Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

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Emotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid-1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right-wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far-right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.

KEY WORDS: affective intelligence theory, anger, authoritarianism, far-right voting, fear

“I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. …Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” (Hume, 1984, pp. 460–462)

Most behavioral theories of voting in liberal democracies are based on social psychological accounts developed in the middle of the last century. These accounts remain highly influential. They have been generated by scholars speculating about what happens inside the “black box” of the human brain. However, they lead to empirical and normative conclusions that seem to us suspect. For
example, if we all simply code our experiences along a single dimension from positive to negative, as the “affective tally” approach by Lodge and Taber (2013) suggests, why do the distinct negative reactions—fear and anger—have different effects on political behavior? One answer is provided by affective intelligence theory (AIT), which makes predictions about why people sometimes abandon extant loyalties to candidates, policies, and parties and why they sometimes strengthen those commitments. The evidence we present below supports a different explanation than is commonly presented for the recent rise in popularity of far-right parties and politicians in several advanced democracies around the globe.

The theory of affective intelligence (Marcus, 2002; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) has long focused on the association of emotional reactions to information-seeking and decision-making processes. That is, whether people seek more or less contemporary information and how they then make use of that information (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Gadarian & Albertson, 2014; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Suhay & Erisen, 2018). These inquiries confront two common claims that derive from the long-held belief that reasoning is the foundation of free will, generally, and, in particular, to the public’s capacity to engage in self-governance.

The first claim is that the sole appropriate basis for human agency, that is, free will, is reliant on our “higher” cognitive functions (Kant, 1970). The second is that emotion’s principle purpose is to serve as a passive storage mechanism of positive or negative evaluations of political attitude objects (Allport, 1935; Converse, 1966; McGuire, 1969).

The theory of affective intelligence has over past decades been focused on two related research areas: the role of anxiety in prompting political learning (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Gadarian & Albertson, 2009, 2014; Groenendyk, 2016; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008) and in prompting the shift to a more deliberative style of political judgment (Brader, 2006; Groenendyk, 2016; Ladd & Lenz, 2008; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Valentino et al., 2008).

There has been a normative consequence to this body of research. By demonstrating that the public has the capacity to become informed and moved to a deliberative and open form of reasoning in making political judgments, AIT suggests that the public comes closer to meeting democratic theory’s standards of citizenship than most empirical researchers believe is possible (Marcus, 2002).

The broad pattern of research suggests that greater fear leads to explicit deliberation on thoughtful contemporaneous information that meets a central standard set forth by deliberative democracy theorists (Benhabib, 1996; Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Dryzek, Bächtiger, & Milewicz, 2011; Elster & Przeworski, 1998; Fishkin, 1991). But, as we discuss more fully below, contemporary information of a different sort is also required to enable a second form of political judgment. This form of judgment achieves results by relying on contemporaneous sensory data that is matched to already mastered efficacious routines of thought and action to effectively deal with familiar noxious threats.

We apply AIT to challenge a common view that posits that fear drives the public to endorse hierarchy and traditional practices especially in reaction to threats (Nussbaum, 2018; Robin, 2004).1 We depart from the common view in two ways. First, we do not think that exposure to threat will necessarily trigger fear alone. Instead, anger is often the predominant emotional reaction in many threatening circumstances. Second, our approach posits that each of the two specific emotional appraisals of a threat leads to very different downstream behavioral consequences.

1This view has a far more ancient precursor. At least in the west, both the Jewish and Christian testaments endorsed god’s wrath as the principal mechanism by which otherwise sinful people would be moved to accept the dogma and show proper compliance and fealty. Even today, the phrase “god fearing people” is commonly used by Christian adherents as a term of approbation. And with Hobbes (2005) comes a secularized version of that same story: the Leviathan is properly justified in using terror though only sufficient to keep the unruly in line. It is only with the regime of terror initiated by the Jacobins after the French Revolution that the normative stance of the term “terror” begins its shift to current defamatory status (Schechter, 1998).
The view that threats raise fear and fear inevitably leads to the endorsement of far-right parties and policies (Bude, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018) is commonly voiced by politicians. In response to a terror attack in lower Manhattan, Governor Cuomo (2017) proclaimed: “The effort yesterday killed eight people, but in my opinion the effort failed, because the effort was not to kill eight people. The effort was to destruct us, to terrorize us, to scare us, to create mayhem. That’s the effort. That’s the goal on all of these attacks.” And, more recently still, in a speech to Congress, April 25, 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron put it thusly: “We have two possible ways ahead. We can choose isolationism, withdrawal and nationalism. … It can be tempting to us as a temporary remedy to our fears. But closing the door to the world will not stop the evolution of the world. It will not douse, but inflame the fears of our citizens.” Or as former Vice President Al Gore put it (Gore, 2004): “Terrorism is the ultimate misuse of fear for political ends. Indeed, its specific goal is to distort the political reality of a nation by creating fear in the general population that is hugely disproportionate to the actual dangers that the terrorists are capable of posing” (p. 779). Thus, a general consensus has been in place for many years that high-threat conditions drive people to press for authoritarian policies and strong, traditional leaders (McCann, 1997).

As we elaborate below, we anticipate that politicized dispositions, of which authoritarianism is but one, are more likely to be activated by anger rather than by fear. Earlier studies have shown that threat activates authoritarianism, mobilizing authoritarians to act in line with their psychological predispositions (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). AIT posits that this activation depends on whether the threatening stimulus generates predominantly anger. More generally, it claims that all politicized dispositions are more likely to be activated by anger and that fear functions to deactivate those same dispositions.

It is our goal in the sections that follow to fully articulate the core ideas underlying conventional accounts of emotion and politics. By doing so, we hope to make visible the often hidden presumptions that many bring to the word “emotion.” We thereafter turn from theoretical exposition to empirical research. AIT extends our understanding of how people make political decisions and act on them. We use the topic of threat to assess our theoretical claim that fear generally weakens support for far-right policies and candidates by weakening the extant commitment of those otherwise habitually inclined to vote for the right and far right. We also advance and test the theoretical argument that anger is the predominant activating mechanism of those on the right.

A Brief History of Emotion in Political Science and Psychology

It is common to treat words as if they identify straightforward features of the world. Yet, words can be slippery things with shifting meanings that produces scientifically imprecise measurement and theory (Wittgenstein & Ogden, 1990). Our goal in this section is to seek precision and clarity when we discuss what we and others mean by the term “emotion.” Three models of emotion have been applied to theories of political behavior and political judgment over the past 70 years. The oldest is attitude theory. Cognitive appraisal theories began to emerge in the 1970s. And, finally, AIT emerged in the late 1980s (Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000).

2 Many may not know that “emotion” is a rather late entry into the semantic language as an overarching category encompassing what had long been understood as passion, desire, or sentiment (Dixon, 2006).
3 Of course scholars have long been examining passion (Descartes, 2012; Montagu, 1994; Montesquieu, 1989; Rorty, 1993; Stiker, 1987), but by the term “models,” we mean effort to apply contemporary scientific, empirical, claims to testing with various modes of data. We do not discuss Freud’s psychoanalytic views for lack of space.
4 We also set aside the body of research that can best be described as the “circumplex” model which emerged in the late 1970s and extended to the 1990s (Plutchik & Conte, 1997; Russell, 1980; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984). We discuss it more fully elsewhere (Marcus, 2003).
Attitude Theory and Emotion

Attitude theory served as the basis for the “Normal Vote” explanation for electoral behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1966). The approach presented affect as one of the tripartite components in an attitude. The other two are the cognitive—what we know about a political object—and the behavioral—what we do with or about the attitude target. In attitude theory, the affect component has two primary features: one dealing with function and one dealing with structure. The function of affect in attitude theory is to serve as a passive repository for an approach–liking–avoid–disliking evaluation, that is, to serve as an “affective tag” (Ajzen, 2001; Allport, 1935; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; McGuire, 1969). That evaluation follows from what we know about the target, that is, the cognitive component is a necessary predicate for generating the affective component.

In this approach, affect was defined as a single valence dimension, ranging from strong liking to strong disliking. This is similar to the measurement of many other matters of perception (e.g., perceptions of threat related to such things as Pearl Harbor or 9/11 in the United States, and the November 13 Paris Terror attacks in France on a single metric ranging from low to high). This unidimensional conception of affect remains active in the widespread use of feeling thermometers deployed in influential surveys such as the American National Election Studies (Kenney & Rice, 1988; Klein, 1991; Wilcox, Sigelman, & Cook, 1989).

In summary, we have identified one central claim made by attitude theory: that affective reactions can be treated as a single dimension that signals whether it is best to approach or to avoid a stimulus (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).

Cognitive Appraisal Theories of Emotion

Reducing emotional experience to a single dimension seems counterintuitive, since a great variety of distinct negative and positive emotional reactions are easy to identify in everyday life. Indeed, an abundance of empirical research soon arose to challenge the conjecture of unidimensionality in attitude theory (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999; Watson & Clark, 1985). Cognitive appraisal theorists subsequently proposed that emotions existed in many different “discrete” states such as anger, fear, hope, pride, disgust, and sadness. There are several versions, differing largely on the number of discrete emotions, from a low of 7 or 8 to a high of more than 22. The general approach was intended to understand the distinct causal etiology of affective experiences well beyond the single positive-negative valence view.

Most cognitive appraisal theories retain the presumption passed down from attitude theory that at any given moment the individual will normally experience predominantly one emotion (Clore & Ortony, 2008; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). This presumption derives from the means by which we are thought to experience an emotion. The process is the application of a sequence of cognitive evaluations of the threats and opportunities present in our environment in the moment (see Figure 1). That is, various cognitive considerations about what is happening and how we should best react are sequentially applied. On exposure to a stimulus, the individual determines if its implications are positive or negative; then, certain or uncertain; controllable or not, and so on, with the particular appraisals deemed important varying from theory to theory. Emotion then flows from the particular sequence of cognitions that occurs one after the other (McGuire, 1969, 1972). In this sense, all cognitive appraisal theories are consistent with attitude theory’s view of perception. In the case of attitude theory, the result is a feeling state that falls somewhere along a single liking-disliking dimension. In the case of cognitive appraisal theories, the result is a discrete affective state, such as hope, fear, anger, or sadness.

The development of a psychology informed by neuroscientific research points to many concepts thought to be singular as better understood as complex. For example, Decety and Norman (2018) point to empathy as such a case wherein a number of concurrent assessments combine to foster more, or less, empathy.
There have been instances wherein research conducted under the guise of cognitive appraisal report multiple concurrent affective reactions. For example, Conover and Feldman (1986) find that people report independent positive and negative reactions to the economy during the Reagan years. And Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007) report that both anxiety and anger can be generated by terrorist attacks. Further, some cognitive appraisal theorists acknowledge that people can experience several emotions during a singular event (Lazarus, 1991). Notwithstanding those departures from the norm, the prospect of multiple recurring affective appraisals is left largely undertheorized by cognitive appraisal researchers.6

There is one accommodation that has been more fully explored. Most, and perhaps all, scholars accept the existence of ambivalence. However, that term has been applied broadly to describe the holding of conflicting policy positions, or of conflicting beliefs, as well as to experiencing conflicting emotions (Craig & Martinez, 2005; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Priester & Petty, 1996). The term “ambivalence” strictly means having contrary beliefs or feelings, with “bi” referring to direct opposition, presumptively positive and negative beliefs, positions, or feelings. Even those attending to the possibility of multiple conflicting feelings accept the premise that such instances are not the norm. Moreover, ambivalence does not encompass, as we argue below, conflicting negative affective appraisals as normal and consequential.

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We can see this clearly in Figure 1. Here we present Ira Roseman’s depiction of his version of cognitive appraisal theory (Roseman, 1984, p. 31). The figure displays the evident considerations and their application to define his understanding of the discrete emotions that he identifies and the sequence (top to bottom) of serial cognitive appraisals that lead to each discrete state. Which of those

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6By undertheorized we mean that cognitive appraisal theories have not offered an account, with one exception which we deal with next, of why, when, and to what effect such multiple affective appraisals occur (or further, specifying which affective appraisals might co-occur). The acknowledgment that affective occurrences are typically multidimensional, rather than affectively homogeneous, arose in the research literature well before any cognitive appraisal theorists paid notice (Abelson et al., 1982; Watson et al., 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982).
basic discrete states any of us experiences at any given moment depends on how those intermediate
cognitive appraisals play out.

**A Brief Critique of Emotion as Understood in Cognitive Appraisal Theories**

Our main critique of cognitive appraisal theories is that they insist on a fairly strict, and often
quite elaborate, sequential cognitive process that precedes the experience of any emotion. For exam-
ple, most appraisal theories suggest anger requires a set of cognitive appraisals identifying both ma-
levolent and intentional threats, in addition to an evaluation of how likely the individual is to mount
a response. It is often claimed that fear is caused initially by exposure to any threat and then is trans-
formed to anger when the individual discovers that some norm was intentionally violated (Salmela &
von Scheve, 2017). Our approach is more consistent with the most recent neuropsychological findings
of brain architecture, which suggests that emotion springs from distinct though interconnected brain
circuitry such that different emotions can be experienced simultaneously and in parallel. Further,
neuroscience suggests distinct emotional states such as anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm occur without
prior intervention of a distinct prior cognitive appraisal (Adolphs, 2008; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, &
Damasio, 1995; Chen et al., 2009; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Straube et al., 2010; Zajonc, 1980, 1984).

We have other concerns as well. Emotion words in the English language number in the hundreds
(Clore & Ortony, 1988; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1998; Storm & Storm, 1987). Further, the number
and nuance varies across languages. This raises a challenge. Which of the many words warrant
treatment as “discrete” emotional states and which may be treated as synonymous? Many English
language emotion words can readily be construed as synonymous. Yet many may also be understood
as naming different underlying emotional states. What enables us to define when the words name
different emotions versus the same emotion state? What, apart from the authority of the scholar, or
some semantic tradition, affords some standard psychometrically valid criterion (Cowen & Keltner,
2017; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2017)?

Finally, both theoretical approaches above have been largely uninformed by neuroscience re-
search on emotions. Before we turn to AIT, we think it useful to lay out the core insights of neurosci-
ence into how human brains function that should inform all theories of emotion and politics (Gray,

**A Necessary Interlude: Some of the Essential Contributions of Neuroscience to the Study of
Emotion and Politics**

The burgeoning research in neuroscience on emotion has, to date, not yet had widespread impact
across the many fields of political science. We next present one self-executing exercise that displays
what research in neuroscience tells us about how the brain functions that challenges one of the assump-
tions embedded in the conventional wisdom about the human experience of reality. Our main goal is to
provoke the reader’s willingness to keep an open mind with regard to our general approach of having
emotional experience as the foundation of all information processing, decision-making, and behavior.

As we have discussed above, ancient belief holds that thinking is the central actor in human
judgment and action. Thinking rules, and if sometime we let our “hearts” get in the way, that lapse
reflects badly on our character (Locke, 1996; Nussbaum, 1994). Indeed this core belief is celebrated,
one might say venerated, as the singular distinguishing feature of our species. With this in mind,
touch your nose with a finger (either hand, any finger will do). How many touches did you experi-
ence? The normal experience is one touch. You might describe what you just did by saying: I touched
my nose. Now, consider: How many touches did your brain process? The accurate answer is two. The

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7By limiting ourselves to just this one vivid experience we do not mean to suggest the evidence is restricted to this example.
Indeed we elaborate the research evidence as well as add yet more self-initiated trials that you can engage yourself (Marcus,
2013).
electrical signals that convey touch somewhere in the body to the brain travel at approximately 76 feet per second. It takes time for the nerve signals generated at the tip of your nose and those generated at the tip of your finger to travel to sensory cortex in the brain. The nerve path from the nose to the brain is measured in inches, but that from the fingertip to the brain is measured in feet. Hence, the signal from the nose arrives well before the signal that arrives from the finger.

Consciousness offers the vivid sense that we have instantaneous access to the events before us, but this is just one example of our brains tricking us (Nørretranders, 1998). Conveniently, our brains reconciles the temporal discrepancy, the two touches being displaced in time, and delivers instead the subjective sense of a single event. In this case, the brain uses the time before the later conscious subjective “experience” of touch to accomplish this resolution. The brain is not capable of magically giving us instantaneous access to the world. It does, however, create the illusion of instantaneous access.

The example is but one insight generated by fundamental breakthroughs in neuroscience about how humans experience reality. Here follow some others. First, we now know that preconscious sensory processing is more precise and deft in executing interactions, especially motor interactions, than is conscious observation (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995). It accomplishes this deftness because preconscious neural activity is highly parallel and distributed in various regions of the brain. For example, though we experience vision as a coherent fully integrated experience, the brain receives the electrical signals arriving from the two retinas via the optic nerves and then sends them to different regions to determine object identification, movement, assign color and other attributes so that these can be simultaneously determined prior to convergence in brain region V1 where the conscious experience of sight is assembled (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Zeki, 1993). Parallel, distributed processing of sensory and somatosensory information is a general feature of the brain (Borst, Grégoire, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2011). It is also a fundamental feature of affective processing (Celeghin, Diano, Bagnis, Viola, & Tamietto, 2017).

Second, consciousness is not “higher” or “better” than the preconscious. Both are essential. One of consciousness’s principal purposes is to serve as an “error-correcting space” (Gray, 2004), this provides a vivid representational space wherein we can deliberate and plan for the future by manipulating mental representations of both specific external stimuli and complex social outcomes, past and anticipated, without the immediate necessity of acting on those deliberations. But humans do not spend much of their lives guiding activities reliant on careful deliberation. Instead, most of the time our behavior is the result of quick routines whereby we apply well-embedded habits that have worked well in the past (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; James, 1890). The constant monitoring of action and response is managed by preconscious appraisal processes (Berthoz, 1997; Jeannerod, 1997). And, when acting in that fashion, consciousness helps humans explain themselves to themselves and to others and to generate mutually reinforcing accounts (Kunda, 1990; Rokeach, 1964). And, here, consciousness has a different function, to foster shared purposes, including mutual affirmations about the proper way of acting and interacting (Graziano & Kastner, 2011; Mercier & Sperber, 2017).

Third, consciousness is much more limited than are the many capacities of preconscious processes (Marcus, 2013). That is so because, in comparison to preconscious neural systems, consciousness is slow, crude, and resource intensive. Moreover, consciousness does not have access to procedural memory wherein our habits of thought and action reside (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Schacter, 1996).

Fourth, nonetheless, consciousness sometimes executes in a fashion we can describe as “free will,” but it most often does so at the instigation of anxiety (i.e., fear, see also footnote 15). Anxiety is

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8 For more on consciousness as a delusion, Michael Gazzaniga’s work is very insightful (1985, 1992, 2011).
9 We endorse the view that there is considerable wisdom in relying on the past to guide the present. Just not in all circumstances.
the executor of the second of two types of judgment, the deliberative route. Hence passion, as Hume pronounced, is here also in charge.

Fifth, most recent research suggests that long-standing sharp distinctions between cognition, affect, and perception are no longer tenable. As we pointed out above, the work of the brain to manage ongoing affairs requires information processing at a speed, deftness, and accuracy that far exceed the capacity of consciousness. To accomplish all that, affective processes are essential. As Siegel, Wormwood, Quigley, and Barrett (2018) put it:

“Feelings do more than influence judgments of what you have seen; they influence the actual content of perception. … Neuroscientific and behavioral studies suggest that affective feelings are integral to the brain’s internal model and, thus, perception. The cytoarchitecture of limbic regions puts affective feelings at the top of the brain’s predictive hierarchy, driving predictions throughout the brain as information cascades to primary sensory and motor regions.” (pp. 496; see also Chanes & Barrett, 2016)

Here we might offer one helpful suggestion. In the quote above you will find a number of spatial metaphors (e.g., in the quote above, “at the top”). If you reimagine these in temporal terms, that is to say, before and after, you will have a clearer insight into the import of the material presented above (see the first point below).

A neuroscientific theory of emotion is guided by the following axiomatic principles. First, affective appraisals arise preconsciously (i.e., well before consciousness is capable of generating its conscious representation of the world of sensory experience). Second, affective responses are themselves focused appraisals. Third, affective appraisals provide the closest possible to real-time assessments essential to multiple aspects of tactical and strategic aspects of life, notably by enabling more deft as well as more swiftly updating control than is offered by self-conscious mechanisms. This is largely because the former have direct and swift access to procedural memory while the latter do not (Berthoz, 1997; Gelder, De Haan, & Heywood, 2001; Jeannerod, 1997; Schacter, 1996; Squire, 1992). Fourth, there are multiple concurrent, parallel, affective appraisals, each largely subserved by different neural processes (Maratos, Senior, Mogg, Bradley, & Rippon, 2012; Shenhav & Buckner, 2014). Thus, it is common for people to experience multiple concurrent emotional states that fluidly report on changing conditions within the self, the external conditions then present, and the interplay of between self and the external world. Fifth, what people end up doing is a result of the competition between and resolution of these concurrent appraisals.

With all this in mind, how can these insights explain how people understand the world and act in it? We turn to that next.

The Theory of Affective Intelligence

The first political theory of emotion to fully rely on neuroscience was AIT (Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). The theory of affective intelligence initially identified two dynamic events.
Theory of Affective Intelligence

preconscious neural systems of affective appraisal. Informed by the research of neuroscientist Jeffrey A. Gray (1985, 1987a, 1987b) and augmented by the work of other neuroscientists (LeDoux, 1992, 1993; Öhman, 1993; Öhman, Flykt, & Lundquist, 2000; Rolls, 1992, 1999), this two-dimension view of emotion lead to a substantial literature of research particularly on the role of anxiety (i.e., fear).

Later, in part stimulated by work on anger by other researchers (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011), a third appraisal dimension was added (Marcus, 2002; Marcus & MacKuen, 1996; Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006). We make two observations: first, the name, theory of affective intelligence arrived more than a decade after the core research findings had already appeared in the research literature (Marcus, 1988), and, second, significant modifications were later made though the name of the theory did not change.

We present two Axioms that are core elements of the theory.

**Axiom 1.** Enthusiasm, and the later addition of anger, enable and affirm reliance on habits to manage the mundane recurring routines by which people manage their affairs. Each of these appraisals reinforces the suitable and ongoing immediate success of those recurring habits. The first, enthusiasm, deals with recurring positive goal-securing thoughts and actions. The second, anger, deals with recurring confrontation with noxious threats.

**Axiom 2.** Fear should delink people from relying on their partisan habits of thought and action. And, importantly, greater fear should also lead to a wide-ranging information search designed to identify a contemporaneous understanding of the character of the novel circumstances, identify the possible options to address those circumstances, and identify the possible coalitions to achieve the apparently best path.

On balance, the bulk of the research that the theory stimulated has been focused on information searching and the role of increased fear in moving people to make contemporaneous deliberative judgments in a manner that hews more closely to those defining deliberative citizenship (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Valentino et al., 2008). Indeed, those offering alternative explanations (Ladd & Lenz, 2008; Lavine et al., 2012) and those affirming AIT (Groenendyk, 2016) retain the same focus on information gathering and deliberation. Three recent reviews summarize the research literature on emotions in politics (Brader & Marcus, 2013; Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011; Vasilopoulos, in press). Collectively these document the focus on information search and on deliberation.

The theory of affective intelligence in its broadest view puts at the forefront the core claim that multiple affective appraisals serve to enable two approaches to judgment: (1) a default approach: partisan reliance on habituated practices, that is reliance on traditions, and (2) a departure from that default, nonpartisan open deliberation that sets aside tradition and “automaticity” for thoughtful assessments so as to produce, consider, and then enact new solutions to challenges poised by novel circumstances.

Having two approaches available is an adaption that addresses the problem that the viability of each mode of judgment entails a specific form of fallibility. The first, reliance on habit, presumes that benefits in the future can be most successfully harvested by relying on proven practices of thought and action. But reliance on past practices when circumstances are dramatically or rapidly changes can lead, at the extreme, to extinction (Darwin, 1966).

The second mode, reliance on open deliberation, presumes that the contemporary circumstances are sufficiently unusual to recommend setting aside proven habits for newly crafted possibilities. But knowing that the past is not likely to provide a template for the current circumstances is not a solution as to what to do. Rejecting the past enables us to more freely consider the possible solutions and guess as to their prospects. But here too there is a fallibility. These novel solutions, formed from reliance on our ability to reason, using such mechanisms as democratic institutions and public reason
fostered by a free press (Fishkin, 1991; Habermas, 1984), have a history of failure in part due to the inability of reason to fully anticipate the consequences that might follow.

Here, we detail one such instance of a failure resulting from reliance on reasoning. After the defeat of the Persians, the Greek alliance between Sparta and its allies and Athens and its allies broke down. Sparta was determined to defeat what they saw was an overweening Athens empire. During the opening phases of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans had the most adept army, while the Athenian military had its navy. This made Athens vulnerable to land invasion. Pericles, the great Athenian leader, proposed a plan that violated traditional Athenian warrior codes of conduct. Instead of meeting the Spartan army on the fields outside of Athens, he persuaded the reluctant Athenian warriors to build a wall that would surround the city and the land all the way to and including their seaport, Piraeus. The walls prevented the Spartans from engaging the Athenians. The Spartans hurled insults at the Athenians to draw them out of their walled city. But, heeding Pericles, the Athenian warriors refused the challenge.

To sustain the Athenians now living inside the walled city, they brought all their animals into the city as well. The Spartans could and did burn the countryside but could not destroy the lands. And once the fighting season ended, the Spartan army returned to Sparta. The new strategy worked. Unanticipated was that this novel solution created a problem far greater. The dense city had become a formidable breeding ground for disease. When the plague came, it killed perhaps as many as one in four Athenians. Among the dead was the architect of the entire strategy, Pericles himself (Thucydides, 1996).12

Innumerable modern examples of failures resulting from reliance on reason readily come to mind, among them: the two space shuttle disasters, the Columbia and the Challenger; the effect of cheap airplane travel enabling the rapid diffusion of viruses through infected passengers; the ability of evolution to work more rapidly among viruses and bacteria which may well overwhelm the slower efforts of pharmaceutical companies to produce efficacious defenses; or the too many instances of bridges failing because of unanticipated conditions. The best outcomes of science and technology have been, on balance, a great aid to human progress, but we must also acknowledge the sometimes grave outcomes some of those advances have generated. When humans invented and adopted a carbon-based economy, they gained electricity generation, production of manmade fertilizer, and pharmaceuticals (among other valuable yields). These innovations reduce starvation, poverty, and crime. But with those benefits came climate change and greater risk to humans and many other species.

In sum, each approach is imperfect. Adopting either as the ubiquitous basis for decision-making would leave us considerably more vulnerable, though in different ways. We are better served by having two routes to judgment. But identifying this dual capability requires identifying when each route is best taken.

Let us apply this insight to citizenship. In his study of citizenship in America, Schudson (1998) found that in any given period there is one dominant normative conception of what is required to be a good citizen. More recently, discussions of citizenship in America have seen a debate as to what form of citizenship is best to ensure the success of democracy. On the one hand are those who espouse a model based on the ubiquitous capacity to be informed and act as an autonomous reasoning agent (Benhabib, 1996; Callan, 1997; Elster & Przeworski, 1998; Rawls, 1971, 1997). In that model, citizens failing to meet the requirements threaten the very heart of democratic institutions (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Caplan, 2007; Dahl, 1992; Somin, 2016). On the other hand are those who

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12This anecdotal example contains another lesson. Humans sought to understand disease for much of its history, seeking wellness through medicinal potions, religious ceremonies, sacrificial acts, and developing theories of disease that only became somewhat successful when bacteria and viruses became identified in the late twentieth century. Happily for humans, resilience to infection was produced by nondeliberative mechanisms provided by evolution, for example, skin that is quite resistant to infection, the immune system, and the blood-brain barrier.
espouse a form of citizenship based on solidarity and commitment to common causes (Rosenblum, 2008; Sanders, 1997; Shapiro, 1999). What they each have in common is the presumption that their normative ideal is to be a universal standard. But as we have argued, AIT holds that each standard—steadfast commitment to extant projects and goals and open deliberation—can hold sway at different times for the same individual. Citizens are better prepared by using each mode in the condition for which that mode is best suited. This claim makes extant accounts of citizenship, at least those that advance a set of uniformly applicable standards, suspect.

This also offers a new understanding of why some humans are genetically inclined to adopt a conservative stance while others adopt a more progressive one (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013, 2014). It has been common to most normative understandings of democracy that an informed reasoning citizenry is required. Presented with the common finding that many citizens are inclined to trust tradition and stable order, it has been common to treat these so inclined as a form of pathological resistance to progress (Proulx & Brandt, 2017). AIT reimagines the role of the right and of the left as each are inclined to adopt one of two modes in operation because each is more adept at that one mode (Bernabel & Oliveira, 2017). This ensures that when the public faces challenges it will have a robust debate, hence making it less likely that a casually secured consensus will be adopted. But this, as we shall see below, overstates the influence of inclinations. The influence of affective appraisals of any particular threat on how best to address that threat are quite robust.

As we have documented, AIT has largely focused on precursors of judgment. In light of that, how does a focus on modes of judgment advance the field? We apply the principal AIT axioms to focus on two modes of judgment. As we, and many others, have noted, habits rely on “automaticity” to swiftly enact the subtlety and deftness that the execution of habits demand (the millisecond interplay of action and response, interacting with the physical world, and with others). Thus, the capacities of anger and enthusiasm operate largely in the preconscious realm, largely playing out in the hidden realm of the preconscious. This leads to two hypotheses.

**H1:** Anger serves to launch defenses against challenges to extant core norms by those who threaten. And, given the importance of those norms, their protection will lead people to disregard the specific benefits or costs of such actions (i.e., utility in the language of classic economic theory). And, anger will be most potent among those who are most attached to those core norms.

Hence, Hypothesis 1 predicts that there will be a positive interaction between anger and the salient political dispositions, especially under conditions of threat.

With respect to identifying novel circumstances, such circumstances are dealt with by conscious consideration of the merits of contemporary proposals (unaffected by partisan loyalties) and the possibilities of new coalitions that might better serve than fervent attachments to extant practices and loyalties.

**H2:** Fear will lead people to disregard extant practices (practices that will likely be ill-suited for novel circumstances). Anxious people will thus be able to turn away from habits otherwise normally at play and concern themselves with the best possible outcomes.

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13In this regard, this hypothesis challenges the ubiquity of prospect theory’s claim that losses will be more influential than gains when people make decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992). When people are angry, they are more likely to disregard the possibility of losses resulting from their actions (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2001; Lerner & Keltner, 1996).
Hence, Hypothesis 2 specifically predicts that the power of political dispositions will be reduced in the presence of fear generated by contemporary threats.

Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Two Received Wisdoms

The claim we examine is that perception of threat, a very familiar and currently widely used concept (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Mutz, 2018; Rosenboim, Benzion, Shahrabani, & Shavit, 2012), fully and satisfactorily accounts for how people react when faced with threats, foreign and domestic. AIT holds that people have two ways of responding to threat. They can understand it as familiar and noxious, best addressed by rallying the troops and launching as ferocious a response as necessary to eliminate it. Or, they can understand the threat as something unusual, hence better to look before you leap. AIT holds both relevant appraisals are executed simultaneously and largely independently. Which is the more robust, at any given moment, will determine the course taken. We apply the model shown in Figure 2, below, to threat in France.\(^{14}\)

With respect to threat, the common view is that people feel a lot of fear or they feel less; thereby indicating whether the threat is high or low. In brief, threat elicits fear, and fear in turn drives people to support conservative policies and politicians.

AIT offers an alternative account of how preconscious emotions impact on both the substantive decisions people make and the process by which they make them. As such, it should be applicable to a very wide array of dependent variables. Here, we examine two important facets of citizenship: how people revise their policy preferences in light of affective appraisals of contemporary events and how they generate vote choice.

We begin with the often-made assertion that fear mobilizes authoritarians and those on the far right (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). There is a unity of understanding, including such works as offered by Glen Wilson (1973), Herbert McClosky (1958), and Ernst Becker (1973, 1975) that threat activates conservative and authoritarian dispositions.

Consideration of any other emotion in this process is often absent, though see (Green & Phillips, 2004; Lambert et al., 2010; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). The impulse to focus on a singular affective cause is a natural derivative of conventional approaches to emotion. As we’ve reviewed above, both attitude theory and the school of cognitive appraisal theories rest on the presumption that at any given moment one affective state is dominant. Hence, if people face a threat, they will become fearful and only fearful. Fear so dominates this narrative that it has become conventional wisdom that it is the only trigger of movement to the right after a crisis (Feldman

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\[^{14}\text{Here and throughout we focus on the interactive effects between the contemporaneous affective appraisals and salient politicized dispositions. In the interest of having a more focused presentation, here we discuss direct effects elsewhere (Valentino, Marcus, Foucault, & Vasilopoulos, 2018; Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 2018; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2018).}\]

However, according to AIT, fear is unlikely to produce such results for two reasons. First, at any given moment, with respect to emotion, the brain is evaluating three focused features of the environment (and the self’s capacity to engage). Thus, it is the norm for there to be three concurrent affective appraisals. And, second, specific to threat, as we outlined above (see Figure 2), AIT points to two different frequently co-occurring appraisals as pivotal in determining how people address the situation.15 If this is indeed the case, then conventional accounts are theoretically under-, and hence misspecified (She, Eimontaite, Dangli, & Sun, 2017).

Exploring what happens when fear increases without simultaneously accounting for the concurrent appraisal of normative violation, expressed by modulating levels of anger, is likely to generate inaccurate estimates of the impacts of fear and anger (Lerner et al., 2003). Only if affective appraisals were completely orthogonal—or if it could be demonstrated that one affective appraisal causally precedes the other—would it be valid to examine one affective appraisal without the other also being included in the model (on this point, see Jost, 2019). But the consequence of the appraisal of uncertainty is not so much directed at impacting the substantive decision of what to choose among any visible options but rather to alter how we go about making that choice. Increased fear moves people to attend to the options presented by contending parties and their leaders and diminished influence of prior political preferences (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). What follows thereafter will depend on how persuasive each side proves to be. It is quite possible that the right or far right may make what they find to be a more credible claim, in which case anxious voters may well move to the right (Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). But that movement is contingent on the merits that the newly attentive, anxious public finds in the available options.

We explore these claims by applying them to two different tasks. The first is authoritarian political preferences: When do people hold to their convictions, and when do they revise their views by taking advantage of new contemporaneous information? The second is voting: When do people rely on their political dispositions to vote for far-right parties, and candidates and when do they abandon them? Our theory anticipates that emotions will have the same pattern of effects with political attitudes and with the act of voting, regardless of the specific stimulus that evoked these emotional reactions. To support these claims, we present three of our recent studies that draw on French data using different emotional targets. Study 1 investigates the association of emotional responses to the state of the economy on the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. Study 2 addresses the impact of emotional reactions to the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks on the endorsement of authoritarian preferences. Study 3 assesses the influences of fear and anger stemming from the November 13, 2015 Paris terror attacks on the 2015 French regional elections that took place four weeks after the attacks. In other studies, we explore similar hypotheses both in both France and in other nations using additional affective targets (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 2019).

**STUDY 1**

We first present some results from a study wherein we examined how fear and anger differentially mobilized right-wing voters to vote for the Front National in the 2014 European parliamentary election (Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017). France, at that time, was wrestling with a stagnant economy, chronic high unemployment, and government debt that exceeded EU requirements. The

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15The earlier work in the AIT vocabulary described one of the two dimensions by the term “aversion.” Others, notably Valentino and Banks (Banks & Valentino, 1999; Valentino et al., 2008), have used anger to name this same dimension. We adopt the latter term as better suited to label this dimension. The underlying neural process is the same (Harmon-Jones, 2004).
Socialist government led by President François Hollande had record low approval ratings, but the major opposition party, the UMP (since renamed Les Republicains), was bedeviled by scandals and intraparty divisions. All of this served to create an opening for the Front National that its leader Marine Le Pen aggressively sought to exploit.

We made use of the Making Electoral Democracy Work Internet survey that was conducted in two French regions (Ile-de-France and Provence) generating a diverse sample of respondents that matched census figures on a variety of demographic dimensions. We compared voters of the Front National with voters of the far-left Front de Gauche, the center-left Parti Socialiste, the center-right UMP, and those who chose to vote for any other party. We excluded nonvoters from the analysis. We made use of affective appraisals of the French economy. Fear and anger toward the economy were each measured by two 5-point Likert scale items ranging from “not at all...” to “quite....” As with any threat stimulus, we expect that fear and anger will be concurrent pertinent appraisals (MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus, Neumann, & MacKuen, 2017; Marcus et al., 2006). They are here, as elsewhere, highly correlated ($r = 0.63; p <.001$).

Our prediction is that fear and anger will alter how people make use of their political dispositions. Elsewhere we have explored a number of available political habits, but here we will focus on just one, left-right political identification, which is considered the key psychological anchor of French voters (Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche, & Tiberj, 2006; Fleury & Lewis-Beck, 1993).

Recall that we predict that increased fear will diminish the impact of political dispositions of thought and action, while we predict that anger will strengthen those same dispositions, in this analysis, ideological identification.

Figure 3 shows that as French citizens move from low to high levels of fear, center-right and left-wing respondents become more likely to vote for the FN. However, these differences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the right-hand side of Figure 3 clearly suggests that anger increases the impact of far-right ideological identification on the probability of voting for the FN.

![Figure 3](https://wileyonlinelibrary.com)

**Figure 3.** The effects of fear and voting on ideological identification and the vote for the Front National, 2014. Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work project (MEDW). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
in the 2014 European election. When anger is at its minimum, ideological identification has a very limited impact on voting for the FN. As we move from low to high levels of anger, however, right-wing respondents become significantly more likely to vote for the FN. On balance then, a modest affirmation.

STUDY 2

Our second study also enables us to test our two central hypotheses. Here we took advantage of the CEVIPOF barometer of political confidence (Baromètre de la Confiance Politique). A wave of the survey had been planned to go in the field when the Charlie Hebdo attacks took place. On the Monday following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, one of the authors was invited to submit a measure to gauge the emotional reactions of the French population. Full details are available in Vasilopoulos et al. (2018).

The survey produces a diverse sample matching the population on an array of demographic variables and consisting of 1,524 respondents in two waves, one prior to the Charlie Hebdo attacks and one three weeks after. Data were collected by the use of Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI). The dependent variable is a scale consisting of all available items in our study that measure adoption or rejection of authoritarian policy preferences. Each of these items were measured using 4-point response options, with higher values indicating greater support for the authoritarian option on each of the four policies. The four items, which we combine into a single summated scale, are:

1. “The death penalty should be restored in France”;
2. “France should have a strong leader who does not have to worry about elections or the parliament”;
3. “There are too many immigrants in France”; and,
4. “The army should run the country.”

In this study, we take advantage of the panel nature of the data to gauge individual-level changes in authoritarian preferences as a result of the public’s affective appraisals of the terror attacks. We employed this method because we anticipate that—as is typically the case with political attitudes—authoritarian preferences after the attacks are shaped by attitudes respondents held before the attacks as well as by the impact of the attacks themselves. We begin by presenting the proportion of the people in this study feeling fearful and angry. As Figure 4 clearly shows, the French report being fearful, but even more so, they report feeling angry.

How do fear and anger condition the impact of ideology on attitude change? Figure 5, below, shows that it was those on the left who were fearful who moved to adopt authoritarian policies, policies they normally reject, while those on the right who were angry were moved to marshal yet greater support for policies that they normally find quite genial.

In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the Socialist government of Hollande proposed stricter security measures, thus signaling to their supporters that they should similarly support such a move (Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). And, as shown in Figure 5, the left pane, it was the fearful among them that made that switch. But, as we show below, in Study 3, our claim that this bifurcated response, fear leading to open-mindedness and anger leading to mobilization of the like-minded loyal to their convictions, is not restricted to ideological convictions nor is it restricted to resistance and change of public opinion.

16The Baromètre is a regularly recurring survey of French public opinion overseen by Sciences Po’s research laboratory, Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF).
17The response options range from “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” As with all other measures, we rescaled the scoring of this measure to a common 0–1 range.
Figure 4. Proportions of the French who felt fearful and who felt angry in response to the Charlie Hedbo attacks. Source: Baromètre de la Confiance Politique. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure 5. Fear and anger interactions with left-right ideological orientation. Source: Baromètre de la Confiance Politique [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
STUDY 3

Study 3 focuses on the 2015 National Regional Elections in France that took place just a few weeks after the November 13 Paris terror attacks. The data come from the first two waves of the French Election Study (Enquête Électorale Française), a panel study which executed a new wave approximately every month between November 2015 and the French legislative elections that took place in June 2017. The survey was conducted between November 20 and November 29, 2015 (Wave 1) and between January 22 and February 3, 2016 (Wave 2) using CAWI in a nationwide representative sample of 24,369 respondents—20,460 of which participated in both waves. The dependent variable is the reported vote in the first round of the 2015 French regional elections, measured in wave 2. In the first round of the French regional elections, French citizens voted for a party candidate to serve as the regional president. In the 2015 election, along with the FN candidates, voters could choose from the four major French political parties, namely the far left Parti de Gauche (“PdG”), the incumbent center-left Parti Socialiste (“PS”), and the center-right Les Republicains (“Republicains”). In addition, they may vote for a variety of minor parties (scored as “Other”), or abstain (“Abstained”).

All of the independent variables were measured in Wave 1. We measure emotional reactions to the terror attacks using the approach proposed by Marcus et al. (2017). In Wave 1, the level of fear is measured by three questions, tapping the extent to which respondents felt anxious, fearful, or frightened when reflecting on the November 13 attacks. They do so by recording their response using a 10-point scale that ranged from “not at all” to “extremely.” A fear scale is constructed by summing across the three anxiety items. Details on this and all other measures in Study 3 can be found in the relevant publication (Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). Anger reactions are measured in a similar way. For fear, the exact terms in French were inquiétude, peur, and effroi; for anger, the French terms used were colère, haine, amertume, and ressentiment.

We measure authoritarianism using the child-rearing values scale (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; see also Federico, Fisher, & Deason, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 2005). The scale asks respondents whether it is more important for a child (1) to be independent or respectful for his/her grandparents; (2) to have an enquiring mind or to be well mannered; (3) to be well-behaved or creative; and (4) to be obedient or autonomous. Ideological identification has been measured by an item asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-interval scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). Finally, our models include the relevant demographic characteristics to see if those characteristics, here, perform much as they have in prior research. Hence, we include measures for age, gender, social class, and education. All variables are coded to range from 0 to 1 so as to enhance comparability of coefficients and hence of effect size.

18The sample is quota-controlled for age, gender, professional status, and stratified by region and size of community. The study was conducted for the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po by the polling institute IPSOS MORI and was sponsored by the French Ministry of the Interior.

19Having multiple items for each dimension is a vital step in the proper measurement of any latent concept, and no less so for measuring affective responses (Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuch, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2011; Sullivan & Feldman, 1973). But apart from the usual psychometric considerations of establishing reliability and validity, there is the further benefit of dealing with the suggestion that anxiety and fear are different emotions. For whatever their semantic meanings might offer on that score, the failure of these items to differentiate as people describe how they feel is telling (Marcus et al., 2017). Also available in these data are multiple indicators of enthusiasm. Including these in these analyses does not alter the results reported.

20It is worth noting that we have long been using hatred and anger as two of the four markers of the anger appraisal. Some have argued that anger and hatred are different in kind, that is, each is a distinct affective state (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011). Yet in dozens of studies, those described here, as well as others in various nations (United States, France, Germany, and Norway), these two items prove to be essentially synonyms, that is, people use both terms to make the same determination: how noxious they feel about the target (Marcus et al., 2017; Neuman, Marcus, & MacKuen, 2018).
Figure 6 presents the affective responses to the November 13th Paris attacks. The results—as was the case with the Charlie Hebdo attacks—suggest that the attacks generated a high degree of both fear and anger.

Let’s turn next to our main hypotheses. We advance the argument that affective appraisals change the extent to which we rely on our dispositions. In Study 3, we rely on two dispositions: ideology and authoritarianism. As we mentioned earlier, ideology is the key dispositional variable explaining vote choice in France, while Vasilopoulos and Lachat (2018) have also found that authoritarianism runs high among French far-right voters. The “normal vote” model’s central axiom is that political habits endure, that is, authoritarians and those who identify with the far right will vote for the far right regardless of the situation. Here, we test the indirect effects of fear and anger on the standing voting habits of voters. The results for left-right ideological identification are shown in Figure 7.

Both hypotheses are supported by the empirical patterns in the figures. Fear reduces voting for the Front National among center-right and especially among far-right party identifiers. As their fear mounts, far-right voters show less loyalty to their party. On the other hand, anger increases support most among far-right party identifiers. Thus, those most inclined to vote for the far right, the FN, those with established loyalties find that fear weakens that loyalty while anger strengthens those same loyalties. At the same time, results show anger mobilizing the far left and center left to vote for the far right, yet to a lesser extent. Overall, we find that ideology displays its maximum effect on voting for the FN at the highest levels of anger. This is in line with our expectations.

When we turn to the second influential predisposition, authoritarianism, we see yet again the same pattern. As shown in Figure 8, below, fear decreases the propensity to vote for the FN both among those scoring high and those scoring low on authoritarianism while those who are authoritarian and angry about the Paris attacks become more likely to vote for the FN in the regional elections of 2015.

Overall, the evidence above suggests that people react to threat by ascertaining how novel is the threat and, in parallel, how noxious is the threat. These are two fundamental properties. The evidence from neuroscience on the generation of such answers is that they are differentially, not
**Figure 7.** Indirect effects of fear and anger on left-right dispositions and voting for the FN 2015 national elections. *Source:* Enquête électorale française. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

**Figure 8.** Indirect effects of fear and anger on authoritarianism and voting for the FN 2015 national elections. *Source:* Enquête électorale française. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
sequentially, determined (Paulus et al., 2010; Whalen et al., 2004, 2001). This suggests that using such concepts as “perceptions of threat” with responses presumed to be a singular dimension, running from low to high, obscures the differentiated ways the human brain actually appraises threat.

A new study examined a diverse sample of 50 news stories. The stories all captured substantial public attention. They ranged from feel-good stories (e.g., the safe landing of a wounded plane in the Hudson River; the successful rescue of Chilean miners) to celebrity stories (golfer Tiger Woods’s car accident) but also included major political stories (abortion controversy in Kansas; Obama’s inauguration). Using the same methodology to measure emotional responses to the 50 stories as we use here, each of these stories shows that these three emotional appraisals are active responses to each and every one of the stories. The results showed dramatic affective responses on each of the three affective appraisals. Hence, well beyond just threat stories, all stories were appraised as to whether they are familiar or not (fear), how they confirm success of important goals (enthusiasm), and how much or how little any noxious challenge is present (Neuman et al., 2018). Thus, these three affective appraisals appear to be ubiquitously active across most circumstances. And this suggests that anger’s function and influence has been understated, and fear’s function and influence been overestimated.

Discussion

We began with a frequently used quote from David Hume. We end with an equally telling quote from Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes begins his book, the Leviathan, with a review of human nature as he understood it. Hobbes (1968) identifies a crucial feature, a sense humans’ lack. He writes:

For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. (p. 97)

All species, in so far as we know, also lack foresight. That makes all species vulnerable to unforeseen events (a new predator, a new disease, changing climate, and more). While evolution has not, as yet, produced the capacity for foresight, it has generated, for humans, a “next best” solution. Humans have the capacity to make efficient use of fast preconscious appraisals to apply the rich inventory of past practices (some encoded genetically, some encoded in cultures, and some secured through life experience—most of these being hidden from introspection). And when reliance on that inventory is failing, the affective appraisals, enthusiasm for reward-seeking actions, and anger for punishment management signal such by lowering of those appraisals. Then, either greater effort can be marshaled or the matter resolved by abandonment. Additionally, humans have an alternative approach to judgment. When fear signals a novel circumstance, then the mode of decision-making changes to thoughtful deliberation. Each mode is fallible, just in different ways; each is adept, but in different circumstances. And, managing the lack of foresight is of at least equal importance to how people respond to reward and punishment.

The long dominant view presents the public as largely ignorant and generally, if not equally, available to elite manipulation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; Kornhauser, 1959; Sartori, 1987). But this view presumes that thoughtful informed deliberation is the sole means for judgment. This presumption, if valid, would indeed require an informed and deliberating citizenry (Benhabib, 1996). And, on this score, the argument ranges between those optimistic about democracy (Fishkin, 2009), to those more dubious (Mueller, 1999), and, to those downright declaring defeat (Caplan, 2007; Somin, 2016). But as we have presented, AIT describes two forms of judgment, one that does rely on deliberative consideration relatively freed from partisan loyalties and one that relies on habituated practices that store past success for future use. We hope that our theoretical perspective provides a new view of this ancient battle between those arguing for more democracy and those arguing for less. Each mode of judgment has its advocates: those who advance the value of deliberation (Habermas,
The operation of the two approaches to political judgments have been largely hidden because their initiation occurs before consciousness and, hence, is largely invisible to us as conscious individuals. It might be useful to juxtapose AIT against the long-established influential model of voting: the “normal vote” model. Phil Converse (1962, 1964, 1966), many years ago, offered a succinct summary: “The election outcome in the population, or subpopulations, can be construed as the result of short-term forces acting on the distribution of partisan loyalties which have characterized the population” (1966, p. 15).

It is, at heart, a very simple account.

**Axiom 1:** People have habituated dispositions which serve as recurring reliable guides to thought and action (partisan identification and later ideological identification).

These provide the “normal vote”: the vote that results from those with left inclinations voting left and those with right inclinations voting right. But, as happens, incumbents lose and challengers win, ruling parties and coalitions on occasion lose strength and are replaced by challengers (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Sundquist, 1973). The “normal vote” model includes a situational component to account for these swings. Hence,

**Axiom 2:** It is the weakest identifiers who abandon their comfortable homes for new alliances when “short-term forces” blow them off their weak moorings.

The “normal vote” model sees the public as responding to the current environment (Converse, 1966) and as largely driven by elite opinion (Zaller, 1992). As we have sought to make clear, we have two disagreements with this and other such accounts. First, we begin by rejecting the view of the public as driven by external and historical forces and replacing that with an account premised on self-enacting agency. Second, we also reject the view that situational circumstances and claims are uniform in their direction and uniform in their impact. As our results show above, much depends on whether a given circumstance evokes greater fear or greater anger.

We began this section by noting that there has been an enduring debate between those who view the public as passive and ill-informed (Achen & Bartels, 2016) and those who view the public as active and capable (Fishkin, 2009). To this point, neither side has given way. The opposing views seem irreconcilable because their theoretical formulations provide no visible basis for a plausible reconciliation.

AIT provides a foundation for reconciling those seemingly mutually exclusive accounts. It does so by recognizing that each mode of decision-making should be understood as a form of agency, but further, that each has recurring fallibilities. And humans, by having the dual capacity to habituate and to reflect, secure a more robust stance to collective action in an often but not always uncertain world.

### Ramifications

Several accounts focus on the role of public fear in generating support for the far right by mobilizing those with authoritarian or right-wing political orientations. In particular, these accounts rest on a presumed dynamic. Those who hold conservative attitudes and far-right partisan loyalties are even more prone to support conservative and far-right parties and candidates because they are especially responsive to fear. We argue that this account is flawed in its singular focus on fear as the key psychological mechanism. It might seem unusual to focus on a “micro” psychological model when engaging in a comparative study of elections; however, the pattern we have gleaned from data already secured and analyzed suggests that this well-established model is misspecified. Or to put the matter more frontally, fear does not have the effects that the above narrative claims. It is anger that plays that role. Fear does alter how people think and act, but in ways that are contrary to this account.
As we pointed out at the outset, politicians and journalists, as well as scholars and pundits, treat threat and fear as equivalent and of singular potency. But that discourse largely ignores the role of anger. But it is anger rhetoric that also describes an important social dynamic as people respond to a threat. When leaders encourage people to deliberate, they talk about how the public should not be so afraid (all we have to fear is fear itself; fear-mongering is bad, etc.). The implicit lesson is citizens need not be fearful. The explicit claim then becomes if only citizens knew better they would not be so afraid. But many politicians, perhaps more so on the right, are not actually stoking fear at all, and their constituents are not dominated by fear. Our theory and findings suggest that in these circumstances, many are more outraged. Addressing those who are angry, on the false understanding that they are fearful, is likely to exacerbate their anger. Moreover, resolving imputed fears is unlikely to be effective because such fears do not directly address their grievances.

This narrow focus on fear is also well established outside the scholarly academy much as it is within. In a recent article on the Huffington Post site, a contributor, Brooke Deterline, in a post entitled “the United States of Anxiety” asserts the following (Deterline, 2017): “[the characteristics of the anxious brain]:

- Safety seeking
- Self- and/or group-focused – I/We matter and You/They don’t
- Tunnel vision – everything rides on this situation, it’s everything
- Need to know – ambiguity feels unsafe and often unbearable
- Zero-sum game – “either/or” thinking versus imaginative of new possibilities
- Simplicity seeking – Things are simple and knowable
- Rigid and certain – “I/We know the right answer.” There is no doubt
- Black and white thinking: “I/We are right/good; You/They are wrong/bad”
- Familiarity – my group is what matters and is safe
- Fixed mindset – this situation, person, dynamic will never change
- Harmony – we all need to agree and conform, loyalty above all else.”

Actually rather than being characteristics of people who are anxious, these are characteristics of angry people.

What we “know” can blind us, especially when certainty of belief infuses what we think we know. The failure to recognize anger even when readily visible or clearly expressed is evident both in academic and nonacademic settings. Noted conservative Joseph de Maistre (1977) was hardly opaque when he expressed his hatred of the enlightenment, nor have most conservative commentators been less clear since. It is a reflection of the limits of the extant theoretical and cultural lens that people looking where the theoretical light falls and not elsewhere.

Another indicator of this deep commitment to the presumption that it is fear that drives all that is negative is revealed by examining our language. We have ample words to identify specific forms of fearfulness: xenophobia (fear of others), Islamophobia (fear of Muslims), and homophobia (fear of gay people). Yet we do not have the equivalent words for the more likely sources of the disparagement to people of color by white people; the disparagement by some towards Muslims; or, towards gay people by social conservatives. Our theory and the findings we report here point to anger as the critical source of action targeting others. Hence, it would be more apt to say that we are observing the impact of xenocholera, Islamocholera, or homocholera, hatred of others, hatred of Muslims, and hatred of gay people. It appears that anxiety is not the predominant source of demands for revenge, limitations on immigration, enhanced security, and more authoritarian rule—it is anger. And that is reflected in the available name we give to those who hold women in contempt, “misogynists.” This term properly has its foundation in the Greek root of hatred (misein). Perhaps, alternatively to our suggestion above, we could coin the terms: “misoxenoist,” “misoIslamist,” or “misohomoist.” No
doubt, both variants will sound so very strange to the ear, reflecting how much we rely on familiar terms (even those that mislabel and mislead).

This misattribution leaves those who subscribe to the conventional account helpless in the face of a confusing world. In a recent *Atlantic* article, entitled “People Voted for Trump Because They Were Anxious, Not Poor,” *Atlantic* staff writer, Olga Khazan, after summarizing recent social science studies of Trump voters, concluded (Khazan, 2018):

These why-did-people-vote-for-Trump studies are clarifying, but also a little bit unsatisfying, from the point of view of a politician. They dispel the fiction—to use another 2016 meme—that the majority of Trump supporters are disenfranchised victims of capitalism’s cruelties.

In other words, it’s now pretty clear that many Trump supporters feel threatened, frustrated, and marginalized—not on an economic, but on an existential level. Now what?"

This helplessness is revealed in that last despairing concluding line: “now what?”

But conventional wisdom, here as it often does elsewhere, keeps us blind to that which lies outside its vision of fear as the essential and singular cause of our discontent. Anger has long been apparent in the reactions to various progressive projects, such as continued population movement from rural areas to urban, increasing cosmopolitan patterns (cultural exchange, interest in style, fashion, and celebrity, as well as trade, travel, and so on), acceptance of previously disparaged groups (such as single women, women in the workplace, gay marriage, atheists, and more). Yet, as we show above, the misattribution of the consequences of anger to anxiety is dominant in coverage and interpretation (Deterline, 2017; Mutz, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018). This in spite of scholars in psychology and political science who call attention to the distinction between anxiety and anger (Banks, 2014; Banks & Valentino, 2012; Lerner et al., 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus, 2002; Valentino et al., 2011; Vasilopoulos, 2018). It is worth mentioning that calling attention to the differentiation is not exactly novel (Ax, 1953; Conover & Feldman, 1986). We make this point to note that theoretical lenses focus attention to what is within their range. When anger is the dominant motivating force, then policies, programs, and political rhetoric meant to assuage fear are unlikely to succeed. Instead, policies addressing fear are likely to be seen as impotent, hence conveying a sense of a political order that is in disarray and ineffectual. And that in turn will produce a hunger for new “outsiders” to take the reins of power from ineffectual elites. Anger springs from the sense that core values and core habits of thought and action are under attack. In democratic societies, people will differ as to what core values and social practices are just. Thus, we see the continuing fights over male supremacy versus female liberation; nativist dominance versus greater respect for marginal and liminal groups; rural dominance versus urban and cosmopolitan practices of life and authority.

In such instances, a political order that cannot address the competing claims made by contending angry groups will be more vulnerable to leaders proposing authoritarian governance. This will be especially so for any political regime that does not accurately recognize the angry forces at play. But the fuller story begins with the ability of pro-democracy liberal politicians to rally the public by presenting programs that offer them a richer future.

We and others have extended this work to apply this approach to attitudes and to political behavior (Lambert et al., 2010; Vasilopoulos, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). But much more remains to be done to exploit this approach, not just to determine its reach but also to identify its limitations.

21Indeed, any grasp of the history of American politics must begin with the enduring fight between those who seek to secure the rural modalities of life against the appeal and seduction of urban life.
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Attacks on Authoritarian Policy Preferences

**Study 3: Table 3A.** The Conditional Effect of Affective Appraisals on the Probability to Vote for the FN in the 2015 National Elections

**Table 4.** The Conditional Effects of Fear and Anger on Left-Right Dispositions and Authoritarianism Voting on the Probability of Voting for the FN in the 2015 French National Elections