Exceptional Seminar via Zoom

Exceptional Seminar via Zoom

Nov 25th - Laurent MATHEVET (NYU)
  • Projector and microphone in conference room prepared for webinarProjector and microphone in conference room prepared for webinar

Laurent Mathevet

Laurent MATHEVET is Assistant Professor of Economics at New York University (NYU). He holds a Ph.D. (2008) and an M.S. (2005) from the California Institute of Technology. Before joining NYU, he taught at the University of Texas at Austin.

The focus of his research has been information and mechanism design and game theory. Information design investigates how to design incentives through information disclosure. For example, if you are a well-intentioned advisor (like a doctor, a parent, etc.), should you always reveal the whole truth (to your patient, your child, etc.)? In general, if you knew something that a group of people did not, how could you use this information to incentivize them to do something? Laurent MATHEVET and his co-authors answer the first question in a paper entitled Disclosure to a Psychological Audience and adopted a belief-based perspective to study the latter in Information Design: The Epistemic Approach.

Laurent MATHEVET will present a paper, joint with Ina TANEVA, at an exceptional seminar via Zoom entitled:

Organized Information Transmission (read paper, PDF 834.71 KB)

More about Laurent MATHEVET and his research

Location: Zoom
Time: 2:45 PM

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