



Workshop in Family Economics and Matching

ERC EQUIPRICE Closing Conference

Paris, May 11th and 12th, 2026

Venue : Sciences Po - 1, Place Saint Thomas d'Aquin 75007 Paris - Salons scientifiques (B 108)

Organisers : Suzanna **Khalifa** (Sciences Po) and Antoine **Jacquet** (Sciences Po), Alfred **Galichon** (PI ERC EQUIPRICE, Sciences Po/NYU Paris)

If you would like to attend, [please contact Maria Ohlund by email](#) for free registration.

* Please indicate "Family Economics & Matching" (object) as well as your affiliation and whether you are a PhD student, a researcher, faculty, etc. *

This event has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement ID: 866274).

Monday, May 11th, 2026

Morning

09.00 - 09.40 **Registration and Check-in / Breakfast**

09.40 - 09.45 ***Introduction by the organisers***

09.45 - 10.30 Anson **Zhou** (HKU Business School)
The Fertility, Marriage, and Gender Equality

Abstract :

This paper studies the nexus among fertility, family structure, and gender income equality. I document a novel three-way trade-off in the data: simultaneously achieving high fertility, low single parenthood, and gender income equality is unlikely at all levels of economic development. I develop a unified theory in which this trade-off arises endogenously in equilibrium. Among various policy instruments, reducing women's child-rearing costs stands out as the unique one that mitigates the trade-off, but the policy costs grow as productivity increases. Calibrating the model to Mexico's experience from 1990 to 2015, I quantify the effects of gender-neutral versus gender-biased productivity growth.

10.30 - 11.00 **COFFEE**



11.00 - 11.45

Anne **Hannusch** (University of Bonn)

When Did Boys Fall Behind? A Historical Perspective on Gender Gaps in Education

Abstract :

I document that girls consistently outperformed boys in high school graduation in the United States over the twentieth century, challenging the notion that the gender gap in education is a recent development. I explore whether this pattern can be explained by the hypothesis that boys are more vulnerable to adverse early-life shocks, leading to divergent trajectories in skill accumulation and persistent gender gaps in educational attainment. Exploiting World War II military mobilization as an exogenous shock to family composition, I find that boys exposed to paternal absence between ages 0 and 8 experience significantly larger declines in high school graduation rates than girls. These findings inform an overlapping generations model with gender-specific human capital accumulation. The model reproduces the persistent female advantage in high school completion. Counterfactual experiments show that postwar education policies, particularly the G.I. Bill, generated a temporary male advantage in college attainment by disproportionately expanding access for men. Absent these policies, the college gender gap would have been substantially smaller or reversed in favor of women.

11.45 - 12.30

Pauline **Morault** (CY Cergy Paris Université, Thema)

Homogamy in Arranged Marriages (with O. Donni and R. Hotte)

Abstract :

The practice of arranged marriages is common in many regions of the world. Parental involvement can lead to different partner choices, with important welfare implications. In this paper, we compare patterns of homogamy in arranged versus self-choice marriages using a structural matching model of the marriage market. We estimate the model across several countries where both types of marriage coexist. Positive assortative mating by age and education is almost systematically stronger among couples in self-choice marriages, whereas couples in arranged marriages appear to be more assortative with respect to ethnicity.

12.30 - 14.00

LUNCH



Monday, May 11th, 2026

Afternoon

14.00 - 14.45

Edoardo **Ciscato** (KU Leuven)

Wealth, Marriage, and Divorce (with F. Blasutto and Z. Wan)

Abstract :

Differences in household wealth are partly shaped by the complex interplay between wealth accumulation, marriage, and divorce. This paper documents the role of wealth in household formation and dissolution. We show that positive assortative mating (PAM) on pre-marital wealth exists and contributes to between-household inequality. This PAM is partly spurious, reflecting wealth's correlation with age and earnings; homeownership also emerges as a significant sorting characteristic. Importantly, PAM is not uniform across the wealth distribution — it is most pronounced among the wealthiest individuals. Household dissolution further contributes to wealth disparities: wealthier households are less likely to divorce, and longer-lasting unions are associated with faster wealth accumulation. Upon dissolution, divorcing couples often liquidate their home, particularly when it has a mortgage attached. While wealth losses are modest for lower-wealth couples, they are substantial for wealthier ones — and women consistently bear a disproportionate share of these losses. We conclude by discussing possible modeling features that can help us rationalize these facts.

14.45 - 15.30

Augustin **Tapsoba** (Toulouse School of Economics)

Uncertainty and the Persistence of Harmful Social Norms

Abstract :

Female genital cutting (FGC) affects over 200 million women worldwide, yet the effectiveness of prohibition laws varies dramatically across communities. This paper develops a model of social norm persistence in which the customary age at cutting determines the degree of behavioral inertia. In a decentralized coordination game among families with heterogeneous preferences, the probability of social sanctions for abandoning FGC follows a random walk that generates increasing uncertainty over longer time horizons. When cutting occurs early in life, the long horizon between the cutting decision and the daughter's departure from the family amplifies the expected cost of deviating from the norm, locking families into the practice. The model yields two testable predictions: (1) ethnic groups that cut earlier exhibit greater persistence of FGC across generations, and (2) anti-FGC policies are more effective among late-cutting groups. We test the first prediction using cross-country DHS data covering 12 African countries and 56 ethnic groups:



each additional year in the customary age at cutting reduces intergenerational transmission of FGC by 3.3 percentage points. We test the second prediction using the staggered adoption of FGC prohibition laws across Nigerian states (1999–2004) and a sample of 155,380 women from ten DHS and MICS waves. Laws significantly reduced FGC among late-cutting ethnic groups but had no detectable effect among early cutters. Our findings imply that the design of anti-FGC policies must account for the timing norms of target communities.

15.30 - 16.00

COFFEE

16.00 - 16.45

Yun **Xiao** (University of Gothenburg)

Land rights and the Allocation of Talent

Abstract :

Educational investment is a central but often overlooked margin through which mobility barriers shape labor allocation. We study agricultural land rights as a key mobility barrier in developing countries and show that insecure tenure distorts both occupational sorting and schooling decisions, leading to persistent talent misallocation and slower structural transformation. A Roy (1951) model of occupational choice with endogenous schooling predicts that land insecurity discourages individuals with a comparative advantage in non-agricultural work from investing in education and transitioning out of agriculture. To test this prediction, we exploit the staggered rollout of China's Rural Land Contracting Law as a quasi-experimental improvement in land security. Relative to older cohorts whose educational choices were already fixed, younger cohorts exposed to the reform attained more schooling and were subsequently more likely to move from low-skill rural jobs into high-skill urban occupations. These effects are strongest among individuals with lower comparative advantage in agriculture. Our quantitative exercise, disciplined by the reduced-form estimates, suggests that roughly one-quarter of the occupational reallocation out of agriculture operates through increased education, highlighting human capital as a crucial driver of structural transformation.

16.45 - 17.30

Pauline **Corblet** (NYU Abu Dhabi)

Multi-sided Matching with Transfers: The Economics of Love and Labor (with A. Robinson Cortes)



17.30 - 18.15

Tim **Obermeier** (University of Leicester)

Cohabitation, Child Development and College

Abstract :

US college-educated couples with children marry at higher rates than those without a college degree. We argue that marriage, which entails lower separation risk and more equitable asset division if separation occurs, provides insurance to the lower-earning spouse, facilitating child investment. Investing in children is more valuable for college-educated couples, who are more likely to send their children to college. Using an OLG model of marriage, cohabitation, wealth accumulation, and educational investments where college is costly and completion is risky, we find that high college costs reduce incentives to marry among couples without a college degree. These differences in union choice by education heighten differences in children's educational attainment and reduce intergenerational mobility.

19.30

DINNER (*upon invitation*)



Tuesday, May 12th, 2026

Morning

09.30 - 10.00 **BREAKFAST**

10.00 - 11.00 **Keynote Lecture**
Pierre-André **Chiappori** (Columbia University)

***Commitment and the Dynamics of Household Labor Supply
- new tests and evidence from Europe***
(with A. Theloudis, J. Velilla, N. Gimenez-Nadal, and A. Molina)

11.00 - 11.30 **COFFEE**

11.30 - 12.15 Fabio **Blasutto** (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
***Income Pooling and Within-Household Risk Sharing: Evidence from
Data on Individual Expenditures*** (with S. Casella and L. Ventura)

Abstract :

We study the extent to which families insure individual consumption against idiosyncratic income shocks and how policy reforms affect this insurance. Using detailed expenditure data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, we estimate the pass-through from permanent and transitory own and partner income shocks to individual private and public consumption. Individuals are only partially insured, with substantial asymmetries between spouses. We develop and estimate a structural model of household consumption and renegotiation under limited commitment. The model replicates the empirical pass-throughs and quantifies the roles of credit markets, labor supply, and intra-household sharing in smoothing shocks. Counterfactual simulations show that reducing the gender wage gap or increasing tax progressivity strengthens individual insurance, while more generous post-divorce transfers weaken it. Our findings highlight the importance of limited risk sharing within the couple for measurement of inequality and for policy design.



12.15 - 13.00

Giulia Tura (LUISS University)

Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy (with A. Bisin)

Abstract :

We study cultural integration as an equilibrium outcome of marital matching along cultural and education lines and intra-household investment decisions regarding fertility and cultural socialization. We show that our marriage model allows us to identify cultural-ethnic group specific investment parameters as well as spousal preferences for marital matching. Structural estimates fit the data well and reveal a strong demand to preserve cultural identity on the part of immigrants as well as limited acceptance of the immigrants' cultural diversity on the part of natives. Furthermore, these estimates reveal a substantial heterogeneity of the parental value of children's education across cultures. Nonetheless, our estimates imply substantial - though heterogeneous - cultural integration rates across immigrant groups in simulations.

13.00

END OF WORKSHOP / LUNCH (*off campus*)