Controls: Subjective life conditions (Household economic conditions & Subjective social status)				X

Note: *All continuous variables apart from relative ISEI (set at 0) are mean centred. Categorical variables are set at their modal value. Consequently, reference level is an unmarried man who does not live in a rural area and does not have an immigrant background, does not identify himself as part of a minority group on the basis of origin or ethnicity, is aged 42 with secondary education, an individual ISEI of 41 and relative ISEI of 0, whose parents reside in France and who sees the economic conditions of his household as no better or worse than those of his parents'*

This simplest approach directly compares immigrants in France to the French natives without an immigrant background. The table presents consecutive models of increasing complexity. In each model I gradually introduce controls for objective demographic characteristics, interactions between independent variables and controls for subjective social conditions. Since differences in predictions on our key dependent variables between models are relatively small, I will discuss the results from the best performing and most complex model above (see model 4).

In terms of social mobility (relative ISEI), the correlation between relative socioeconomic status and subjective social mobility is highly significant. Holding individual ISEI at the sample mean, a one-point increase in relative ISEI over 0 is associated with an approximate 2% increase in the probability of reporting upward mobility ($p < 0.001$), all else equal. Moreover, we see that increases in individual ISEI over the mean, when holding relative ISEI at 0 (i.e. no mobility) are negatively correlated with upward SSM ($p < 0.001$). For every 1-point increase in ISEI over the mean we expect to see an approximate 1% decrease in the probability of reporting upward mobility. This suggests that individuals who themselves have a higher socioeconomic status are significantly less likely to report upward mobility when, in etic terms, they are neither upwardly nor downwardly mobile.

More importantly, the relationship between objective and subjective social mobility is weaker for migrants than non-migrants ($p < 0.01$). With every 1-point change in relative SES, migrants are estimated to see an increase of just under 1% in the probability of reporting upward subjective social mobility - compared to 2% for non-migrants. The negative interaction effect is small in absolute terms, but considerable moderator relative to the effect associated with non-migrants. Moreover, our predictor for migrants is significant in all models. In the best performing model, the probability of immigrants responding that they are more successful than their parents relative to non-immigrants in France are approximately 30% higher ($p < 0.01$), all else equal.

In sum, compared to non-immigrants in France, then, immigrants are not only more likely to report upward mobility, their probability of doing is significantly less dependent on their objective socioeconomic trajectories. By extension, remembering that the relationship predicted by this model is linear, this means that that the relationship between downward objective social mobility and subjective social mobility is weaker for migrants. In other words, all else equal migrants who are downwardly objectively mobile compared to their parents are more likely than natives with the same trajectories to report upward social mobility.

Changes in Household Economic Conditions

It would be reasonable to expect that both the major gap in SSM, and the difference in its correlation with objective mobility owes to the methodological approach. As discussed in the methods section, direct comparison of ISEI scores for migrants and non-migrants implies that occupations (and thereby trajectories) in country A and country B are commensurable. However, the conditions afforded by a given occupation varies significantly by country of residence. Therefore, it is possible that many immigrants in France who've experienced downward mobility in SES equivalent to that of non-migrants have seen a less dramatic decrease in economic prosperity and life conditions precisely as a result of their migrating. In fact, some might be objectively more economically comfortable than their parents despite downward mobility (de Haas, 2021). Such upturns in economic fortune are not captured by ISEI and would arguably result in a predisposition toward perceiving oneself as upwardly mobile regardless of changes in SES.

For this reason, the most telling control variable is the subjective change in household economic conditions from parents to descendants in the final model (see model 4). This highly significant variable ($p < 0.001$) adjusts for whether respondents' see their own household as more economically comfortable than that of their parents. Its inclusion not only increases the explanatory power of the model but allows me to address these issues of cross-national comparability. This variable is only available in TeO2 – meaning we can only estimate relative to the French non-migrant population, and not when comparing to individuals in other countries. Nonetheless, its use allows us to narrow down the construct being measured. Controlling for changes in economic conditions *and* socioeconomic status addresses the question of micro-level economic improvements wrought through migration as a key explanatory factor for the gap between migrants and non-migrants.

In directly comparing models that differ only in the addition of this variable (see figure 4, models 3 & 4), we see that the estimated difference between migrants and non-migrants doesn't decrease. Rather, a marginal means calculation of underlying probabilities for either group at the reference level suggests that the gap actually increases slightly once perceived changes in household economic conditions are controlled for (figure 4). Moreover, its inclusion strengthens the significance of the coefficient denoting immigrants (table 7).

Figure 5: *Marginal means (predicted probability of subjective upward mobility at reference level) - Migrants and non-migrants in France across models 2, 3 & 4.*



The distance between migrants and non-migrants in terms of subjective intergenerational mobility, then, does not appear to owe to increases in microeconomic conditions achieved by migrating. The same can be said for the moderating effect of migration for the relationship between objective and subjective mobility - controlling for subjective economic change does not significantly affect the interaction (table 7, model 4).

On this basis we can suggest that migrants under the same conditions are more likely than French non-migrants to report upward mobility, that perceptions of social mobility among immigrants are less dependent on objective mobility trajectories than French non-migrants and that this doesn't owe to major gains in economic stability. In the following subsection I propose two main reasons for which we might think estimates thus far lack nuance. Specifically, we may be concerned that treating migrants as a single group masks heterogeneity in the immigrant population. Moreover, regression coefficients and marginal means do not show us group-level differences in the probability of upward SSM as a result of cumulative characteristics but fix estimations at the reference level. As such, they do not show at which point in our relative ISEI measure the probabilities for migrant and non-migrant groups deviate from one another.

I.I From whence the gap

The models so far provide a single coefficient for all immigrants using a binary variable, treating migrants as a single entity. However, both place of origin and reason for migrating might have significant impacts on both objective (Grönlund & Nordlund, 2020) and subjective outcomes (Sand & Gruber, 2018) in the receiving country. We have no reason to believe that *all* migrant groups would have a higher SSM, nor that the gap owing to reduced importance of relative ISEI would apply equally in all cases. Rather, we expect the group average shown above to be increased by sub-populations in the migrant sample who migrated for economic reasons or from less prosperous regions (**H.3a & H.3b**). To fully understand

what the relationship between migration and subjective social mobility looks like, the effect should be disaggregated to produce separate estimations of the relationship between migration and SSM for different immigrant groups.

Second, the approach taken shows the marginal effect of certain variables on the relationship between subjective mobility and migration. This allows us to see that migration appears as one distinct effect and that the interaction of objective socioeconomic mobility and migration appears as another. Consequently, at least two factors (the lesser importance of objective social mobility for subjective social mobility and migration background) might account for gaps between migrants and non-migrants. This approach, however, approach does not show us systematic differences between groups (as defined by region of origin or reason for migrating) across the distribution of relative ISEI - i.e. the gap as a result of our respondents' cumulative characteristics. Displaying the fitted values from our models by group can help us assess what the gap in probability of reporting upward mobility between immigrants and non-immigrant groups looks like overall when distributed across socioeconomic mobility.

To address these two issues, I retain the format and approach of model 4 but replace the binary migrant variable with two specifications of $\beta 1 Group$. In the first case this variable denoted regions of origin, in the second divides the sample by immigrants' stated reason for migrating. I use the following logistic specification to visualise group level differences:

b)

$$logit(P(Y_{ic} = 1) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 Group_i + \beta 2\ Relative\ ISEI_i + \beta 3\ (Group_i * Relative\ ISEI_i) + \beta 4\ Respondent\ ISEI_i + \beta 5\ (Respondent\ ISEI_i * Relative\ ISEI_i) + \beta x\ Controls_i + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_i$$

Drawing on this respecified model, I plot predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility for respondents across the relative ISEI scale - doing so for each group individually. These plots use fitted values to capture cumulative effects of individual-level characteristics on probability within groups. I then fit a logistic regression over fitted values to show deviations along the relative ISEI scale. As such, we are no longer only looking at a single marginal effect, but on predicted probabilities of *groups* responding that they are upwardly mobile at different rates of relative ISEI.[12]

[12] Marginal effects of relative ISEI in different populations are discusses in the text, the specific regression tables, however, are included only as an appendix.

Subsequently, as above, I also use modified fixed effects Poisson regressions to look at the influence of individual variables:

c)

$$log(E[Y_{ic}]) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 Group_{i} + \beta 2\ Relative\ ISEI_i + \beta 3\ (Origin_i * Relative\ ISEI_i) + \beta 4\ Respondent\ ISEI_i + \beta 5\ (Respondent\ ISEI_i * Relative\ ISEI_i) + \beta x\ Controls_i + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_i$$

From this I present coefficient estimates for origin to show the residual effect of migration background, as well as the interaction of origin and relative ISEI to show variance in the relationship between objective and subjective mobility.

Specifying populations

The most intuitive approach to disaggregating our binary variable for migrants would be to regroup immigrant populations into the smallest possible geographical regions of origin. However, as mentioned in section 4, to ensure respondent anonymity, TeO2 provides limited information on respondents' country of origin. For this reason, we must settle for broader regions of origin. This means our estimates, in terms of specific populations, are less precise. However, aggregation also means we avoid the risk of producing insignificant results simply due to diminutive sample sizes. These more robust samples ultimately allow us to plot predicted probabilities across the entire 139-point relative ISEI scale without greatly inflated confidence intervals. This provides relative certainty regarding the reliability of our predictions at all points in the distribution.

Figure 6: *Fixed effects logistic regression model results (fitted values from model 4.1) - Predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility across objective socioeconomic mobility - French non-migrants and the Immigrant population in France by Region of origin. Model specification b.*



Drawing on the results of model 4.1, figure 6 present respondents' predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility based on our logistic model. As such, the plot performs a descriptive and inferential purpose, displaying cumulative effects (i.e. fitted values) within populations across the continuous measure of social mobility measure. In these plots, the x-axis indicates relative ISEI. For clarity, the point at which a respondent is upwardly mobile in etic terms (i.e. their ISEI is higher than the mean of their parents' household, in other words where relative ISEI = 0) is denoted by a vertical red line. The y-axis shows the probability of respondents reporting upward SSM. As such, the horizontal red line at 0.50 indicates the point at which respondents are more likely than not to report being upwardly mobile relative to their parents. Points denote fitted values for individual respondents. In each facet of the plot, I include the estimation for French, non-immigrant as our comparative case.

In all cases, immigrants who are downwardly mobile are more likely than non-immigrants to report upward mobility. Apart from immigrants from the Americas and Oceania (for whom the difference, while significant, is vanishingly small), the gap between downwardly mobile immigrants and non-immigrants is remarkably consistent (figure 6). The distance is typically largest just below 0 on the relative SES scale (i.e. for those who have experienced some degree of downward mobility in objective terms) and only closes once individuals' own SES is between 20 and 40 points higher than that of their parents. Except for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and America and Oceania, the average immigrant respondent is more likely than not to report upward SSM (i.e. probability > 0.5) while still downwardly mobile in etic terms - at between 10 and 20 points below their parents on the relative ISEI scale. French non-immigrants, on the other hand, are only more likely than not to report upward mobility once their own SES is roughly 20 points higher than that of their parents' - i.e. when they have experienced significant upward mobility. Finally, while the gap is conditional on downward mobility for immigrants sub-Saharan Africa and America and Oceania, this does not appear to be the case for our remaining regions of origin. At all but the highest levels of social mobility, most immigrant groups appear more likely than non migrants to report upward mobility.

In sum, the effect we are looking at, wherein migrants are consistently more likely than non-migrants to report upward mobility when they are in fact downwardly mobile, is robust to differences between migrant groups in France[13] . In line with hypothesis 1 (**H.1**), there is a

[13] It is of course possible that these differences owe to selection of migrants on occupational resources. Although migrants appear downwardly mobile due to migration related status-loss their pre-migration socioeconomic mobility (if they chose to migrate knowing they will be downwardly mobile and do so anyway) might be a better measure of how individuals understand their own trajectory. As a robustness check, I construct this same model, only replacing current ISEI with pre-migration ISEI in cases where this is higher than current ISEI. There is a small reduction in the gap between migrants and non-migrants when we take this approach, however, it does not significantly change the results (graphical appendix b).

significant gap between migrants and non-migrants. Moreover, in line with hypothesis 2 (**H.2**) this gap is largest and most consistent for migrants who experience some degree of downward mobility. Yet findings thus far go beyond hypothesis 2. In certain groups (those who've migrated from America and Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa) the probability of upward SSM is *only* higher for immigrants than non-immigrants when they are downwardly mobile relative to their parents. However, in *most* cases the gap is not conditional on downward mobility. Rather, most immigrant groups are more likely than non-migrants to report upward mobility at all but the highest rate of upward mobility (figure 6). This appears to attest to a consistent migration-related premium with regards to subjective social mobility. Although we can confirm out second hypothesis (**H.2**) when comparing to French non-migrants - the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants is largest for those who are downwardly mobile – we do so with a caveat. In most cases the gap is not conditional on downward social mobility.

However, group level effects do no serve to address our more specific hypotheses: 3a and 3b. Per the *immigrant bargain*, the non-recognition of downward mobility would likely be conditional on migrants moving from low-income regions, or for economic purposes. Consequently, these hypotheses proposed between-group differences in two residual effects of migration for SSM. First, we expected the direct association between migration background on SSM to vary by origin and reason for migrating. Second, we expected the same to be true for the moderating effect of migrant background on the relationship between relative ISEI and SSM. For this reason, we turn to the estimated coefficients both for origin itself and the interaction between origin and socioeconomic mobility (Figure 7) - the results of our fixed effects Poisson regression (model 4.3).

In so doing, we find remarkable constancy across groups. All but those from the Americas and Oceania see a significant positive effect of origin on subjective upward mobility ($p < 0.001$). What's more, in interacting origin and relative ISEI we find that the coefficient is negative all cases – this negative association being significant for all but one of our origin groups. Compared to non-immigrants in France, the subjective social mobility of immigrants is both higher as a residual effect of origin (one that only differs significantly between EU migrants and those who've migrated from the Sahel region), and significantly less dependent on objective mobility trajectories - with the exception only of immigrants from East and Central Asia, the coefficient for whom is only significant at the 10% level ($p = 0.065$). Neither at the level of our origin covariates, nor at the level of their interaction with objective mobility trajectories do we see systematic variance between groups. Although there is some minor variance, there is no clear pattern in terms of region of origin.

Figure 7: *Fixed effects Poisson regression coefficients (Model 4.2) – Estimated effect for region of origin and interaction Region of Origin * Relative ISEI expressed as prevalence ratio. Mmodel specification c.*



However, in terms of individual coefficients there is divergence in the prediction of our logistic and modified Poisson models. In both cases, all regions of origin but Americas and Oceania are significantly associated with a higher likelihood of reporting upward social mobility ($p < 0.001$). However, the logistic regression does not show significance for all interaction terms. In cases where the point estimate is particularly large (Turkey & Middle East, DOM/TOM and all African origin regions) coefficients remain significant. However, for EU or American/Oceanian immigrants, though negative, coefficients are significant only at a 10% confidence level. The remaining interactions are not significant. As such, logistic results better align with predictions, meaning we may retain some uncertainty regarding hypothesis 3b. However, since these models often perform worse in estimating associations between dependent and independent variables when the outcome in question is common (Zou, 2004), estimates from the modified Poisson regression may be more reliable. In sum, although the pathways through which the gap emerges remains broadly consistent (weaker correlation between objective and subjective mobility for migrants and a residual effect of migration), the extent to which this varies by group remains in question.

Yet, differing pathways notwithstanding, the results in both cases attest to a significant residual gap between migrants and non-migrants.

Figure 8: *Fixed effects logistic regression outcome - Predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility across objective socioeconomic mobility (fitted values model 4.3) - French non-migrants and the Immigrant population in France by stated reason for migrating. Model specification b.*



Similar results emerge if we replace the region of origin with the stated reason for migrating (figure 8, model 4.4). Again, we do find some variance between groups[14]. In accordance with hypothesis 3a (**H.3a**), those who report migrating for economic reasons - either their children's future, or to escape poverty themselves - are more likely to report upward mobility than other migrant groups as a cumulative effect. This notwithstanding, immigrants, no matter the conditions that brought them to France, are consistently more likely to say they are more successful in life than their parents than are non-migrants in France (figure 8). What's more, this gap is still largest, in almost all cases, for those who have experienced some degree of downward mobility.

Examining the output of our modified Poisson regression we find mixed results. Although the cumulative effect is strongest for those with economic motivations (figure 8), the residual effect of migration background on subjective social mobility appears strongest for those who moved in search of political stability (figure 9). Consequently, although economic migrants may be more likely on aggregate to report upward mobility, we cannot confirm hypothesis 3a (**H.3a**). It is not the case that residual migration effects are strongest for those who move for economic reasons, nor, as we saw above, those who move from less prosperous regions. Finally, in refutation of hypothesis 3b (**H.3b**), the residual effect of migration on the correlation between subjective and objective mobility does appear to vary as a function of reason for migrating (figure 9).

Figure 9: *Fixed effects Poisson regression coefficients (Model 4.4) – Estimated effect for reason for migrating and interaction Reason* Relative ISEI expressed as prevalence ratio. Model specification c.*



[14] Unlike region of origin, these are not mutually exclusive categories (meaning respondents can indicate more than one reason and may therefore be counted multiple times limiting the precision of the measurement).

Again, there is some variation between logistic and Poisson regressions. As above, there is no difference between the two in terms of the significance of migration background. However, some variance can be found in terms of the interaction between groups and relative ISEI (models in appendix). Notably, the interaction is insignificant in this case for those who migrated for their Children's future, or to escape poverty (our two main categories, alongside profession, which can be classified as forms of economic migration). Regardless of the model, predictions are inconsistent with expectations of a stronger residual effect for economic migrants (**H.3b**). Results from the logistic model directly contradict hypothesis 3b, showing the opposite to be true. For the remaining categories, significance levels are unchanged.

Thus far, results attest to a significant and consistent migration premium in SSM across migrant groups in France. Moreover, although this is not universal, the association between objective and subjective social mobility is consistently lower for migrants than non-migrants. In terms of both cumulative effects (figures 6 & 8), the results are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. The gap between immigrants and non-immigrants appears in all cases (**H.1**). Although the distance between migrants and non-migrants is rarely conditional on downward mobility, it is most consistent, and frequently largest, for those who are somewhat downwardly mobile (**H.2**).

However, despite uncertainty in predictions, findings thus far contradict the more targeted hypotheses (**H.3a**, **H.3b**). Except for migrants from the Americas and Oceania (see figure 7) we do not see significant variation in the residual effect of migrant origin itself. What's more, although we find mixed results, the more reliable modified Poisson regression suggests that all origin places (save East and Central Asia) have lower associations between objective and subjective mobility than do non migrants. Results from logistic analyses suggest that this effect is significant only for certain immigrant groups. These results align better with our hypotheses but are arguably less reliable. Some significant differences between populations can be found when divided by reason for migrating. However, counter to hypotheses 3a and 3b, we cannot conclude that variation in the residual effect of migration aligns with economic motivations. The same is true of the effect of migration background on the correlation between objective and subjective mobility.

In sum, while we have confirmation of our first two hypotheses, the findings paint a more complex picture of the relationship between objective and subjective mobility for immigrants in France than hypotheses 3a and 3b allow for. These results attest to a more general

association between migration and subjective upward mobility, one that does not appear to depend heavily on the migration trajectory in question.

I.II Holding out hope

Deviations from these hypotheses notwithstanding, it is important that this project considers further predictions of the *immigrant bargain*. Specifically, the *immigrant bargain* proposes that the acceptance of downward mobility is based on an expectation of future upward mobility (Alba & Foner, 2015). According to this framework, migrants trade pre-migration advantages for the promise of long-term opportunities in places characterised by more favourable macroeconomic conditions. So far, results suggest a weaker correlation between objective and subjective mobility for immigrants. Yet, although the gap outlined in the sections above provide a basis on which to start, a further test of the *bargain* should consider whether trajectories post-migration significantly affect SSM. Specifically, it would test for the effect of long-term stagnation in career trajectories.

If the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants in subjective social mobility originates in a belief that the benefits of migration will materialise over time, then the degree to which individuals *did* experience upward mobility after migration would become a crucial factor in subjective assessments. Immigrants whose migration trajectories were marked by downward mobility but whose circumstances did not subsequently improve over time would, we suspect, be less likely to perceive themselves as upwardly mobile (**H.4**). The premium in social mobility brought by the promise at the core of the *immigrant bargain* should fade if it becomes apparent that this bargain is not, in fact, paying off. Consequently, subjective social mobility premium associated with migration would diminish.

To test this hypothesis, I construct a simplified model using a subset of TeO2 respondents. I include only those who in addition to current occupation, parental occupation and perceived intergenerational mobility, report the occupation they were in immediately before and after migrating to France. From this sample I select individuals whose pre-migration ISEI score was higher than their position immediately following migration and whose current ISEI is no higher than that associated with the first position they held in France. If the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants owes to a belief in future mobility, we would expect a significant negative effect of time since migration in this (**H.4**).

Since this sample is significantly smaller (n = 370) I specify much simpler models to avoid overfitting. In this context, we have no reasonable level at which to cluster standard

errors without creating diminutive sample sizes in each cluster. The same is true for fixed effects. For this reason, I resort to a simple logistic model. Nonetheless, I retain the stepwise approach used above, gradually including controls. I use the following specification, mirroring the format of models above:

d)

$$logit\big(P(Y_i = 1)\big) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 \;\; Years\ since\ migrating_i \;\; + \beta 2 \;\; Relative\ ISEI_i \; + \beta 4 \;\; Respondent.ISEI_i + \beta x \;\; Controls_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Again, *Y* takes value 1 for those who see themselves as upwardly mobile. Other than the simplification described above, the only change to above models is in the form of two variables denoting time since arriving in France. Since our interest is not in the comparison of underlying probabilities, nor in the influence of other contextual variables, but rather in the specific association between time since migration for those who were downwardly mobile and subsequently experience no mobility, I present only these coefficients.

Table 8: *Logistic regression output (Models 5 - 9): Estimated effect of years in France on subjective social mobility of the downwardly mobile. Model Specification d*

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Years in France	1.005+	1.006	1.004	0.988	
	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	
10-20 Years					0.811
					(0.255)
20-30 Years					0.929
					(0.379)
> 30 Years					0.506
					(0.246)
Num.Obs.	370	370	370	370	370
R2	0.005	0.064	0.070	0.200	0.204
BIC	691.5	484.7	493.5	436.2	446.0
Std.Errors	IID	IID	IID	IID	IID
Controls: Demographics (Age, Sex, Minority status)		X	X	X	X
Controls: Socioeconomic (Relative ISEI, Respondent ISEI)			X	X	X
Controls: Subjective conditions (Subjective social status)				X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Simplified as these models are we see that, regardless of the controls included, the results do not allow us to suggest that there is a significant association between SSM and time since migrating for those who were downwardly mobile and subsequently remained in a disadvantaged position[15]. Null results do not allow us to refute, nor confirm the claim that the gap between immigrant and non-immigrants are conditional on future upward mobility. However, these models also do not constitute proof that there is any significant relationship between long term stagnation the probability of reporting subjective social mobility. The coefficient for time since migrating *is* typically negative, but in no model is it significant at the conventional 95% level. Immigrants who do not see an increase in their socioeconomic status following migration do not appear to be significantly less likely, regardless of how long they have remained in France in a socioeconomic position that is lower than that held in the country of origin and without upward mobility, to see themselves as upwardly mobile.

On this basis, we cannot confirm hypothesis 4 (**H.4**) and cannot outright conclude that the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants in France is a simple function of short-term acceptance due to a belief in future mobility. This notwithstanding, although the result *is* inconsistent with expectations, we cannot draw clear conclusions from this null finding.

In full, the results thus far laid out a significant and pervasive gap in terms of SSM between immigrants and non-migrants in one receiving country (France). We found that, as a cumulative effect, immigrants were significantly more likely to report upward social mobility than non-migrants when they've in fact experienced downward mobility independent of perceived changes in economic conditions at the household level. However, with the exception of those from the Americans and Oceania and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap between migrants and non-migrants is not conditional on downward trajectories. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1. In terms of hypothesis 2, we can confirm that the gap is most consistent and often widest for those who are downwardly mobile. Although our results differ slightly depending on model specification, the most reliable approach provides is minimal evidence to suggest that this relationship differs significantly between immigrant groups - whether denoted by region of origin or stated reason for migrating. This runs counter to

[15] As I will discuss in my conclusion, estimating the effect of time cross-sectional data raises an obvious risk of collinearity (controlling for age of respondent might interfere with the significance of time since migration since the two are, to some degree, linearly dependent). The second, categorical, approach reduces collinearity relative to a continuous specification, however, it does not fully eliminate the identification problem - some degree of multicollinearity will always remain. For this reason, while we may take note of the result, they should be interpreted with some caution.

hypotheses 3a and 3b. Finally, we were unable to confirm hypothesis 4. Even when immigrants have experienced downward mobility following migration, long term stagnation in socioeconomic status does not *appear* to be significantly associated with the probability of reporting upward intergenerational mobility. This notwithstanding, we cannot draw a clear conclusion regarding this relationship from our null result.

II. Cross-country estimates (ISSP and TeO2)

The results of section 1 outline a picture of migration with a built-in sense of social mobility. However, it is essential to recognise certain inherent limitations of the approach taken thus far.

TeO2 provides by far the best data source on post-migration trajectories and subjective social mobility. Yet, comparing immigrants in France only to French non-immigrants only tells us so much. First, the fact that estimates between immigrant groups, regardless of region of origin do not differ significantly begs the question of whether the difference between migrants and non-migrants owes to specificities of the comparative case (France), rather than the immigrant population concerned. It is indeed plausible that French natives are particularly unlikely to consider themselves upwardly mobile, and that this particularity of France as the case against we're comparing ultimately underlies the gap. In fact, as Vigna (2023) shows, portions of the French population have seen a steady decline in their subjective social status since the beginning of the 21st century. This may well apply to subjective mobility. Second, there is no reason to think that the French non-migrant population is *the* relevant comparison group. If we wish to assess the relationship between migration and SSM, it is insufficient to only compare migrants with non-migrants in their destination country. In fact, a more appropriate comparison would be to estimate whether migrants' perceived social mobility is higher than those in their region of origin who did not migrate. To understand the association between migration and SSM it is essential to consider an appropriate counterfactual case in region of origin – what emigrants' SSM might look like (in theory) had they not left.

In this section I approach these two issues. To do so I move beyond using only TeO2, combining this data with data from the ISSP 2019. Knowing that our outcome variable in TeO2 and the ISSP show no statistically significant differences, this approach allows me to consider the extent to which we can reasonably suggest that France is a typical case - both in terms of SSM overall, and in terms of the relationship between objective social mobility and SSM. On

this basis we can assess whether estimates in the previous section are biased by our comparative case. A second concern of this section (one which will carry over to the third part of my results) is whether we can also suggest that immigrants in France not only have a higher SSM than non-migrants in the receiving country, but than non-migrants in their own region of origin. Doing so would allow me to assert that the gap evidenced in section 1 of these results is a feature of migration and not of specific populations or specific comparisons.

To explore these two issues, I pool data from TeO2 and the ISSP. On the basis of this combined dataset, I construct a logistic regression model (since we are looking at pooled, group level probabilities and have no reasonable level at which to cluster standard errors that is not collinear with predictors, and would therefore be likely to produce false positives) that is almost identical in terms of specification to those in section 1:

e)

$$logit\big(P(Y_i = 1)\big) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 Origin_i + \beta 2\ \ Relative\ ISEI_i + \beta 3\ \ \big(Origin_i * Relative\ ISEI_i\big) + \beta 4\ \ Respondent\ ISEI_i + \beta 5\ \ \big(Respondent\ ISEI_i * Relative\ ISEI_i\big) + \beta x\ \ Controls + \varepsilon_i$$

A few substitutions have been made to adapt this model for this purpose. *Y* remains a binary variable that takes the value 1 for those who see themselves as upwardly mobile. However, I substitute *β1Migrant* from the first model for *β1Origin.* I use two specifications of origin. The first is a factor variable denoting region or country of origin for individual *i*. The second divides the sample into three, the emigrant population in France (TeO2), the non-emigrant population in TeO2 and non-emigrants in ISSP. Again, I include an interaction between our key dependent variable ($\beta 2$*Relative ISEI*) and our origin variable ($\beta 1 Origin$). I interact $\beta 4 Respondent.ISEI$ with $\beta 2$*Relative ISEI* as before. Finally, since we are using multiple survey with differing variables our $\beta x\ Controls$ is now reduced to contain only the following variables available in both TeO2 and ISSP: Age (centred at the sample mean), age squared, sex, marriage status, education level, current employment status and subjective social status (centred at 5).

I construct two plots based on these models. First, I plot marginal means for each country, disaggregating the TeO2 sample into regions of origin such that we can compare probabilities of upward SSM at the reference level with each country surveyed by the ISSP. Second, I reproduce the approach in the previous section – I extract fitted values for

respondents in each country/region of origin in the sample, plotting these against relative ISEI. This provides a probability distribution for SSM for each country in the ISSP against which we can compare the prediction for French non-emigrant and immigrants in France. With this approach, we can not only estimate whether, at the baseline, French respondents are an appropriate reference group, but whether at any point in the distribution we see that French respondents deviate from a typical relationship between SSM and intergenerational socioeconomic mobility.

Having done this, the following subsection explores a propensity score matching approach to comparing EU emigrants residing in France to non-emigrants within the EU.

II.I External comparison: is France an outlier?

French respondents do not appear to be outliers in terms of SSM (figure 10). They are no more likely than most other respondents to report upward mobility, *ceteris paribus*. As we have established already (see methodological appendix a), the survey average for non-migrants in TeO2 (France – Mainland) and the predictions for ISSP respondents in France (FRA) align perfectly. Yet, confidence intervals for non-migrant TeO2 respondents also overlap with respondents in 15 of the 24 countries surveyed by the ISSP. This provides confidence that the results in the previous section are not biased due to particulates regarding the reference group used. What's more, in practically all cases, the underlying probability of reporting upward mobility at the reference level (ISEI = 0), is lower for all other non-emigrant populations surveyed than for immigrants in France. Immigrants in France from almost all origins (with the same exception of the Americas or Oceania) are more likely to report subjective upward mobility, all else equal, than non-migrants in the countries surveyed by the ISSP. This serves to bolster our existing findings. The lack of variation between countries in the ISSP, and constancy with which the gap between migrants and non-migrants is present also suggests that migration background, rather than origin, is likely to serve as the particular correlate of subjective social mobility to which we can ascribe the significant results in previous sections.

Figure 10: *Marginal means (predicted probability of subjective upward mobility at reference level) by place of origin and survey (Logistic regression - weighted estimates - Model 10.1 & 10.2). Model specification e.*



Note*: Prediction for male respondent, aged 42, employed and ISEI 41, relative ISEI 0, with secondary education, subjective social status at 5 and unmarried.*

Concerning the probability distribution over relative ISEI we see that this too is unremarkable for French non-immigrant respondents (figure 11). French respondents are, in this regard, indistinguishable from respondents in most other advanced (admittedly primarily European) economies. Out of 24 countries covered by the ISSP, 12 (Denmark, Germany, Finland, Austria, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Slovenia as well as Chile, Israel and Taiwan)

have distributions that at all points overlap with that of French non-immigrant respondents, both to TeO2 and ISSP. Where countries do deviate from the line denoting non-migrant TeO2 respondents in France, the probability of reporting subjective upward mobility tends to be lower. With the exception of our TeO2 immigrant sample, there are only 3 cases in which we find probabilities that are higher than for French non-migrants. What's more, this deviation from the general trend is always at the lowest rate of objective social mobility (Czechia, Australia and the Philippines - figure 8). In these cases, the strength of the relationship between SSM and relative ISEI is significantly weaker than in France.

Finally, while predictions in several countries overlap with that of immigrants in France at the lower end of the relative ISEI scale, these plots show that there is no case out of the countries surveyed by the ISSP that matches the distribution of probabilities across social mobility that we see for the TeO2 immigrant sample (figure 11). Although the precise points at which distributions diverge or converge does differ, the probability of reporting upward mobility across the relative SES scale is typically significantly higher for immigrants in France than non-immigrants elsewhere, *ceteris paribus*. With exceptions for Australia and Czechia, this gap is both most consistent and widest at the lower end of the relative SES scale - i.e. for the downwardly mobile.

In sum, comparing results from TeO with those of the ISSP has allowed us to reaffirm conclusions we can draw from the findings in the in previous sections. The comparison suggests that a significantly higher probability among migrant residents in France is unlikely be due to a particularity of the reference group in question. Moreover, the above suggests it is relatively unlikely to owe to place of origin (since non-migrant populations do not vary significantly). Rather, the higher rate of subjective social mobility, one that is robust, significant and largest for those who are downwardly mobile appears most likely to owe to migration itself – the migrant population in France being consistent outliers with regards to their subjective social mobility.

Figure 11: *Predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility (fitted values) across objective socioeconomic mobility (fitted values Model 11) - Non-migrants across ISSP (2019) surveyed countries, TeO2 by migration background. Model specification e*



II.II Propensity score matching - an intra EU comparison

Yet, while this approach has helped us to ensure that the comparison is robust, the more salient reference group remains *within* region of origin - comparing emigrant respondents in France to their non-emigrant counterparts. As noted, privacy concerns in the construction of TeO2 means we cannot identify individuals' precise *countries* of origin. This means direct comparison between non-emigrants in their origin country and emigrants in TeO2 is not possible in this section[16]. Nonetheless, given the scope of the ISSP we can effectively compare EU migrants in France to their non-emigrant EU counterparts. Although individual country specificity would be preferable, any closer estimate is out of the question for this particular portion of the analysis. With this in mind, to narrow the comparison as far as possible, I use nearest-neighbour propensity score matching (NN-PSM) to create an adequate reference group against which to compare EU migrant respondents in TeO2.

Typically used in quasi-experimental conditions to approximate randomness, NN-PSM allows me not only to ensure that migrant and non-migrant respondents have the same broader region of origin, but to reduce the ISSP sample in such a manner as to be as similar to the TeO2 sample on key covariates as possible. To do this I pool data from EU countries in the ISSP (excluding France) and EU immigrant respondents to TeO2. I then construct a logistic model the same as the one used above (section 2 model 1), replacing only the dependent variable. This means that Y now takes the form of a binary indicator with value 1 for TeO2 EU-migrant respondents (see model in appendix). I use this model to predict the conditional probability (the propensity score) of a given respondent being an EU migrant in France, rather than a non-migrant EU respondent:

$$\hat{e}(X_i) = P(TeO2EmigrantSample_i = 1|X_i)$$

Here Xi is the same set of socioeconomic and demographic control included in the model in the previous section. Based on this conditional probability, I match observations one-to-one such that each TeO2 EU-migrant observation (T_i = 1) is paired with one ISSP non-migrant observation (T_j = 0) with the closest possible estimated probability. In some cases, particularly when control samples are small, it may be preferable to match multiple control observations to one observation in the treatment group. However, in the case of ISSP and TeO2, I work with an extensive group of non-migrant EU residents to the ISSP. For this reason, I can

[16] In a different manner, I do this in the following section using LITS.

afford to use a more restrictive 1:1 matching approach without replacement (such that each ISSP observation appears only once in the synthetic control group) to create the most similar non-migrant sample possible. The resulting synthetic sample, therefore, is equally divided between EU migrants and non-migrant EU residents such that each immigrant observation in France has an equivalent non-emigrant observation from the ISSP (n = 2 342, see table in appendix for sample comparison), having reduced the number of ISSP respondents in such a way as to minimise differences on all control variables between the two surveys[17].

Importantly, though NN-PSM is typically used for causal estimates, this is by no means a causal estimate. At best, the estimate is correlational. NN-PSM in this context serves merely as a manner of creating an adequate reference group from extensive data such that we can narrow down our correlation to the specific factors of interest – relative ISEI and emigration.

Using this reduced sample, I rerun the same model as above, replacing $\beta 1 Origin$ with a simple binary variable - the same used as a dependent variable for propensity score matching. This denotes whether respondents are EU migrants in France, or non-emigrants who remain in their EU country of origin.

Figure 12: *Predicted probabilities of subjective upward mobility (fitted values) across objective socioeconomic mobility (model 11.1) - Propensity score matched samples of EU non-emigrants and EU immigrants in France.*



We see minimal deviation from our existing findings (Figure 12). EU migrants in France are significantly more likely, even under these restricted conditions, than non-emigrants

[17] Sample summaries comparing matched and unmatched samples can be found in the appendices.

in their region of origin to say they are upwardly mobile. As in previous sections, the gap is widest just below 0 - for individuals who have seen some degree of upward mobility – and most consistent for the downwardly mobile. However, throughout most of the distribution emigrants from EU countries remain significantly more likely than their non-emigrant counterparts to report upward mobility.

As with the above, the preferred modified Poisson regression is not possible here. Levels at which we could theoretically cluster standard errors (survey country) are collinear with predictors. Any such, approach would be very likely to drastically underestimate standard errors and produce false positives. Due to the prevalence of upward mobility in this sample (60% of emigrant respondents report upward mobility, to 40% of non-emigrants), the estimated effects associated with these coefficients are very likely to be overstated. Nonetheless, we have no reason to question the significance of these estimates.

Figure 13: *Logistic regression coefficients for propensity score matched sample (Model 11.1) – Estimated effect for on subjective social mobility Emigrants and interaction Emigrant * Relative ISEI expressed as odds ratio. Model specification e.*



Although we cannot directly compare these estimated coefficients (expressed in the odds ratio) to those in section 1, these coefficients paint a similar picture. The underlying premium in SSM associated with migration background remains highly significant (figure 13). Migration background itself is still highly significant ($p < 0.001$). Compared to non-emigrants, EU migrants in France are significantly more likely to report upward mobility, all else equal. This notwithstanding, the interaction between relative ISEI and migration background is insignificant ($p > 0.05$). We find a migration-related premium in SSM (a residual effect associated with being an emigrant in France), but no reduced association between objective mobility and SSM in the emigrant sample.

To recap, section 1 of this analysis effectively addressed several hypotheses, doing so with mixed results. So far, we have displayed significant positive relationship between migration and SSM (**H.1**) that is strongest for the downwardly mobile (**H.2**). Although these results were somewhat inconclusive, they did not suggest any systematic variance depending on the region of origin or reason for migrating (**H3a & H.3b**). In brief, this section reaffirmed these findings by addressing a potential source of bias, estimating the extent to which our comparative case is typical. I showed that there is little evidence to suggest that the gap between migrants in France and non-migrants in terms of SSM owes to particularities in the reference group used for the initial analysis. French respondents are no more or less likely than those in any other country surveyed by the ISSP to report upward mobility. On the other hand, migrants in France are not only more likely to report upward mobility than are non-migrants in their destination country, they are also more likely than non-emigrants in their region of origin. Moreover, the use of an NN-PSM estimate suggests that this does not owe to systematic differences (on known covariates) between migrant populations and non-migrants in their region of origin, but to migration-related factors associated with SSM. Broadly, this suggests that a subjective social mobility premium is strongly associated with migration.

III. Tending to the gap (LITS IV)

Yet, despite the constancy with which our gap in SSM appears, there remain two broad categories of alternative explanation that prevent us from plausibly attributing differences to migration itself. The first of these is migrant selection – whether individuals who see themselves as upwardly mobile are simply more likely to intend to migrate in the first place. The second pertains to the use of France as a singular destination country across our analyses, and the broader macro-economic differences between origin and destination places that cannot be controlled for using TeO2.

Our reliance on TeO2 thus far (the richest of our 3 datasets) has provided significant insight allowing us to address a number of key hypotheses. However, it has limited our analysis in three key ways. First, cross sectional analyses in migration studies are always at risk of capturing what are, at heart, selection biases. Much as we might have believed gaps in subjective social mobility owed to specificities in the French population, it is perfectly plausible that gaps between migrants and non-migrants owe to dispositional traits on which migrants are selected (Boneva & Frieze, 2002). I have showed that perceptions of oneself as upwardly mobile may be a characteristic of people who have migrated. However, does not mean that this is a feature of *having migrated*. Thus far, then, we have been unable to make

any assertions regarding the extent to which any of these systematic differences between migrant and non-migrant populations are characteristics of the post-migration life of migrants. Second, a lack of specific country of origin data in TeO2 has left us unable to account for a question central to the *immigrant bargain* - namely that of broader macro-economic changes and associated future prospects – in brief, changing life chances as determined by changes in macroeconomic context achieved by migrants (**H.5**). If this gap emerges from immigrants accepting downward mobility in the hope that improved contextual conditions (i.e. more prosperous macroeconomic climate) will eventually enable upward mobility, then we would expect an effect of time since migration (**H.4** addressed in section 1 part I.II). However, we would also expect that any variable accounting for changes in macroeconomic context over the life-course would significantly reduce the effect associated with coefficients denoting migrants. In this final section, I address each of these gaps empirically using micro-data from LITS IV.

III.I. Selection – Addressing endogeneity

Who does or does not migrate in a given population is not random. Numerous studies (briefly reviewed in chapter 3 of this mémoire) attest to selection processes in migration. On the one hand, selection is a question of resources - those who migrate tend to have high levels of education (Feliciano, 2005; Ichou, 2014) and tend to be more economically stable (Domozetov & Yossifov, 1991) relative to the non-emigrant populations in country of origin. Yet, migrants are also selected on personal dispositions – particularly low life satisfaction, high self-assessed risk-taking (Dustmann et al. 2023; Kirisciogl u et al. 2023) and high achievement motivation (Boneva et al. 1998) among other traits. In our case, we might consider that individuals who are more ambitious and optimistic about their social trajectories would be more likely to consider migration as a viable option, making them more likely to migrate. If this is the case, significant differences between migrants and non-migrants (regardless of the reference group) would owe to endogenous features of the migrant population - higher rates of self-selection into migration by individuals who are also more likely to report upward subjective social mobility.

For this same reason that we cannot estimate a causal effect of migration on SSM, we have no surefire way of controlling for selection. We lack longitudinal data, tracking migrants from before to after moving. However, we can implicitly address the selection problem by considering whether intentions to migrate are themselves correlated with subjective upward mobility. The relationship between intention to migrate and actual migration is not 1-to-1

(Carling 2002; Carling & Schewel 2018). While actual migrations reflect socioeconomic resources and political constraints (Boneva & Frieze 2001; de Haas & Fokkema 2011), intentions are non-binding. However, intentions are, in most cases, a prerequisite for action (Creighton 2013).

While the reliability of migration intention variables is often criticised as insufficient and non-representative, Tjaden et al. (2019) show that the two are highly correlated. Although it is true that more people state intentions to migrate than actually do move, survey-based emigration estimates (based on intentions and plans to migrate) offer complementary data in the absence of formal data on migration flows (Tjaden et al., 2019). Although these estimates of selection are imperfect, they remain informative regarding the direction of the relationship between subjective intergenerational mobility and migration (Tjaden et al. 2019). For this reason, I suggest estimating the correlation nonetheless provides relevant information regarding potential selection mechanisms. I rely primarily on data from LITS IV, constructing equivalent models for TeO2 as robustness checks.

In the case of migration intentions, both survey location and the wording of survey questions matter. Migration intentions are not only unequally spread between countries, a more abstract question also renders respondents more likely to report intentions (Tjaden et al.; 2019). In addition to fielding a more restrictive question regarding migration intentions that is likely to be higher correlated with actual migration ('Do you intend to migrate in the next 12 months?') LITS has the benefit of covering multiple majority sending countries - including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the three largest sending countries of migration to France (OECD, 2024). For this reason, I include only LITS estimates in the main body of this thesis, attaching TeO2 estimates in the appendices as a robustness check.

Mixed effects

To estimate the correlation between migration intentions I use mixed effects logistic regression models. In previous analyses I used fixed effects to control for systematic differences across geographic regions. In this way I attempted to isolate the influence of our covariates of interest from or region-specific confounders. However, in some cases (particularly in cases of sparse data) fixed effects might provide overly restrictive estimates.

Our LITS sample covers 37 countries. Across these countries there is significant variance in the number of respondents who report an intention to migrate. In certain cases, this number is close to 0. In a fixed effects framework, each unit receives its own intercept and

outcome covariates are calculated as a summarisation – the average of that covariate across within-unit effects. However, when data is sparse this becomes problematic. Within-unit effects are drawn from each level regardless of how many relevant observations it contains. With insufficient within-group variance, countries with few intended migrants (i.e. with low variance) inflate our overall standard errors and reduce statistical power across the whole model. This makes for unstable covariates. Sparse data in a fixed effects framework, therefore, significantly raises the risk of type 2 error (a failure to detect meaningful relationships between our dependent and independent variables).

To address this, I use mixed effects. On the one hand, this approach retains the assumption of fixed effects - namely that observations within countries are more similar than those between countries and that we want to control for between-country systematic differences. However, unlike fixed effects, it does not treat country level effects as constants with distinct estimates. Rather, this approach treats between-country differences with regards to our dependent variable as random samples from a shared distribution. Mixed-effects models, therefore, benefit from partial pooling. This means that estimations for countries with few observations can borrow strength from the broader sample such as to stabilise otherwise unstable coefficients. Compared to a fixed effects model this raises the likelihood that we would correctly identify meaningful relationships despite data sparsity.

In these models, I allow both the intercept (intentions to migrate) and the slope for subjective upward mobility to vary across countries. This means we don't only allow the underlying probability of intended migration to vary, but also the effect of subjective mobility on migration intentions. This serves to account for both heterogeneity in intention to migrate and variance in the relationship between SSM and migration intention all the while overfitting and mitigating the risk of type 2 error we'd face in a simple fixed effects approach. There is no fixed consensus regarding the number of necessary clusters for reliable multilevel analysis. In this case we work with 37 country clusters, above the argued threshold for reliable estimates (Gelman & Hill, 2006).

We know that migrants are more likely to intend to migrate in the future (Dustmann & Görlach, 2016), and, based on our analyses above, that migrants are more likely to report upward mobility. In these models, then, to avoid spurious correlations between migration intentions and subjective mobility I remove individuals who are themselves migrants,

estimating only for those who have not migrated in their lifetime. In sum I use the following model specification:

f)

$$logit\left(P\left(Y_{ij}=1\right)\right) = \beta 0 + b0j + \left(\beta 1 + b1_j\right) * more\ successful_{ij} +$$
$$\beta 2\ \ Educational\ mobility_{ij} + \beta 3\ \ Education\ level_{ij} + \beta x Control_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here I let *Y* take the value 1 for individual *i* who intends to migrate in country *j*. $b0j$ is a country level random intercept and $b1j$ a country specific random slope for subjective upward mobility (more successful). More successful is, as before, a binary variable which takes value 1 for those who respond that they are more successful in life than their parents. By necessity, I replace the intergenerational socioeconomic status variable (Relative ISEI) with my categorical measure of intergenerational educational mobility. $\beta 2\ EducationalMobility$ is (as described in section 5) a categorical variable with five levels denoting the distance in the ordinal ranking a respondent's education level provides them relative to that of their parents up to two levels above or below. $\beta 3\ Educationlevel$denotes the respondents highest achieved level of education coded into 3 levels (primary or below, secondary and tertiary or above). $\beta x Controls$ denotes a set of controls which I divide into 3 parts. First, I include standard sociodemographic controls as above. The only primary difference between these and previous sociodemographic controls is the inclusion of the categorical variable denoting profession in lieu of granular data. This variable is described in section 4. Second, I introduce controls for migrant networks - whether the respondent reported that others in their household have previously migrated. I distinguish between those who have, and those who have not, since returned. This set of controls also includes a binary variable indicating whether respondents' households receive remittances from abroad. Finally, I include controls for known subjective correlates of migration intentions in the form of self-assessed propensity toward risk taking and life satisfaction (respectively, a 10 and 5-point scale centred at their median values).

As before, I present gradually more complex models. Models 13 through 16 build on variables available in LITS such as to construct the most precise estimates. Model 17 is constructed based on variables shared with TeO2 such that these findings can be validated across surveys (see appendix models 17.1). In the text, I will comment on model 16 since this is the best performing out of the below. Importantly, since we are considering the results of a logistic, rather than Poisson regression, exponentiated coefficients are no longer prevalence

ratios or probabilities, rather they are expressed in the odds ratio. In the text I therefore refer to percentage changes to the odds of migration intention.

Table 9: *Mixed effects logistic regression (models 13-17) –Residual effect of educational mobility, educational achievement, migration networks and subjective social mobility - Odds ratio of migration intentions (LITS IV, weighted estimates, model specification f).*

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17 - TeO2 Equivalent)
More Successful (SSM)	0.748**	0.912	0.949	0.983	0.945
	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.082)
Downwardly Mobile <= -2		1.252*	1.226+	1.206+	1.283*
		(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.132)
Downwardly Mobile = 1		1.120	1.075	1.053	1.117
		(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.128)
Upwardly Mobile = 1		1.038	1.020	1.022	1.025
		(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Upwardly Mobile >= 2		1.017	1.000	0.998	0.983
		(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.081)
Primary Education (or below)		0.622***	0.610***	0.623***	0.586***
		(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.073)
Tertiary Education (or Above)		1.165*	1.216*	1.197*	1.234**
		(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Remittances			1.612***	1.604***	
			(0.150)	(0.150)	
Emmigrant from Household			2.664***	2.623***	
			(0.267)	(0.263)	
Return Emmigrant from Household			2.326***	2.305***	
			(0.263)	(0.262)	
Num.Obs.	32117	32117	32117	32117	32117
R2 Marg.	0.005	0.192	0.234	0.239	0.196
R2 Cond.	0.272	0.400	0.410	0.410	0.399
BIC	11426.9	10543.3	10254.9	10210.4	10522.7
Demographic controls (eg. Age, Profession, Sex, Marriage Status, Income)		✓	✓	✓	✓
Dispositional predictors (Life satisfaction & Risk taking)				✓	
Random intercepts (Country)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Random slopes (More successful)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note**:** *Coefficients upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile denote* ***educational mobility*** *relative to parents' highest level of education achieved. Reference levels for controls are set to the mode for categorical predictors, at the median for integers and at the mean for age.*

Respondents' education level is a highly significant predictor of migration intentions (cf. Ichou, 2014). Not only are higher levels of education associated with a higher odds of reporting intentions to migrate ($p < 0.05$), those with primary education or below were significantly less likely to intend to migrate ($p < 0.001$). Compared to the reference level (secondary education) the odds of an individual with a tertiary degree or above intending to emigrate are approximately 20% higher. On the other hand, the odds of an individual with primary education or below reporting an intention to emigrate were approximately 38% lower. Conversely, where educational mobility is significant, downward intergenerational mobility in educational achievement shows a weak positive association with migration intentions ($p < 0.05$). However, this effect is no longer significant at the 5% threshold once we control for migration networks, and other known dispositional correlates of migration - life satisfaction (centred at the median) and self-assessed risk tolerance. Upward educational mobility relative to parents on the other hand, does not show significance (either negative or positive) in any of our models. All controls denoting links between respondents and other migrants are also highly significant and positively correlated with intentions.

However, regarding our main predictor, SSM (More successful), it is only significant in our first model. Without controlling for any demographic or dispositional factors, we see a significant negative correlation between subjective upward mobility and migration intentions ($p < 0.01$). None of the subsequent models suggest any significant correlation with intentions to migrate ($p > 0.05$).

Much as in section 1 part II, we cannot conclude based on an absence of significance that there never is a correlation. It is merely the case that we retain the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is no correlation). Nonetheless, we can take note of the fact that this coefficient is, though nowhere near significant, consistently negative. As there is no perfect substitute for longitudinal data these models do not allow us to categorically rule out selection on subjective intergenerational mobility. This notwithstanding, any residual relationship between subjective perceptions of upward mobility and migration intentions is nowhere near strong as is the correlation between *having migrated* and subjective intergenerational mobility[18].

[18] In the appendix I reproduce these findings using TeO2. To do so I use the same specifications as model 17 above. Here I consider occupational mobility, over educational mobility a control. Although these results are less informative, given we are looking at association between migration intentions and SSM only for French non-migrants (rather than potential migrants elsewhere), it should be noted that results therefrom do not differ significantly. Moreover, to ensure that what we are capturing is representative of those who intend to migrate to

In essence, the null result regarding the association between SSM and migration intentions. On this basis, although we cannot reject the possibility of a correlation under certain circumstances, the selection of migrants on subjective social mobility does not appear to be a strong explanation for the gap measured above. We retain the null hypothesis (i.e. there is no significant association between intention to migrate and subjective upward mobility). Consequently, I conclude that this alternate causal pathway is unlikely to account, at least fully, for differences between migrants and non migrants evidenced in the remainder of the results. This in turn suggests that the differences that we are seeing are most likely tied to *having emigrated*.

III.II. Beyond L'hexagone – a case of the tunnel effect

In previous sections we have considered whether the gap between migrants and non-migrants owes to differences in economic stability at the household level, examined selection as an alternative pathway and controlled for observable differences between migrant populations in France and non-emigrants in their broader region of origin. The results attest to a significant and persistent gap between migrants and non-migrants in SSM, suggesting that there is a specific migration-related premium in subjective perceptions of upward mobility. Although there is no longer a mediating effect of emigration on the correlation between objective and subjective mobility when we compare emigrants to non-emigrants in their region of origin, the emigration gap remains. However, when estimating the difference between migrants and non-migrants we have remained with France as a destination country. For the purpose of this thesis (and on the basis of the findings thus far) it is imperative in this final section that we expand beyond this limitation – estimating whether the relationship between migration and SSM pertains to migration *per se* rather than migration to France specifically.

Returning to the *immigrant bargain,* the intuition of this thesis was that the gaps we are seeing in subjective social mobility (what I have referred to as an emigration premium) are not necessarily a reflection of migrating as such, but one of migrating to higher income, more developed countries with greater promise for upward mobility (**H.5**). When we only consider immigrants in France, we cannot disentangle this form of upward trajectory – one associated with moving to a developed and wealthy country (and the potential promise inherent in this

France, I also include two simpler models with reduced samples. One keeps only those intended migrants who cite France as end destination. The other does the same while also reducing the LITS sample to respondents in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – countries that we know are well represented in the immigrant population in France (OECD, 2024) and for whom we saw a clear gap in SSM in section 1 of these results. Crucially, results from these models do not differ. The coefficient associated with SSM is neither positive nor significant.

act) - from the fact of having migrated. The analysis has been limited, then, by a lack of specific country of origin information in TeO2. We have been unable to account for macroeconomic differences between origin and destination places. Even if we could do so, comparing migrants in France with non-migrants on this factor might always be problematic since dramatic increased in GDP per capita over the life course would likely to be highly collinear with being a migrant since what is a gradual change over the life course for non-immigrants in France may be a dramatic increase for immigrants. Moreover, the extent to which we have been able to compare emigrants to their non-emigrant counterparts in country of origin has been restricted. Although the combination of surveys provided an estimation (showing that the migration premium is a more likely culprit for the gap between migrants than non migrants than is the acceptance of downward mobility) we have remained limited to broader regions.

To address these factors, we would want to estimate whether the residual effect of migrating holds for a larger set of destination and origin countries. Particularly, we would want to consider the effect of migration between countries with similar macroeconomic conditions while also controlling for these changes in macroeconomic conditions over the life course, comparing these estimates to non-emigrants left behind. To do so, I use LITS IV. The ability to identify individual countries of origin and destination in LITS does not only allow us to include macroeconomic change as a predictor but allows far more specificity in terms of defining populations than can be achieved with TeO2 and ISSP in combination. Drawing on data from middle- to low-income transitions economies, I reduce the LITS sample such that (in addition to non-emigrants) it includes only emigrants whose origin country is also a country surveyed by LITS – i.e. a country for which we have a complete sample of non-emigrants already. Since these countries constitute the majority of the LITS sample, the majority of those to have migrated have done so between proximate countries in Eastern Europe.

By specifying my model with origin-country fixed effects, estimates are a summation of comparisons between emigrants and non-emigrants from the same origin country. Although the model ultimately produces a single coefficient, estimated differences from these models are a summary of differences *within country of origin* - leavers compared to those who stayed behind. As above, mixed effects could be envisioned for a similar approach. However, fixed effects produce a more conservative estimate, allowing an explicit summation of within-group comparison. This approach, then, constitutes a robust test of differences between individuals who have and have not migrated on the basis that they are drawn from the same population,

and moved to more similar countries - all the while accounting for potential macroeconomic changes migrants wrought through their choice to leave.

Addressing these questions constitutes a test of hypothesis 5 (**H.5**). I expect the coefficient denoting emigrants to be significantly reduced by the inclusion of life course changes in macroeconomic conditions. This would suggest that the gap between emigrants and non-emigrants can be accounted for by changing life conditions and the consequent potential for upward mobility.

For this purpose, I use the following modified Poisson specification:

b)

$$log(E[Y_{ic}]) = \beta_0 + \beta 1 \;\; Emigrant_i + \beta 2 \;\; Educational\ mobility_i + \beta 3(Emigrant_i * Educational\ mobility_i) + \beta 4 \;\; Education\ level_i + \beta 4 \;\; GDPchangePPP_i + \beta xControls_i + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_i$$

Deviation from above models is again minimal. Primary changes are the addition of GDP change. Expressed in purchasing power parity, this variable takes the value of the total difference between GDP in respondents' year of birth and country of birth and GDP in country of residence in 2022. This variable has been centred at the mean and z-score standardised. Coefficients for GDP change consequently reflect the estimated effect of a one standard deviation change in life course GDP growth. $\beta xControls$ is made up by the same standard sociodemographic variables and attitudinal variables described in the previous section, with one notable addition. To account for the lack of precise occupation data I also include a variable for equivalised household income expressed in purchasing power parity. This variable is log transformed, centred at the mean and standardised such that a 1-point change indicates a 1% change in equivalised household income over the sample mean. Fixed effects (α_c) are, as discussed above, set at the origin country level. Similarly, I report robust standard errors clustered at the country of origin.

Table 10: *Modified fixed effects Poisson regression results (models 18:20) – Effects on probability of subjective upward mobility (fixed effects at origin country leve[19]l, RCSE at origin country level - Coefficients expressed as prevalence ratio. Model specification g.*

	18: Origin FE	19: Origin FE + Interaction	20: Origin FE + GDP
Emigrant	1.188**	1.176*	1.142*
	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.070)
Downwardly Mobile <= -2	0.922	0.887**	0.886**
	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Downwardly Mobile = 1	0.917*	0.910**	0.904**
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Upwardly Mobile = 1	1.078+	1.094**	1.107***
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Upwardly Mobile >= 2	1.134*	1.206***	1.207***
	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.036)
Primary Education (or below)	0.867	1.057	1.070
	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Tertiary Education (or Above)	1.113**	1.007	0.978
	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Emigrant * Downwardly Mobile <= -2		0.743+	0.784+
		(0.118)	(0.111)
Emigrant * Downwardly Mobile = 1		0.843	0.888
		(0.224)	(0.236)
Emigrant * Upwardly Mobile = 1		1.093	1.051
		(0.116)	(0.099)
Emigrant * Upwardly Mobile >= 2		0.820**	0.855*
		(0.055)	(0.061)
Household Income (log)		1.001***	1.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP change (SD)			1.121***
			(0.034)
Num.Obs.	24547	24547	24547
R2	0.004	0.027	0.045
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.024	0.042
BIC	41997.9	41523.1	40784.2
Fixed Effects: Origin	X	X	X
RCSE: Origin	X	X	X
Demographic controls (eg. Age, Profession, Sex, Marriage Status)		X	X
Subjective life conditions (Life satisfaction & subjective social status)			X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

[19] As a robustness test, I reproduce these same models setting fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the survey country level – included in graphical appendices. Although the estimated effect is slightly stronger for emigrants, the results therefrom do not differ significantly.

Outside of its position relative to parental education level, individual educational achievement is insignificant in these models ($p > 0.05$). Higher or lower education, in absolute terms, does not appear to predict subjective intergenerational mobility. This notwithstanding, both upward and downward educational mobility are highly significant. Although the estimated effect of respondents being two or more ordinal positions from their parents in terms of educational achievement (rather than one) is relatively small, point estimates suggest that the effect is slightly stronger the further a respondent is from their parents' highest level of education. Relative to the reference level (no educational mobility and secondary education) the probability of an individual whose highest level of education is lower than that of their highest educated parent reporting subjective upward mobility are approximately 10% lower ($p < 0.001$). This point estimate remains largely consistent whether respondents are one, or two or more positions below their parents. Conversely, the probability of subjective upward mobility is approximately 10% higher for those who are one ordinal position above their parents in educational achievement, and 20% higher for those who are two ordinal positions above their highest educated parent ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 14: *Modified fixed effects Poisson regression coefficient estimates (model 20) -– Effects on probability of subjective upward mobility (fixed effects at origin country level, RCSE at origin country level). Expressed as prevalence ratio. Model specification g.*



Crucially, see a significant overall effect associated with emigration itself. At the reference level, emigrants are significantly more likely than non-emigrants to report upward social mobility ($p < 0.05$). Specifically, the estimated residual effect of emigration is roughly equal to that of one degree of upward educational mobility (figure 14). Moreover, both household income and the GDP change variables are highly significant ($p < 0.001$). A 1 standard deviation change above the sample mean in GDP growth over the life course is associated with an approximate 12% increase in the probability of reporting upward mobility.

Yet, counter to predictions, the inclusion of GDP change does not significantly impact the effect associated with migration.

The residual effect of migration estimated in these models is smaller than in those using TeO2. Rather than the 30-40% increases in the probability of reporting upward mobility we saw in section 1, these results suggest that relative to their origin-country peers, emigrants are approximately 10% more likely to see themselves as upwardly mobile. Yet, a reduction in effect size notwithstanding, the coefficient remains significant. Moreover, the estimated coefficient associated with emigration does not waiver as a result of our including changes in macroeconomic conditions, nor accounting for income. While the difference in our emigrant coefficient between models 19 and 20 is roughly 0.03, a simple z-test of reveals that this difference is insignificant. With a standard error of approximately 0.09 and a z-statistics of roughly 0.31 the test returns a p-value of 0.75. On this basis we cannot reject the null hypothesis and cannot conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between the residual effect associated with emigration in the sample when accounting for changes in macroeconomic conditions.

This notwithstanding, the results do not suggest a protective effect of emigration on the relationship between downward mobility and subjective social mobility. Emigrants whose highest level of education is lower than that of their parents are estimated to be just as likely to report upward mobility as are non-migrants under these same conditions ($p > 0.05$). In the case of upward mobility, however, models indicate that any residual positive effect of upward educational mobility is practically nullified for migrants ($p < 0.05$). Similar to section 2.II, these results suggest that the *immigrant bargain* lens through which we parsed our findings regarding social mobility (i.e. a lower importance of objective mobility for subjective mobility) do not apply in this context - comparing emigrants to non-emigrants, or in the case of educational mobility. Emigrant background appears to dampen the effect of educational mobility on SSM but does nothing for downward mobility. Yet, differing effects of educational and occupational mobility are to be expected. Unlike occupational downgrades associated with migration, migrants' educational achievement doesn't change because of their moving. Rather, existing achievements may become less valuable due to non-recognition (Engzell & Ichou, 2020). Material benefits associated with being upwardly mobile in terms of education, for migrants may consequently be nullified by their migration background. Nonetheless, in a different manner to the above, these findings indicate that correlations between SSM and objective mobility differ systematically between migrants and non-migrants. More

importantly, however, these results also show that the effect associated with migration (an effect outlined and reaffirmed in each section of this thesis) appears to be distinct from the effect of changes in macroeconomic context over the life course.

At the outset, the intuition of this thesis followed from oft cited narratives in the migration literature - specifically the *immigrant bargain* (Alba & Foner, 2015). It assumed that we would see a residual effect of migration for subjective social status (particularly for those who had experienced downward mobility). However, it also expected objective changes in surrounding conditions – broadly, life chances allowing for mobility as a result of migrating to higher income countries - to significantly reduce the residual effect associated with migration (**H.4**). I reached this conclusion by combining the well documented 'tunnel effect' with regards to subjective mobility (Kelley & Kelley, 2009; Gugushvili, 2021) and the *immigrant bargain* thesis. The 'tunnel effect' framework suggests that wider societal developments affect individual perceptions of their own mobility regardless of changes to their own relative position (Gugushvili, 2021), while the immigrant bargain suggest that downward mobility is accepted in exchange for access to more prosperous conditions in which immigrants subsequently expect upward mobility. Changes in macroeconomic conditions, then, would capture the effect of migrating. Though the 'effect' associated with being a migrant in this final analysis is significantly weaker than in our previous models, migration is still significantly associated with subjective upward mobility - even after accounting for changing macroeconomic conditions.

7. Discussion & Conclusion

This thesis started at a central tension in the migration experience. Migrants tend to be relatively advantaged in their country of origin and often move for the purpose of upward mobility (Domozetov & Yossifov, 1991; Feliciano, 2007; Ichou, 2014; Ferry & Ichou, 2024). Migration, however, tends to be synonymous with labour market penalties, and most can expect to be downwardly mobile upon arrival (Gans, 2009). Although many will regain some of these losses as they establish themselves in a new place, the extent of this reversal depends on individual background (Chiswick et al., 2005; Grönlund & Nordlund, 2020). As such, rather than the desired upward trajectory or economic gain imagined to be associated with migrating, many migrants experience persistent and cumulative disadvantages as they establish themselves in a new place (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Groenwald et al., 2012). These disadvantages are no secret to prospective migrants (Pajo, 2008), begging the question of why they move nonetheless, and why they subsequently persevere.

Seen through an economic lens, the promise of migration as a means to the end of social mobility is tenuous and uncertain. However, examining migrant's own perceptions of their social mobility paints a vastly different picture. Far from suggesting that migration is tied to downward mobility, the above analysis attests to a complex entanglement of emic conceptions of social mobility and migration. Crucially, migration *in itself* appears to play a major role in individuals' assessment of their social trajectories – above and beyond the objective socioeconomic trajectories typically described by academics. This association between having migrated and perceiving oneself as upwardly mobile is remarkably consistent and robust. It is unlikely to be reducible to selection effects, or to changes in life chances - as defined by occupational mobility or economic conditions at either the macro or micro level. Moreover, showing that variation between immigrant groups depending on origin or destination is minimal, that the comparison group used to assess migrants' mobility does not appear to matter significantly and that it can be reproduced under vastly different circumstances, the results point to migration itself as the source of a significant premium in perceptions of social mobility.

In accordance with Lu (2021), then, my results suggest that the lived experience of migration is deeply tied to individuals own conceptions of their social mobility. In expanding on Lu's (2021) analysis, I show that this relationship holds in the context of international migration, appearing to apply across migrant populations. This association extends over and beyond objective mobility and improvements in economic conditions at both the macro, and micro-level – factors that previous analyses were unable to address. Status attainment may well "occur as a net result of several quite different sets of events" (Haller & Portes, 1973, p. 54), and this analysis suggest strongly migration itself may be one such event (de Haas, 2006; Pajo, 2008). In simple terms, the results indicate that migration comes with an in-built sense of social mobility *par excellence*.

Occupations and economic conditions have, for almost a century, been treated as benchmarks for assessing migrants' success (López & Williams, 2024). Yet, whether migrants are successful is not necessarily a natural fact of the world, but arguably a question of migrant's own interpretation of their trajectories. Even if we accept that migration *is* typically a social mobility project (Ferry & Ichou, 2024), this thesis reveals that it is worth taking a deeper look at how social mobility is understood by those turn to migration in search of it.

The frameworks used by academics and those used by laypeople to assess their mobility do not necessarily align (Duru-Bellat & Keifer, 2008). Rather, individuals draw on numerous

contextual factors to assess whether they are upwardly mobile (ibid.). My results attest to this general misalignment. However, in more specific terms they show that this divide is particularly notable for those who have migrated. Not only is migration itself associated with subjective upward mobility, migration background also appears (under certain conditions) to be a significant mediator of the relationship between objective and subjective mobility. Migrant's subjective social mobility is not only higher as a rule, but often less associated with objective mobility trajectories - up or down. As predicted, we found a significant gap between migrants and non-migrants who've been downwardly mobile in occupational terms. Migrants who are downwardly mobile are more likely than non-migrants (either in receiving or sending country) to see themselves as upwardly mobile. However, this gap was, in most cases, not contingent on downward mobility. In fact, non-migrants and (most) migrant groups only converged at the highest rate of upward occupational mobility[20].

Counter to expectations, the results showed few significant differences depending on region of origin or reason for migrating, nor do the results give reason to believe that the migration-associated premium is entirely dependent on subsequent re-gained status. Recalling mechanisms used by scholars to explain objective/subjective discordance in social status reviewed in section 2 of this thesis, these results could well be framed in terms of cognitive dissonance (D'Hooge et al., 2018). While some are aware of the challenges they will face (Pajo, 2008), many migrants hold unrealistic expectations of prosperity in destination places (Groenwald et al., 2012). For this reason, given our results, one may consider whether the gap is cognitive compensation for inconsistencies between the trajectories experienced (disadvantage and downward mobility), and the envisioned promises (economic prosperity) that drive many migration decisions (Groenewold et al., 2012). It is, in theory, reasonable to think that those who have taken on significant expense and undergone considerable hardship to migrate may be predisposed to compensate cognitively for disadvantages incurred as a result.

It is it beyond the scope of this project to adjudicate on cognitive mechanisms. However, it is within its remit to suggest that relying on cognitive dissonance *alone* to explain these findings is theoretically untenable. Namely, to do so is to retain the assumption that migration is a mere means to an end – the postulate being that when that end is not achieved, individuals must compensate for this fact. To make this assumption, is to ignore perfectly

[20] Deviations from this trend were non-systematic, and only two exceptions (North America and Oceania and from sub-Saharan African countries in France, groups that are only more likely than non-migrants to see themselves as upwardly mobile, when they are downwardly mobile) can be found to these general themes.

credible explanations from rich ethnographic and theoretical work in favour of a atomising psychological explanation (Carling, 2002; de Haas, 2006; Pajo, 2008). Per Pajo (2008), many consciously select into migration-related downward mobility on the basis that destination places have a higher position in an abstract geographical hierarchy of places. Even a lower relative position in a higher status place may be accepted on the basis that 'territorial fulfilment' constitutes upward mobility ('socioglobal mobility') in its own right. Similarly, the *immigrant bargain* suggests that migrants' downward mobility may be willingly accepted (Alba & Foner, 2015). Here, however, acceptance of disadvantage is seen as a conscious trade - those moving from less prosperous places settling for lower socioeconomic status on the expectation that they can eventually regain lost ground under better macroeconomic conditions (Alba & Foner, 2015). While economic conditions may well be a major motivator for migrants, then, these results arguably suggest that instrumental motivations should not be decoupled from how the possibility, or promise, of migrating is framed (Pajo, 2008; de Haas, 2021). The choice to migrate is just as much a reflection of culturally embedded expectations - expectations both of what migration can provide in the form of economic gains and improved better life conditions (Groenwald et al., 2012) and expectations of what successful life course development *should* look like (de Haas, 2021; Veron, 2024) – as it is an economic decision (Carling, 2002). For this reason, cognitive dissonance alone, while convenient, provides an unsatisfactory account.

For this thesis, it is sufficient to say that emigration does not only appear to provide a subjective mobility premium but appears to serve as a buffer against perceptions of downward mobility in occupational terms. If we understand migration as an actualisation of social expectation, and an achievement in itself, it follows that migration may constitute a form of success and social mobility in itself - one that also moderates the importance of occupational mobility for individuals' self assessments. As tempting as a cognitive framework may be, whether gaps can truly be attributed to cognitive dissonance is a question for future researchers.

Moreover, though the results of this analysis are both novel and theoretically meaningful, more research is necessary to untangle the dynamics the mechanisms that underlie it. Most notably, there was significant variation in the association between objective and subjective trajectories for migrants and non-migrants. Analyses in section 1 revealed that the association between occupational mobility and subjective mobility differed systematically between migrants and non-migrants, suggesting that immigrants' subjective assessments of their trajectories may, under certain circumstances, be significantly less dependent on their objective socioeconomic mobility, all else equal. In section 3, results suggested that upward

educational mobility carries less value for migrants' subjective mobility than that of non-migrants'. Yet, mixed evidence overall regarding the mediating role of migration for the relationship between objective and subjective social mobility suggests that more research is necessary on this point.

Moreover, though the quantitative, data-driven approach taken here provides numerous benefits – notably in allowing a systematic analysis of group-level differences and in allowing us to consider the correlation between objective and subjective social mobility – it is important to note certain crucial limitations to the approach.

One such limitation comes in the use occupational scales as a means of measuring social mobility. Many immigrants do not experience traditional upward class mobility but remain in low-status professions long term (Benton et al., 2014). Yet, taking this to mean that migrants experience no social mobility may be to oversimplify their trajectories. Working-class jobs and trades, sectors where immigrants are overrepresented (Benton et al. 2014) are frequently placed near the bottom of theoretical hierarchies of social position. For convenience, occupation classification schemas group similar jobs together. This means that quantitative measures of status and class lack the nuance and granular detail required to capture within-profession mobility trajectories (Oesch & Vigna, 2023). For this reason, immigrants who move from professional roles into trades long-term were, in this analysis, framed as first downwardly mobile and then stagnant. Yet stagnation, individuals can experience significant career development and mobility as they establish themselves in a new profession without moving between occupational classes. However, any within-occupation trajectories are rendered largely imperceptible by traditional survey-based approaches to social mobility.

Addressing these issues in the context of migration demands an exploration of the dynamics surrounding the *concrete milieux* that make up the lives of immigrants. For this reason an expansion of this project may take a qualitative approach – examining how within occupation mobilty affects the relationship between objective and subjective trajectories. This is a fundamental question that remains at the end of this analysis, one that I hope to address in future research.

Furthermore, the use of cross-sectional data impedes our ability to draw concrete conclusions. A longitudinal approach would, in theory, better serve the purpose of this thesis. First, longitudinal data (if following the same individual in both pre- and post-migration contexts) would allow us to more explicitly address the issue of selection on dispositional traits.

As it stands, we have only an approximation. For the same reason, longitudinal data would allow for a causal estimate of the relationship between migration and subjective social mobility that the cross-sectional approach does not. This notwithstanding, the difficulty of surveying populations throughout their migration trajectories is not specific to this thesis, but rather a recurring theme in migration studies. As such, although this is a clear limitation it does not invalidate the results, nor is it within the scope of this project to solve (ref). Second, concerning the analysis of time since migration (section 1 part III.), insignificant results may well reflect collinearity in predictors. Assessing the effect of time with cross sectional data is risky. Age, time since migration and cohort are likely to be collinear - if not linearly dependent, meaning a longitudinal analysis would provide a far more reliable estimate. For this reason, although I take note of the insignificant result, this thesis leaves the question of time since migration open to future analyses, drawing no clear conclusions from this section. Third, although I attempt to implicitly address questions of selection into migration, the use of cross-sectional data for migration research creates a secondary selection problem – selection *out* of immigrant status. Although Caron (2020) shows that attrition of migrants from survey samples does not significantly bias estimates of occupational trajectories in France, we must consider the possibility that the gap in subjective social mobility between migrants and non-migrants (in France or elsewhere) owes to selection out of migration. It is perfectly plausible that those who migrate but do not see this as paying off (i.e. they still see themselves as less successful than their parents or see themselves as less successful due to conditions in the receiving country) would be more likely to either move to a third location or to return to place of origin.

Finally, the combination of surveys (ISSP & TeO2) provided a crucial empirical dimension of this thesis. To the extent that this was possible, I used an inferential approach to ensure that the measures used were commensurable. However, we have no absolute guarantee that estimates are unbiased. This notwithstanding, the fact that measures may be interpreted differently depending on cultural setting or slight differences in wording depending on translation is always a question in survey research. Future analyses can hope for more compatible measures across surveys, until then although the findings give no immediate reason for concern, remain significant and are consistent with the findings in the remainder of this thesis, these results may be interpreted with some care.

Nevertheless, the above project laid out a significant and pervasive gap both between how migrants' social mobility is framed by the literature and migrants' own perceptions, as well as between the tools used to measure migrants' social mobility and migrants' subjective

social mobility. The findings show that individuals do not conceive of their mobility exclusively in the terms used by academics (Duru-Bellat & Kiefer, 2008) and that migrants' perceptions of social mobility is less dependent on their objective trajectories (Alba & Foner, 2015). This reaffirmed the notion that migration and social mobility, as it is understood by migrants themselves are tightly interwoven (Pajo, 2008). Although mechanisms remain to be explored, the overarching conclusion is clear: approaching migrants' decisions to migrate, or their success post-migration in pure economic-occupational terms, then, is to leave a significant part of the equation on the table.

Characters: 236,359

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Graphical appendices:

a) Relative ISEI - Socioeconomic mobility distribution (Effective sample, ISSP 2019, weighted)



b) Replacing current ISEI with respondents highest recorded ISEI (Before or after migration)



c) Logistic regression models TeO2 replication of model 17 (model 17.1). Coefficients represent odds ratio of reporting migration intentions among French non-migrant population.

	(17.1) TeO2 Replication - selection
more.successful	1.577
	(0.450)
relative.ISEI	0.970**
	(0.011)
ISEI.m	1.043***
	(0.013)
sss.m	0.940
	(0.094)
Unemployedretired	2.575+
	(1.267)
UnemployedUnemployed / inactive / never worked	0.759
	(0.220)
Age.m	0.952***
	(0.008)
educsecondary	1.422
	(0.664)
eductertiary or above	1.558
	(1.017)
female1	0.698+
	(0.144)
MarriedMarried/PACS (French Spouse)	0.371***
	(0.063)
MarriedMarried/PACS (non French Spouse)	2.815
	(2.371)
MarriedWidowed / Divorced	1.037
	(0.504)
Num.Obs.	2111
R2	0.154
R2 Adj.	0.110
R2 Within	0.129
R2 Within Adj.	0.105
BIC	1129.0
Std.Errors	by: region.rural
Demographic controls (eg. Age, Profession, Sex, Marriage Status, Income)	✓
Fixed Effects (Region/rural)	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

d) LITS selection, replication of model 16 – intended migrants to France only – all countries and Maghreb only

	(16.1) Destination France	(16.2) Maghreb - Destination France
More Successful (SSM)	0.998	0.677+
	(0.206)	(0.148)
Downwardly Mobile <= -2	1.118	1.713
	(0.490)	(0.876)
Downwardly Mobile = 1	0.437	0.000
	(0.261)	(0.000)
Upwardly Mobile = 1	1.196	1.151
	(0.356)	(0.433)
Upwardly Mobile >= 2	1.300	1.514
	(0.361)	(0.522)
Primary Education (or below)	0.590	0.814
	(0.202)	(0.310)
Tertiary Education (or Above)	1.565+	1.542
	(0.376)	(0.433)
Remittances	2.326**	3.974***
	(0.705)	(1.618)
Emmigrant from Household	1.883+	2.326+
	(0.708)	(1.150)
Return Emmigrant from Household	1.716	0.747
	(0.694)	(0.455)
Num.Obs.	30802	2384
R2		0.134
R2 Adj.		0.086
R2 Marg.	0.265	
BIC	1449.7	918.1
Std.Errors		IID
Demographic controls (eg. Age, Profession, Sex, Marriage Status, Income)		✓
Dispositional predictors (Life satisfaction & Risk taking)		
Random intercepts (Country)	✓	
Random slopes (More successful)	✓	

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

e) LITS IV, replication of model 18-20 – RCSE and fixed effects at survey country level

	18: Survey Country FE	19: Survey Country FE + Interaction	20: Survey Country FE + GDP
Emigrant	1.188***	1.169**	1.175*
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.087)
Downwardly Mobile <= -2	0.922	0.887**	0.883**
	(0.059)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Downwardly Mobile = 1	0.917*	0.910**	0.930*
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Upwardly Mobile = 1	1.078+	1.095**	1.120***
	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Upwardly Mobile >= 2	1.134*	1.208***	1.219***
	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.039)
Primary Education (or below)	0.867	1.058	1.087
	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Tertiary Education (or Above)	1.113**	1.006	0.969
	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Emigrant * Downwardly Mobile <= -2		0.806	0.717+
		(0.132)	(0.136)
Emigrant * Downwardly Mobile = 1		0.903	0.801
		(0.177)	(0.187)
Emigrant * Upwardly Mobile = 1		1.071	1.091
		(0.083)	(0.100)
Emigrant * Upwardly Mobile >= 2		0.868*	0.868
		(0.054)	(0.079)
Household Income (log)		1.001***	1.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP change (SD)			1.119*
			(0.049)
Num.Obs.	24547	24547	24547
R2	0.004	0.027	0.044
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.024	0.042
BIC	41997.9	41512.5	40863.7
FE: Country		X	X
Fixed Effects: Survey Country	X	X	X
RCSE: Survey Country	X	X	X
Demographic controls (eg. Age, Profession, Sex, Marriage Status)		X	X
Subjective life conditions (Life satisfaction & subjective social status)			X

Methodological Appendices*:*

a) Cross-survey comparability

The comparability of measures is a common problem in survey research (Obserski, 2012; Davidov et al., 2014). Often, researchers may have access to multiple samples surveyed using different measures to assess the same construct or can't know that the same measure is commensurable in different contexts. Such data cannot typically be directly compared. This is particularly a problem in migration research wherein ideal comparison groups include both destination country and origin country. On the one hand cross-national surveys address this problem. In the above text, for instance, I use LITS IV for this exact purpose. However, since immigration is not the focus of most cross-national surveys, and sampling is random, the extent to which researchers can pinpoint specific immigrant populations, make explicit comparisons or work in detail with data on immigrants is restricted. Often samples are small and non-representative. National surveys, developed for the expressed purpose of studying migration (TeO2 for example) address this problem by intentional oversampling of specific populations (Beauchemin et al., 2023). Yet since these are intra-national, analyses are typically restricted to comparisons between immigrant populations and the population in the receiving country.

For this memoire, TeO2 provided the key population of interest. However, international comparison is necessary for one to reach any clear conclusions from the findings. As such, I supplement TeO2 with ISSP and LITS. In the below I estimate where we can safely assume there is no bias in responses that render surveys incommensurable. In this way I try to overcome the comparison problem by modelling the extent to which differing questions for the same construct are comparable across surveys. The results indicate TeO2 and ISSP are directly comparable, but that LITS does not provide a comparable estimate.

a. TeO2 & ISSP

To estimate the difference between surveys I start by comparing TeO2 with ISSP. I start from the knowledge that both surveys cover France at roughly the same time. TeO2 was fielded between 2020 and 2021, while the ISSP 2019 fieldwork was run in France at the start of 2021.

In the text (figure 1) I display correlations between these two variables, showing predictions based models trained and fitted on either dataset. Regardless of the training and fitting data, predictions are highly correlated ($r > 0.75$). To reaffirm that these variables are in

fact commensurable, I include regression tables below from model fitted on pooled data for non-migrants ISSP respondents and non-migrant TeO2 respondents in France. In sum, none of these models suggest any significant difference between the surveys that are not accounted for by demographic variables or by our primary social mobility variable. All the below are constructed using the following specification in which y takes value 1 for those who respond that they are more successful than their parents:

$$logit\big(P(Y_i = 1)\big) = \beta 0 + \beta 1\, ISSP_i + \beta 2\, RelativeISEI_i + \beta 3 \left(ISSP_i * RelativeISEI_i^{(m)}\right) + \beta 4\, Controls + \varepsilon_i$$

Regardless of controls included, the model does not suggest significant variance between French respondents to the TeO2 question and respondents to the ISSP question. Moreover, it does not suggest that either variable is any more or less associated with out key dependent variable (Relative ISEI). For this reason, I will treat these variables as comparable in the main text. Table II below describes the sample used for these models:

I. Logistic regression output: Comparing French (Non-migrant) TeO2 respondents to equivalent ISSP respondents

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	-1.02 ***	-2.06 ***	-2.09 ***
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)
sourceISSP	0.03	0.07	0.06
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
female	0.05	0.13 *	0.13 *
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
marriedMarried	0.62 ***	0.54 ***	0.54 ***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	0.09	0.07	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
age.m	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
age.m2	0.00 ***	0.00 *	0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
educprimary or below	-0.11	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
eductertiary or above	0.31 ***	0.32 ***	0.31 ***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
unemployedinactive	-0.20	-0.15	-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
unemployedretired	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	-0.46 ***	-0.33 **	-0.33 **
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
sss		0.17 ***	0.17 ***
		(0.02)	(0.02)
relative.ISEI		0.04 ***	0.04 ***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI.m		-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
sourceISSP:relative.ISEI			0.00
			(0.01)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m			0.00 **
			(0.00)
Num. obs.	6076	5944	5944
Deviance	7885.44	7262.12	7254.14
Log Likelihood	-3668.71	-3383.61	-3380.73
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.16	0.16

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

I. TeO2 & ISSP (Non-Migrant) French Sample

	level	TeO2	ISSP
n		5290	786
more.successful (%)	0	3193 (60.4)	371 (47.2)
	1	2097 (39.6)	415 (52.8)
source (%)	TeO2	5290 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
	ISSP	0 (0.0)	786 (100.0)
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		2.55 (17.94)	9.65 (19.12)
female (%)	0	2598 (49.1)	377 (48.0)
	1	2692 (50.9)	409 (52.0)
married (%)	Single	2016 (38.1)	46 (5.9)
	Married	2872 (54.3)	621 (79.0)
	Widowed / Divorced	402 (7.6)	119 (15.1)
sss (median [IQR])		5.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]
educ (%)	secondary	2385 (45.1)	344 (43.8)
	primary or below	339 (6.4)	39 (5.0)
	tertiary or above	2566 (48.5)	403 (51.3)
unemployed (%)	employed	4638 (87.7)	417 (53.1)
	inactive	125 (2.4)	21 (2.7)
	retired	132 (2.5)	329 (41.9)
	unemployed / never worked	395 (7.5)	19 (2.4)

a.. ISSP/LITS

Following the same approach, I conclude that any direct comparison between our other sources (TeO and ISSP) and LITS is not possible. The underlying distribution of responses to the equivalent variable are incompatible. Under the same modelling conditions as the above I compare ISSP and LITS below - on the basis that these share multiple countries, surveyed in the same two year period (Russia, Czechia, Croatia and Bulgaria). These models show systematic bias toward positive responses on the equivalent LITS SSM measure - a bias I suggest is likely to arise from different question wording. Since LITS and ISSP lack comparable social mobility measures these models are reduced to comparing with only sociodemographic controls:

$$logit\big(P(Y_i = 1)\big) = \beta 0^{\square} + \beta 1^{\square} LITS_i^{\square} + \beta 2^{\square} Country_i + \beta 3^{\square}\big(LITS_i^{\square} * Country_i\big) + \beta 4^{\square} Controls_i + \varepsilon_i$$

I also fit a model with country level fixed effects to get an overall estimate of survey bias:

$$logit\big(P(Y_{ic} = 1)\big) = \beta 0^{\square} + \beta 1^{\square} LITS_i^{\square} + \beta 4^{\square} Controls_i + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_i$$

In sum, LITS respondents with the same sociodemographic features, in the same period and in the same country, are, all else equal, significantly likely to report upward mobility. This means a direct cross-survey comparison in this context is out of the question. Rather, LITS must be used as its own distinct data source. A summary of the sample used for the above models is included as table IV below.

II. Logistic regression output: LITS respondents and equivalent ISSP respondents in survey Country.

	GLM	Fixed Effects GLM
(Intercept)	0.05	
	(0.03)	
COUNTRYCRO	0.17 ***	
	(0.03)	
COUNTRYCZE	0.24 ***	
	(0.02)	
COUNTRYRUS	-0.05 *	
	(0.02)	
sourceLITS	0.26 ***	0.26 *
	(0.02)	(0.05)
age	0.00 ***	0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)
age.m2	0.00 **	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
female	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)
unemployedinactive	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)
unemployedretired	-0.05 *	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)
unemployedstudent	-0.16 ***	-0.15
	(0.05)	(0.05)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	-0.10 ***	-0.11
	(0.02)	(0.04)
educprimary or below	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)
eductertiary or above	0.09 ***	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)
marriedSingle	-0.11 ***	-0.11
	(0.02)	(0.04)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	-0.12 ***	-0.11 **
	(0.02)	(0.01)
COUNTRYCRO:sourceLITS	-0.05	
	(0.04)	
COUNTRYCZE:sourceLITS	-0.05	
	(0.03)	
COUNTRYRUS:sourceLITS	0.21 ***	
	(0.03)	
AIC	9176.12	
BIC	9311.99	
Log Likelihood	-4568.06	-4609.18
Deviance	1377.97	1394.85
Num. obs.	6589	6589
Num. groups: COUNTRY		4
Pseudo R^2		0.06

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

III. LITS IV & ISSP 2019 Sample - shared countries

	level	ISSP	LITS
n		5000	9102
more.successful (%)	0	3552 (71.0)	4546 (49.9)
	1	1448 (29.0)	4556 (50.1)
COUNTRY (%)	BUL	1141 (22.8)	1008 (24.7)
	CRO	780 (15.6)	1006 (24.6)
	CZE	1677 (33.5)	1055 (25.8)
	RUS	1402 (28.0)	1017 (24.9)
age (mean (SD))		49.38 (16.95)	51.60 (17.44)
age.m2 (mean (SD))		289.47 (296.69)	304.75 (311.58)
female (%)	0	2271 (45.4)	3896 (42.8)
	1	2729 (54.6)	5206 (57.2)
unemployed (%)	employed	2933 (60.1)	4971 (54.6)
	inactive	259 (5.3)	0 (0.0)
	retired	1230 (25.2)	2729 (30.0)
	student	177 (3.6)	282 (3.1)
	unemployed / never worked	280 (5.7)	1120 (12.3)
educ (%)	secondary	3097 (62.1)	6409 (97.5)
	primary or below	43 (0.9)	162 (2.5)
	tertiary or above	1848 (37.0)	0 (0.0)
married (%)	Married	3145 (82.2)	4031 (44.6)
	Single	581 (15.2)	2222 (24.6)
	Widowed / Divorced	98 (2.6)	2788 (30.8)

Supplemental Materials

a) Sample summary statistics – TeO2 Effective sample (mod els 1:4)

Table 1: Sample Characteristics by Migration Status

	level	Overall
n		10751
more.successful (%)	0	5195 (48.3)
	1	5556 (51.7)
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		1.61 (18.72)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		41.33 (16.77)
age (mean (SD))		43.20 (10.14)
sss (median [IQR])		5.00 [5.00, 6.00]
Household.econ (%)	The same	3621 (33.7)
	Better	3402 (31.6)
	Worse	3728 (34.7)
female (%)	0	5326 (49.5)
	1	5425 (50.5)
married (%)	Single	3336 (31.0)
	Married	6459 (60.1)
	Widowed / Divorced	956 (8.9)
discrim.group (%)	0	9206 (85.6)
	1	1545 (14.4)
educ2 (%)	secondary	4570 (42.5)
	primary or below	1933 (18.0)
	tertiary or above	4248 (39.5)
unemployed (%)	employed	8858 (82.4)
	inactive	540 (5.0)
	retired	336 (3.1)
	unemployed / never worked	1017 (9.5)
parent.france (%)	1	6303 (58.6)
	0	4448 (41.4)

b) Sample summary statistics – Key dependent and independent variables (TeO2 Effective sample, models 4.2, 4.3, 10.1, 10.2 & 11)

	level	France - Mainland	Africa (Sahel)	Africa, sub-Sahara	Americas & Oceania	Asia (Other)	Asia (South East)	DOM/TOM	EU27	Europe (Other)	Maghreb	Turkey & Middle East
n		4670	417	719	129	380	594	482	1061	306	1436	557
more.successful (%)	0	2804 (60.0)	186 (44.6)	311 (43.3)	65 (50.4)	127 (33.4)	211 (35.5)	215 (44.6)	388 (36.6)	150 (49.0)	548 (38.2)	190 (34.1)
	1	1866 (40.0)	231 (55.4)	408 (56.7)	64 (49.6)	253 (66.6)	383 (64.5)	267 (55.4)	673 (63.4)	156 (51.0)	888 (61.8)	367 (65.9)
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		2.77 (17.67)	-4.45 (21.44)	-8.40 (21.99)	-4.07 (19.52)	3.45 (18.23)	3.22 (20.68)	5.39 (18.31)	4.78 (17.29)	-2.50 (19.90)	0.67 (18.79)	3.17 (14.24)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		44.48 (16.63)	37.27 (17.13)	35.53 (15.99)	38.28 (16.64)	44.10 (15.40)	45.12 (16.51)	42.51 (16.50)	39.10 (17.17)	41.08 (16.96)	36.31 (15.63)	36.59 (14.15)
age (mean (SD))		41.53 (10.47)	41.86 (9.67)	42.38 (9.78)	43.59 (10.27)	42.22 (9.62)	47.11 (7.88)	42.24 (10.66)	47.42 (9.76)	42.66 (10.75)	44.97 (8.98)	44.23 (8.98)
sss (median [IQR])		5.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	5.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	5.00 [5.00, 7.00]
Household.econ (%)	The same	1719 (36.8)	129 (30.9)	172 (23.9)	46 (35.7)	141 (37.1)	195 (32.8)	171 (35.5)	375 (35.3)	103 (33.7)	395 (27.5)	175 (31.4)
	Better	1567 (33.6)	81 (19.4)	162 (22.5)	26 (20.2)	133 (35.0)	277 (46.6)	158 (32.8)	403 (38.0)	76 (24.8)	379 (26.4)	140 (25.1)
	Worse	1384 (29.6)	207 (49.6)	385 (53.5)	57 (44.2)	106 (27.9)	122 (20.5)	153 (31.7)	283 (26.7)	127 (41.5)	662 (46.1)	242 (43.4)
female (%)	0	2286 (49.0)	243 (58.3)	326 (45.3)	45 (34.9)	158 (41.6)	268 (45.1)	220 (45.6)	496 (46.7)	147 (48.0)	807 (56.2)	330 (59.2)
	1	2384 (51.0)	174 (41.7)	393 (54.7)	84 (65.1)	222 (58.4)	326 (54.9)	262 (54.4)	565 (53.3)	159 (52.0)	629 (43.8)	227 (40.8)
married (%)	Single	1805 (38.7)	130 (31.2)	277 (38.5)	43 (33.3)	75 (19.7)	124 (20.9)	261 (54.1)	279 (26.3)	80 (26.1)	196 (13.6)	66 (11.8)
	Married	2527 (54.1)	240 (57.6)	374 (52.0)	71 (55.0)	280 (73.7)	420 (70.7)	190 (39.4)	638 (60.1)	202 (66.0)	1067 (74.3)	450 (80.8)
	Widowed / Divorced	338 (7.2)	47 (11.3)	68 (9.5)	15 (11.6)	25 (6.6)	50 (8.4)	31 (6.4)	144 (13.6)	24 (7.8)	173 (12.0)	41 (7.4)
discrim.group (%)	0	4392 (94.0)	287 (68.8)	458 (63.7)	109 (84.5)	296 (77.9)	521 (87.7)	347 (72.0)	976 (92.0)	289 (94.4)	1089 (75.8)	442 (79.4)
	1	278 (6.0)	130 (31.2)	261 (36.3)	20 (15.5)	84 (22.1)	73 (12.3)	135 (28.0)	85 (8.0)	17 (5.6)	347 (24.2)	115 (20.6)
educ2 (%)	secondary	2192 (46.9)	125 (30.0)	269 (37.4)	53 (41.1)	107 (28.2)	212 (35.7)	231 (47.9)	470 (44.3)	131 (42.8)	565 (39.3)	215 (38.6)
	primary or below	311 (6.7)	143 (34.3)	171 (23.8)	29 (22.5)	103 (27.1)	119 (20.0)	59 (12.2)	290 (27.3)	35 (11.4)	432 (30.1)	241 (43.3)
	tertiary or above	2167 (46.4)	149 (35.7)	279 (38.8)	47 (36.4)	170 (44.7)	263 (44.3)	192 (39.8)	301 (28.4)	140 (45.8)	439 (30.6)	101 (18.1)
unemployed (%)	employed	4101 (87.8)	341 (81.8)	575 (80.0)	103 (79.8)	299 (78.7)	497 (83.7)	411 (85.3)	893 (84.2)	224 (73.2)	1028 (71.6)	386 (69.3)
	inactive	113 (2.4)	12 (2.9)	29 (4.0)	6 (4.7)	40 (10.5)	30 (5.1)	18 (3.7)	47 (4.4)	20 (6.5)	156 (10.9)	69 (12.4)
	retired	116 (2.5)	22 (5.3)	40 (5.6)	5 (3.9)	10 (2.6)	22 (3.7)	15 (3.1)	16 (1.5)	11 (3.6)	58 (4.0)	21 (3.8)
	unemployed / never worked	340 (7.3)	42 (10.1)	75 (10.4)	15 (11.6)	31 (8.2)	45 (7.6)	38 (7.9)	105 (9.9)	51 (16.7)	194 (13.5)	81 (14.5)
parent.france (%)	1	3967 (84.9)	91 (21.8)	204 (28.4)	38 (29.5)	135 (35.5)	329 (55.4)	213 (44.2)	380 (35.8)	102 (33.3)	602 (41.9)	242 (43.4)
	0	703 (15.1)	326 (78.2)	515 (71.6)	91 (70.5)	245 (64.5)	265 (44.6)	269 (55.8)	681 (64.2)	204 (66.7)	834 (58.1)	315 (56.6)

c) Models 4.1 & 4.2 – Fixed effects Logistic and modified Poisson regression models by Region of origin - Estimated effect of independent variables on subjective upward mobility (expressed in odds ratio and prevalence ratio respectively) weighted estimates from TeO2, RCSE at the level of region, divided by rural/non-rural residents.

	(4.1) Logistic	(4.2) Modified Poisson
n.origin.smplAfrica (Sahel)	3.61 ***	1.83 ***
	(0.24)	(0.08)
n.origin.smplAfrica, sub-Sahara	2.62 ***	1.62 ***
	(0.14)	(0.06)
n.origin.smplAmericas & Oceania	1.48	1.30
	(0.47)	(0.22)
n.origin.smplAsia (Other)	3.11 ***	1.64 ***
	(0.25)	(0.07)
n.origin.smplAsia (South East)	2.56 ***	1.50 ***
	(0.16)	(0.06)
n.origin.smplDOM/TOM	2.75 ***	1.59 ***
	(0.15)	(0.07)
n.origin.smplEU27	2.80 ***	1.51 ***
	(0.15)	(0.06)
n.origin.smplEurope (Other)	3.93 ***	1.74 ***
	(0.27)	(0.10)
n.origin.smplMaghreb	3.46 ***	1.68 ***
	(0.13)	(0.06)
n.origin.smplTurkey & Middle East	3.34 ***	1.76 ***
	(0.19)	(0.08)
relative.ISEI	1.04 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
ISEI.m	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
female	1.09	1.04
	(0.08)	(0.04)
marriedMarried	1.73 ***	1.29 ***
	(0.11)	(0.05)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	1.17	1.13
	(0.18)	(0.08)
discrim.group	1.15	1.05
	(0.17)	(0.07)
age.m	1.01 **	1.01 *
	(0.01)	(0.00)
age.m2	1.00 *	1.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)
educ2primary or below	1.07	1.03
	(0.11)	(0.05)
educ2tertiary or above	1.38 **	1.15 ***
	(0.11)	(0.04)
unemployedinactive	0.92	1.00
	(0.20)	(0.08)
unemployedretired	0.77	0.89
	(0.25)	(0.12)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	0.75	0.88
	(0.24)	(0.12)
Household.econBetter	4.34 ***	1.86 ***
	(0.09)	(0.05)
Household.econWorse	0.48 ***	0.61 ***
	(0.11)	(0.07)
parent.france0	1.07	1.03
	(0.11)	(0.04)
n.origin.smplAfrica (Sahel):relative.ISEI	0.98 *	0.99 **
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplAfrica, sub-Sahara:relative.ISEI	0.97 **	0.99 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplAmericas & Oceania:relative.ISEI	0.96	0.98 *
	(0.02)	(0.01)
n.origin.smplAsia (Other):relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplAsia (South East):relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99 **
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplDOM/TOM:relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99 *
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplEU27:relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplEurope (Other):relative.ISEI	1.00	0.99 *
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplMaghreb:relative.ISEI	0.98 *	0.99 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
n.origin.smplTurkey & Middle East:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. obs.	11100	11100
Num. groups: region.rural	26	26
Deviance	13893.23	7552.78
Log Likelihood	-6259.61	-9185.27
Pseudo R^2	0.29	0.09

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

d) Sample descriptive statistics – by reason for migrating (TeO2 Effective sample, models 4.3 & 4.4)

	level	Non-migrant	Childrens future	Fleeing poverty	Join family member	Political instability	Profession	Studies
n		4670	306	228	1523	534	923	702
more.successful (%)	0	2804 (60.0)	94 (30.7)	63 (27.6)	590 (38.7)	202 (37.8)	325 (35.2)	321 (45.7)
	1	1866 (40.0)	212 (69.3)	165 (72.4)	933 (61.3)	332 (62.2)	598 (64.8)	381 (54.3)
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		2.77 (17.67)	-6.92 (19.24)	-4.32 (16.69)	-4.79 (18.47)	-8.08 (18.97)	-1.99 (18.05)	3.08 (21.73)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		44.48 (16.63)	31.65 (14.08)	29.31 (11.18)	33.89 (14.68)	33.87 (14.31)	34.55 (15.06)	50.07 (18.57)
age (mean (SD))		41.53 (10.47)	46.26 (8.00)	46.50 (8.46)	44.91 (8.92)	47.16 (8.65)	45.63 (8.71)	42.71 (9.72)
Household.econ (%)	The same	1719 (36.8)	74 (24.2)	81 (35.5)	447 (29.3)	143 (26.8)	303 (32.8)	212 (30.2)
	Better	1567 (33.6)	82 (26.8)	86 (37.7)	384 (25.2)	112 (21.0)	289 (31.3)	186 (26.5)
	Worse	1384 (29.6)	150 (49.0)	61 (26.8)	692 (45.4)	279 (52.2)	331 (35.9)	304 (43.3)
female (%)	0	2286 (49.0)	160 (52.3)	149 (65.4)	568 (37.3)	312 (58.4)	615 (66.6)	384 (54.7)
	1	2384 (51.0)	146 (47.7)	79 (34.6)	955 (62.7)	222 (41.6)	308 (33.4)	318 (45.3)
married (%)	Single	1805 (38.7)	38 (12.4)	46 (20.2)	192 (12.6)	115 (21.5)	210 (22.8)	191 (27.2)
	Married	2527 (54.1)	235 (76.8)	156 (68.4)	1141 (74.9)	369 (69.1)	609 (66.0)	451 (64.2)
	Widowed / Divorced	338 (7.2)	33 (10.8)	26 (11.4)	190 (12.5)	50 (9.4)	104 (11.3)	60 (8.5)
discrim.group (%)	0	4392 (94.0)	240 (78.4)	174 (76.3)	1265 (83.1)	424 (79.4)	735 (79.6)	474 (67.5)
	1	278 (6.0)	66 (21.6)	54 (23.7)	258 (16.9)	110 (20.6)	188 (20.4)	228 (32.5)
educ2 (%)	secondary	2192 (46.9)	109 (35.6)	63 (27.6)	544 (35.7)	207 (38.8)	307 (33.3)	125 (17.8)
	primary or below	311 (6.7)	137 (44.8)	144 (63.2)	595 (39.1)	209 (39.1)	420 (45.5)	25 (3.6)
	tertiary or above	2167 (46.4)	60 (19.6)	21 (9.2)	384 (25.2)	118 (22.1)	196 (21.2)	552 (78.6)
unemployed (%)	employed	4101 (87.8)	224 (73.2)	171 (75.0)	1082 (71.0)	385 (72.1)	749 (81.1)	605 (86.2)
	inactive	113 (2.4)	29 (9.5)	10 (4.4)	205 (13.5)	32 (6.0)	33 (3.6)	23 (3.3)
	retired	116 (2.5)	18 (5.9)	13 (5.7)	62 (4.1)	27 (5.1)	41 (4.4)	21 (3.0)
	unemployed / never worked	340 (7.3)	35 (11.4)	34 (14.9)	174 (11.4)	90 (16.9)	100 (10.8)	53 (7.5)
parent.france (%)	1	3967 (84.9)	47 (15.4)	30 (13.2)	335 (22.0)	106 (19.9)	147 (15.9)	145 (20.7)
	0	703 (15.1)	259 (84.6)	198 (86.8)	1188 (78.0)	428 (80.1)	776 (84.1)	557 (79.3)

e) Models 4.3 & 4.4 – Fixed effects Logistic and modified Poisson regression models by Region of origin - Estimated effect of independent variables on subjective upward mobility (expressed in odds ratio and prevalence ratio respectively) weighted estimates from TeO2, RCSE at the level of region, divided by rural/non-rural residents.

	(4.3) Logistic	(4.4) Modified Poisson		(4.3) Logistic	(4.4) Modified Poisson
reasonChildrens future	3.91 ***	1.74 ***	unemployedinactive	0.83	0.92
	(0.26)	(0.10)		(0.21)	(0.10)
reasonFleeing poverty	4.69 ***	1.80 ***	unemployedretired	0.84	0.91
	(0.17)	(0.07)		(0.25)	(0.14)
reasonJoin family member	2.63 ***	1.58 ***	unemployedunemployed / never worked	0.64	0.78
	(0.11)	(0.06)		(0.24)	(0.14)
reasonPolitical instability	2.97 ***	1.66 ***	parent.france0	1.05	1.02
	(0.11)	(0.05)		(0.10)	(0.05)
reasonProfession	2.97 ***	1.62 ***	sss.m	1.14 ***	1.07 ***
	(0.15)	(0.07)		(0.03)	(0.02)
reasonStudies	2.28 ***	1.54 ***	reasonChildrens future:relative.ISEI	1.00	0.99 **
	(0.10)	(0.05)		(0.01)	(0.00)
relative.ISEI	1.04 ***	1.02 ***	reasonFleeing poverty:relative.ISEI	1.00	0.99 **
	(0.01)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.00)
ISEI.m	0.97 ***	0.99 ***	reasonJoin family member:relative.ISEI	0.99 *	0.99 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.00)
female	1.16	1.07	reasonPolitical instability:relative.ISEI	0.98 **	0.99 ***
	(0.08)	(0.04)		(0.01)	(0.00)
marriedMarried	1.77 ***	1.36 ***	reasonProfession:relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99 ***
	(0.11)	(0.06)		(0.00)	(0.00)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	1.02	1.06	reasonStudies:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.18)	(0.10)		(0.01)	(0.00)
discrim.group	1.08	1.05	relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	1.00 *	1.00
	(0.21)	(0.10)		(0.00)	(0.00)
age.m	1.02 ***	1.01 **			
	(0.01)	(0.00)	Num. obs.	8886	8886
age.m2	1.00 **	1.00 *	Num. groups: region.rural	26	26
	(0.00)	(0.00)	Deviance	13668.23	7368.59
educ2primary or below	1.04	1.02	Log Likelihood	-6252.18	-8386.44
	(0.16)	(0.07)	Pseudo R^2	0.19	0.05
educ2tertiary or above	1.38 **	1.18 **			
	(0.10)	(0.05)	*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05		

f) Models 5-9 - Logistic regression models (expressed in odds ratio) estimated effect of time since migration for downwardly mobile on odds of reporting subjective upward mobility.

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(Intercept)	1.73 ***	1.12	0.99	0.08 ***	0.08 ***
	(0.05)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.49)	(0.47)
Years.since.Migration	1.00	1.01	1.00	0.99	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	
discrim.group		1.61	1.78	2.32 *	2.27 *
		(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.34)
female		0.98	1.05	0.82	0.85
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)
age.m		1.03	1.04 *	1.04 *	1.04 *
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI.m			0.98 *	0.97 ***	0.97 ***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
relative.ISEI			1.01	1.01	1.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
sss				1.72 ***	1.71 ***
				(0.08)	(0.08)
since.mig.categ10-20 Years					0.81
					(0.31)
since.mig.categ20-30 Years					0.93
					(0.41)
since.mig.categ> 30 Years					0.51
					(0.49)
Num. obs.	370	370	370	370	370
Deviance	85.25	477.10	471.96	412.49	410.63
Log Likelihood	-339.84	-227.56	-226.05	-194.44	-193.42
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.17	0.17

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

g) Models 5-9 – Sample summary statistics (downwardly mobile, no regained socioeconomic status following migration.

	level	Overall
n		385
more.successful (%)	0	119 (32.2)
	1	251 (67.8)
Years.since.Migration (median [IQR])		18.00 [13.00, 27.00]
since.mig.categ (%)	0-10 Years	69 (17.9)
	10-20 Years	170 (44.2)
	20-30 Years	100 (26.0)
	> 30 Years	46 (11.9)
female (%)	0	260 (67.5)
	1	125 (32.5)
discrim.group (%)	0	303 (78.7)
	1	82 (21.3)
female (%)	0	260 (67.5)
	1	125 (32.5)
age (mean (SD))		47.65 (7.96)
sss (median [IQR])		5.00 [5.00, 6.00]
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		-2.98 (16.46)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		33.69 (14.71)

h) ISSP sample statistics by country key dependent and independent variables (Effective sample models 10.1, 10.2, 11)

ISSP sample

	level	AUS	AUT	CHE	CHL	CRO	CZE	DEN	DEU	FIN	FRA	ISL	ISR	ITA	JAP	LTI	NOR	NZL	PHI	RUS	SLV	SUR	SWE	THA	TWN	USA	VEN
n		336	764	1028	294	465	1164	498	687	417	786	772	241	622	821	649	601	402	2793	892	649	265	802	770	1118	973	311
more.successful (%)	0	173 (51.5)	342 (44.8)	460 (44.7)	168 (57.1)	306 (65.8)	645 (55.4)	230 (46.2)	327 (47.6)	180 (43.2)	371 (47.2)	385 (49.9)	133 (55.2)	410 (65.9)	579 (70.5)	410 (63.2)	269 (44.8)	226 (56.2)	1860 (66.6)	742 (83.2)	310 (47.8)	152 (57.4)	413 (51.5)	551 (71.6)	467 (41.8)	566 (58.2)	244 (78.5)
	1	163 (48.5)	422 (55.2)	568 (55.3)	126 (42.9)	159 (34.2)	519 (44.6)	268 (53.8)	360 (52.4)	237 (56.8)	415 (52.8)	387 (50.1)	108 (44.8)	212 (34.1)	242 (29.5)	239 (36.8)	332 (55.2)	176 (43.8)	933 (33.4)	150 (16.8)	339 (52.2)	113 (42.6)	389 (48.5)	219 (28.4)	651 (58.2)	407 (41.8)	67 (21.5)
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		7.75 (19.32)	8.42 (15.50)	8.74 (19.99)	5.94 (17.64)	6.54 (15.72)	6.77 (15.55)	13.00 (21.80)	7.52 (17.00)	11.18 (18.36)	9.65 (19.12)	11.18 (17.24)	8.52 (20.35)	8.52 (17.47)	4.88 (17.95)	7.03 (18.95)	11.96 (17.25)	9.36 (19.39)	6.35 (14.92)	3.79 (19.42)	9.70 (17.45)	7.99 (17.83)	9.63 (17.74)	8.48 (14.74)	8.46 (15.33)	5.43 (19.03)	4.09 (18.71)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		50.35 (16.84)	42.81 (14.97)	51.24 (16.27)	37.01 (16.41)	41.77 (15.11)	42.09 (15.57)	49.46 (18.71)	48.30 (14.70)	46.65 (17.37)	50.90 (15.84)	50.15 (16.09)	53.34 (15.56)	44.23 (16.69)	41.35 (15.62)	41.91 (17.11)	51.86 (15.75)	49.79 (16.97)	31.22 (13.52)	42.91 (16.20)	44.25 (16.57)	42.37 (16.26)	49.93 (16.04)	26.88 (14.02)	37.53 (15.10)	49.05 (16.19)	38.39 (17.20)
age (mean (SD))		60.28 (13.30)	60.11 (14.26)	56.43 (13.95)	54.84 (14.58)	49.40 (13.80)	55.79 (14.90)	56.11 (12.98)	57.87 (14.56)	56.28 (12.25)	57.18 (13.27)	55.65 (14.98)	41.90 (10.87)	57.75 (13.67)	58.41 (14.92)	54.84 (14.37)	58.34 (12.20)	61.54 (16.55)	49.28 (14.55)	50.91 (15.19)	55.39 (15.56)	49.97 (13.52)	58.97 (13.55)	48.89 (11.54)	55.26 (14.73)	57.92 (15.60)	48.37 (12.93)
female (%)	0	167 (49.7)	368 (48.2)	546 (53.1)	120 (40.8)	194 (41.7)	545 (46.8)	251 (50.4)	337 (49.1)	185 (44.4)	377 (48.0)	391 (50.6)	113 (46.9)	346 (55.6)	393 (47.9)	238 (36.7)	262 (43.6)	186 (46.3)	1446 (51.8)	383 (42.9)	295 (45.5)	130 (49.1)	401 (50.0)	330 (42.9)	564 (50.4)	436 (44.8)	166 (53.4)
	1	169 (50.3)	396 (51.8)	482 (46.9)	174 (59.2)	271 (58.3)	619 (53.2)	247 (49.6)	350 (50.9)	232 (55.6)	409 (52.0)	381 (49.4)	128 (53.1)	276 (44.4)	428 (52.1)	411 (63.3)	339 (56.4)	216 (53.7)	1347 (48.2)	509 (57.1)	354 (54.5)	135 (50.9)	401 (50.0)	440 (57.1)	554 (49.6)	537 (55.2)	145 (46.6)
sss (median [IQR])		6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [3.00, 5.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	7.00 [6.00, 8.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	7.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	7.00 [6.00, 8.00]	5.00 [3.00, 5.00]	5.00 [3.00, 5.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]	6.00 [4.00, 7.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [4.00, 5.00]	5.00 [4.00, 6.00]	6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [4.00, 5.00]
married (%)	Married	308 (91.7)	640 (83.8)	941 (91.5)	194 (66.0)	386 (83.0)	988 (84.9)	453 (91.0)	611 (88.9)	390 (93.5)	621 (79.0)	593 (76.8)	230 (95.4)	518 (83.3)	755 (92.0)	511 (78.7)	538 (89.5)	354 (88.1)	2377 (85.1)	753 (84.4)	424 (65.3)	200 (75.5)	677 (84.4)	717 (93.1)	993 (88.8)	841 (86.4)	218 (70.1)
	Single	16 (4.8)	99 (13.0)	51 (5.0)	33 (11.2)	41 (8.8)	155 (13.3)	25 (5.0)	53 (7.7)	24 (5.8)	46 (5.9)	44 (5.7)	4 (1.7)	55 (8.8)	62 (7.6)	133 (20.5)	27 (4.5)	32 (8.0)	330 (11.8)	134 (15.0)	74 (11.4)	35 (13.2)	58 (7.2)	48 (6.2)	118 (10.6)	103 (10.6)	30 (9.6)
	Widowed / Divorced	12 (3.6)	25 (3.3)	36 (3.5)	67 (22.8)	38 (8.2)	21 (1.8)	20 (4.0)	23 (3.3)	3 (0.7)	119 (15.1)	135 (17.5)	7 (2.9)	49 (7.9)	4 (0.5)	5 (0.8)	36 (6.0)	16 (4.0)	86 (3.1)	5 (0.6)	151 (23.3)	30 (11.3)	67 (8.4)	5 (0.6)	7 (0.6)	29 (3.0)	63 (20.3)
unemployed (%)	employed	175 (52.1)	382 (50.0)	660 (64.2)	159 (54.1)	307 (66.0)	733 (63.0)	333 (66.9)	400 (58.2)	243 (58.3)	417 (53.1)	540 (69.9)	213 (88.4)	351 (56.4)	537 (65.4)	403 (62.1)	361 (60.1)	226 (56.2)	1892 (67.7)	508 (57.0)	360 (55.5)	183 (69.1)	459 (57.2)	684 (88.8)	703 (62.9)	510 (52.4)	204 (65.6)
	inactive	23 (6.8)	17 (2.2)	66 (6.4)	49 (16.7)	20 (4.3)	36 (3.1)	15 (3.0)	31 (4.5)	6 (1.4)	21 (2.7)	33 (4.3)	6 (2.5)	34 (5.5)	149 (18.1)	27 (4.2)	47 (7.8)	16 (4.0)	617 (22.1)	74 (8.3)	16 (2.5)	20 (7.5)	10 (1.2)	53 (6.9)	199 (17.8)	77 (7.9)	29 (9.3)
	retired	132 (39.3)	351 (45.9)	288 (28.0)	68 (23.1)	115 (24.7)	376 (32.3)	143 (28.7)	245 (35.7)	156 (37.4)	329 (41.9)	173 (22.4)	12 (5.0)	197 (31.7)	130 (15.8)	187 (28.8)	185 (30.8)	154 (38.3)	180 (6.4)	271 (30.4)	258 (39.8)	59 (22.3)	328 (40.9)	26 (3.4)	165 (14.8)	344 (35.4)	45 (14.5)

i) Model 10.1 –Logistic regression models by Region of origin - Estimated effect of independent variables on subjective upward mobility (expressed in odds ratio) weighted estimates from ISSP & TeO.

	(10.1)
(Intercept)	0.72 ***
	(0.05)
OriginAfrica (Sahel)	2.38 ***
	(0.22)
OriginAfrica, sub-Sahara	2.05 ***
	(0.12)
OriginAmericas & Oceania	1.25
	(0.26)
OriginAsia (Other)	2.44 ***
	(0.20)
OriginAsia (South East)	2.74 **
	(0.33)
OriginAUS	0.94
	(0.14)
OriginAUT	1.41 ***
	(0.09)
OriginCHE	1.31 ***
	(0.08)
OriginCHL	1.00
	(0.14)
OriginCRO	0.61 ***
	(0.12)
OriginCZE	0.79 **
	(0.08)
OriginDEN	0.80
	(0.12)
OriginDEU	1.08
	(0.09)
OriginDOM/TOM	2.39 ***
	(0.18)
OriginEU27	2.28 ***
	(0.11)
OriginEurope (Other)	2.64 ***
	(0.19)
OriginFIN	0.75 *
	(0.13)
OriginFRA	1.16
	(0.10)
OriginISL	0.78 *
	(0.10)
OriginISR	0.93
	(0.16)
OriginITA	0.56 ***
	(0.11)
OriginLTI	0.71 ***
	(0.10)
OriginMaghreb	2.45 ***
	(0.09)
OriginNOR	0.90
	(0.11)
OriginNZL	0.64 ***
	(0.12)
OriginPHI	0.58 ***
	(0.05)
OriginRUS	0.31 ***
	(0.10)
OriginSLV	1.23 *
	(0.10)
OriginSUR	0.96
	(0.16)
OriginSWE	0.71 ***
	(0.09)
OriginTHA	0.35 ***
	(0.10)
OriginTurkey & Middle East	1.73 **
	(0.20)
OriginTWN	1.42 ***
	(0.08)
OriginUSA	0.78 **
	(0.08)
OriginVEN	0.46 ***
	(0.14)
relative.ISEI	1.04 ***
	(0.00)
ISEI.m	0.97 ***
	(0.00)
female	1.07 **
	(0.02)
marriedSingle	0.63 ***
	(0.03)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	0.74 ***
	(0.05)
age.m	1.01 ***
	(0.00)
sss.m	1.32 ***
	(0.01)
age.m2	1.00 ***
	(0.00)
educsecondary	0.87 **
	(0.04)
eductertiary or above	1.06
	(0.05)
unemployedinactive	0.95
	(0.05)
unemployedretired	0.86 **
	(0.05)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	0.77 ***
	(0.06)
OriginAfrica (Sahel):relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginAfrica, sub-Sahara:relative.ISEI	0.98 **
	(0.01)
OriginAmericas & Oceania:relative.ISEI	0.98
	(0.01)
OriginAsia (Other):relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginAsia (South East):relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.02)
OriginAUS:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginAUT:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginCHE:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.00)
OriginCHL:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginCRO:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginCZE:relative.ISEI	0.99 **
	(0.00)
OriginDEN:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginDEU:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginDOM/TOM:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginEU27:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginEurope (Other):relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginFIN:relative.ISEI	1.02 *
	(0.01)
OriginFRA:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginISL:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginISL:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.01)
OriginISR:relative.ISEI	0.99 *
	(0.01)
OriginITA:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginJAP:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***
	(0.00)
OriginLTI:relative.ISEI	0.99 **
	(0.00)
OriginMaghreb:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.00)
OriginNOR:relative.ISEI	1.01
	(0.01)
OriginNZL:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginPHI:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***
	(0.00)
OriginRUS:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***
	(0.00)
OriginSLV:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginSUR:relative.ISEI	0.98 **
	(0.01)
OriginSWE:relative.ISEI	1.01
	(0.00)
OriginTHA:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***
	(0.01)
OriginTurkey & Middle East:relative.ISEI	0.99
	(0.01)
OriginTWN:relative.ISEI	1.00
	(0.00)
OriginUSA:relative.ISEI	0.98 ***
	(0.00)
OriginVEN:relative.ISEI	0.96 ***
	(0.01)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	1.00 ***
	(0.00)
AIC	41335.05
BIC	42057.74
Log Likelihood	-20580.52
Deviance	42027.08
Num. obs.	29937

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

j) Model 10.2 –Logistic regression models by Region of origin - Estimated effect of independent variables on subjective upward mobility (expressed in odds ratio) weighted estimates from ISSP & TeO.

	(10.2)
(Intercept)	0.66 ***
	(0.05)
sampleISSP Non-Emigrant	0.75 ***
	(0.03)
sampleTeO2 Emigrant Average	2.24 ***
	(0.05)
relative.ISEI	1.04 ***
	(0.00)
ISEI.m	0.98 ***
	(0.00)
female	1.06 *
	(0.02)
marriedSingle	0.62 ***
	(0.03)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	0.78 ***
	(0.05)
age.m	1.01 ***
	(0.00)
age.m2	1.00 **
	(0.00)
sss.m	1.34 ***
	(0.01)
educsecondary	0.99
	(0.04)
eductertiary or above	1.12 *
	(0.05)
unemployedinactive	0.92
	(0.05)
unemployedretired	0.93
	(0.05)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	0.78 ***
	(0.05)
sampleISSP Non-Emigrant:relative.ISEI	0.99 ***
	(0.00)
sampleTeO2 Emigrant Average:relative.ISEI	0.99 ***
	(0.00)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	1.00 ***
	(0.00)
AIC	42123.51
BIC	42281.34
Log Likelihood	-21042.75
Deviance	42931.70
Num. obs.	29937

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

k) Model 11 –Logistic regression models by Region of origin - Estimated effect of independent variables on subjective upward mobility (expressed in odds ratio) weighted estimates from ISSP & TeO.

	(11)
(Intercept)	-0.33 ***
	(0.05)
sample2AUS	-0.06
	(0.14)
sample2AUT	0.34 ***
	(0.09)
sample2CHE	0.27 ***
	(0.08)
sample2CHL	0.00
	(0.14)
sample2CRO	-0.50 ***
	(0.12)
sample2CZE	-0.23 **
	(0.08)
sample2DEN	-0.23
	(0.12)
sample2DEU	0.07
	(0.09)
sample2FIN	-0.28 *
	(0.13)
sample2FRA	0.14
	(0.10)
sample2ISL	-0.25 *
	(0.10)
sample2ISR	-0.07
	(0.16)
sample2ITA	-0.58 ***
	(0.11)
sample2JAP	-0.66 ***
	(0.09)
sample2LTI	-0.35 ***
	(0.10)
sample2NOR	-0.11
	(0.11)
sample2NZL	-0.44 ***
	(0.12)
sample2PHI	-0.56 ***
	(0.05)
sample2RUS	-1.17 ***
	(0.10)
sample2SLV	0.20 *
	(0.10)
sample2SUR	-0.04
	(0.16)
sample2SWE	-0.34 ***
	(0.09)
sample2TeO2 - Immigrant in France	0.79 ***
	(0.05)
sample2THA	-1.06 ***
	(0.10)
sample2TWN	0.35 ***
	(0.08)
sample2USA	-0.25 **
	(0.08)
sample2VEN	-0.79 ***
	(0.14)

	(11)
relative.ISEI	0.04 ***
	(0.00)
ISEI.m	-0.03 ***
	(0.00)
female	0.07 **
	(0.02)
marriedSingle	-0.46 ***
	(0.03)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	-0.30 ***
	(0.05)
age.m	0.01 ***
	(0.00)
sss.m	0.28 ***
	(0.01)
age.m2	-0.00 ***
	(0.00)
educsecondary	-0.15 ***
	(0.04)
eductertiary or above	0.06
	(0.05)
unemployedinactive	-0.05
	(0.05)
unemployedretired	-0.15 **
	(0.05)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	-0.26 ***
	(0.06)
sample2AUS:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2AUT:relative.ISEI	-0.00
	(0.01)
sample2CHE:relative.ISEI	-0.00
	(0.00)
sample2CHL:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2CRO:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2CZE:relative.ISEI	-0.01 **
	(0.00)
sample2DEN:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2DEU:relative.ISEI	0.00
	(0.01)
sample2FIN:relative.ISEI	0.02 *
	(0.01)
sample2FRA:relative.ISEI	0.00
	(0.01)
sample2ISL:relative.ISEI	0.00
	(0.01)
sample2ISR:relative.ISEI	-0.01 *
	(0.01)
sample2ITA:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2JAP:relative.ISEI	-0.02 ***
	(0.00)
sample2LTI:relative.ISEI	-0.01 **
	(0.00)

	(11)
sample2NOR:relative.ISEI	0.01
	(0.01)
sample2NZL:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2PHI:relative.ISEI	-0.02 ***
	(0.00)
sample2RUS:relative.ISEI	-0.02 ***
	(0.00)
sample2SLV:relative.ISEI	-0.01
	(0.01)
sample2SUR:relative.ISEI	-0.02 **
	(0.01)
sample2SWE:relative.ISEI	0.01
	(0.00)
sample2TeO2 - Immigrant in France:relative.ISEI	-0.01 ***
	(0.00)
sample2THA:relative.ISEI	-0.02 ***
	(0.01)
sample2TWN:relative.ISEI	0.00
	(0.00)
sample2USA:relative.ISEI	-0.02 ***
	(0.00)
sample2VEN:relative.ISEI	-0.04 ***
	(0.01)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	0.00 ***
	(0.00)
AIC	41327.13
BIC	41900.30
Log Likelihood	-20594.56
Deviance	42055.07
Num. obs.	29937

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

l) Effective sample (model 12.1) Matched and unmatched samples for EU emigrants in France (TeO2) and non-migrants in country of origin (ISSP)

Unmatched sample

	level	ISSP EU	TeO2 EU
n		4456	1067
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		8.34 (16.77)	4.71 (17.28)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		45.31 (16.05)	39.04 (17.16)
female (%)	0	2182 (49.0)	499 (46.8)
	1	2274 (51.0)	568 (53.2)
married (%)	Married	3824 (85.8)	641 (60.1)
	Single	444 (10.0)	282 (26.4)
	Widowed / Divorced	188 (4.2)	144 (13.5)
age (mean (SD))		57.74 (14.18)	47.43 (9.75)
sss (median [IQR])		6.00 [5.00, 7.00]	5.00 [5.00, 6.00]
educ (%)	primary or below	115 (2.6)	292 (27.4)
	secondary	3069 (68.9)	473 (44.3)
	tertiary or above	1272 (28.5)	302 (28.3)
unemployed (%)	employed	2568 (57.6)	899 (84.3)
	inactive	134 (3.0)	47 (4.4)
	retired	1653 (37.1)	16 (1.5)
	unemployed / never worked	101 (2.3)	105 (9.8)

Matched sample

	level	ISSP EU	TeO2 EU
n		1067	1067
relative.ISEI (mean (SD))		6.59 (16.65)	4.71 (17.28)
r.ISEI (mean (SD))		42.73 (16.04)	39.04 (17.16)
female (%)	0	455 (42.6)	499 (46.8)
	1	612 (57.4)	568 (53.2)
married (%)	Single	92 (8.6)	282 (26.4)
	Married	838 (78.5)	641 (60.1)
	Widowed / Divorced	137 (12.8)	144 (13.5)
age (mean (SD))		47.04 (12.21)	47.43 (9.75)
sss (median [IQR])		0.52 [-0.48, 1.52]	-0.48 [-0.48, 0.52]
educ (%)	secondary	584 (54.7)	473 (44.3)
	primary or below	45 (4.2)	292 (27.4)
	tertiary or above	438 (41.0)	302 (28.3)
unemployed (%)	employed	909 (85.2)	899 (84.3)
	inactive	41 (3.8)	47 (4.4)
	retired	30 (2.8)	16 (1.5)
	unemployed / never worked	87 (8.2)	105 (9.8)

m) Logistic regression models (12.1 & 12.2) odds ratio of subjective upward mobility. Matched and unmatched estimates EU migrants in France and non-migrants in region of origin.

	(12.1) Matched estimate	(12.2) Unmatched estimate
(Intercept)	0.32 ***	0.49 ***
	(0.19)	(0.12)
sourceTeO2 EU	2.61 ***	2.56 ***
	(0.12)	(0.10)
relative.ISEI	1.04 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
ISEI.m	0.97 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
female	1.16	1.01
	(0.10)	(0.06)
marriedMarried	1.55 **	1.35 **
	(0.15)	(0.10)
marriedWidowed / Divorced	1.46 *	1.29
	(0.18)	(0.15)
sss	1.34 ***	1.43 ***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
educprimary or below	1.77 ***	1.41 **
	(0.16)	(0.13)
eductertiary or above	1.65 ***	1.33 ***
	(0.13)	(0.08)
age.m	1.01	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
age.m2	1.00	1.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)
unemployedinactive	1.03	0.94
	(0.25)	(0.17)
unemployedretired	1.21	1.05
	(0.38)	(0.11)
unemployedunemployed / never worked	0.60 **	0.59 **
	(0.17)	(0.16)
sourceTeO2 EU:relative.ISEI	0.99	0.99 *
	(0.01)	(0.00)
relative.ISEI:ISEI.m	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. obs.	2134	5523
Deviance	2552.62	6607.98
Log Likelihood	-1260.79	-3367.62
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.08

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

n) LITS IV effective sample, key dependent and independent variables (models 13-17 – migration intentions table 10 in body) stratified by migration intention.

	level	Overall	Intends to migrate	No Intention
n		32117	1428	30689
more.successful (%)	0	16171 (50.4)	853 (59.7)	15318 (49.9)
	1	15946 (49.6)	575 (40.3)	15371 (50.1)
Education.Mob2 (%)	0	13641 (42.5)	511 (35.8)	13130 (42.8)
	-2	2121 (6.6)	130 (9.1)	1991 (6.5)
	-1	1795 (5.6)	95 (6.7)	1700 (5.5)
	1	6282 (19.6)	245 (17.2)	6037 (19.7)
	2	8278 (25.8)	447 (31.3)	7831 (25.5)
educ2 (%)	secondary	20928 (65.2)	877 (61.4)	20051 (65.3)
	primary or below	2668 (8.3)	104 (7.3)	2564 (8.4)
	tertiary	8521 (26.5)	447 (31.3)	8074 (26.3)
female (mean (SD))		0.59 (0.49)	0.48 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)
married (%)	Single	6063 (18.9)	524 (36.7)	5539 (18.0)
	Married	17904 (55.7)	701 (49.1)	17203 (56.1)
	Widowed / Divorced	8150 (25.4)	203 (14.2)	7947 (25.9)
life.satisfaction (median [IQR])		3.00 [2.00, 4.00]	3.00 [1.00, 4.00]	3.00 [2.00, 4.00]
risk.taking (mean (SD))		4.77 (2.93)	6.00 (3.29)	4.72 (2.90)
age (mean (SD))		48.81 (16.51)	38.12 (13.33)	49.31 (16.48)
sss (median [IQR])		4.00 [3.00, 5.00]	4.00 [3.00, 5.00]	4.00 [3.00, 5.00]
unemployed (%)	employed	14733 (45.9)	697 (48.8)	14036 (45.7)
	retired	6774 (21.1)	55 (3.9)	6719 (21.9)
	unemployed / never worked	10610 (33.0)	676 (47.3)	9934 (32.4)
profession (%)	Service professional	4410 (13.7)	210 (14.7)	4200 (13.7)
	Agriculture	4120 (12.8)	212 (14.8)	3908 (12.7)
	Blue collar	2794 (8.7)	149 (10.4)	2645 (8.6)
	retired	6774 (21.1)	55 (3.9)	6719 (21.9)
	student	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	unemployed / never worked	9931 (30.9)	625 (43.8)	9306 (30.3)
	White collar	4088 (12.7)	177 (12.4)	3911 (12.7)

a) LITS IV effective sample, key dependent and independent variables (models 18-20 – migration intentions table 11 in body) stratified by migration background.

	level	Overall	Emigrant	Non-Emigrant
n		24547	510	24037
more.successful (%)	0	11896 (48.5)	196 (38.4)	11700 (48.7)
	1	12651 (51.5)	314 (61.6)	12337 (51.3)
Education.Mob2 (%)	0	10639 (43.3)	197 (38.6)	10442 (43.4)
	-2	1699 (6.9)	33 (6.5)	1666 (6.9)
	-1	1371 (5.6)	22 (4.3)	1349 (5.6)
	1	4555 (18.6)	109 (21.4)	4446 (18.5)
	2	6283 (25.6)	149 (29.2)	6134 (25.5)
gdp.change (mean (SD))		13129.58 (8763.55)	19037.79 (9541.09)	13004.23 (8703.18)
log.HH.INC.PPP (mean (SD))		690.67 (102.78)	735.24 (103.05)	689.73 (102.57)
female (%)	0	9915 (40.4)	178 (34.9)	9737 (40.5)
	1	14632 (59.6)	332 (65.1)	14300 (59.5)
married (%)	Single	4649 (18.9)	57 (11.2)	4592 (19.1)
	Married	13457 (54.8)	270 (52.9)	13187 (54.9)
	Widowed / Divorced	6441 (26.2)	183 (35.9)	6258 (26.0)
urbanity (%)	rural	9970 (40.6)	138 (27.1)	9832 (40.9)
	urban	14577 (59.4)	372 (72.9)	14205 (59.1)
life.satisfaction (median [IQR])		3.00 [2.00, 4.00]	3.00 [2.00, 4.00]	3.00 [2.00, 4.00]
age (mean (SD))		48.64 (16.03)	59.11 (15.03)	48.42 (15.97)
sss (median [IQR])		4.00 [3.00, 5.00]	4.00 [3.00, 5.00]	4.00 [3.00, 5.00]
educ2 (%)	secondary	16218 (66.1)	362 (71.0)	15856 (66.0)
	primary or below	1745 (7.1)	22 (4.3)	1723 (7.2)
	tertiary	6584 (26.8)	126 (24.7)	6458 (26.9)
unemployed (%)	employed	11774 (48.0)	201 (39.4)	11573 (48.1)
	retired	5335 (21.7)	214 (42.0)	5121 (21.3)
	unemployed / never worked	7438 (30.3)	95 (18.6)	7343 (30.5)
profession (%)	Service professional	3555 (14.5)	69 (13.5)	3486 (14.5)
	Agriculture	3297 (13.4)	51 (10.0)	3246 (13.5)
	Blue collar	2243 (9.1)	44 (8.6)	2199 (9.1)
	retired	5335 (21.7)	214 (42.0)	5121 (21.3)
	unemployed / never worked	6909 (28.1)	82 (16.1)	6827 (28.4)
	White collar	3208 (13.1)	50 (9.8)	3158 (13.1)