

Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Death Events[†]

Julien Sauvagnat

Fabiano Schivardi

Bocconi University and CEPR

Luiss University, EIEF and CEPR

March 17, 2022

Abstract

Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labor market thickness for executives that vary by industry and location. We then show that firm performance is negatively affected by executive death, but only in thin local labor markets. The new executives hired after death events in thin local labor markets have lower education levels and are more likely to be replaced. Consistent with the hypothesis that the drop in performance is due to executive short supply, we find that after a death event executive wages in other firms increase, but only in thin markets.

Keywords: Executive supply, firm performance, local growth.

JEL classification numbers: J24, M51, R11.

[†]Julien Sauvagnat is with Bocconi University, IGER, and CEPR. Contact: julien.sauvagnat@unibocconi.it. Fabiano Schivardi is with Luiss University, EIEF, and CEPR. Contact: fschivardi@luiss.it. We thank Nicola Gennaioli, Felix Koenig, Marco Manacorda, our discussant Marco Sammon, and seminar participants at Nova, Stockholm School of Economics, the 2020 Econometric Society World Congress, 3rd Bank of Italy CEPR Labour workshop, the Stockholm Labor and Finance Group Conference, Visitins Annual Conference, and the CAED seminar series for their valuable comments. We thank the Visitins program for granting us access to the Social Security records. Julien Sauvagnat thanks the Italian Ministry of Education for financial support (PRIN 2017). Fabiano Schivardi thanks the ERC for financial support (ERC grant 835201).

1 Introduction

Recent research shows that differences in performance between firms are substantial, persistent over time and largely unexplained (Syverson, 2011). As a potential explanation, a growing body of work highlights the role of management quality in shaping firm outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). However, we still have a poor understanding of the factors that determine the differences in managerial quality across firms. In particular, what are the frictions that account for the fact that some firms allocate control to inferior managerial talent, hurting firm performance and, through this, aggregate productivity?

This paper focuses on the role of the local supply of managerial skills and provides evidence on the causal role that the thickness of local markets for executives plays for firm performance. Empirically, the main challenge is to set up an identification strategy that addresses the joint endogeneity of firm productivity and labor market thickness to unobserved features of localities. One also needs rich micro data on both firms and workers in order to understand empirically the mechanism through which the supply of executives in a given labor market affects firm performance. Our approach satisfies both requirements and allows us to isolate the causal effect of the local supply of executives on firm performance.

We use employer-employee administrative data from the Italian social security records covering the entire population of Italian workers in the private sector over the period 2005-2015, matched with firm balance sheet and income statement information. We first document that executives direct disproportionately their job searches toward firms within the same industry and geographical area, arguably due to mobility costs and industry-specific human capital. We therefore define the relevant market for executives at the industry-location level and construct measures of local labor market thickness for executives that vary by industry and location (the market in what follows).

Our empirical design exploits negative exogenous shocks to the executive team and traces their impact on firm performance according to executive local labor market thickness. This allows us to isolate causal mechanisms through which executive market thickness has an impact on firm performance. As the main source of shocks to the executive team, we exploit executive death, thus circumventing the endogeneity of executive exits. We focus on premature deaths, and check that this set of death events are random to firm characteristics. Deaths are rare events: the probability of death for an executive younger than sixty is 0.10% per year. Despite this, the size of the Italian labor market (around 14 million workers and 123,000 executives in 2015) generates a number of executive deaths sufficiently large to allow for reliable inference.

To guide our empirical investigation, we formulate a simple model of executive search building on the seminal contribution of labor search with on-the-job offers of [Burdett \(1978\)](#). After an executive death, a firm (the worker in a labor search model) searches for an executive, who delivers a certain stream of profits (the wage in a labor search model) which depends on her quality. Relative to the literature, we introduce a fixed cost of replacing an executive to capture a monetary severance payment and/or a disruption cost generated by executive turnover. We assume that the arrival rate of executive applications increases with market thickness. We characterize how, after the death of the incumbent executive, the quality of the newly hired executives, and therefore firm performance, varies with market thickness. The model delivers two key empirical predictions. First, after the death of an executive, firms in thin markets on average appoint executives of lower quality compared to firms in thick markets and therefore experience a larger drop in performance relative to their pre-death levels. Second, executive turnover after death is higher in thin markets, as firms will replace low quality executives when they receive better job applications, gradually returning to their pre-death levels.

These predictions are fully borne out in the data. We start by documenting that death events have a substantial negative and long-lasting impact on firm performance. Using returns on assets (ROA) as our preferred measure, we find that ROA drops by around 0.8 percentage points on average in the year of death and in the following three, an economically large effect when compared to a sample mean of 4%. However, the estimated decline in firm performance is not per se evidence that the local supply of executives matters. After all, executives are likely to have accumulated a certain level of firm-specific capital, which gets destroyed when the executive dies, possibly inducing a deterioration in performance, irrespective of the external supply of executives. To estimate whether local supply matters, we leverage the research design and estimate heterogeneity in firm response to executive death depending on the thickness of the local labor markets for executives. Consistent with the idea that it takes more time for firms to find a good replacement in thin markets, we find that firm performance drops significantly after the death of one of their executives, but only in thin markets, in which case the effect is significantly larger (-1.8 percentage points). Dynamic specifications show the absence of any pre-trend and that, in thin markets, ROA returns to its pre-death level only four years after the death event.

We assess the robustness of our results along a large series of dimensions. We experiment with different market definitions along the geographical and the industry component. To exclude that our estimates reflect the heterogeneous response to death events of some types of firms which are differentially present in markets with different levels of thickness, we augment our specification with controls for firm and executive characteristics interacted with

the deceased executive dummy. To assess if the results are driven by specific types of firms, we consider different subsamples and control groups. We find that our results are remarkably consistent across these different exercises. We also consider the effect of executive death on other corporate outcomes. First, we show that our results are robust to using productivity instead of ROA as an alternative measure of performance. Then, we decompose the effect on ROA into its components, finding that its drop following the death of an executive is driven by a substantial decline in sales.

Still, other mechanisms could give rise to stronger effects of death events in thin markets. Executive deaths could, for example, more severely disrupt local input-output relationships when the market is thin. In order to nail down search frictions for finding replacement executives as the economic mechanism through which executive-specific shocks affect firm performance, we look at the elasticity of peer wages to executive death in the same market. If firms hit by death events search for a replacement locally, their demand for executives will generate an upward pressure on executive pay, whose intensity depends on the thickness of executive supply. In line with our results on firms, we find evidence of spillovers on the compensation of existing executives in other firms in the same market, but only in thin markets.

Finally, we exploit the richness of our micro data to investigate the specific channels through which the effects of executive deaths are magnified in thin markets. The model predicts that, after death, firms in thin markets appoint lower quality executives and experience more executive turnover. Consistently, we show that new executives hired following death events in thin local markets have lower education and experience levels. They are also more likely to leave the firm over the next few years, consistent with the idea that executive short supply on the external labor market generates lower quality firm-executive matches.

Overall, our findings highlight that the local supply of executives is an important driver of firm performance. Our work has important implications for the design of location-based policies to foster growth (see e.g. [Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008](#); [Kline, 2010](#)). In particular, the results suggest that local policies aiming at boosting growth should take into consideration the supply of executive skills.

Our work relates to several strands of literature. We first contribute to the literature on the consequences of frictional workers' mobility and the associated agglomeration effects. Our analysis rests on Marshall's 1890 idea that firms and workers in thicker labor markets face fewer frictions in finding a suitable match, and particularly so for skilled workers ([Abowd and Kramarz, 2003](#); [Blatter, Muehleemann, and Schenker, 2012](#)). Better worker-firm matches resulting from larger labor pools increase firm productivity ([Diamond and Simon, 1990](#); [Helsley and Strange, 1990](#); [Combes and Duranton, 2006](#)), also due to knowledge flows through

workers mobility (Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti, 2010; Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen, 2019; Serafinelli, 2019). A recent body of work suggests that the local supply of executives might play a key role (Gennaioli, LaPorta, de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2013; Bloom et al., 2019), but, to the best of our knowledge, no causal evidence is available yet. We fill this gap. Local labor markets matter because workers’ mobility is costly (Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren, 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014). Consistently, Marinescu and Rathelot (2018) and Manning and Petrongolo (2017) find that job search behavior is quite local. There is also evidence that labor mobility has declined significantly in the U.S. (Moretti, 2011; Molloy, Smith, Trezzi, and Wozniak, 2016; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011, 2017; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2017). We show that, despite substantially higher wages, mobility is low for executives too.

Our results also relate to the body of work in management economics that emphasize the key role of top executives in shaping firm outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that executive fixed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010) and Schivardi and Schmitz (2020) focus on measurable management practices, and find a strong association between these practices and firm productivity. Bender, Bloom, Card, Van Reenen, and Wolter (2018) use matched employer-employee data to show that firm performance is disproportionately dependent on the human capital of the executives, rather than of the average worker. More directly related to our work, several studies rely on the occurrence of exogenous events such as CEO deaths or hospitalizations to shed light on the importance of executives for firm outcomes (see e.g. Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman, 1985; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2007; Holland and Lel, 2015; Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth, 2018; Smith, Yagan, Zidar, and Zwick, 2019; Choi, Goldschlag, Haltiwanger, and Kim, 2019; Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon, 2020; Huber, Lindenthal, and Waldinger, 2021; Becker and Hvide, 2021). Compared to these papers, we estimate the causal impact of the thickness of local labor markets for executives on firm performance. Using US listed firms, Cziraki and Jenter (2021) supply evidence of large frictions in the assignment of CEOs to firms while Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) show that endogenous CEO replacements – i.e., decided by the board – are more effective in changing the firm’s policies when the firm’s headquarters are in thick markets, where frictions are arguably lower. We look at private firms, for which the executive market is more likely to be local; moreover, we consider exogenous executive changes following death events. Our work isolates a supply-side friction that can explain why some firms allocate control to inferior managerial talent, hurting their performance and, through this, aggregate productivity. In doing so, our results speak to previous work in corporate finance on the performance effects of managerial turnover (see for instance Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson,

Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004). We also contribute to recent research showing that differences in productivity between firms are substantial, persistent over time and remain large even after controlling for differences in the quality of production inputs (Syverson, 2004; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008).

We also add to the literature that studies the effects of labor supply shocks on firm performance and employees' compensation. Prior work focuses on large, market-wide labor supply shocks, e.g., due to immigration or changes in the college graduation rate (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card, 2009; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009). More recent studies provide evidence on peer effects and wage spillovers among workers within the firm (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Waldinger, 2010, 2011; Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang, 2010; Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg, 2017; Herkenhoff, Lise, Menzio, and Phillips, 2018; Jarosch, Oberfield, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2021). Isen (2013) uses worker deaths to show that workers are paid less than their marginal product. The paper that is closest to ours is Jäger and Heining (2019), who show that workers' exits on average raise co-workers' wages and retention probabilities, and the more so in thin markets. We share the general conclusion that replacing workers is more difficult in thin markets. Differently from them, who study workers complementarity/substitutability, we look at firm performance and focus on executives, a category particularly relevant for it—in fact, we find no evidence that the death of other (non executive) workers has any impact on performance. Moreover, we offer direct evidence that matches formed in thin markets after death are of lower quality, a dimension unexplored in Jäger and Heining (2019). Our results on wages in other firms are related to a recent literature that looks at the spillovers of changes in large firms employment policies on wages in neighboring firms (Arnold, 2019; Derenoncourt, Noelke, Weil, and Taska, 2021).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of executive search. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the data and some motivating evidence. Section 5 describes the results on firm performance and Section 6 those on outcomes at the executive level. Section 7 discusses the external validity and economic significance of the results. Section 8 concludes.

2 A model of executive search and replacement

To guide the interpretation of our empirical findings presented below, we construct a simple model of executive search building on the seminal contribution of labor search with on-the-job offers of Burdett (1978). A firm (the worker in a labor search model) searches for an executive, who delivers a certain stream of profits (the wage in a labor search model) which depends on her quality. The model is partial equilibrium, that is, the executive quality

distribution is given. Relative to the literature, we introduce a fixed cost of replacing an executive to capture a monetary severance payment and/or a disruption cost generated by executive turnover. We assume that the arrival rate of executive applications depends on market thickness: the thicker the market for executives, the higher the arrival rate of executive applications. We characterize how, after the death of the incumbent executive, the quality of hired executives, and therefore firm performance, vary with market thickness.

2.1 The model

Time is continuous. A firm can operate without an executive, in which case it generates a profit flow y , or with one executive of quality b , in which case it generates a profit flow $y + b$.¹ Job applications arrive at Poisson rate λ , with quality drawn from a cumulative density function $F(b)$ with bounded support over $[0, B]$. If the firm is currently without an executive, when it receives an application it can hire the executive at no cost. Once hired, the executive dies at Poisson rate δ . The flow equation for a firm without an executive is:

$$rD = y + \lambda \int_0^B \max[V(b) - D, 0] dF(b), \quad (1)$$

where D is the value of a firm without an executive, $V(b)$ is the value of a firm with an executive of quality b and r is the discount rate. Equation (1) states that the flow value of a firm without an executive is the profit flow y plus the expected gain from receiving a job application from new executives. When receiving an application, the firm decides whether to accept or decline it.

The firm keeps receiving job applications even after having hired an executive. For simplicity, we assume that the arrival rate of executives and their quality distribution is the same as when the firm has no executive. When receiving an application, the firm must decide whether to replace the current executive of quality b with the applicant, in which case it pays a fixed cost $C > 0$. We focus on the case in which the replacement cost C is not too large, that is: $C < V(B) - D$.²

The flow equation for a firm with an incumbent executive of quality b is:

$$rV(b) = y + b + \lambda \int_0^B \max[V(s) - C - V(b), 0] dF(s) + \delta[D - V(b)]. \quad (2)$$

¹ b represents the additional impact of executive quality on firm profits (net of executive compensation). One could interpret b as either the intrinsic quality of the executive or the quality of the executive-firm match.

²When $C > V(B) - D$, a firm never replaces an incumbent executive, an unrealistic situation which is not borne by the data.

The flow value of the firm with an executive is the profit flow $y + b$ plus the expected gain associated with the possible arrival of job applications from new executives, in which case the firm might optimally decide to replace the incumbent with a new applicant of higher quality after paying the replacement cost C , minus the expected loss associated with the possible death of the incumbent executive.

Consider a firm with an executive in place of quality b . When receiving a new application, the firm will replace the incumbent executive if the new one is sufficiently better to make it worthwhile paying the replacement cost C . Formally, we define $T(b)$ as the threshold value at which it is optimal to replace an incumbent executive of quality b if the quality of the new applicant is greater or equal than $T(b)$,³ with $T(b)$ defined by the following condition:

$$V(T(b)) - C = V(b). \quad (3)$$

Define b^* as the quality of the incumbent executive such that $V(b^*) = V(B) - C$. By construction, $T(b^*) = B$. It follows that, when the incumbent executive is of quality $b \geq b^*$, the firm stops searching, given that, even if it receives an application from a candidate with the highest possible quality B , the associated increase in firm value (equal to $V(B) - V(b)$) is lower than the replacement cost C . When the quality of the incumbent executive b is lower than b^* , the firm keeps searching, using the threshold $T(b)$ to decide when to hire a new applicant.

Given that the firm continuously receives new applications, the firm eventually receives an application of a candidate with quality $b \geq b^*$. We define $\bar{b} \equiv E[b|b \geq b^*]$ as the average quality of incumbent executives when firms do not find it optimal anymore to replace them with new applicants. Importantly, b^* , and thus \bar{b} , does not depend on the arrival rate λ . To see this, suppose a firm has an incumbent executive with quality $b \geq b^*$. As it is never optimal for the firm to replace the incumbent in that case, Equation (2) for $b \geq b^*$ simplifies to:

$$rV(b) = y + b + \delta[D - V(b)] \quad (4)$$

Replacing b by respectively b^* and B in Equation (4) and using the equality $V(b^*) = V(B) - C$ above yields $b^* = B - (r + \delta)C$, which is independent from λ .

After the death of an executive, the firm does not incur the replacement cost when hiring a new executive. Therefore, in that case, the firm hires a new applicant if her quality is

³In Appendix A.1, we show that $V(s)$ is increasing and continuous in s . In Equation (2), since $V(s)$ is increasing in s and $C + V(b)$ is independent from s , there exists a unique threshold denoted $T(b)$ satisfying $V(T(b)) - C = V(b)$, such that $s < T(b)$ implies $V(s) - C < V(b)$ and so the incumbent of quality b should not be replaced by a new applicant with quality s , and $s > T(b)$ implies $V(s) - C > V(b)$ and so the incumbent of quality b should be replaced.

larger than b^D , where the threshold value b^D is given by $V(b^D) = D$.⁴ We show in Appendix A.1 that the threshold value b^D for hiring a new applicant when the firm has no executive is implicitly given by the following equation:

$$b^D = \lambda \int_{b^D}^{T(b^D)} \frac{1 - F(s)}{r + \delta + \lambda[1 - F(T(s))]} ds. \quad (5)$$

2.2 Results

We now derive four key results that will form the basis for our empirical analysis. The proofs are relegated to Appendix A.1.

Result 1. *The hiring threshold for the executive quality of a firm with no executive, b^D , increases with market thickness:*

$$\frac{db^D}{d\lambda} > 0.$$

Even though, after death events, hiring a new executive does not require firms to pay a replacement cost, firms still optimally take into account that it will be costly to replace an incumbent in the future, which creates an option value of waiting. When the arrival rate of applications is higher, the firm becomes “choosier”, setting a higher hiring threshold after the death of an incumbent executive. In fact, higher arrival rates increase the option value of waiting for applications of executives with higher quality.⁵

Result 2. *After a death event, the average drop in the quality of the first new hired executive (and therefore in profits) relative to the pre-death average executive level is smaller the thicker the market:*

$$\frac{d\{\bar{b} - E[b|b > b^D]\}}{d\lambda} < 0.$$

This result follows from two facts. First, we have shown above that the average quality of incumbent executives when firms do not search anymore, \bar{b} , is independent from market thickness. Second, as established in Result 1, after the death of an executive, the average quality of the first hire is lower in thinner markets. Therefore, following a death event, firms in thin markets experience on average a larger drop in profits relative to pre-death levels.

Result 3. *After a death event, the probability that a firm experiences executive turnover – i.e., it replaces the first executive hired – decreases with market thickness:*

$$\frac{dPr(b < b^* | b > b^D)}{d\lambda} < 0.$$

⁴We show in Appendix A.1 that the assumption $C < V(B) - D$ implies that $b^D < b^*$.

⁵It is immediate to show that, when $C = 0$, the firm hires the first executive who applies for the job and replaces the incumbent executive whenever a better application is received.

This result reflects the fact that executives of lower quality are more likely to be replaced in the future. Given that the threshold value for hiring a new executive after death events, b^D , increases with λ , the probability that the first hire has quality above b^* , the threshold above which the firm does not replace incumbents, increases with λ .

Result 4. *The sign of the effect of market thickness on the expected duration before hiring a new executive after death events is ambiguous and depends, in particular, on the shape of the quality density function F .*

The expected duration before hiring a new executive after death events is equal to $\frac{1}{\lambda[1-F(b^D)]}$. Market thickness has two contrasting effects on the probability of hiring a new executive after death events. On one hand, a higher arrival rate λ mechanically implies a higher frequency of receiving new applications and therefore of potentially hiring a new executive. On the other hand, Result 1 indicates that the hiring threshold b^D increases (and therefore the acceptance rate $1-F(b^D)$ decreases) with λ : the firm receives more applications but is less likely to accept them.

Summing up, this simple model predicts that, after an executive's death, firms in thin markets experience a larger drop in profits because they tend to subsequently hire executives of lower quality. Whereas the effect of market thickness on the expected duration before hiring a new executive after death events is ambiguous, the new executives hired following death events are more likely to be subsequently replaced in thin markets. In both thin and thick markets, profits eventually revert to pre-death levels.

3 Identification strategy

Our goal is to determine if the local supply of top managerial skills is a determinant of firm performance. Ideally, one would use random variation in the supply of executives to determine its effects on firm performance. In practice, finding exogenous shocks to the supply of managerial skills is very difficult. We propose an alternative identification strategy based on the occurrence of executive deaths. Specifically, we use premature death as a random shock for executive exit at the firm level and check if it affects firm performance. To tease out the effects of executive supply from the disruption due to the loss of firm specific human capital, we distinguish the effects according to the thickness of the local market for executives.

The model presented above predicts differential effects of executive deaths on firm performance depending on the thickness of the executive labor supply a firm faces. We therefore need to first define the firm's relevant market for managerial skills. Below, we show that

executive mobility across industries and space is limited. We therefore define the combination of the commuting zone and industry as the relevant labor market for executives (“the market” in what follows) and the executives working in other firms in this market as the pool from which each firm is likely to hire executives. Our preferred measure of market thickness is the logarithm of the number of executives in the market at $t - 1$. We experiment with alternative definitions below.

Our identification strategy closely approximates the following example. Assume that an executive dies prematurely in, say, a textile firm located in Prato, a thick textile cluster. We will estimate the impact on firm performance in several years surrounding the event. We will then contrast the magnitude and duration of this impact with death events of executives occurring at firms located in thin local labor markets, such as for instance another firm in Prato operating in the Chemicals industry, for which the local pool of executives is thin. If the probability of finding good executives is lower in this case, we expect a larger and more persistent negative effect of executive exit on performance. Conditional on other controls, differences in the effect of a premature death according to executive market thickness indicate that executive supply matters for its performance.

To implement our identification strategy, we leverage a matched and exhaustive employee-firm panel, which provides us with precise information on the working address of all executives, as well as on the firms they work for. Specifically, we run the following OLS regression at the firm-year level:

$$\text{ROA}_{i,j,t} = (\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1}) \times \text{DecEx}_{i,\tau} + \beta_2 \text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1} + \beta_3 X_{i,j,t} + \eta_{i,j,t} \quad (6)$$

where $\text{ROA}_{i,j,t}$ is return on assets of firm i in market j at time t and the market is defined as the combination of the commuting zone and the industry in which the firm operates; $\text{DecEx}_{i,\tau}$ is a dummy taking the value of one if at least one of the firm’s executives dies in period τ , where τ can be a single year or, in our preferred specification, the years from $t - 3$ to t ; $\text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1}$ is the log of the number of executives in market j at $t - 1$; and $X_{i,j,t}$ are additional controls, including a rich set of dummies. The parameter β_0 measures the impact of an executive death for a firm in a market with no outside executives, and we expect it to be negative. If the local supply of executives matters, β_1 should be positive: a relatively larger local pool of replacements reduces the negative effects of a death. Finally, given that we always include firm fixed effects and that the shock is firm specific, we cluster standard error at the firm level.

Formally, identification rests on the assumption that, conditional on controls, the interaction between market thickness and the premature death event is orthogonal to the error

term: $E(\eta_{i,j,t} | \text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1} \times \text{DecEx}_{i,\tau}, X_{i,j,t}) = 0$. Next, we discuss potential threats to this assumption and how we address them. A first possibility is that firms in thin markets are different from those in thick ones for reasons unrelated to executive supply. To account for this, in all specifications we include firm fixed effects, so that $\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1}$ captures the effects of deaths in different markets in deviation from the firm’s “normal” performance. This also controls for the possibility that firms hit by a death event are low-performing in general. To account for time-varying shocks related to market thickness, we always include the indicator of market thickness itself, so that the effect we measure is in deviation from any general correlation between thickness and performance. In our preferred specification, we include industry \times year and commuting zone \times year fixed effects, to account for shocks at the location and industry level. When the empirical design allows it, we also estimate a specification with market \times year fixed effect to account for any shock at the market level. In this specification, identification comes from comparing performance of treated (ie., hit by a death event) and control firms *within* the same market and time period, addressing the concern that local market thickness interacted with the death event could spuriously correlate with market shocks driving the differential firm response to executive exit.⁶

Still, differential responses to deaths might be generated by differences in firm characteristics across thin and thick markets, above and beyond the fixed attributes captured by firm fixed effects. To control for this, we introduce lagged controls for size, age, and profitability, interacted with year fixed effects. Including these controls ensures that the estimates are not driven by heterogeneous trends among large, old, or profitable firms. We also augment some specifications with dummies indicating terciles of the number of firm executives interacted with year dummies, in order to make sure that the results are driven by the treatment - the death of an executive - rather than indirectly by the number of firm executives. A further concern is that there might be firm and executive characteristics correlated with market thickness which imply a differential response to executive deaths. For example, small firms might suffer more from executive death and be more common in thin markets. To control for this, in robustness tests we include the interactions of firm and deceased executive characteristics with the death dummy. We also run additional robustness checks discussed in detail in Section 5.2.

One could still argue that a stronger effect of an executive death in thin markets is related to factors different from executive market thickness. Suppose for example that the death of an executive disrupts firms’ relationships with their suppliers and customers, which

⁶ We do not use this as our preferred specification for two reasons. First, while addressing market level shocks, this specification is vulnerable to the bias coming from within market spillovers, if the death of a firm’s executive propagates to other local firms. Second, in some specifications that we introduce below, the independent variable varies at the market \times year level, making the inclusion of market \times year effects unfeasible.

could have a significant effect on firm performance (see e.g. [Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016](#)). If executive relationships with their local suppliers and customers are more valuable in thin markets – maybe because these are also markets with sparse local production networks in which existing relationships are less substitutable – we would still get a stronger effect of deaths in thin markets, but for a different reason. To obtain more direct evidence of the channel we hypothesize, we look at spillovers on executives working at other firms in the same market, and focus on their wages. If firm searches for new executives are mainly local, we can gauge the thickness of local labor markets for executives with the elasticity of other executive wages in the same market. Specifically, we estimate the following equation at the executive (rather than at the firm) level:

$$\text{Ln(Wage)}_{k,-i,j,t} = (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{MktTkn}_{j,t-1}) \times \text{DecEx}_{j,t-1} + \gamma_2 X_{k,-i,j,t} + u_{k,-i,j,t} \quad (7)$$

where $\text{Ln(Wage)}_{k,-i,j,t}$ is the logarithm of the wage of executive k working in firm $-i \neq i$ in the same market as firm i hit by a death event and $\text{DecEx}_{j,t-1}$ is a dummy taking the value of one if at least one executive died in the previous year in the same market. Firms ever hit by an executive death are excluded from the sample. Differently from the performance equation, this regression is at the executive rather than at the firm level, so that, in addition to year fixed effects, in all regressions we include executive fixed effects,⁷ and we progressively add commuting zone \times year and industry \times year fixed effects, as well as controls for executive gender, age, and tenure, interacted with year fixed effects. In these wage specifications, standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone \times industry level to account for serial correlation of the error term within executives in the same market. We expect γ_0 to be positive and γ_1 to be negative: the pressure exerted on executive wages by the extra demand from the affected firm decreases with market thickness.

Yet another concern is that executive deaths disrupt firms, which might benefit executives employed at other firms in the same executive market if they are competitors in the product market. If wages share to a certain degree firm shocks, as shown for example by [Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi \(2005\)](#), the improvement in firm performance would explain the increase in the wage, without resorting to equilibrium response of wages due to changes in local demand for executives. To address this concern, we run a version of Equation (7) in which we exclude executive wages of firms operating in non-tradable industries, for which product market competition is local, and check if our results change. We also run a placebo test using white collar wages, which should benefit from reduced competition but not from the increase in executive demand.

⁷Note that in this specification we cannot add market \times year fixed effects, as the DecEx dummy is fixed at the market-year level.

One might worry that firms endogenously select their location by taking into account the fact that executive turnover might have a negative impact on performance, especially in thin labor markets. This is not a threat to the identification strategy: if anything, this should bias the results against finding larger effects in thin labor markets, given that the most vulnerable firms to executive exits are likely to endogenously select their location in thick labor markets.

Finally, the model predicts both that newly appointed executives after death are on average of lower quality and that they are more likely to separate the thinner the market. To test these predictions, we will also estimate a set of regressions in which the dependent variables will be measures of executives quality (e.g. education and experience) and of the separation rate of the new hires following the death event, using the same set of control variables as in Equation (6).

4 Data

In this section we describe our data sources, provide summary statistics, and establish some facts about executive mobility that motivate our definition of local markets for executives.

4.1 Data description and summary statistics

We leverage restricted-access administrative data available at the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS, Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale). We have access to matched employer-employee records for all private firms with at least one employee. The dataset contains longitudinal information on all workers' job position, compensation, and employer since they joined the labor force. The data start in 1984, but the information on the municipality in which each firm is located is available only from 2005. We therefore focus on the period 2005-2015. All monetary values are in 2015 constant euros. We exclude financial firms from the sample.

The Italian economy features large heterogeneity in the thickness of labor markets across areas. We consider Commuting Zones (hereafter CZs) – around 600 – defined by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) as the relevant geographical unit for computing measures of labor market thickness. These areas are aggregated as clusters of municipalities that are characterized by strong within-cluster and weak between-cluster commuting ties. We then measure thickness at the $CZ \times$ (2-digit) industry level with the total number of executives in a $CZ \times$ industry in the previous year.⁸ As a result, a given labor market can

⁸The 19 2-digit industries are Agriculture and Fishing, Mining, Wood and Furniture, Food and Tobacco,

be classified as thick in one set of industries, and thin in others.

The INPS data allow us to precisely identify firm *executives*. The job title of executives (“dirigente” in Italian) applies only to the set of workers that have an executive collective contract, a fact that is recorded by social security data as the job title matters to determine social security contributions and entitlements. Legally, executives are defined as employees that manage a firm or a part of it and exert their role with some discretionary decision power. Executives therefore constitute the workers that take the strategic decisions within the firm: in fact, they represent around 1% of the Italian workforce. The next category in the firm hierarchy is that of “managers” (“quadro” in Italian), who are hierarchically below executives and have limited or no autonomous decision power, followed by “clericals” (“impiegati” in Italian). We refer to the superset of “managers” and “clericals” as *white-collars*.⁹ The hierarchical structure is clearly reflected in compensation: The average (median) executive gross wage in 2015 is 135,000 euros (111,000 euros), against 61,000 euros for managers and 28,000 for clericals.

Information on the year of death is known from Social security records. The cause of death is unknown. As in [Jaravel, Petkova, and Bell \(2018\)](#), in order to reduce the likelihood that death results from a lingering health condition, we consider executives passing away before or at the age of sixty.¹⁰ We identify 1,076 such events. Figure 1 shows the set of Italian CZs for which we observe at least one death of an executive over our sample period. As expected, we are more likely to observe death events in northern CZs, given that on average these local markets are larger. Note however that the set of death events spans the entire Italian territory. Importantly for us, we do observe death events both in thin and thick markets.

The INPS has some information on firms (location, industry, and all the information on employees), but no information on their economic and financial performance. We therefore match the INPS records with a firm database (referred to as CERVED, the data provider) that contains balance sheet information of all incorporated companies in Italy. These companies account for approximately two thirds of private sector GDP. The matched executive-firm dataset provides us with a large sample of events hitting executives, allowing for precise estimates.

Following the literature on executive turnover (see, among others, [Denis and Denis, 1995](#);

Basic Metals, Mechanics, Textile, Chemicals, Shoes, Non Metallic Minerals, Paper and Publishing, Construction, Utilities, Transport, Personal Services, Trade, Real Estate, Hotel and Restaurant, and Professional Services.

⁹The last category is that of blue collar workers (“operai” in Italian), which we do not use in our analysis.

¹⁰In robustness checks, we repeat the analysis by excluding deceased executives with claims to the administration for paid-sick leave in any prior year.

Huson et al., 2004; Bennedson et al., 2007, 2020), we use ROA as preferred measure of performance, defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) over lagged assets. ROA measures the average return on the capital immobilized by the firm, without distinguishing between its sources (debt vs. equity). As such, it is a measure of profitability of the overall capital stock. If a firm suffers from the death of one of its executives, we expect this to show up in terms of ROA. An alternative would be to consider ROE, that more directly reflects returns to equity holders. The problem with ROE is that it depends on the firm’s financial structure and it is more volatile than ROA.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample.¹¹ Panel A describes the firm sample, which consists of 306,246 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2015. A firm is included in our sample if it appears as having at least one executive in the INPS files in any year over the sample period. ROA for the average (median) firm is around 4.1% (3.8%), and firm value-added per worker is equal to €84,553 on average (66,940 at the median). The average firm in our sample has 3.2 executives.

The second part of Panel A compares the size, age, ROA and number of executives of firms in thin versus thick markets for executives. Firms in thick markets tend to be on average more profitable, slightly smaller, younger, and employ more executives. The third part of Panel A compares instead the size, age, return on assets and number of executives of eventually treated and never treated firms. Eventually treated firms – those hit by the death of one of their executives at least once during the sample period – are larger, more profitable and employ more executives than never treated firms. These comparisons underline the importance of accounting for firm characteristics in the empirical analysis.

Panel B presents the executive-level sample, separately for deceased executives, taken in the year of death, and non-deceased executives. Executive characteristics are fairly similar across both samples, even though the average deceased executive tends to be older - 52.8 years old compared to 48.4 for non-deceased executives -, has worked slightly more in the same firm - her/his tenure is 11.9 at the time of the death versus 9.8 years for non-deceased executives, and is slightly less likely to be a woman (9.7% versus 13.2% for non-deceased executives). Note however that wages in the year preceding the death event are virtually identical to the average wage in the sample of non-deceased executives. This is consistent with the notion that the premature death events that we observe in the data are fairly unexpected, as the compensation should be lower in the year prior to the death if the executive had some health conditions that impaired the quality of her work.

Next, we report the separation of new hires. Approximately one quarter of newly hired

¹¹To account for outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables below the 1st and above the 99th percentile to the value of the 1st and of the 99th percentile respectively.

executives separate within a year, and almost half work for the firm less than 4 years, indicating that recently formed matches have a high hazard rate.

Since 2010, firms are required to report to the ministry of labor the educational attainment of new hires. We use the INPS codification in order to construct three dummies corresponding to the executive having less than a high school degree,¹² high school and a college degree. Even though reporting education attainment of all new hires is a legal obligation since 2010, firms have the possibility to report “not known”. The consequence for our analysis is that we observe information on education for around 85% of the executives who changed firm after 2010. In the sample of executives changing firm after 2010, 5% have no high school degree, 21% have a high school degree, and 74% have a college degree.

4.2 Stylized facts on executive mobility

In this section we present stylized facts on the mobility of executives to support our assumption that employees’ industry specific human capital and geographical mobility costs direct job searches toward firms within the same industry and geographical area.

We first describe in Table 2 where newly appointed executives come from. Panel A shows that most of the newly appointed executives come from outside the firm: around one third are internal promotions, 9.4% are externally hired white collars and 51.4% externally hired executives.¹³

Panel B focuses on external hires and distinguishes between newly appointed executives from the same industry, the same CZ, and the same industry-CZ combination. Importantly for our identification strategy presented above, a large fraction of executive mobility tends to occur within CZ and industry: we find that 54.5% are from the same industry, 58.4% from the same CZ and 35.3% from the same industry-CZ combination. Appendix Table A.1 shows that, when assuming random mobility, these numbers are much smaller. In particular, hires within the same industry-CZ would be less than 2%. These patterns suggest that executives in our sample deploy significant industry specific knowledge, and face significant costs of moving from one area to the other.

One may wonder whether the Italian economy is an outlier in terms of executive mobility. As a first comparison, we reproduce in Panel B of Appendix Table A.1 the same computations for the French economy, for which we have similar matched employer-employee records from

¹²Note that in Italy compulsory schooling age is sixteen, while high school requires three more years of education. Differently from the US, therefore, a large part of the population does not hold a high school degree.

¹³The INPS archives contain the universe of Italian private sector employees, so the category “Not in the sample at T-1” contains individuals working abroad, working for the public sector, self-employed or not employed at T-1.

a random sample of 1/12th of the French workforce (provided by the French statistical office, INSEE). We use an industry classification with a similar granularity (17 industries instead of 19), and the list of CZs as defined by the French statistical office. The pattern of executive moves within industry and CZ is remarkably similar to the one in Italy: 71% percent of French executive moves are within the same CZ, 66% percent within the same industry, and 50% percent within the same CZ \times industry, against respectively 15%, 13%, and 3% in counterfactuals with random moves. We do not have similar matched employer-employee data for the United States. However, the same computations using alternatively Execucomp data which covers the top five highest-paid executives of a large sample of U.S. listed firms also indicate that even (the tail of) U.S. listed firms' top executives tend to move disproportionately more within the same area and industry (see Panel C of Appendix Table A.1).

In Table 3 we illustrate in a regression framework how the executives hiring process is related to market thickness.¹⁴ An implication of the fact that a thicker local supply of executives is more likely to satisfy a firm's managerial needs is that, when a firm hires an executive, the probability of hiring locally should be higher the thicker the market. Consistently, Columns (1-3) of Table 3 show that the probability of hiring external executives from the same CZ, industry and market is positively correlated with market thickness. For example, for the market regression (Column 3), the coefficient is equal to 0.053 (and highly statistically significant), which implies that doubling the number of executives goes together with an increase in the share of locally hired executives of approximately 5.3%. Given that the average share of locally hired executives is 35% (see Table 2), this represents an increase of 15% over such average.

Next, we consider the "quality" of executives hired. For this, we first exploit the education data, available for a majority of executives who changed job since 2010. Columns (4-6) show that, the thicker the market, the less likely it is that a newly hired executive has a high-school degree and the more likely that she is a college graduate. Next, we use different measures of experience. Column (7) shows that local experience, defined as the number of years employed in the same province as the hiring firm,¹⁵ increases with market thickness. The same holds for industry experience, defined as the number of years employed in the same industry of the hiring firm (Column 8), while no significant effect emerges for experience as executive (Column 9). Finally, the wage in the previous job increases with market thickness

¹⁴We always control for industry \times year and CZ \times year fixed effects to account for industry and location specific fixed and time-varying attributes and cluster standard errors at the market (CZ \times industry) level.

¹⁵Provinces are administrative units roughly comparable to US counties and larger than CZ. As of 2021, there are 107 provinces in Italy. We use provinces rather than CZs to construct the local experience measure as the province information is available since 1984 rather than 2005.

(Column 10).

Overall, this evidence is consistent with the idea that the thickness of the local executive market has a positive impact both on the likelihood to hire locally and on the quality of new executive hires. Of course, this correlation cannot be interpreted in a causal sense. In particular, it might be that firms located in thicker markets are “better” firms, that is, more productive, more innovative or export oriented, and therefore they might express a demand for executives of higher quality. To take a step towards a causal interpretation of the correlation between executive supply and firm performance we now move on to our main identification strategy: firm performance after an executive death in markets with different degrees of thickness.

5 Results

In this section, we estimate the effect of executive exit on firm ROA. Before doing so, we document the evolution of the number of executives following a death event. Figure 2, Panel A plots the change in the number of executives following a death event, separately for thin and thick markets. The patterns are very similar: in both market types, the number of firm executives drops by virtually 1 on the year of the death, and then it recovers in the following two years, by around 0.30 each year. The coefficients are virtually zero in years 3 and 4. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of the model, according to which the effects of market thickness on the expected time to fill a vacancy is ambiguous. Moreover, the fact that the patterns are very similar in thin and thick markets is a first indication that any difference in the effects of deaths on performance is likely to come from match quality rather than quantity. We further show in Panel B that the change in the number of executives is not driven by any abnormal behavior of internal promotions: both in thin and thick markets, death events are not associated with a significant change in the share of newly appointed executives that are internally promoted.

5.1 Baseline results

To check for the effects of executive deaths, we first run a simplified version of Equation (6) without controlling for market thickness, and present the results in Panel A of Table 4. We consider performance on the year of the event and the three following ones: in the notation of Equation (6), $\tau = [t - 3, t]$. Given that we always include firm fixed effects and that the shock is firm specific, we cluster standard error at the firm level. The estimate in Column (1), where we only control for firm and year fixed effects, indicates that ROA drops by an

average of approximately 0.9 percentage points, significant at the 1% level.¹⁶ Relative to the sample mean of 4%, the effect implies a drop of ROA by almost a quarter. In Column (2) we include industry×year and CZ×year fixed effects. The estimate remains virtually the same. Not surprisingly, this confirms that the effect on firm performance is not related to shocks at the industry or geographical levels correlated with executive deaths. In Column (3) we add firm characteristics (dummies for tercile of assets, age, ROA interacted with year dummies, all measured at t-3) and dummies for terciles of the total number of firm executives interacted with year dummies. Again, the results are unchanged. This addresses the concern that the results could be driven by diverging trends between firms with different characteristics or with a small versus large number of executives. Finally, in Column (4) we add market×year fixed effects. In this specification, we absorb any shock that hits the firm’s executive market and that could be correlated with executive death, including natural disasters and the like. The effect is slightly reduced, at -0.72%, and significant at 5%.

The results of our basic estimation indicate that executive deaths have a large impact on profitability. This regression is a useful starting point in our analysis but arguably a negative effect of death on performance can result independently from executive supply: an executive is likely to have some firm specific capital that gets destroyed by death and, in the process of rebuilding it, firm performance might suffer. To implement our identification strategy, we now bring into the picture the effect of executive market thickness. We begin by estimating Equation (6), but replacing the continuous indicator of market thickness with a dummy equal to one if the market is above the median in terms of number of executives (a “thick” market). The results of Panel B in Table 4 are clear cut: all the aggregate effect comes from deaths in thin markets. In fact, we find that, across specifications, the drop of ROA in thin markets is large and stable –between 1.7 and 2 percentage points– and highly statistically significant. This means that, compared to the sample mean, ROA drops approximately by half. Instead, in thick markets we find virtually no effect: β_1 , the coefficient of the variable DecEx×Thick market is positive, statistically significant and only slightly smaller in absolute value than the coefficient in thin markets β_0 , so that we fail to reject the hypothesis that $\beta_0 + \beta_1 = 0$ in all specifications. The estimates imply that the firm-specific human capital channel finds little support in the data. In thick markets, where it is easier to find a replacement, firm performance is hardly affected by the death event. Instead, in thin markets the drop is large and precisely estimated. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the (local) supply of top management skills affects firm performance.

¹⁶In terms of comparison, [Bennedsen et al. \(2020\)](#) find a stronger effect in their Danish data (-1.86%, see the fourth column in their Table VI), arguably because they only consider the year of death and focus on CEOs only rather than all executives.

The high degree of stability of the coefficients as we increase the controls is an indication that our death event is indeed orthogonal to the observed and unobserved heterogeneity we control for, supporting our identification framework.

Panel C of Table 4 reports the estimate of Equation (6) using the continuous indicator of labor market thickness. The estimates of β_0 vary between -3.1 and -3.6, implying that, when no other executives are present in the market, following a death event the firm ROA drops almost to zero compared to the sample mean. The estimate of β_1 is positive, highly significant and stable across specifications, with a value of around 0.4, indicating that, as thickness increases, the negative effects of executive deaths are attenuated. Using the estimates of our preferred specification of Column (3), we obtain that the effect of a death is zero in markets with almost 1,400 executives. Given that the 99th percentile is 340 (see Table 1), these estimates imply that the negative effect of a death event completely disappears only in very large markets. Finally, we find some evidence of a negative effect of thickness in itself in the first two columns. Note however that this should not be interpreted in a cross sectional sense, that is, firms in thicker markets having lower ROA. Given that we always include firm fixed effects, and given that firms do not change markets, the coefficient is only identified by the time series variation in the number of executives within market. In fact, when we add more controls at the level of the firm (Column 3), the effect disappears (in Column (4) market thickness is absorbed by market \times year effects).

Our baseline specification delivers an average effect over the period of the year of the death and the following three ones. We next examine the dynamics of the effect by estimating the following equation separately for thin and thick markets:

$$\text{ROA}_{i,j,t} = \sum_{\tau=-2}^5 \beta_{\tau} \text{DecEx}_{i,t-\tau} + \beta_3 X_{i,j,t} + \eta_{i,j,t}. \quad (8)$$

The coefficients β_{τ} trace the dynamics of the death event from 2 periods before to 5 periods after its occurrence. The results of this exercise are plotted in Figure 3, based on our preferred specification of Column (3) in Table 4. First, for our identification strategy to hold, ROA should show no prior trend. Reassuringly, the coefficients on DecEx_{t+1} and DecEx_{t+2} are small and not statistically different from zero both in thin and in thick markets. Second, in thick markets we observe a drop in the year of the event (-0.8%), and values very close to zero in all the following years. None of the coefficients is statistically significant, indicating that for these firms there is no departure from the firm-level average ROA (recall that all regressions include firm fixed effects). On the contrary, in thin markets ROA drops substantially on the year of the event, with an estimated value of -2.1%, and remains below -1.5% and highly significant in the three following years. It marginally loses significance after 4 years (-1.16%),

and the effect clearly disappears only after 5 years. We conclude that, consistently with the model’s predictions, the effects of executive deaths are both larger and longer lasting in thin markets.

5.2 Robustness and extensions

We now exploit our granular data to explore in detail the robustness of the results and to perform some heterogeneity analysis.

Performance measure. We explore the robustness to using alternative performance measures in Table 5. In Column (1) we use productivity, defined as value added (in 2015 constant thousand euros) per worker. Productivity is a more comprehensive measure of the firm’s efficiency, as it also accounts for the number and the compensation of employees. The results fully confirm those obtained with ROA: the coefficient of DecEx is -10 and that on its interaction with market thickness is 1.5, both statistically significant at conventional levels. Next, we consider the probability that a firm exits the market following the death event. In fact, disruptions caused by the death could, in the most extreme cases, lead to firm exit. In Column (2) we report the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exits the market in year t . While the signs are as expected—the DecEx dummy has a positive and its interaction with MktTkn a negative coefficient—the estimates are imprecise and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of deaths on firm exit.

An important question relates to what causes the drop in ROA. By definition, ROA is sales minus intermediate and labor costs over assets. In the next three columns we use as dependent variable each component of ROA separately, that is, sales, intermediates expenditure and labor costs, each divided by lagged assets. We find that the drop in ROA is caused by a large drop in sales over asset (Column 3), not compensated by a corresponding drop in intermediates costs (Column 4, the coefficients are significant but smaller than those of sales) or labor costs (Column 5, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero). Finally, in Column (6) we use the log of assets as the dependent variable, to account for the possibility that the death event disrupts firm assets. The estimates do not lend support to this hypothesis, indicating that changes in ROA are dictated by changes in profits rather than assets. The picture that emerges from this exercise is one in which a death event causes a drop in sales that is not compensated by a corresponding drop in costs: in particular, labor costs do not move, consistently with the large evidence of a low elasticity of employment to firm shocks, both in terms of number of employees and of wages (see, for example, [Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi, 2018](#); [Guiso et al., 2005](#)).

Thickness measure. Our preferred measure of market thickness is the logarithm of the

number of executives in the market at $t - 1$. We explore the robustness of the results with respect to this measure in the first three columns of Table 6. In column (1) we use the number of firms and in Column (2) the number of executives working for other firms (that is, excluding own executives). The estimates are very similar to those based on our preferred measure. A possible concern relates to the fact that market thickness, even though lagged in our specifications, could be affected by the death of an executive itself. The estimates of Column (1) and (2) go against this hypothesis: our results do not change when we define thickness using only the number of executives in other firms and the number of firms, not directly affected by the death. Still, one could argue that the number of executives in other firms could be indirectly affected by death via executive poaching. We therefore address this concern directly running our baseline specification using a time-invariant measure of market thickness. To do so, we fix market thickness in 2005, the first year of our sample period. As shown in Column (3) of Table 6, the estimates are virtually unchanged. The same holds when we use the average number of executives over the sample period (unreported for brevity).

Market definition. Next, we experiment with the sectoral and geographical components of the market definition, using CZ and 1-digit Industry in Column (4), province and 2-digit Industry in Column (5), and province and 1-digit Industry in Column (6). The next two columns experiment with a different notion of the geographical component of the market definition, based only on geographical distance: We use municipalities within a radius of 10 miles around the firm, together with 2-digit Industry in Column (7) and 1-digit Industry in Column (8).¹⁷ In this case, the geographical component of the market definition is basically different for each municipality.

The algorithm used by the National Statistical Institute to define CZ is based on home-to-work commuting patterns and it is the standard definition of labor markets in the labor literature (see, for example, [David, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013](#); [Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2017](#); [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020](#)). [Nimczik \(2018\)](#) proposes an alternative definition that leverages on matched employer-employee data and uses observed worker flows across firms. We follow his procedure and compute an alternative measure of market thickness based on observed executive flows across each pair of markets (Industry \times CZ cells). Specifically, consider a square matrix T in which $T_{l,m}$ denotes the total number of executive transitions from market l to market m within the sample period. For a firm located in market m , we then compute market thickness as $\log\left(\frac{\sum_l T_{l,m} \times N_{l,t-1}}{\sum_l T_{l,m}}\right)$ where $N_{l,t-1}$ is the number of executives working for firms in market l in year $t - 1$. We present the results when

¹⁷The distance of 10 miles is similar to the average distance between pairs of municipalities of the same CZ.

the data-driven local labor markets are computed based on executive flows across 2-digit Industry×CZ pairs in Column (9) and across 1-digit Industry×CZ pairs in Column (10).

The estimates of the coefficient of DecEx and of its interaction with MktTkn are stable across all these different specifications, indicating that our results are extremely robust to the definition of market thickness.

Firm and executive characteristics. Our regressions already control for firm characteristics. However, one further concern is that our estimates of market thickness might reflect the heterogeneous responses to death events of some types of firms which are differentially present in markets with different levels of thickness, as opposed to the true causal impact of labor market thickness itself. For example, firms with many executives might be both more present in thick markets and less adversely affected by death events than firms with few executives, irrespective of the thickness of their labor market. To control for this possibility, we augment our specification with firm characteristics (number of executives, assets, age and ROA, all measured 3 years before the death event), and their interactions with the death dummy, as well as with market thickness. The result of this augmented specification is reported in Column (1) of Table 7. Reassuringly, the estimate of the interaction of interest between the deceased executive dummy and market thickness remains remarkably stable at 0.49.

A similar argument can be made regarding the characteristics of the deceased executives. For example, older executives might be more common in thin markets, and their death might have a stronger impact on performance. To gauge the relevance of these concerns, we include the interactions between age, tenure, gender and wage of the deceased executive in the year prior to death with the deceased executive dummy.¹⁸ Column (2) of Table 7 shows that the estimate on the main interaction term between the deceased executive dummy and market thickness remains stable when adding these additional controls.

Taken together, the results presented in Columns (1) and (2) address the concern that potential differences in firm characteristics or executive characteristics across thin and thick markets could confound our findings.

Different subsamples. Next, we check if the results change when using different subsamples to run the regressions. The Italian economy is characterized by a large heterogeneity in economic development, with a clear negative gradient from the North to the South. One might be concerned that our effects are induced by some specific area, for example the South,

¹⁸In the unlikely event in which two executives of the same firm died in the same year, we take the average of each executive characteristic. Note that we do not include neither the (non-interacted) deceased executive characteristics, nor their interaction with market thickness, as they are only defined for firms hit by death events.

where markets are thin and firms are generally weaker in terms of performance. This concern is greatly mitigated by the fact that, as shown in Figure 1, death events are spread across Italy, and that our specifications exploit within CZ variation only. In any case, we have estimated our regressions separately for the North and the Center-South. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show that the estimates are similar across areas, indicating that our effects apply generally and go beyond the territorial differences that characterize the Italian economy.

Another issue is that eventually treated firms and never treated firms are different in terms of characteristics, as, by construction, a firm is more likely to be treated the larger the number of executives it employs (see the descriptive statistics in Table 1). We address this issue with the inclusion of firm fixed effects and a large number of controls in our specifications. However, to dispel any further concern we also estimated our model only keeping eventually treated firms, so that the control group is only composed of eventually treated firms themselves in the periods in which they are not classified as treated. Despite a large drop in observations (from 306,246 to 8,727), Column (5) of Table 7 shows again stable results.

In yet another check, following [Jaravel et al. \(2018\)](#) we have also employed an exact matching technique to construct a balanced control sample. Appendix Table A.2 reports the results using eight different firm characteristics to perform the match (the matching procedure is described in detail in the note to the table). This matching procedure delivers similar estimates for both the death dummy and its interaction term with labor thickness across all specifications, supporting the robustness of our results and in particular the adequacy of our controls.¹⁹

Another concern is that the results might be driven by firms with only one executive, which might be more likely to operate in thin markets. The specification presented in Column (1) of Table 7, in which we add firm characteristics and their interaction with the death dummy, including the number of firm executives, largely alleviates this concern. In any case, we directly address it in Columns (6) and (7), which report the results when running the baseline estimation separately for the sub-samples of firms with only 1 executive and with more than 1 executive in $t - 1$. Perhaps not surprisingly, the effect of death events is stronger for firms with only one executive. Moreover, market thickness bears a larger coefficient in this sample, arguably because finding a good replacement is more important when the firm has only one executive, and this is more difficult in thin markets. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant also in the sub-

¹⁹To maximize comparability with the main specification, Table A.2 includes CZ and Industry fixed effects interacted with year dummies. One could argue that the matching procedure makes these dummies somehow redundant. We have therefore also estimated the matched sample without these dummies. As expected, the results, unreported for brevity, are similar.

sample of firms with more than one executive, indicating that market thickness matters in general for the impact of an executive’s death on firm performance.²⁰

In the following section, we run regressions of executive wages that require at least another firm besides the firm hit by the death of an executive. To check that our baseline results on firm performance are not different in this sub-sample, we report in Column (8) the results from the restricted sample with at least two firms in a given market. The estimates are virtually unchanged compared to our baseline specification.

Next, we check the sensitivity of the results to restricting the sample to a more conservative set of unexpected executive deaths. For this, we repeat the analysis by excluding deceased executives with claims to the social security administration for paid-sick leave in any prior year, and present the results in Column (9), finding again very similar coefficients.

We conclude that our results are extremely robust to changes in the sample definition and in the selection of controls.

Firms attrition. Another possibility is that our results are driven by the firms that eventually exit the market. It might be that in thin markets some firms do not find a suitable replacement and therefore, after a deterioration in performance, they exit, while firms that find a replacement do as well as those in thick markets. In particular, we might also wrongly interpret the dynamics presented in Figure 3 as evidence that firms gradually absorb death shocks while it might simply reflect the fact that the most-severely affected firms exit first. While this hypothesis confirms that executive market thickness affects performance, it implies that the average effect we measure is actually concentrated in a few low-performing firms. Note that the results on firm exit suggests that this should not be the case, as we do not find significant effects of thickness on exit (see Column (2) of Table 5). However, we can directly test its validity by repeating the dynamic regressions of Panel A and B of Figure 3 on the closed sample, that is, excluding firms that exit the sample at some point. Appendix Figure A.1 reports these estimates, showing that the results are similar to those obtained with the full sample. This indicates that the results are not driven by eventually exiting firms.

Non executive white-collar. We analyze if the effect is specific to executives by considering the evolution of ROA when at least one (non-executive) white-collar dies. Appendix Table A.3 repeats the regressions of our preferred specification of Table 4, panel C, substituting the Deceased Executive dummy with a Deceased white-collar dummy. We find no significant effect of a white-collar death and of its interaction with market thickness. This can be due both to the fact that one white-collar worker other than an executive is not a

²⁰We provide more evidence on the heterogeneity of our effects according to firm characteristics below.

key asset for firms, and that there is no shortage of white collar workers: they are not in short supply in any market. Either way, this placebo test rejects the concern that differences in firm characteristics between thin and thick markets could drive both worker deaths and performance.

Firm ownership and management. Another concern is that market thickness could be related to different ownership structures, in particular in terms of presence of family owned and managed firms, which might have a large degree of firm specific human capital and for which it could be particularly problematic to find a replacement after an executive death.²¹ We use data on firm ownership and control to gauge the severity of this concern.²² Due to privacy reasons, we cannot link this information to our firm data, but we can aggregate them at the market-period level. We run a regression of the share of family owned and managed firms on our measure of labor market thickness, after including both industry-year and CZ-year fixed effects, following the empirical framework used in our analysis. Reassuringly, as shown in Appendix Table A.4, we fail to find any significant correlation between the two variables. Indeed, the share of family owned and managed firms is almost identical in both market types. This addresses the concern that the larger drop in profits that we observe in thin labor markets following death events could be driven to the fact that, in these markets, the deceased executive is more likely to also be the owner of the affected firm.

Heterogeneity of the effects. We now turn to heterogeneity analysis of our baseline findings depending on firm characteristics, executive characteristics, and sector of firm operations.

To do so, we use the same firm and executive characteristics introduced as controls in Columns (1) and (2) of robustness Table 7, in which we further augment the specifications with the triple interaction of the death dummy, market thickness and the firm (and respectively executive) characteristics.

Panel A of Table 8 presents the results separately for each of the following firm characteristics: Number of executives, log of assets, age, and ROA, all measured three years before the death event. In a similar way as in Column (1) of Table 7, we also include all the pairwise

²¹ Consistently with this hypothesis, [Smith et al. \(2019\)](#) show that a large share of closely held business income is attributable to owners' specific human capital. This result might seem at odds with our finding that, when an executive dies in a thick market, the firm ROA is not affected. Note however that the two exercises are not directly comparable. [Smith et al. \(2019\)](#) focus on business *owners* in pass-through corporations, while we focus on executives, who are paid employees in traditional incorporated businesses, and we cannot determine if they are also business owners.

²²Data on firm ownership and control are from the Chamber of Commerce (the same source as the balance sheet data), to which all incorporated firms must report both ownership and board composition. We assume that individuals are part of a family if they share the same last name or the same home address. We define a firm as family owned and managed if one or more individuals belonging to the same family own at least 50% of shares and one of them also has the most important position in the board (CEO or President).

interaction terms between DecEx, MktTkn and the firm characteristic of interest. We find that firm size, measured both in terms of the number of executives and of total assets, is an important mediator of the impact of an executive death and of the effect of market thickness. Specifically, firms with more executives or larger assets are less impacted by the executive death (the interaction between the size indicator and the death dummy is positive) and benefit less from the mitigating effect of market thickness (the triple interaction is negative). This is consistent with the hypothesis that large firms are less reliant on a single executive. These results also imply that the negative impact of operating in thin labor markets when hit by a death event is magnified for small firms. Next, we introduce firm age (Column 3) and lagged ROA (Column 4), finding that none of the interactions is significant.

Panel B of Table 8 repeats the same exercise using the following characteristics of the deceased executives: tenure, age, gender and wage in the year prior to death. Differently from firm characteristics, we find no significant heterogeneity along these dimensions. Interestingly, this result is consistent with the model’s predictions, according to which pre-death average executive quality is the same across thin and thick markets, as firms keep searching until when they find a sufficiently high-quality executive.

The last dimension of heterogeneity we consider is sectoral.²³ We estimate the model repeatedly, singling out each one digit sector at a time (Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction, Utilities, Retail, Food and Accommodation and Services) and checking if the estimates are statistically different from those of the other sectors. The results, reported in Appendix Table A.5, show no significant cross sectoral heterogeneity. Moreover, the estimates on the main interaction term $\text{DecEx}(t, t - 3) \times \text{MktTkn}$ are remarkably stable across specifications, and indicate that our baseline findings do not depend on any particular sector.

6 Is it really executive supply?

Our evidence so far is consistent with the hypothesis that the local supply of executives matters for firm performance. However, one might still argue that the effect we find is spurious, as there might be unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated with thickness and that determine the intensity of a firm’s reaction to the death shock. For example, thin executive markets might be also thin in terms of other firms’ inputs, such as general workers and intermediates. It might be that firms in such areas are more fragile and therefore more affected by any negative shock, including an executive death. We believe that our rich set of local, sectoral and firm controls, as well as the interactions considered in the previous section, makes this possibility unlikely. However, given that it is theoretically possible, we now supply

²³We have already shown in Table 7 that the estimates are stable when splitting the sample geographically.

further evidence building on some unique implications of the economic mechanism behind our hypotheses. We first consider executive wages in non affected firms and then move on to the quality of new hires and turnover after death.²⁴

6.1 Executive wage response in other firms

Our hypothesis is that affected firms need to replace the deceased executive, possibly poaching the replacement executive from other firms in the same local market. One implication of this hypothesis is that executive wages in neighboring firms should increase after a death event in another firm due to the increase in executive demand, and the more so the thinner the market.²⁵ In fact, as reported in Table 1, the median market has 4 executives, so that one death represents a substantial shock to executive supply in many markets. Our granular data allow us to test this hypothesis. Specifically, we estimate Equation (7), regressing executive wages in non affected firms on the dummy variable $\text{DecEx}_{j,t-1}$, which is one if a firm in market j was hit by a death event at $t - 1$, and with its interaction with market thickness. Note the change of observation unit, now at the executive rather than at the firm level. Correspondingly, we control for executive fixed effects. We only use one lag of the death shock, as the hiring pressure on the local executive market should be concentrated in the year following the death event (we test this hypothesis below). We exclude all firms that ever had a death event, so that the sample is only of never affected firms. In some specifications, we also include industry \times year and CZ \times year fixed effects, and executive controls (age, tenure and gender interacted with year fixed effects).

Table 9 presents the results. When only controlling for year and executive fixed effects, we find that the coefficient of the deceased executive dummy is positive (2.72) while that of the interaction with market thickness is negative (-0.42), both statistically significant at 1%. Both estimates decrease in absolute value when we gradually include industry \times year and CZ \times year fixed effects, and when we control for potential diverging trends between young and old executives, male and female executives, and executives with short and long tenure, to approximately 1.7 and -0.27, but remain significant at 1%.

A possible concern is that affected and non affected firms are already on different trends before the death event, and that such trends differ according to market thickness. As in the firm performance analysis presented above, we check for this possibility by estimating a dynamic version of the wage Equation (7) separately for thin and thick markets. Figure 4

²⁴Our model presented in Section 2 is cast in partial equilibrium and therefore offers no insights for executive wages in other firms (while it does so for executive quality and turnover). We illustrate below the standard demand mechanism that motivates the analysis of executive wages in other firms.

²⁵Using French matched employer-employee data, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) show that between-firm competition is important in the determinant of wages.

plots the coefficients and the associated 95% confidence intervals resulting from this exercise. First, we find no evidence of any pre-trend both in thin and in thick markets, which further supports our identification strategy. Second, in thin markets, wages increase by 0.5% in the year following the event whereas we do not find statistically significant wage effects in the following years. Instead, in thick markets, wages do not respond to death events hitting other firms in any year.

While the wage spillovers are consistent with the idea that executive deaths are associated with an increase in the demand for executives, there is another potential explanation. In fact, the disruption caused by executive deaths in affected firms might benefit competitors on the product market and, consequently, their employees. If the set of competitors overlaps with that of the executive market, that is, if competitors are mostly local firms in the same industry, the increase in the wage might be due to an improved performance in neighboring firms. We address this possibility in three ways.

First, we present the dynamics of the effects on firm performance around the executive death, but focusing on the neighboring firms. Panel B of Figure 3 plots the coefficients for two periods before and five periods after the death event, separately for thin and thick markets. Again, we only include never treated firms. The coefficients are small and never statistically different from zero in both thin and thick markets. The evidence indicates that firm performance is not significantly affected by a death event hitting another firm located in the same market.

Next, we check in Panel B of Table 9 whether other white-collars in the firm hierarchy experience an increase in wages, which would presumably be the case if the effect we find for executives is due to rent sharing. Reassuringly, we find no effect on white-collars compensation in either thin or thick markets. Finally, we run the same specification as in Panel A but exclude from the sample executives working in non-tradable industries, for which product market competition is local, and higher performance of non-affected firms in the same local market could in principle explain the increase in wages that we observe. As shown in Appendix Table A.6, the estimates on executive wages employed at neighboring firms are still strongly statistically significant, and, if anything, larger.²⁶ We conclude that the effect on wages is attributable to the upward pressure of the demand for executives of the firms affected by the death event and not by changes in performance of neighboring firms.

²⁶We classify the following industries as non-tradable: Construction, Utilities, Transport, Personal Services, Trade, Real Estate, Hotel and Restaurant, and Professional Services.

6.2 Disruption within affected firms

Our model predicts that, after executive deaths, the quality of new hires is lower and their turnover higher, the thinner the market. We exploit these predictions and run a set of regressions to assess their validity.

First, we look at characteristics of new hires, replicating the regressions of Table 3 using DecEx and DecEx \times MktTkn as additional regressors (instead of MktTkn only) together with all the controls of our preferred specification, including firm fixed effects. These estimates inform us about to what extent new hires differ after deaths relative to “normal” times within firms. The first three columns of Table 10 consider where executives come from, using as dependent variable a dummy equal to one if an executive hired in the year after death is from the same CZ (Column 1), the same Industry (Column 2), or the same market (Column 3). Note that the model does not offer any clear prediction along this dimension, as it is a model of a single market. The results indicate that, in terms of where externally hired executives come from, firms do not significantly change their hiring behavior after a death event: for both Industry, CZ and CZ \times Industry, the coefficient of DecEx and that of DecEx \times MktTkn are not statistically different from zero.

Next, we consider the educational attainments of new hires, which Huber et al. (2021) show to be a particularly important managerial characteristic for firm performance.²⁷ We have seen in Table 3 that, in general, new hires are of lower “quality” in thinner markets. We now check if this is the case following a death event. Columns (4-6) use education as a quality measure. We find that the likelihood of hiring an executive with a college degree decreases in the year following a death event (the coefficient on the non-interacted coefficient DecEx ($t-1$) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level) and that this effect is mitigated by market thickness (the interaction term with MktTkn is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level). Symmetrically, the coefficients change sign when we look at executives with no education or a high school diploma (they are statistically significant only in the latter case, possibly because less than 5% of executives have no education, see Table 1). While these results are in line with the reduced form evidence of Table 3, we stress the difference in the data variation used to identify the coefficients: there, we show that higher education level of new hires is positively correlated with market thickness in the cross-section; here, given that we have firm fixed effects, we shows that, after being hit by an executive death, a firm in a thin market is less likely to hire executives with high education attainments compared to the hires of *the same firm* in “normal” periods. This indicates that, when facing an unexpected executive exit, firms in thin markets on average hire less educated executives compared to

²⁷Huber et al. (2021) use the Nazi discriminatory laws as a source of exogenous separation of managers of Jewish origin from German corporations during the Nazi regime.

normal times, in line with the model’s prediction.

In Column (7) we consider local labor market experience, finding that, after executive deaths, firms hire executives with lower local labor market experience and that this effect is mitigated by market thickness. The coefficients are large and highly statistically significant. We also look at industry experience (Column 8), experience as executive (Column 9) and wage in the previous job (Column 10). For these measures, the estimates are not statistically significant.

The model also predicts that low quality appointments are replaced over time, and given that they are more likely to occur in thin markets, they should lead to an increase in subsequent separations of executives in affected firms. In Table 11 we test whether death events have a differential effect on the likelihood of separations for new hires depending on market thickness. Specifically, we run regressions in which each observation is a newly hired executive, and use as dependent variables dummies for whether she remains employed for less than respectively 1, 2, 3, or 4 years. We find that the coefficient on the DecEx dummy is always positive and turns statistically significant at 3 and 4 years, indicating that the duration of the new matches formed between firms and executives hired after a death event is significantly lower compared to normal times. Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term between the death dummy and market thickness is always negative and significant at and after year 2, indicating that early separations of newly hired executives after death events are less likely when local labor markets are thicker.

Putting all these results together, we conclude that market thickness positively affects the quality of newly hired executives after an executive death. This emerges both when we look at direct measures of quality, in particular education, and when we use the duration of the match as an indirect quality measure. Consistently with the model, this can explain the deterioration in performance for firms in thin markets documented above.

7 Discussion

In this section we discuss the external validity of our results, propose an estimate of the aggregate costs of premature deaths and argue that these effects are not specific to Italy.

7.1 External validity: Planned Exits

Our results are informative for the effects of unexpected executive turnover on firm outcomes. Nonetheless, these results can plausibly be extended to other types of shocks that require firms to acquire quickly new types of skills on the market – for example an unexpected,

large business opportunity in China. If the firm does not respond quickly by hiring a new executive with the required skills (for instance, having experience with doing business in China), the opportunity is gone. Arguably, firms are continuously subject to a variety of similar shocks. How do our findings speak to the implications of labor market thickness for firm performance in “normal times”, that is, when firms might have more time to find a suitable match? Even if this remains outside the scope of this paper, one first pass to shed light on this question is to estimate the effect on firm performance of executive exits that are arguably more likely to be anticipated. For this, we present in Figure 5 the dynamics of the effects on performance using executive retirements as an anticipated exit. As for executive deaths, the effect of executive retirement on performance is negative and significant only in thin markets. Quantitatively, the effect is significantly weaker (-0.5 against -2 for unplanned exit, see Figure 3, Panel A) and lasts only for two periods. This is in line with the idea that a planned exit gives the firm the time to search for a replacement, reducing its disruption. Still, it represents a sizable drop in ROA. In thick markets, the effect is never statistically significant. Given that executive exits are common events in a firm’s life cycle, this result suggests that the scarcity of executive supply affects firm performance in a substantial way.

7.2 Economic significance of the effects

Is the negative effect of executive exit on firm ROA in thin markets reflected in market-level data, or is it offset in the aggregate? To answer this question, we first sum separately the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the assets of all firms operating in the same CZ×industry, and construct a measure of ROA at the market level, defined as the ratio of market-level EBIT over lagged market-level assets. For each market and year, we also compute a dummy indicating whether (at least) one firm in that market is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years, and also interact this dummy with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same market in the previous year. We then run similar regressions as those with firm-level data, here aggregated at the market level, and present the results in Panel A of Appendix Table A.7. While we find no significant effect of death events on a given market profitability in specifications in which we only include the DecEx dummy (Column 1), the same pattern as with the firm level data emerges once we also include the interaction of the DecEx dummy with market thickness: market-level profitability drops significantly after death events (the coefficient on the DecEx dummy is negative and statistically significant in Columns 2 to 4), and this effect is mitigated by market thickness (the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant). Using the estimates of Column (4), the effect of death events

on a local industry profitability becomes zero in a market with around 80 executives. Panel B repeats the exercise using value added per employee aggregated at the market level as dependent variable. We find similar results.

Next, we compute a back-of-the-envelope total value of the aggregate losses associated with death events. To do so, we take into account two important sources of heterogeneity. First, our key heterogeneity, that is, labor market thickness. Second, we also account for the fact that firm size is an important mediator of the effect. Specifically, Panel A of Table 8 shows that large firms are less sensitive to death events. In fact, using assets as the measure of size (Column 2 of Table 8), the implied drop in ROA in the thinnest markets for a firm at the first percentile of the size distribution (with log assets equal to 4.6, see summary statistics) is -10% ($-15.6+1.168*4.6$) while it is only -0.1% for the largest firms at the ninety-ninth percentile of the size distribution (with log assets equal to 13.3). Using the estimates of Column 2 of Table 8, the aggregate lost profits amount to around 1.45 billion euros over the sample period.²⁸ Importantly, compared to 1,000 executive deaths throughout the period, this implies that the death of an executive leads to 1.7 million euros loss on average, which is 425.000 per year when taking into account that this loss is estimated on a 4-year window. This value is of the same order of magnitude but substantially higher than the average wage of an executive in our sample, equal to 130.000 euros. The larger loss in profits compared to executive wages suggests a sizeable amount of rent sharing.

7.3 Are the results specific to Italy?

One may wonder how these results extend beyond the case of Italy. First, how representative is Italy in terms of the role of executives for firm performance? Thanks to the World Management Survey (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012), recent years have seen a substantial increase in our capacity to measure the quality of firm managerial practices and to compare them across countries. For example, Schivardi and Schmitz (2020) show that Italy ranks in the middle of the distribution of advanced economies, suggesting that it is a good benchmark in terms of comparability. A second question is how representative Italy is in terms of worker mobility. While international comparisons of labor market dynamics are difficult, due to data comparability issues, the available evidence suggests that Italy is fairly representative also along this dimension. First, in Appendix Table A.1 we have shown

²⁸To obtain this number, for each firm we multiply the 2015 constant dollar value of the affected firm assets in the year before death events by $4/100*(-15.649+1.168*\ln(\text{Assets})+2.097*\ln(\#\text{NbExecutives}(\text{Industry,CZ})) (t-1)-0.156*\ln(\#\text{NbExecutives}(\text{Industry,CZ})) (t-1)*\ln(\text{Assets}))$, where $\#\text{NbExecutives}(\text{Industry,CZ})$ is the total number of executives in the market in which the firm operates, Assets are the firm assets in 2015 constant dollar value, and we multiply by 4/100 because the effect lasts for four years and is expressed in %. We then sum these firm-level estimates over the negative values.

that the mobility patterns of executives are similar in Italy, France and the U.S. Second, the few papers that perform international studies supply a mixed picture. [Gómez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti \(2004\)](#) compute job reallocation rates (equal to the sum of job creation and job destruction) for 13 European countries, finding that Italy has the highest rate (12.3%, against an average of 9.3%). [Bassanini and Garnero \(2013\)](#) focus on worker flows for OECD countries and find that Italy is somehow on the low side of the distribution. For example, the hiring rate is 13% in Italy, 14.41% in Germany and 16.3% in France, while the U.S. and the U.K. display higher values (21% and 19.5% respectively). The numbers are similar for the separation rate. A particularly important flow for our analysis is job-to-job mobility. Using highly comparable social security data, [Berson, de Philippis, and Viviano \(2020\)](#) show that the job-to-job mobility rate is similar in Italy and France at around 8-9% – if anything, it is higher in Italy. Corresponding numbers computed for the U.S. by [Hahn, Hyatt, and Janicki \(2021\)](#) indicate lower mobility rates. Overall, this evidence suggests that the Italian labor market is not an outlier in terms of job and worker flows.

8 Conclusion

This article explores whether the local supply of executives affects firm performance. Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labor market thickness for executives that vary by industry and location. We then exploit executive deaths as an exogenous shock to executive exit, and show that firms in thin executive markets experience a drop of 1.7 percentage point in ROA following death events, which amounts to a large reduction with respect to the sample average. Strikingly, we find virtually no impact for death events that occur in thick executive markets. The effect shows no prior trend in neither market type, and lasts for at least three years in thin markets.

Consistent with the notion that thin executive markets lead to poorer firm-executive matches, we find that new executives hired after death events have lower education levels and are more likely to be replaced. We confirm firms' difficulty in finding a suitable replacement as the source of the drop in performance: in fact, peers wages in the same market increase, but only in thin markets. Taken together, these findings suggest that the scarcity of managerial skills is an important dimension in explaining differences in firm performance across industries and regions. From a policy perspective, they suggest that local policies aiming at boosting growth should take into consideration the supply of executive skills.

While premature deaths offer a useful source of exogenous variation to tease out the effects of executive supply, they do come at a cost with respect to the ideal setting of exogenous

shocks to executives supply. In fact, while we have shown that the local supply of executives matters for firm performance following a death event, we cannot directly derive an elasticity for the general setting. Doing so would require a structural approach that incorporates death events in an equilibrium model of the market for executives, an important topic for future research.

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
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9 Figures and tables

Figure 1

LOCATION OF EXECUTIVE DEATH EVENTS




Notes: This map presents executive death events located in each Italian Commuting Zone over the sample period.


Figure 2

DEATH SHOCKS AND EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL HIRING

Panel A. Change in Number of Executives



Panel B. Share Internal Promotions Among Newly Appointed Executives



Notes: These graphs present estimates from panel regressions of the change in the number of executives and the share of internal promotions in a given firm for different years around the death event of one executive. In Panel A, each graph plots estimated coefficients, β_τ , as well as the associated 95% confidence interval, of the following set of regressions:


$$\Delta\#Exec_{t+\tau-1,t+\tau} = \beta_\tau DecEx_{i,t} + f_i + d_t + \eta_{i,t}$$

where $\Delta\#Exec$ is the change in the number of executives between two dates and $DecEx_{i,t}$ is a dummy equal to one if the death of an executive hits firm i in year t in a thin labor market (respectively in a thick labor market). In Panel B, the dependent variable is replaced by the share of firm workers previously employed in the same firm in non-executive occupations and promoted to executives in year $t - \tau$ among the total number of individuals appointed as new executives in the same year (including both internal promotions and external hires). The specifications include firm fixed effects f_i , and year fixed effects d_t . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period spans 2005 to 2015.


Figure 3

EXECUTIVE EXITS AND FIRM ROA IN THIN VERSUS THICK LABOR MARKETS

Panel A. Treated Firms



Panel B. Neighboring Firms




Notes: Panel A of this figure presents estimates of return on assets in the two years before and five years after the occurrence of a deceased executive in respectively thin and thick labor markets. Return on assets (ROA) is earnings before interest and taxes, over the value of assets in the previous year. Each graph plots estimated coefficients, β_τ , as well as the associated 95% confidence interval, of the following regression:

$$ROA_{i,t} = \sum_{\tau=-2}^5 \beta_\tau DecEx_{i,t-\tau} + f_i + d_{s,t} + d_{cz,t} + d_{f,t} + \eta_{i,t}$$

where $DecEx_{i,t-\tau}$ is a dummy equal to one if the death of an executive hits firm i in year $t - \tau$ in a thin labor market (respectively in a thick labor market). The specification also includes firm fixed effects f_i , industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, $d_{s,t}$ and $d_{cz,t}$, and firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies $d_{f,t}$. Panel B runs the same specification for firms never treated over the sample period, and presents estimates for ROA in different years around the occurrence of a deceased executive in another firm in the same market, separately for thin and thick labor markets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in Panel A and at the Industry \times CZ level in Panel B. The sample period spans 2005 to 2015.

Figure 4

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AT NEIGHBORING FIRMS IN THIN VERSUS THICK LABOR MARKETS




Notes: This figure presents estimates of executive compensation (the log of total compensation in thousand 2015 real euros) in the two years before and five years after the occurrence of a deceased executive in another firm in the same market in respectively thin and thick labor markets. Each graph plots estimated coefficients, β_τ , as well as the associated 95% confidence interval, of the following regression:

$$\text{Ln(Wage)}_{k,-i,j,t} = \sum_{\tau=-2}^5 \beta_\tau \text{DecEx}_{k,-i,j,t-\tau} + f_k + d_t + u_{k,-i,j,t}$$

where $\text{DecEx}_{k,-i,j,t-\tau}$ is a dummy equal to one if the death of an executive hits another firm $-i$ in the same market j in year $t - \tau$ in a thin labor market (respectively in a thick labor market). The specification also includes executive fixed effects f_k , and year dummies d_t . The specification includes only executives of firms never treated over the sample period. Standard errors are clustered at the Industry \times CZ level. The sample period spans 2005 to 2015.

Figure 5

EXECUTIVE PLANNED EXITS AND FIRM ROA IN THIN VERSUS THICK LABOR MARKETS



Notes: This figure presents estimates of return on assets in the two years before and five years after a given executive of the firm retires in respectively thin and thick labor markets. Return on assets (ROA) is earnings before interest and taxes, over the value of assets in the previous year. Each graph plots estimated coefficients, β_τ , as well as the associated 95% confidence interval, of the following regression:

$$ROA_{i,t} = \sum_{\tau=-2}^5 \beta_\tau \text{RetiredEx}_{i,t-\tau} + f_i + d_{s,t} + d_{cz,t} + d_{f,t} + \eta_{i,t}$$

where $\text{DecEx}_{i,t-\tau}$ is a dummy equal to one if the death of an executive hits firm i in year $t - \tau$ in a thin labor market (respectively in a thick labor market). The specification also includes firm fixed effects f_i , industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, $d_{s,t}$ and $d_{cz,t}$, and firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies $d_{f,t}$. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period spans 2005 to 2015.

Table 1
Summary Statistics

This table presents the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents the firm sample, which consists of 306,246 firm-years between 2005 and 2015. A firm is included in our sample if it appears as having at least one executive in the INPS files in any year over the sample period. We exclude financial firms, which follow different accounting rules. ROA is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over lagged assets. Exit is a dummy that equals one if the firm exits the firm database in year t . Eventually Exit is a dummy that equals one for a firm that exits the firm database in any year over our sample period. Labor productivity is value added divided by the number of employees at the end of the previous year. Firm Size is the logarithm of assets. Firm Age is the number of years since firm creation. DecEx is a dummy indicating the death of at least one executive of the firm in year t or any of the previous three years. The first part of Panel A is based on all firms. The second part distinguishes by labor market type. A labor market (the combination of a CZ and an industry) is defined as thin (respectively thick) if it lies below (respectively above) the yearly median across all firms in the sample in terms of the total number of executives in each market. The third panel distinguishes between treated and untreated firms. Eventually treated firms are those that are hit by the death of one executive at least once over the sample period, and never treated firms are those never hit by a death event. The last part reports characteristics at the market (commuting zones \times industry) level, namely the lagged number of executives employed in all firms in a given market, and a dummy indicating whether at least one executive dies in a given market \times year. Panel B presents the executives sample, separately for deceased and non-deceased executives. We exclude executives with pay below €50,000 in the previous year (around 2% of the full sample). Executive tenure is the number of years since the individual has joined the firm as an executive. The third panel of Panel B reports the separation rates of newly hired executives. The last panel of Panel B reports the education of individuals joining a new firm to work as an executive. Information on education is available only for executives who changed job since 2010. All monetary values are in 2015 constant thousand euros, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles.

Panel A:	Firm Sample					
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p50	p99
ROA (%)	306,246	4.155	15.163	-52.103	3.796	54.034
Exit	306,246	0.034	0.180	0.000	0.000	1.000
Eventually Exit	306,246	0.170	0.376	0.000	0.000	1.000
Labor Productivity ('000s euros)	290,617	84.553	78.901	-67.640	66.940	394.000
Firm Size (log assets)	306,246	9.095	1.732	4.663	9.131	13.324
Firm Age	306,246	17.687	12.458	1.000	14.000	48.000
Number of Executives	306,246	3.201	18.255	0.000	1.000	38.000
Number of Employees	306,246	136.363	1146.706	1.000	37.000	1398.000
DecEx (t,t-3) (%)	306,246	0.792	8.863	0.000	0.000	0.000
RetiredEx (t,t-3) (%)	306,246	8.486	27.867	0.000	0.000	100.000
	Thin Labor Markets			Thick Labor Markets		
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.
ROA (%)	153,550	3.542	13.200	152,696	4.772	16.885
Firm Size (log assets)	153,550	9.305	1.603	152,696	8.885	1.828
Firm Age	153,550	18.194	12.505	152,696	17.117	12.389
Number of Executives	153,550	2.072	5.557	152,696	4.336	25.195
	Eventually Treated			Never Treated		
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.
ROA (%)	8,727	5.794	12.317	297,519	4.107	15.236
Firm Size	8,727	11.131	1.928	297,519	9.036	1.689
Firm Age	8,727	16.872	11.825	297,519	17.711	12.475
Number of Executives	8,727	31.881	95.319	297,519	2.360	7.192
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p50	p99
CZ \times Industry characteristics						
Number executives (CZ \times Industry)	32,643	29.532	224	1	4	340
At least one Deceased executive (CZ \times Industry)	32,643	0.021	0.143	0.000	0.000	1.000

Summary Statistics – Continued

Panel B:	Executive Sample					
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p50	p99
<hr/>						
Sample of deceased executives						
Executive Tenure	1,076	11.908	8.017	1.000	10.000	30.000
Executive Age	1,076	52.840	5.506	37.000	54.000	60.000
Female	1,076	0.097	0.296	0.000	0.000	1.000
Wage (t-1)	1,076	136.462	93.891	55.521	113.561	519.764
<hr/>						
Sample of non-deceased executives						
Executive Tenure	1,060,971	9.856	7.286	1.000	8.000	29.000
Executive Age	1,060,971	48.461	6.600	34.000	49.000	60.000
Female	1,060,971	0.132	0.339	0.000	0.000	1.000
Wage (t-1)	1,060,971	134.992	114.357	55.001	110.630	498.250
<hr/>						
Separation rates of new hires						
Remains employed for less than 1 Year	51,185	0.256	0.436	0.000	0.000	1.000
Remains employed for less than 2 Years	51,185	0.348	0.476	0.000	0.000	1.000
Remains employed for less than 3 Years	51,185	0.411	0.492	0.000	0.000	1.000
Remains employed for less than 4 Years	51,185	0.455	0.498	0.000	0.000	1.000
<hr/>						
Education of new hires (since 2010)						
Below High-School	23,410	0.045	0.207	0.000	0.000	1.000
High-School	23,410	0.209	0.407	0.000	0.000	1.000
College	23,410	0.738	0.440	0.000	1.000	1.000

Table 2
Provenance of Newly Appointed Executives

This table presents statistics on all new appointed executives across industries and areas in our employee-employer matched panel dataset. The sample period is 2005-2015. The Panels report the number of hires that were previously blue-collar or white-collar in the same firm, or blue-collar, white-collar or executive in another firm (or previously not employed in a firm in our dataset). The second part of the Table reports for new hires working previously in another firm, the number of hires that were previously employed in the same industry versus other industries, in the same CZ versus other CZs, in the same market (CZ \times industry) versus other markets.

Panel A: All Newly Appointed Executives					
Same Firm in T-1		Other Firm in T-1			Not in Sample in T-1
Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive	
<0.1%	32.2%	<0.1%	9.4%	51.4%	6.8%
Panel B: Newly Appointed Executives Working in Other Firms in T-1					
Same Industry in T-1			Other Industry in T-1		
Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive	Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive
<0.1%	7.1%	47.4%	<0.1%	8.3%	37.1%
Same CZ in T-1			Other CZ in T-1		
Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive	Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive
<0.1%	7.6%	50.8%	<0.1%	7.8%	33.7%
Same CZ \times Industry in T-1			Other CZ \times Industry in T-1		
Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive	Blue-Collar	White-Collar	Executive
<0.1%	3.7%	31.6%	<0.1%	11.7%	52.9%

Table 3
Market Thickness and New Hires Characteristics

This table presents estimates from cross-section regressions of a series of characteristics for all new hires into an executive position on the previous year thickness of the executive labor market. All regressions include industry dummies interacted with year dummies, and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies. Labor market thickness is defined at the CZ \times industry level and is constructed as the logarithm of the total number of executives in the firm's CZ \times industry in year $t - 1$. The dependent variables are dummies for respectively whether newly hired executives were previously employed in another firm from the same CZ, from the same industry, or from the same market (Columns 1, 2, and 3), dummies for three education levels of newly hired executives (Columns 4, 5, and 6), local experience measured as the number of years employed in the same province as the location of the firm from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 7), industry experience measured as the number of years employed in the same industry as the industry of the firm from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 8), executive experience measured as the number of years employed as executive from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 9), and the previous wage of the newly hired executive (Column 10). Standard errors are clustered at the CZ \times industry level. The sample period is 2010-2015 in Columns (4) to (6), and 2005-2015 in Columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (10). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Same CZ	Same Ind	Same Market	No Schooling	High School	College	Local Exp.	Industry Exp.	Exec. Exp.	Previous Ln(Wage)
MktTkn	0.032*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.420*** (0.115)	0.932*** (0.096)	0.036 (0.056)	0.031*** (0.007)
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	51,185	51,185	51,185	23,410	23,410	23,410	51,185	51,185	51,185	51,185
R^2	0.224	0.152	0.155	0.077	0.098	0.100	0.144	0.194	0.075	0.083

Table 4
Executive Exits and Firm ROA

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firm ROA on respectively one dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years in Panel A, its interaction term with a dummy indicating a thick labor market in Panel B, and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ×industry in the previous year in Panel C. A labor market is defined at the CZ × industry level and is defined as thick if it lies above the sample median in terms of the total number of executives in each CZ × industry. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. In Column (2) we add industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, in Column (3) firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. In Column (4), we include market (CZ × industry) dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-years of our firm sample (described in Table 1, Panel A) between 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<hr/>				
Panel A:	ROA (× 100)			
DecEx (t,t-3)	-0.883*** (0.321)	-0.971*** (0.322)	-0.812*** (0.304)	-0.719** (0.323)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE			Y	Y
Market(CZ × Industry) - Year FE				Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.520	0.530	0.553	0.579
<hr/>				
Panel B:	ROA (× 100)			
DecEx (t,t-3)	-1.690*** (0.475)	-1.945*** (0.467)	-1.807*** (0.469)	-1.825*** (0.514)
DecEx (t,t-3) × Thick market	1.382** (0.628)	1.645*** (0.626)	1.688*** (0.604)	1.709*** (0.649)
Thick market	-0.414 (0.266)	-0.291 (0.302)	0.093 (0.290)	
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE			Y	Y
Market(CZ × Industry) - Year FE				Y
Test DecEx (t,t-3) (1+thick market) = 0				
P-value	0.466	0.482	0.759	0.775
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.520	0.530	0.553	0.579
<hr/>				
Panel C:	ROA (× 100)			
DecEx (t,t-3)	-3.118*** (0.796)	-3.574*** (0.801)	-3.360*** (0.783)	-3.524*** (0.865)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn	0.408*** (0.134)	0.474*** (0.137)	0.464*** (0.127)	0.490*** (0.139)
MktTkn	-0.340*** (0.119)	-0.224* (0.126)	-0.083 (0.122)	
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE			Y	Y
Market(CZ × Industry) - Year FE				Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.523	0.532	0.555	0.578
<hr/>				

Table 5
Executive Exits and Other Firm Outcomes

This table presents variants of the specification presented in Column (3) of Panel C of Table 4, in which we replace firm ROA with other firm outcomes as dependent variable. All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. We consider the following firm outcomes: labor productivity in Column (1), firm exit in Column (2), sales over lagged assets in Column (3), cost of goods sold over lagged assets in Column (4), labor expenses over lagged assets in Column (5), and the logarithm of assets in Column (6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Outcome X scaled by lagged assets			
	Labor Prod. (K€ per emp)	Firm Exit (× 100)	X=Sales (× 100)	X=Cogs (× 100)	X=Labor Costs (× 100)	Ln(Assets)
DecEx (t,t-3)	-10.314*** (3.553)	1.051 (1.148)	-8.785** (4.032)	-5.744** (2.772)	-1.181 (0.995)	-0.036 (0.057)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn	1.470** (0.602)	-0.133 (0.179)	1.531** (0.744)	1.104** (0.504)	0.138 (0.179)	0.008 (0.009)
MktTkn	-1.185* (0.705)	0.174 (0.164)	0.608 (0.717)	0.168 (0.421)	0.010 (0.180)	0.013 (0.008)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	290,617	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.713	0.263	0.722	0.833	0.810	0.941

Table 6
Robustness - Alternative Market Thickness Definitions

This table presents variants of the specification presented in Column (3) of Table 4, in which we use alternative ways of measuring labor market thickness. All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. Labor market thickness is defined as the logarithm of the number of firms in the same 2-digit Industry \times CZ in year $t - 1$ in Column (1), the number of executives working for other firms in the same 2-digit Industry \times CZ in year $t - 1$ in Column (2), the number of executives in the same 2-digit Industry \times CZ in year 2005 in Column (3), the number of executives in the same 1-digit Industry \times CZ in year $t - 1$ in Column (4), the number of executives in the same 2-digit Industry \times Province in year $t - 1$ in Column (5), the number of executives in the same 1-digit Industry \times Province in year $t - 1$ in Column (6), the number of executives in the same 2-digit Industry located in municipalities within a radius of 10 miles around the firm in Column (7), the number of executives in the same 1-digit Industry located in municipalities within a radius of 10 miles around the firm in Column (8). We compute market thickness based on observed executive flows across 2-digit Industry \times CZ in Column (9), and based on observed executive flows across 1-digit Industry \times CZ in Column (10). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Alternative Thickness Measures			Alternative Market Definitions						
	# Firms	# Exec in Other Firms	# Exec in 2005	Other Industry/Area Definition			Distance Around Firm		Exec-Flow Based Across all Pairs of	
				CZ 1-digit Ind	Province 2-digit Ind	Province 1-digit Ind	< 10 miles 2-digit Ind	< 10 miles 1-digit Ind	CZ 2-digit Ind	CZ 1-digit Ind
DecEx (t,t-3)	-2.916*** (0.682)	-3.479*** (0.785)	-3.675*** (0.786)	-3.829*** (0.824)	-3.219*** (0.937)	-3.952*** (1.023)	-3.377*** (0.980)	-2.531*** (0.893)	-2.279** (0.916)	-4.706*** (1.536)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times MktTkn	0.497*** (0.141)	0.483*** (0.127)	0.476*** (0.126)	0.468*** (0.119)	0.412*** (0.148)	0.455*** (0.143)	0.403*** (0.142)	0.337** (0.146)	0.235* (0.142)	0.528** (0.206)
MktTkn	0.002 (0.153)	-0.050 (0.118)		0.209 (0.170)	-0.106 (0.154)	0.118 (0.214)	0.163 (0.193)	-0.259* (0.146)	0.042 (0.268)	0.119 (0.561)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb exec Age, Size, ROA (t-3) \times Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.555	0.555	0.553	0.554	0.554	0.553	0.557	0.561	0.553	0.553

Table 7
Executive Exits and Firm ROA - Additional Robustness checks

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firm ROA on one dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ×industry in the previous year. All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. Column (1) further control for firm size, age, ROA, and the number of executives, and their interaction with the dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years, and with market thickness. Column (2) further control for the interaction of the dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years, with the following characteristics of the deceased executive: Tenure, Gender, Age and the logarithm of her/his wage in the previous year. The sample is restricted to firms located in the Center-South regions in Column (3) (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia), to firms located in the North in Column (4) (all the other regions), to eventually treated firms only in Column (5), to firms with only one executive in year $t - 1$ in Column (6), to firms with two or more executives in year $t - 1$ in Column (7), to firms operating in markets with at least another firm in Column (8). We exclude all firms with events for deceased executives with paid-sick leave in any prior year in Column (9). The sample period is 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Control for DecEx× Firm Char.	Exec Char.	South+Center +Islands Only	North Only	Eventually Treated	# Exec in T-1 = 1	# Exec in T-1 > 1	At least 2 Firms in Market	Excl. Death With Prior Sick Leave
DecEx (t,t-3)	-6.807*** (2.481)	-3.016*** (0.796)	-3.910** (1.556)	-3.023*** (0.896)	-4.028*** (0.986)	-6.422** (2.618)	-2.026*** (0.755)	-3.551*** (0.858)	-3.444*** (0.816)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn	0.486*** (0.130)	0.472*** (0.128)	0.552** (0.265)	0.416*** (0.143)	0.542*** (0.152)	0.826** (0.419)	0.309** (0.123)	0.492*** (0.137)	0.478*** (0.132)
MktTkn	0.168 (0.400)	-0.082 (0.122)	-0.239 (0.211)	0.013 (0.150)	-0.631 (0.774)	0.178 (0.230)	-0.353* (0.200)	-0.041 (0.131)	-0.083 (0.122)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
DecEx (t,t-3) × Nb exec, Age, Size, ROA (t-3)	Y								
MktTkn × Nb exec, Age, Size, ROA (t-3)	Y								
DecEx (t,t-3) × Tenure, Age, Gender, Wage (t-1)		Y							
Observations	306,246	306,246	77,171	229,075	8,727	81,947	108,321	289,422	305,788
R ²	0.555	0.555	0.542	0.559	0.712	0.675	0.643	0.554	0.555

Table 8
Heterogeneity Analysis - Interacting with Firm and Executive Characteristics

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firm ROA on a dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years, and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ×industry, augmented with additional interaction terms with firm and executive characteristics. Panel A focuses on firm characteristics. We consider the following firm characteristics: the number of executives in the firm (Column 1), the logarithm of firm assets (Column 2), firm age (Column 3), and ROA (Column 4), all measured three years before the death events. Panel B focuses on executive characteristics. We consider the following executive characteristics: executive tenure upon death (Column 1), age (Column 2), sex (Column 3), log wage in the year prior to death (Column 4). All regressions include lower level interactions, firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-years of our firm sample (described in Table 1, Panel A) between 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	ROA (× 100)			
Panel A: Firm Charac.	Nb Exec	Ln Assets	Firm Age	ROA
DecEx (t,t-3)	-3.879*** (0.828)	-15.649*** (5.929)	-3.307** (1.353)	-2.771*** (0.804)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn	0.527*** (0.132)	2.097** (0.928)	0.473** (0.227)	0.375*** (0.132)
DecEx (t,t-3) × Firm charac. (t-3)	0.043*** (0.017)	1.168** (0.526)	-0.003 (0.057)	-11.646 (8.808)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn × Firm charac. (t-3)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.156* (0.082)	-0.001 (0.009)	1.662 (1.267)
MktTkn × Firm charac. (t-3)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.031 (0.037)	0.002 (0.008)	0.138 (0.167)
MktTkn	-0.080 (0.122)	0.207 (0.376)	-0.117 (0.204)	-0.082 (0.123)
Firm charac. (t-3)	-0.003 (0.031)	-1.003*** (0.232)		-3.826*** (1.015)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Size, Age, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.555	0.556	0.555	0.555
Panel B: Deceased Exec Charac.	Tenure	Age	Female	Ln Wage (t-1)
DecEx (t,t-3)	-3.418*** (0.936)	-2.975*** (0.924)	-3.368*** (0.803)	-3.089*** (0.940)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn	0.497*** (0.155)	0.468*** (0.157)	0.466*** (0.132)	0.483*** (0.159)
DecEx (t,t-3) × Exec charac.	0.009 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.019)	0.137 (2.552)	-0.105 (0.209)
DecEx (t,t-3) × MktTkn × Exec charac.	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.030 (0.353)	-0.006 (0.035)
MktTkn	-0.083 (0.122)	-0.081 (0.122)	-0.083 (0.122)	-0.082 (0.122)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Size, Age, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R ²	0.555	0.555	0.555	0.555

Table 9
Executive Compensation at Neighboring Firms

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of executive (and white-collar in Panel B) wages on two dummies indicating whether a given CZ \times industry is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the previous year, and its interaction with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ \times industry in the previous year. All regressions include executive and year fixed effects. In Column (2), we add industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, in Column (3), we add executive-level characteristics (dummies indicating gender, and terciles of age and tenure respectively) interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all executive-year of our executive sample (described in Table 1, Panel B) between 2005 and 2015, which includes only executives at firms never treated during the sample period. Standard errors are clustered at the Industry \times CZ level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A:	Executive Ln(Wage) (\times 100)		
DecEx (other firm, t-1)	2.723*** (0.483)	1.545*** (0.549)	1.652*** (0.521)
DecEx (other firm, t-1) \times MktTkn	-0.420*** (0.082)	-0.254** (0.099)	-0.271*** (0.094)
MktTkn	0.452*** (0.088)	0.695*** (0.147)	0.624*** (0.143)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Executive FE	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y
Age, Tenure, Gender \times Year FE			Y
Observations	574,891	574,891	574,891
R^2	0.885	0.888	0.892
Panel B:	White-Collar Ln(Wage) (\times 100)		
DecEx (other firm, t-1)	-0.204 (0.364)	0.011 (0.326)	0.085 (0.301)
DecEx (other firm, t-1) \times MktTkn	0.044 (0.061)	0.007 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.053)
MktTkn	0.235*** (0.051)	0.143* (0.076)	0.119 (0.074)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Executive FE	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y
Age, Tenure, Gender \times Year FE			Y
Observations	3,437,050	3,437,050	3,437,050
R^2	0.942	0.943	0.948

Table 10
Executive Exits and New Hires' Characteristics

This table presents estimates from regressions of a series of characteristics for all new hires into an executive position on one dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the previous year and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ×industry in the previous year. All regressions include firm, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, and firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. The dependent variables are dummies for respectively whether newly hired executives were previously employed in another firm from the same CZ, from the same industry, or from the same market (Columns 1, 2, and 3), dummies for three education levels of newly hired executives (Columns 4, 5, and 6), local experience measured as the number of years employed in the same province as the location of the firm from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 7), industry experience measured as the number of years employed in the same industry as the industry of the firm from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 8), executive experience measured as the number of years employed as executive from 1984 to year $t - 1$ (Column 9), and the previous wage of the newly hired executive (Column 10). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period is 2010-2015 in Columns (4) to (6), and 2005-2015 in Columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (10). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Same Ind	Same CZ	Same Market	No Schooling	High School	College	Local Exp.	Industry Exp.	Exec. Exp.	Previous Ln(Wage)
DecEx (t-1)	0.009 (0.100)	-0.104 (0.093)	-0.070 (0.106)	0.113 (0.071)	0.139* (0.084)	-0.266** (0.114)	-4.420*** (1.438)	-1.813 (1.325)	-0.026 (0.963)	-0.056 (0.104)
DecEx (t-1)× MktTkn	-0.006 (0.016)	0.012 (0.013)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.020* (0.011)	0.039** (0.017)	0.555*** (0.208)	0.179 (0.193)	-0.011 (0.124)	0.011 (0.015)
MktTkn	0.046* (0.025)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.030* (0.017)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.000 (0.034)	-1.166*** (0.416)	-0.215 (0.376)	-0.526* (0.295)	-0.026 (0.025)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb exec, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	51,185	51,185	51,185	23,410	23,410	23,410	51,185	51,185	51,185	51,185
R ²	0.468	0.495	0.468	0.541	0.400	0.424	0.438	0.498	0.286	0.296

Table 11
Executive Exits and New Hires' Future Separations

This table presents estimates from regressions of separation rates of new hires into an executive position on one dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the previous year and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ×industry in the previous year. All regressions include firm, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, and firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. The dependent variables are dummies for whether the new hire remains employed in the firm for respectively less than 1 year (Column 1), 2 years (Column 2), 3 years (Column 3), and 4 years (Column 4). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period is 2005-2015. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	New hire remains employed for less than:			
	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
DecEx (t-1)	0.089	0.109	0.164**	0.149**
	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.073)
DecEx (t-1)× MktTkn	-0.016	-0.021*	-0.027**	-0.021**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
MktTkn	-0.018	-0.034	-0.012	0.001
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	51,185	51,185	51,185	51,185
R ²	0.355	0.381	0.413	0.441

Online Appendix

Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Death Events

JULIEN SAUVAGNAT AND FABIANO SCHIVARDI

A.1 Proofs

Let us first characterize an implicit expression for b^D , the quality threshold above which a firm with no executive finds it optimal to hire a new applicant.

We conjecture and verify below that V is increasing. The assumption that $C < V(B) - D$ then implies that $b^D < b^*$. Indeed, given that $D = V(b^D)$ and $V(b^*) = V(B) - C$, $C < V(B) - D$ implies $V(b^D) < V(b^*)$, and thus $b^D < b^*$.

Consider a firm with an incumbent executive of quality $b < b^*$. In that case, it is optimal for the firm to replace the incumbent whenever it receives a job application from an executive of quality higher than $T(b)$ (which is lower than B when $b < b^*$). Thus, the flow equation given by Equation (2) in the main text for a firm with an incumbent executive of quality $b < b^*$ can be rewritten as:

$$rV(b) = y + b + \lambda \int_{T(b)}^B [V(s) - C - V(b)] dF(s) + \delta[D - V(b)]. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

After taking the derivative of Equation (A.1) with respect to b , using the fact that by definition $V(T(b)) - C - V(b) = 0$, and rearranging, we get for $b < b^*$:

$$V'(b) = \frac{1}{r + \delta + \lambda [1 - F(T(b))]} > 0. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

After integrating by parts the right-hand side of Equation (A.1), using the expression for $V'(b)$ in Equation (A.2) and the fact that by definition $V(T(b)) - C - V(b) = 0$, we get for $b < b^*$:

$$rV(b) = y + b + \lambda \int_{T(b)}^B \frac{1 - F(s)}{r + \delta + \lambda [1 - F(T(s))]} ds + \delta[D - V(b)]. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

After integrating by parts the right-hand side of Equation (1) in the main text, using the expression for $V'(b)$ in Equation (A.2) and the fact that by definition $V(b^*) = D$, we get the following expression for a firm without an executive:

$$rD = y + \lambda \int_{b^D}^B \frac{1 - F(s)}{r + \delta + \lambda [1 - F(T(s))]} ds. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Using Equation (A.3) evaluated at b^D , and Equation (A.4) together with the condition $V(b^D) = D$ yields an equation which implicitly determines the quality threshold value b^D for hiring a new applicant when the firm has no executive, given by:

$$b^D = \lambda \int_{b^D}^{T(b^D)} \frac{1 - F(s)}{r + \delta + \lambda [1 - F(T(s))]} ds. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

We are left to verify that V is increasing. Note that Equation (4) in the main text implies that V is increasing for $b > b^*$. As shown in Equation (A.2), V is also increasing for $b < b^*$. Moreover, because the value function V satisfies Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction on the space of continuous functions, the value function exists, is unique, and

is continuous (see [Stokey and Lucas \(1989\)](#)).

Proof of Result 1

Differentiating Equation (A.5) with respect to b^D and λ , we get:

$$\frac{db^D}{d\lambda} = \frac{\int_{b^D}^{T(b^D)} \frac{1-F(s)}{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(s))]} ds - \lambda \int_{b^D}^{T(b^D)} \frac{[1-F(s)][1-F(T(s))]}{(r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(s))])^2} ds}{1 - \lambda T'(b^D) \frac{1-F(T(b^D))}{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(T(b^D)))]} + \lambda \frac{1-F(b^D)}{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(b^D))]}}. \quad (\text{A.6})$$

We show below that both the numerator and the denominator of Equation (A.6) are strictly positive, and therefore b^D is strictly increasing in λ .

The numerator of Equation (A.6) rewrites:

$$\int_{b^D}^{T(b^D)} \frac{[1-F(s)](r+\delta)}{(r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(s))])^2} ds,$$

which is strictly positive as $T(b^D) > b^D$.

As for the denominator of Equation (A.6), after differentiating Equation (3) in the main text with respect to b , we get for $b = b^D$:

$$T'(b^D) = \frac{V'(b^D)}{V'(T(b^D))}. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Equation (A.7) combined with Equation (A.2) yield:

$$T'(b^D) = \frac{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(T(b^D)))]}{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(b^D))]} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

After substituting the expression of $T'(b^D)$ in Equation (A.8) into the denominator of Equation (A.6), the denominator of Equation (A.6) simplifies to:

$$1 + \lambda \left[\frac{F(T(b^D)) - F(b^D)}{r+\delta+\lambda[1-F(T(b^D))]} \right],$$

which is strictly positive as $T(b^D) > b^D$.

Proof of Result 2

The average quality of the first hire after a death event is given by:

$$E[b|b > b^D] = \frac{\int_{b^D}^B s dF(s)}{1 - F(b^D)}. \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Differentiating the above expression (A.9) with respect to b^D yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dE[b|b > b^D]}{db^D} &= \frac{-b^D f(b^D)[1 - F(b^D)] + f(b^D) \int_{b^D}^B s dF(s)}{(1 - F(b^D))^2} \\ &= \frac{f(b^D) \int_{b^D}^B (s - b^D) dF(s)}{(1 - F(b^D))^2} > 0. \end{aligned} \tag{A.10}$$

Given that we have shown that $db^D/d\lambda > 0$, it follows that the average quality of the first hire increases with λ .

Proof of Result 3

This immediately follows from the fact that $\Pr(b > b^* | b > b^D) = \frac{1 - F(b^*)}{1 - F(b^D)}$ so that

$$\frac{d\Pr\{b > b^* | b > b^D\}}{d\lambda} = \frac{[1 - F(b^*)]f(b^D)}{[1 - F(b^D)]^2} \frac{db^D}{d\lambda}.$$

Proof or Result 4

The firm hires a new applicant with Poisson arrival rate

$$p = \lambda [1 - F(b^D)] \tag{A.11}$$

Differentiating with respect to λ , we obtain:


$$\frac{dp}{d\lambda} = 1 - F(b^D) - \lambda f(b^D) \frac{db^D}{d\lambda} \tag{A.12}$$

which cannot be signed in general.

A.2 Additional figures and tables

Figure A.1

EXECUTIVE EXITS AND FIRM ROA IN THIN VERSUS THICK LABOR MARKETS -
EXCLUDING EVENTUALLY EXITING FIRMS



Notes: This figure presents estimates of return on assets in the two years before and five years after the occurrence of a deceased executive in respectively thin and thick labor markets. Return on assets (ROA) is earnings before interest and taxes, over the value of assets in the previous year. Each graph plots estimated coefficients, β_τ , as well as the associated 95% confidence interval, of the following regression in the restricted sample of never exiting firms:

$$ROA_{i,t} = \sum_{\tau=-2}^5 \beta_\tau \text{DecEx}_{i,t-\tau} + f_i + d_{s,t} + d_{cz,t} + d_{f,t} + \eta_{i,t}$$

where $\text{DecEx}_{i,t-\tau}$ is a dummy equal to one if the death of an executive hits firm i in year $t - \tau$ in a thin labor market (respectively in a thick labor market). The specification also includes firm fixed effects f_i , industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, $d_{s,t}$ and $d_{cz,t}$, and firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies $d_{f,t}$. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period spans 2005 to 2015.

Table A.1
Executive Transitions between Industries and Areas - Comparison with Other Countries

This table presents patterns in firm-to-firm executive transitions across industries and areas in Italy, France, and the United States. The sample period is 2005-2015. Column (1) in Panel A represents the fraction of the transitions that are within respectively the same Commuting Zone, the same 2-digit industry, and the same 2-digit industry \times Commuting Zone in our sample. Column (2) represents the analogous fractions assuming random transitions for executives across two different sample firms. Panel B reproduces the same statistics for the French economy, and Panel C for executive turnover in a sample of U.S. listed firms using data from the Execucomp database.

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Executive transitions in Italy (our sample)	Data	Assuming random
% within same CZ	0.58	0.14
% within same 2-digit industry	0.54	0.13
% within same CZ \times 2-digit industry	0.35	0.019
Panel B: France (DADS Panel)	Data	Assuming random
% within same CZ	0.71	0.15
% within same Industry (NES 17)	0.66	0.13
% within same CZ \times Industry	0.50	0.03
Panel C: Top executives U.S. listed firms	Data	Assuming random
% within same State	0.32	0.055
% within same FF17 industry	0.4	0.14
% within same State \times FF17 industry	0.17	0.012

Table A.2
Matching

This table presents variants of the specification presented in Column (3) of Panel C of Table 4, in which we first restrict the sample to a group of control firms which appear similar to treated firms but have never been treated over the sample period. Specifically, we follow [Jaravel et al. \(2018\)](#) and use a one-to-one exact matching procedure on the number of executives in the local market (CZ \times 2-digit industry), and another characteristic in Columns (2) to (8): operating in the same CZ in Column (2), operating in the same 2-digit industry in Column (3), operating in the same market (CZ \times 2-digit industry) in Column (4), with the same number of executives within the firm in the previous year in Column (5), being in the same quintile of firm size in the previous year in Column (6), with the same firm age in Column (7), being in the same quintile of ROA in the previous year in Column (8). The match is conducted year by year. An exact match is found if there is a never treated firm in the same year operating in a market with exactly the same number of executives as the treated firm (and the same additional characteristic described in each column). The firms that match are then taken out of the sample of potential matches, and the procedure is repeated for the following year, until the end of the sample. When there is no exact match, the treated firm is removed from the estimation. When there is more than one exact match, the ties are broken at random. All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Matching on Same Market Size +							
	\emptyset	Same CZ	Same Industry	Same Market	Same # Exec	Same Firm Size	Same Firm Age	Same ROA
DecEx (t,t-3)	-3.633*** (1.076)	-3.112*** (0.940)	-3.813*** (0.983)	-2.760*** (0.950)	-2.794** (1.201)	-3.847*** (0.997)	-3.547*** (1.057)	-4.041*** (1.036)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times MktTkn	0.479*** (0.165)	0.396*** (0.149)	0.523*** (0.154)	0.377** (0.150)	0.371** (0.184)	0.505*** (0.155)	0.436*** (0.160)	0.522*** (0.158)
MktTkn	-0.077 (0.628)	0.006 (0.807)	0.077 (0.673)	0.082 (0.837)	0.115 (0.971)	-0.448 (0.623)	-0.469 (0.758)	-0.246 (0.719)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb exec, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) \times Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	13,861	13,294	13,488	12,981	8,958	12,684	12,106	12,566
R ²	0.655	0.651	0.623	0.632	0.667	0.657	0.643	0.629

Table A.3
White-Collar Deaths and Firm ROA - Placebo

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firm ROA on respectively two dummies indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one white-collar (non-executive) in the same or previous three years, and its interaction with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ \times industry in the previous year. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. In Column (2) we add industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, in Column (3) firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) as well as terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. In Column (4), we include market (CZ \times industry) dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-years of our firm sample (described in Table 1, Panel A) between 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	ROA (\times 100)			
DecEx (t,t-3)	-0.035 (0.281)	-0.133 (0.286)	0.062 (0.285)	0.214 (0.337)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times MktTkn	-0.010 (0.051)	0.004 (0.052)	-0.019 (0.052)	-0.040 (0.060)
MktTkn	-0.334*** (0.119)	-0.219* (0.126)	-0.077 (0.122)	
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Age, Size, ROA (t-3) \times Year FE			Y	Y
Market(CZ \times Industry) - Year FE				Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R^2	0.523	0.532	0.555	0.578

Table A.4
Firm Ownership

This table presents estimates from cross-section regressions aggregated at the market level of the share of family owned and managed firms in a given market on respectively a dummy indicating thick labor markets in Column (1), and labor market thickness defined as the logarithm of the total number of executives in the firm's CZ \times industry in year $t - 1$ in Column (2). We assume that individuals are part of a family if they share the same last name or the same home address. We define a firm as family owned and managed if one or more individuals belonging to the same family own at least 50% of shares and one of them also has the most important position in the board (CEO or President). Each regression includes industry dummies interacted with year dummies, and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ \times industry level. The sample period is 2005-2015. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)
	Share of family owned and managed ($\times 100$)	
Thick market (Dummy)	-0.403 (0.401)	
MktTkn		-0.282 (0.175)
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y
Observations	38,908	38,908
R^2	0.323	0.324

Table A.5
Heterogeneity Analysis - Across Industries

This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firm ROA on a dummy indicating whether the firm is hit by the death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years, and its interaction term with the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ \times industry, augmented with additional interaction terms with industry dummies. We consider all 1-digit industries: Agriculture (Column 1), Manufacturing (Column 2), Construction (Column 3), Utilities (Column 4), Retail, Food and Accommodation (Column 5), and Services (Column 6). All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year dummies and dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-years of our firm sample (described in Table 1, Panel A) between 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ROA (\times 100)					
Industry J is:	Agri	Manuf	Construction	Utilities	Retail, Food, Accom	Services
DecEx (t,t-3)	-3.432*** (0.801)	-3.436*** (1.177)	-3.473*** (0.814)	-3.320*** (0.806)	-3.464*** (0.812)	-3.259*** (0.798)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times MktTkn	0.473*** (0.129)	0.497*** (0.192)	0.466*** (0.130)	0.466*** (0.130)	0.472*** (0.134)	0.450*** (0.129)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times Industry j	-0.521 (2.831)	0.146 (1.407)	1.457 (3.956)	-0.177 (2.633)	1.291 (2.442)	-1.725 (3.371)
DecEx (t,t-3) \times MktTkn \times Industry j	0.870 (1.023)	-0.060 (0.232)	0.157 (0.829)	-0.269 (0.499)	-0.113 (0.358)	0.222 (0.486)
MktTkn \times Industry j	0.009 (0.181)	-0.038 (0.025)	0.030 (0.065)	0.133 (0.088)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.092** (0.042)
MktTkn	-0.083 (0.122)	-0.075 (0.122)	-0.083 (0.122)	-0.091 (0.122)	-0.082 (0.122)	-0.081 (0.122)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nb executives, Size, Age, ROA (t-3) \times Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246	306,246
R^2	0.555	0.555	0.555	0.555	0.555	0.555

Table A.6
Executive Compensation at Neighboring Firms - Tradable Industries Only

This table presents estimates from variants of the panel regressions presented in Panel A of Table 9 in which the sample is restricted to executives in tradable industries only. All regressions include executive and year fixed effects. In Column (2), we add industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies, in Column (3) executive-level characteristics (dummies indicating gender, and terciles of age and tenure respectively) interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all executive-year of our executive sample operating in tradable industries (described in Table 1, Panel B) between 2005 and 2015, which includes only executives at firms never treated during the sample period. Standard errors are clustered at the Industry \times CZ level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Executive Ln(Wage) (\times 100)		
DecEx (other firm, t-1)	2.515*** (0.520)	2.731*** (0.629)	2.627*** (0.629)
DecEx (other firm, t-1) \times MktTkn	-0.342*** (0.085)	-0.463*** (0.109)	-0.446*** (0.109)
MktTkn	0.293*** (0.107)	0.371 (0.239)	0.312 (0.229)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Executive FE	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE		Y	Y
CZ-Year FE		Y	Y
Age, Tenure, Gender \times Year FE			Y
Observations	307,400	307,400	307,400
R^2	0.894	0.898	0.902

Table A.7
Executive Exits and Market-level Outcomes

This table presents estimates from panel regressions aggregated at the market level of firm value-weighted ROA (Panel A) and labor productivity (Panel B) on respectively a dummy indicating whether a given Industry×CZ market is hit by death of (at least) one executive in the same or previous three years and interacted with the the logarithm of the number of executives working in the same CZ ×industry in the previous year. ROA at the market level is the ratio of market-level EBIT (the sum of the EBIT of each firm in a given market) over market-level assets for each CZ×industry and year. Labor productivity at the market level is the sum of the value added over the sum of the employees of each firm in a given CZ×industry and year. All regressions include market fixed effects, as well as industry and CZ dummies interacted with year dummies. Column (3) also includes dummies indicating terciles of the average size, the average age, and the average ROA of firms in the same market, interacted with year dummies, and Column (4) includes dummies indicating terciles of the number of executives in a given market interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all (Industry×CZ) market-years in which there are at least two firms between 2005 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the market (Industry×CZ) level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Market ROA (× 100)			
DecEx in Industry × CZ (t,t-3)	-0.255 (0.215)	-1.484** (0.678)	-1.355** (0.674)	-1.318* (0.673)
DecEx in Industry × CZ (t,t-3) × MktTkn		0.331** (0.156)	0.310** (0.156)	0.301* (0.156)
MktTkn		-0.536*** (0.139)	-0.482*** (0.137)	-0.433*** (0.136)
Market (CZ × Industry) FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Market Average Size, Age, ROA (t-3) × Year FE			Y	Y
Market Nb of executives (t-3) × Year FE				Y
Observations	22,260	22,260	22,260	22,260
R ²	0.626	0.634	0.640	0.641
	Market VA per employee (in thousand euros)			
DecEx in Industry × CZ (t,t-3)	-1.866 (1.361)	-10.360** (4.219)	-10.437** (4.167)	-10.643** (4.162)
DecEx in Industry × CZ (t,t-3) × MktTkn		2.276** (0.934)	2.331** (0.930)	2.365** (0.929)
MktTkn		-1.711* (0.897)	-1.674* (0.896)	-1.531* (0.880)
Market (CZ × Industry) FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZ-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Market Average Size, Age, ROA (t-3) × Year FE			Y	Y
Market Nb of executives (t-3) × Year FE				Y
Observations	22,260	22,260	22,260	22,260
R ²	0.824	0.827	0.830	0.831