

THE IMPACT OF THE OTTOMAN LEGACY ON TURKISH POLICY IN THE BALKANS (1991-1999)

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The Turks dominated the Balkans for more than five centuries and this historical presence makes the Balkans a specific area for Turkey. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the peninsula is widely commented on and resented in the national historiography and the Turks confront the area in a rather deeply emotional way. This historical and possibly cultural legacy is moreover combined with the presence of Muslim and Turkish communities in the Balkans; communities founded under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire or settled at its instigation. How does Turkey deal – or how can it deal – with this legacy now? Is Turkey particularly inclined to rush to help its “persecuted Muslim brothers”? In short, are all these historical and cultural affinities or kinship real, are they asserted, and, are they influential on the orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans?



THE IMAGE OF THE TURK AS PRIME ENEMY

It was against the Ottoman Empire that the people of the Balkans forged their independence. This phenomenon of “fundamental enmity” is not a specificity of the Balkans. However, what is particular in this case, however, is the inability of the peoples of the Balkans to overcome this enmity; enmity that takes on the aspects of a struggle between Islam and Christianity, between civilization and obscurantism.

The “Ottoman yoke” was endured with a special pain as it was applied by “infidels” and this situation created confusion between Turks and Muslims. This overlapping of ethnicity, politics and religion, the role of scapegoat played by the Turks in the formation of Balkan states, contributed to the ‘demonization’ of the Turks. Today they still represent the oppressors of Balkans and are perceived as being tormented by an irresistible desire to expand toward the West and to conquer Christian lands. All opinion polls confirm this perception. In Greece, in a survey undertaken in 1995, 89 percent of those interviewed declared that they had an aversion for the Turks;¹ two studies carried out in Bulgaria in 1992² and 1994³ showed that a majority of Bulgarians perceived the Turks as religious fanatics (70 to 80 percent of those interviewed) and untruthful (60 percent). This perception is confirmed – and certainly strengthened – by the media. The analysis of media discourse in the Balkans undertaken by the *International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights* from 1994 to 1998 and by the Bulgarian association Access,⁴ give us quite a lot of examples of this perception: “Turkey is preparing the war” (*Vecernje Novosti*, Serbia, January 9, 1997); “The revival of the Turkish imperial ambition threatens the Balkans” (*Politika*, Serbia, December 15, 1996); “Turks are by nature a belligerent nation” (*Nin*, Serbia, September 5, 1997); “Turks, even today, are guided by their primitives instincts” (*Eleftherotypia*, Greece, October 2, 1996); “The Turk is untrustworthy, barbarian and hypocritical” (*Kathimerini*, Greece, July 25, 1995); “For centuries, Turks have enslaved people, destroyed and plundered nations, civilizations, monuments, antiquities and violated human rights” (*Apogevmatini*,

¹ Greek Helsinki Monitor, *Press Release* (May 19, 1995).

² This survey was published in Bulgarian in the journal *Sociologičeski Pregled*, n°3, 1993, pp. 54-81; A report in English is available in Kjell Engelbrecht, “Bulgaria”, *RFE/RL*, Vol. III, n°16, April 22, 1994, p. 77

³ This survey was conducted in May 1994 under the direction of Petar Milev. P. Milev, “Relations of compatibility and incompatibility in the everyday life of Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria”, in *Relations of compatibility and incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*, Sofia, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 1994, pp. 179-231

⁴ This association is financed by the Open Institute (Budapest). These studies were published in the semi-annual *Balkan Neighbours*.

Greece, September 23, 1995); Turkey's "strong ambition is to restore its imperial influence in the Ottoman provinces" (24 *Chassa*, Bulgaria, July 21, 1998), etc.⁵

Turkey could not *not* take into account the persistence and the strength of these resentments. It was – and it still is – under constant threat of being accused of returning to its "warrior tendencies" of the past, of following an "imperialist policy". One example: In February 1993, when the late President Turgut Özal undertook a tour of the Balkans, immediately the Defense Minister of Greece raised his voice against this "provocation" and, together with Serbia, accused Turkey of attempting to following a neo-ottomanist policy.⁶

Second, Turkey is regularly accused of using Turkish or Muslim minorities to pave the way for its supposed irredentist policy. This fear is fed by Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Indeed, whereas the Turks comprised only 18 percent of the total population of Cyprus, Turkey invaded the north of the island on the grounds that this minority was persecuted. What can be called the "Cyprus syndrome" is particularly widespread in Greece and Bulgaria, which have to deal with important Turkish minorities.⁷ Since 1991, another fear has emerged in Greece: the feared building of an "Islamic arc" (or "Green transversal") stretching from Istanbul to Bosnia-Herzegovina through Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, the Sandjak and Kosovo, and cutting off Greece from its hinterland.⁸ The Greeks have been troubled by the rapprochement between Turkey and Bulgaria after 1992 and put it down to the pressure exercised by the Turkish minority – itself supposed to be under the influence of Turkey – on the course of Bulgaria's international relations. Turkey also developed good relations with Albania. Therefore, Turkey is accused of positioning itself as the protector of Muslim minorities and relying on them to expand its political influence (and maybe more) in the area. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism are equally mentioned and mixed in these accusations, and Greece shares this fear with Serbia and, to some extent, with Bulgaria. And of course,

⁵ All these examples are quoted from *Balkan Neighbours*.

⁶ Interview with S. Milošević, *Hürriyet*, March 1, 1993; *Turkish Probe*, February 23, 1993.

⁷ Studies are regularly published on the subject in Greece and Bulgaria. See, for example, Paul Hidioglou, *Thrace in the light of the national Ideal of the Turks*, Athens, Hellenic University Press, 1991, where the author "explains" how Turkey manipulates the Turkish minority in Western Thrace.

⁸ On this "Islamic arc phobia", see, for example, Gregorios Demestichas, "Greek security and defense policy in the Eastern Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, n°2, Summer 1997, pp. 215-227. Gregorios Demestichas is the head of the "Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies" and former chief of the Hellenic navy. In this article, he asserts that Turkey has an imperialist policy and that it could imprint its influence over the Balkans by "setting itself as the protector of the Muslim minorities in the area". The same ideas can be seen in the press: "The general Turkish Consul in Komotini spreads out hostile propaganda, controls and terrorizes the Muslim minority with Turkish spies in every large village. These spies assimilate the recently arrived Muslims of different races into the 'Great Turkish nation'. The muftis are also involved", *Adesmeftos Typos*, November 25, 1995.

the nomination of Necmettin Erbakan as Prime Minister in 1996 initiated a flurry of new fears of Islamization of the Balkans.⁹

Besides, Turkey faces another dilemma in the area. Conflicts in Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) were perceived, by the people of the Balkans themselves, as confrontations between Islam and Christianity. In this respect, the manifestation of conflicts with religious connotations – Christians against Muslims – represents a challenge for Turkey. If it publicly takes the side of the Muslims, this can only reinforce its image of a Muslim state and therefore cut it off from Europe.

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL PRIORITIES VERSUS POLITICAL DISCOURSES

Ankara has therefore systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the “principles and positions” of the international community, and has carefully refused to actively participate in military interventions. When NATO issued an ultimatum to Serbia in February 1994, Turkey certainly backed this initiative but proposed its participation in air strikes only for logistic missions.¹⁰

Besides their cautious policy, the Turkish leaders undertook as well some very symbolic initiatives in the area such as the restoration of the Catholic church in Zenica or the reconstruction of the Mostar’s bridge, symbol of friendship between Christian and Muslims. These initiatives are regularly underlined by Turkish leaders (and intellectuals and editorialists) as a move supposedly showing or proving their a-religious commitment to peace abroad and in their neighborhood (i.e. former Ottoman lands).

Turkey has also worked hand-in-hand with Washington in the planning of its diplomacy in the area, and especially for ‘sensitive’ questions (ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo). It was only after the United States got involved in the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-95 and after it recognized the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and signed military agreements with the latter, that Turkey itself took the step of signing military agreements with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

⁹ Here again, regional media echoed this fear: “Turkish fundamentalists want to turn history six centuries back”, *Continent* (Bulgaria) January 26, 1996; “Erbakan prepares return of turbans”, *Douma* (Bulgaria) March 8, 1997 (in Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Hate Speech in the Balkans*, February 97 Report).

¹⁰ *Milliyet*, February 11, 1994. A total of 18 Turkish F-16’s were stationed in the Ghedi base in Italy to contribute to the implementation of the “no-fly zone”.

(August 1995 and January 1996). Washington and Ankara also undertook a collaborative effort to re-arm and train the Croat-Muslim army (in the framework of the US “Train and Equip Program” launched right after the signing of the Dayton Agreements).

However, the persecutions that the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered logically prompted the scandalized reaction of the other Muslims in the Balkans and in Turkey, who saw their fellow Muslims massacred precisely because of their religion. The war in Bosnia was extensively commented on; journalists accused the West of applying a “double standard” and letting the Muslims be killed because they were Muslims.

In this regards, the conflict in Bosnia has been a recurrent theme during electoral campaigns. It was mainly used by the Islamist party, at the time the *Refah Partisi*, to feed its own rhetoric concerning the perversity of Western world. It allowed it as well to demonstrate its determination (by opposition to the passive attitude of the government) to help these “persecuted brothers”.¹¹ This instrumentalization of this conflict motivated other political leaders to use the same profitable theme. For example, Tansu Çiller, former Prime Minister, went twice to Sarajevo during the war: in February 1994, a few weeks before local elections, and in November 1995, again four weeks before elections. These trips were certainly aimed at expressing the support of Turkey for the Muslim community, but as well at restoring a rather tarnished image before elections. It was also thought important not to leave Necmettin Erbakan, former president of the Islamist party (the *Refah*), with the ‘monopoly of indignation’, and therefore the government had to compete with the *Refah* in terms of condemnations of the massacres, criticism of the United Nations, and so on.

But, here again, Turkey can make use of the ‘Islamic’ discourse only in moderation. Its secularism and its aspiration to be recognized as a fully westernized country forbids it to raise the Muslim banner as soon as its political interests are concerned. It opposed, for example, Iran’s attempts, within the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to describe the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a “religious war”. When in July 1993, at the Islamabad meeting, seven countries of the OIC proposed to contribute 17,000 soldiers to a United Nations force, Turkey offered only about a hundred men, whereas it declared being ready to contribute 5,000 troops to the

¹¹ However, revelations in 1994 that the funds collected by the *Refah* for the Muslims in Bosnia were used to finance its electoral campaign, have cast doubts on the sincerity of its brotherhood drive and have damaged the reputation of this political party which polishes its “clean” image.

UNPROFOR. After having pushed the other members of OIC to pressure the UN, it could not decently refuse to participate in this “Muslim force”, but reduced its contribution to a minimum.

In reality, the promotion of Islam has remained in tandem with political options. Indeed, Ankara and Tirana underscored their “common culture”, but this was only in support of a political rapprochement. As for the leaders of the Muslim community in Bosnia, they finally looked to Turkey only when they were in a difficult situation. The Pan-Islamism promoted by these leaders was in any case not compatible with Turkish secularism. On the whole, Islam is invoked only to justify or reinforce a pre-existing political decision and it has met *political* and not religious common interests. Turkish leaders did not hesitate to quickly renew their relations with the previously called “Serbian aggressors” after the Dayton agreement. Turkish businessmen, including the members of the MÜSİAD,¹² hastened to invest in this country and the agreements regulating trade between the two nations were rapidly concluded. Bosnia does not seem to receive the same attention. In 1997, bilateral trade did not exceed \$25 millions, \$34 millions in 2000¹³.

Another example of this preeminence of political over religious dimension is the official reaction of Turkey to the conflict in Kosovo. As for the war in Bosnia, it condemned the violence of the repression and proposed its participation in an international peace-keeping force, but, in contrast to its reaction toward the events in Bosnia, it did not display an intense diplomatic activism. Here again, national interest clearly prevails over religious solidarity. Indeed, another dilemma was added to the wish to avoid antagonizing the people of the Balkans. In the case of Bosnia, the country’s independence was accepted – if not recognized – on the international scene but, in the case of Kosovo, the entire international community – at least officially and at first – insisted on the territorial integrity of the FRY. In this context, it was hard to imagine Turkey supporting a separatist movement (or one so perceived by the international community) when it was fighting a similar movement on its own territory. Actually, numerous scholars or politicians have made this analogy between Kosovo and Kurdistan (an ethnic minority, a majority in its own area, demanding rights or claiming independence). The Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara, for example, did not miss an

¹² The MÜSİAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* – Independent Businessmen and Industrials Association) is an association of businessmen openly advocating their link to Islam.

¹³ In comparison, bilateral trade with Bulgaria, in 2000, amounted \$718 millions, with Romania \$1 billion, with Macedonia \$34 millions. Source: T.C. Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı (Under-secretariat for foreign trade).

opportunity to refer to the fight against the PKK in Turkey (“Turkey should understand Belgrade better than any other country since it is involved in a similar situation”).¹⁴ In his letter to President S. Milošević dated 8 March 1998, former President Demirel himself emphasized that Turkey “too” had to fight “terrorism” on its territory.¹⁵

Therefore, Turkey has not launched any diplomatic initiative of any importance and, at most, has condemned the violence of the repression and has called for a constructive dialogue,¹⁶ a dialogue with the participation of the Turkish minority of Kosovo. Belgrade subscribes fully to this request, which would allow it to break the Albanian unity of Kosovo.¹⁷ Turkish leaders officially advocate the “restoration” (and not the granting!) of the rights of the Albanians. This distinction is essential as the Albanians in Kosovo, contrary to the Kurds in Turkey, did have some rights in the past (such as those enjoyed under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution).

Turkish leaders were backed, in this approach, by most of the editorialists: “There is no other state that commits such violence against its own population on its own territory. (...) The war between the Serbs and the Albanians is both an ethnic and religious confrontation”.¹⁸

IS THERE A MUSLIM KINSHIP?

Whatever Turkey’s cautious policy (for political reasons!) in these conflicts was, the feared shadow of an “Islamic arc”, as well as the allegation that Turkey backs and supports the Muslims in the area (in order to destabilize the area or to strengthen its political influence) should prompt us to question the reality of these links between Balkans Muslims.

¹⁴ See the interview he gave to *Turkish Daily News*, January 30, 1999.

¹⁵ Reuters, March 9, 1998.

¹⁶ This ‘realistic’ approach has been widely backed by the press. *Cumhuriyet*, March 13, 1998; *Milliyet*, March 11, July 8, 1998.

¹⁷ Actually, Belgrade has already in the past, promoted the cultural expression of this Turkish minority, with the same aim. See, for example, C. N. O. Bartlett, “The Turkish Minority in Yugoslavia”, *Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia*, n°3, 1980, pp. 1-15.

¹⁸ *Milliyet*, March 26, 1999.

Actually, each of the Balkan Muslim communities (Albanians, Turks in Bulgaria and in Greek Thrace, Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pomaks, etc.)¹⁹ has kept their own ethnic characteristics (language, folklore and so on) and they do not have the same social or cultural profile. Turks in Bulgaria have been largely secularized but their 'brothers' on the other side of the border (Greek Thrace) tend to remain deeply religious. The Turks in Macedonia, contrary to those in Bulgaria and Greece, live mainly in towns and the Macedonian Turkish leaders have rather tense relations with their co-religionists in Macedonia, the Albanians. The "Albanian community" is split into Albanians from Albania and Albanians from the former Yugoslavia. The former accuse the latter of taking advantage of the cheap commercial opportunities offered by Albania, in sum of being unscrupulous; the latter have been more secularized than the former and see them as too traditionalist, etc. Fifty years of separation have definitely created a cultural gap between the two. Very few common features link as well the various Muslims communities in Yugoslavia (Albanians, Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turks).²⁰ Turks and Albanians in Kosovo oppose each other on their stands toward the Serbs,²¹ and the Pan-Islamism praised at some point by Alija Izetbegović's SDA (*Stranka Demokratske Akcije* – Party of Democratic Action) did not meet with much success among Albanians and Turks.

Apart from cases where two separate Muslim minorities are isolated in a vast area of Christianity (Turks and Pomaks in the Rhodope Mountains, Albanians and Turks in Macedonia), these Muslim communities have very few contacts with each other. And, actually, neither the Albanians nor the Turks rushed to help their 'Muslim brothers' in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. A few years later, the outburst of a conflict in Kosovo at the beginning of 1998 did not produce the impulse of sympathy one could have expected from the other Albanians, yet supposedly part of the same 'ethnic community', and political parties advocating a "Greater Albania" are rather rare.²² In

¹⁹ On the Muslims in the Balkans, see Alexandre Popovic, *L'islam balkanique. Les musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane*, Wiesbaden/Berlin, Otto Harrassowitz, 1986.

²⁰ On the diversity of the former Yugoslavia Muslim communities, their relations to the State, their social profile or the weight of Islam in their identity, see Marie-Paule Canapa, "L'islam et la question des nationalités en Yougoslavie", in Olivier Carré, Paul Dumont (dir.), *Radicalismes islamiques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1985, pp. 100-145.

²¹ Relations between these two Muslim communities within Kosovo are pretty tense. But Kosovo Turks are themselves divided on their stands toward the Albanians! See Şule Kut, "Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect", *Perceptions* (Ankara), Vol. V, n°3 (web version); Selçuk Tepeli, "Sırplar'ın destekleyen Türkler" [Those Turks who support the Serbs], *Aktüel* (Istanbul), January 21, 1999.

²² It could be certainly argued that this claim would not be very "diplomatically correct" and that some secretly aim at greater Albania but, so far, variations of discourses in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania are more the result of a political game between the Albanian politicians themselves.

Macedonia, for example, a poll conducted in April 2001 on the behalf of the US State Department's Office of Research shows that 71 percent of the Albanians in Macedonia would prefer to live in an ethnically mixed Macedonia rather than a greater Albanian State.²³

Relations between Balkan Muslims communities and Turkey are rather ambiguous. Bosnian leaders, for example, were actually close to the Iranian Islamist trend before the beginning of the conflict.²⁴ It was finally only when they found themselves in an hostile environment that they turned to Turkey for help. All the observers noted that the Turkish soldiers deployed in Bosnia since 1994 have pretty good daily relations with the locals. And there is indeed a genuine feeling of sympathy, which relies on a common culture (historic or religious). But, more than anything else, Turks are not perceived as enemies whereas these Muslims feel threatened from their neighbors and remain skeptical over Westerners who, at least according to them, delayed before acting to rescue them. Turkey is a *'by default' ally* and not necessarily a chosen one. The same analysis can partly apply to (Muslim) Albania which, isolated in the area – its relations were tense with all of its neighbors – welcomed the hand Turkey extended. But the same analysis applies as well to 'Orthodox Macedonia' who, as well isolated in the area, developed very good ties with Turkey!²⁵ Last, Turkish minorities (around 800,000 in Bulgaria, 100,000 in Greece, 70,000 in Macedonia and 20 to 40,000 in Kosovo) do not necessarily perceive Turkey as their motherland, and, as a matter of fact, in general, they do not. The most sensitive communities toward Turkey might be in fact, here again, the most isolated ones (Turks from Kosovo or Macedonia). These isolated communities tend therefore to emphasize a little bit more than their other Muslim neighbors their Ottoman cultural heritage.²⁶ One example among many, the monthly Macedonian *Vardar* (in Turkish) regularly prints studies on "the Turkish words in Macedonian language" or "the Ottoman architecture", etc.

²³ Tim Judah, "Albanians Back Macedonian Unity", Institute for War and Peace reporting, *Balkan Crisis Report*, n°250, May 25, 2001 (www.iwpr.net); See as well, for more detailed analyses, Nadège Ragaru, "Dits et non dits de la crise macédonienne", *Politique Internationale*, n°92, été 2001 (web version on www.politiqueinternationale.com).

²⁴ On this Islamist trend, see Xavier Bougarel, "Discours d'un ramadan de guerre civile", *L'Autre Europe*, n°26-27, 1993, pp. 171-197 and "Un courant panislamiste en Bosnie-Herzégovine", in Gilles Kepel (dir.), *Exils et royaumes. Les appartenances au monde arabo-musulman aujourd'hui*, Paris, FNSP, 1994, pp. 275-299.

²⁵ Albania and the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were the two main strategic partners of Turkey in the aftermath of 1992. See Sylvie Gangloff, "La politique balkanique de la Turquie et le poids du passé ottoman", in Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer (dir.), *Le nouvel islam balkanique*, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001, pp. 317-356.

²⁶ The Turkish press tends, of course, to magnify this 'sensitivity'. See, for example, "Kosova'daki Türk Dünyası" [The Turkish world in Kosovo], *Sabah*, May 6, 1997.

As for the Balkan Muslims who migrated to Turkey, in general, they perceive themselves as more 'modern' and westernized than the Turks in Turkey. All the evidence that we have collected from interviews and observations verifies this perception of a difference: they feel more 'secular', more educated, more modern, in sum, more European. The presence of these communities in Turkey has been put forward to justify the interest Turkey might show to the Balkans. The number of Muslims who emigrated from the Balkans to Turkey since the fall of the Ottoman Empire is not exactly known (from 4 to 10 millions according to various estimations), but whatever this group can amount to, it does not say anything about their link to their former land. And the least we can say is that these links are not so clear and seem to be rather different in diverse 'communities'. Forced, incited or voluntary migrations, recent or old ones, Turks or non-Turks... conditions and relations to the country of origin – and to Turkey – are as diverse as the profile of the migrations and migrants. And these differences can even be seen within a same so-called "community". For example, most of the Turks of Albanian origins are deeply secular but some of them could be found in the leadership of the former *Refah*. Actually, the political, social, cultural and religious profile of those Albanian-Turks deeply varies according to the date of their arrival, the reasons/motivations behind their migrations, their Balkan origins, etc. However, notwithstanding the diversity of the "Balkan Turks" and even if they cultivate their difference, integration in Turkey occurs rather quickly and they tend to melt into the Turkish population.

In any case, they do not really offer any political visibility, as could be seen during conflicts. For example, the Turks of Bosnian origin did not really mobilize around the Bosnian / Muslim cause. These Muslims settled in Turkey a long time ago (at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century), they have been Turkicized and therefore no longer have very close links to their country of origin. They mainly extended help to the Bosnian refugees in Turkey (around 20,000 people according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees)²⁷ and, in any case, they did not constitute a lobby nor did they play an intermediary role between Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia who arrived in the 50's and the 60's²⁸ are certainly more mobilized and sensitive to the political situation in the Balkans. However,

²⁷ See, for example, the research made by Belkıs Kümbetoğlu in the Pendik area of Istanbul, "Göçmen ve sığınmacı gruplardan bir kesit: Bulgaristan göçmenleri ve Bosnalı sığınmacılar" [Profile of some groups of migrants and refugees: the Bulgarians migrants and the Bosniak refugees], in Kemâli Saybaşılı, Gencer Özcan (ed.), *Yeni Balkanlar, eski sorunlar*, Istanbul, Bağlam, 1997, pp. 227-259.

²⁸ Under the agreement signed between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953, Turks from Yugoslavia could immigrate to Turkey. As a consequence, many Albanians declared themselves Turks and moved to Turkey. Around 150,000 "Turks" immigrated to Istanbul at the time

despite the active mobilization of their leaders, this 'Albanian community' did not really take part in this lobbying.²⁹ They definitely do feel concerned about the fate of their countrymen (in Kosovo or Macedonia); however, this does not mean that they are ready to assume any particular personal – political or financial – engagement for Kosovo. According to the words of the leader of one of the most important Albanian associations, the Turkish-Albanian Brotherhood Association (*Türk-Arnavut Kardeşliği Derneği*), the mobilization of the Turkish population of Albanian origin was rather disappointing.³⁰ The two demonstrations that were organized by several associations after the outburst of repression in Kosovo in March 1998 did not gather significant crowds,³¹ and when the 'ethnic cleansing' campaign was launched in March 1999, money collected for humanitarian purposes by the Albanian associations was rather poor.³² Last, even if mobilized, leaders of these associations keep a low Kemalist profile. They have completely integrated, and propagate, the official discourse of a tolerant, multicultural, and westernized Turkey. However, this "ethnic" network plays a significant role in informing the Turkish authorities on the local situation and it acts as an interface between Turkish and Albanian leaders.³³

As for the official policy, since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has not seemed concerned by the fate of Balkan Muslims, being geographically cut off from some of them, and of different ethnic origin from others. Only the "rebirth process" in Bulgaria (1984-85) motivated a strong reaction of the leaders and the press, and had important repercussions on the bilateral relations. Turkey did extend its support to the persecuted Turks in Bulgaria and opened its doors to massive emigration in 1989.³⁴ But later, Turkey was, for example, reluctant to finance the Turkish schools in this country (it is only during the summer of 1998 after the Bulgarians had threatened to

²⁹ See, in this volume, the article of Gilles de Rapper.

³⁰ Interview with Halil Metin, president of the *Türk-Arnavut Kardeşliği Derneği* (Turkish-Albanian Brotherhood Association), August 29, 2000.

³¹ The first demonstration (March 1998) gathered around 6,000 people according to the press (*Turkish Daily News*, March 9, 1998) 2,000 according to the official press agency (Anadolu Ajansı, March 9, 1998) and from 8 to 10,000 according to the organizers. As for the second demonstration, it was even less popular.

³² Interview with Halil Metin, August 29, 2000.

³³ That was the case, for example, for the inauguration of a "Kosova representative office" in December 1996 in Istanbul. This opening did not receive, of course, any official authorization, but the "Minister of Information" of the "Republic of Kosovo" and the vice-chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova attended the opening ceremony.

³⁴ Almost 320,000 arrived in Turkey in 1989 before the government decided to close the border. Of course, they faced a lot of problems (work, lodging, etc.) and almost half of them return to Bulgaria before the expiration of their "Tourist visa". See Darina Vasileva, "Bulgarian Turkish emigration and return", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, n°2, summer 1992, pp. 342-252.

close down these schools that an agreement was signed on the matter).³⁵ Investment in areas inhabited by Turks, although badly needed, has remained as well poor. The same lack of interest can be seen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As for the interest shown for the Turks in Greek Thrace, it should be seen in the frame of the tensions between Greece and Turkey. And even the support Turkey extended to the Turks in Cyprus replies to considerations more strategic than fraternal.³⁶

The only real policy of solidarity toward these communities – and it has had a noticeable cost for Turkey – is a policy of accepting, almost without any restrictions, refugees from the Balkans. This had been a constant policy since the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire. Turks from Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania between the World Wars, Albanians in the 30's and in the 50's, Turks from Bulgaria at the beginning of the 50's and in 1989, Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1992, Albanians from Kosovo in 1999, all could find shelter in Turkey.³⁷

THE ONGOING REFORMULATION OF TURKISH IDENTITY AND THE REHABILITATION OF THE OTTOMAN PAST

After the dismemberment of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, the Kemalists formulated a new identity, based solely on 'Turkishness'.³⁸ The criteria of identification from the time of the Ottoman Empire (Arabic and Muslim past) were not operational anymore. Without denying the role the Turks had played – or supposedly played – in the history of the Muslim world, it was then the pre-Islamic past that was emphasized. The Central Asian roots of the Turks were put forward and a glorious past of a people who founded empires and states was built up. There was no nostalgia for the Ottoman

³⁵ The Direction of religious affairs (*Diyanet*) sent henceforth teachers for the three Turkish high schools and the Islamic Institute.

³⁶ Which did not prevent the *a posteriori* construction (meaning after the 1974 military intervention) of a kinship that justified the intervention.

³⁷ On these migrations from the Balkans to Turkey, see Cevat Geray, probably the most reliable source. Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye göçler ve göçmenlerin iskanı (1923-1961)* [Migrations from Turkey and to Turkey and settling of migrants], Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1962. For the post-Second World War migrations, see Kemal Kirişçi, "Post-Second World War immigrations from Balkan countries to Turkey", *New Perspective on Turkey* (Istanbul), n°12, spring 1995, pp. 61-77.

³⁸ Etienne Copeaux, *Espaces et temps de la nation ottomane. Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste, 1931-1993*, Paris, CNRS, 1997, pp. 33-74.

Empire in this new identity. The Turkish adage of “non-interference in the affairs of the Empire’s former provinces” illustrates well this withdrawal to the ‘restricted’ Anatolian lands. This was henceforth the image of Westernized and secular Turk, in good relations with his neighbors, that Kemalist élites tried to shape and export.

The official historical vision tends to erase all the persecutions committed by the Turks. History textbooks emphasize this idea of a tolerant empire where Muslims and Christians lived together happily.³⁹ The Ottoman Empire was even supposed to have been a model of tolerance: Jews were welcomed after being expelled from Spain in 1492 and, contrary to what was happening in the rest of Europe, they did not suffer persecution; Jews and Christians enjoyed a wide autonomy in the Ottoman system of *Millet*, they were free to direct their secular and religious life, etc.⁴⁰ In the most extreme scheme, these people, and in particular the Greeks, who had – or supposedly had⁴¹ – a privileged position in the Empire, are portrayed as having betrayed their “benefactors” when they fought against the Porte.

This vision is notably subject to speculations by the fundamentalists. They multiply speeches on the tolerance of a specifically Turkish Islam and underline, for example, that at a time of such an indulgent empire, slavery was practiced in America and Jews were persecuted in Europe.⁴² Islamists dailies tend therefore to highlight cultural affinities between Turkey and the Balkans along with the peace that reigned in the area under the Ottoman rule.⁴³ The “*Osmanlı hoşgörüsü*” (the Ottoman tolerance) is, for example, a recurrent theme in the Islamist daily *Türkiye*.⁴⁴ This newspaper appeals, as well, for Turkey to be more active in the area and emphasizes the specific duty of the Turks, as heirs of the Ottomans, to save oppressed Muslims.⁴⁵ Regularly this appeal

³⁹ See, for example, the study made by Etienne Copeaux on the Turkish history textbooks (he gives, as an example, a text on the happiness of the Greeks and the Serbs under the Ottoman rule). Etienne Copeaux, *De l’Adriatique à la mer de Chine. Les représentations du monde turc à travers les manuels scolaires d’histoire, 1931-1993*, PhD Thesis, Paris 8, 1994, pp. 632- 633.

⁴⁰ Stephanos Pasmazoglu even argues that these features are the constant highlighted in both Turcological historiography and political propaganda. Stephanos Pasmazoglu, “Turkey and Europe, reflections and refractions: Toward a contrapuntal approach”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 2, n°1, summer 1997, p. 141.

⁴¹ This is of course subject to an intense debate. Political and nationalist tendencies, in Greece as well as in Turkey, weigh heavily on the debate. See, for example, the controversial work of Dimitri Kitsikis, *L’Empire Ottoman*, Paris, PUF, “Que-sais-je” (2222), 1994. Translated into Turkish under the title *Türk-Yunan İmparatorluğu* [L’Empire gréco-turc], Istanbul, İletişim, 1996.

⁴² Reference to a speech made by Necmettin Erbakan in August 1995 in Istanbul (Gülhane Parkı).

⁴³ This is a constant line in the editorials of Necati Özfaturo in *Türkiye*: “Balkanlar, Osmanlı döneminde en huzurlu ve rahat günleri yaşadı. (...) Balkanlar, Osmanlı sonrası asla rahat yüzü görmedi” [The Balkans enjoyed their most peaceful and happiest days at the time of the Ottoman Empire. (...) Since the Ottomans, the Balkans have never enjoyed peace], *Türkiye*, July 22, 1998..

⁴⁴ See, for example, *Türkiye*, July 15, 2000; November 28, 1999.

⁴⁵ “Kosovalı müsülmanlar yardım bekliyor” [Muslim Kosovars are waiting for help], *Türkiye*, August 21, 1998.

turns into a *cri de cœur* for solidarity (“*Bosna’yı unutmalayım!*” – “Let’s not forget Bosnia!”).⁴⁶ They regularly denounce the destruction of the Ottoman monuments and, in any case, underline Turkish or Muslim presence in the area.⁴⁷ As for other dailies, they also tend to emphasize the imprint of the Ottoman rule in the area but to a lesser extent.

This line of reasoning is directed against – and in reaction to – various presumptions and beliefs proliferating in the Balkans and in Europe, which portray the Ottoman Empire as barbarian, where persecutions, forced conversions, massacres and other discriminations against non-Muslims were common. This Turkish interpretation is partly true to reality (there were indeed very few forced conversions; persecutions were indeed not so massive). But this interpretation remains, of course, partial. Jews and Christians were *de facto* under a non-equal status. They had to pay an additional tax, had to follow a kind of dress code, and so on. The Turkish nation, as other nations in the area, did not really initiate a deep self-critique, notably of the role of the Turks in this famous *Dark Age* that fell on the Balkans.

Last, whereas European historiography emphasizes the rupture generated by the irruption of the Ottomans in South-East Europe (fall of Constantinople, siege of Vienna, etc.), Turkish historiography tends to focus on the Westernization process undertaken in the Empire in the 19th century (*Tanzimat*) or to emphasize the weight of the Ottomans in the “European game”. The alliance between François 1er and Soliman the Magnificent is, for example, recurrently put forward as a “prove” of this full “historical participation” in European affairs (and therefore of the ‘Europeanness’ of the Empire).

Kemalist identity is not as well free from questioning and reformulation. Initiated in the 60’s, diffused after 1970 by the “Home of the Intellectuals” (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) and officialized at the beginning of the 80’s, the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (*Türk-Islam sentezi*) is based on a redefinition of the relation to the Western model, estimated partly alien to Turkish culture and, above all, not as the *sole* source of Turkish identity.⁴⁸ The synthesis does not reject this model but refuses to simply copy it. The sacred values of Kemalism are still appealed to and ancient Turkish civilizations glorified, but an

⁴⁶ *Türkiye*, August 15, 2001.

⁴⁷ See, for example, “Kosova’da tarih katliam” [Historical massacre in Kosovo], *Türkiye*, September 12, 2000. The journalist explains that mosques, *türbe* and other Ottoman monuments are systematically destroyed in Kosovo with the help of Saudi foundations!

⁴⁸ The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was notably consecrated by a report adopted by the “Ataturk High Foundation for culture, language and History” (*Atatürk kültür, dil ve tarih Yüksek Kurumu*) created by the 1982 Constitution. On this synthesis, see the publications of its theorist, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, and in particular *Türk-Islam Sentezi* [Turk-Islam synthesis], İstanbul, Ülkücü Ocakları, 1985; and Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Saylan, İlhan Tekeli, Serafettin Turan, *Türk-Islam Sentezi*, İstanbul, Sarmal, 1991.

indissociable link between Islam and Turkishness is as well put forward. Not only is the previously claimed incompatibility between Islam and Turkishness is rejected but the Muslim religion is supposed to be the most appropriate to Turkish nature.⁴⁹ According to this thesis / synthesis, Turkish culture has flourished within Islam and, the other way around, the Turks have saved Islam. The result of this glorious marriage is an original Turkish culture that certainly does not need to copy a Western model! This reintroduction of Islam in the official national identity was backed by the military complex, in power in the beginning of the 80's, who intended to use this cultural-political reference to fight extremist political discourse (and first of all, probably, communism). In the same move, the Ottoman past, perceived henceforth as a neglected source of cultural identity, had been subject to a renewed interest.

The West remains, however, the obsessional (but not admitted) reference of the followers of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This West can be demonized, devalued, or might served as an exorcist comparative in the mode: "At the time when the West was only ... the Turks had already ...". Here again, the relation to the Ottoman past is central: "While we are protecting and repairing all historical and cultural heritage including Greek and Byzantine, Europeans, who consider themselves western and contemporaneous, are showing how generous and noble they are by utterly destroying the Ottoman heritage" (declaration made by the former Culture Minister, I. Talay in June 2001).⁵⁰

This Turkish-Islam synthesis trend is particularly advocated by some religious movements and first of all the *Fethullahcı*. The *Fethullahcı* produce a kind of liberal Islam, trying to combine modernism, nationalism, democracy and religious precepts. Their philosophy is based more on Turkish nationalism than on Islam; they back the State in its effort to export the so-called Turkish model, i.e. secular state model that includes Ottoman heritage, secularism, market economy and democracy.⁵¹ The *Fethullahcı* try to achieve their (official) goal through education and they run around 100 schools in Turkey and 200 abroad, particularly in the CIS but as well in the Balkans. Their daily paper, *Zaman*, circulates in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania and they opened high schools in

⁴⁹ Füsün Üstel, "La synthèse turco-islamique" in Jacques Thobie, Salgur Kançal (ed.), *Industrialisation, communication et rapports sociaux en Turquie et en Méditerranée orientale*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1994, pp. 391-393.

⁵⁰ Anadolu Ajansı, June 10, 2001.

⁵¹ On the structure and the philosophy of this movement, see, for example, Bülent Aras, Omer Caha, "Fethullah Gülen and his liberal Turkish Islam movement", *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 4, n°4, December 2000; and Ferhat Kentel, "Les Balkans et la crise de l'identité turque", in Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer (dir.), *Le nouvel islam balkanique, op. cit.*, pp. 386-393. See as well their internet site <http://tr.fgulen.com/>

Skopje and in Tirana. Their attempts to revive the Ottoman legacy (the multiculturalism of the Empire, its tolerance, etc.), has met some success in the area, especially among small Turkish minorities, eager to specify their own identity within new Balkan nations. The *Fethullahcı* have also denounced the split among Balkan Muslims, the nationalist lines that have divided this community.⁵² As for the ultra-nationalist trend, represented in Turkey by the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – Nationalist Movement Party) and its youth organization (the Idealist youth – *Ülkücü gençlik*), they turn their eyes toward all the Turks outside Turkey but focus on Central Asia and the Caucasus. They have neither been extremely active in the Balkans, nor does this area carry much weight in their discourse. They opened a branch in Prizren in 2000 and undertook actions in the area (distribution of Turkish textbooks, publications...).

Most of Turkish historians oppose the identification of the Ottomans with the Turks (“The Ottoman empire was not the land of the Turks”).⁵³ However, a tendency has emerged among Turkish intellectuals and historians that tend to explain the present backwardness of the country through the legacy of a feudal and centralist Ottoman State.⁵⁴ Others argue as well that Turkey is a direct legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Its basic secular and westernized identity originated from the 19th century reforms (the *Tanzimat*) and Kemalism is the direct continuation of this process.⁵⁵

More recently, rhetoric on “shared history” and “common culture” appeared in political discourse. As stated by former Foreign Minister İsmail Cem: there is a “new consciousness in Turkey. The role of shared history and of parallel cultural characteristics is highlighted and put in practice in all spheres of our foreign policy”.⁵⁶ This new discourse appeared in the course of 1998 after the refusal of the European Union in December 1997 (a refusal that generated extremely virulent reactions in Turkey) to consider Turkish candidacy (Luxembourg summit). A few months after, NATO

⁵² On the *Fethullahcı* in the Balkans, see Nathalie Clayer, “L’islam, facteur des recompositions internes en Macédoine et au Kosovo”, in Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer (dir.), *Le nouvel islam balkanique*, *op. cit.*, p. 205; and Ferhat Kentel, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-394.

⁵³ See, for example, Sina Akşin, “Factors put forward to explain independence movements in the Balkans”, in *Tarihte Güney-Doğu Avrupa: Balkanolojinin, dünü, bugünü ve sorunları*, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1999, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁴ Halil İnalcık, “The meaning of legacy: The Ottoman case”, in Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 18. This view is discussed by Halil İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, Bloomington, Indiana University, “Turkish Studies” (9), 1993; and Feroz Ahmad, *The making of modern Turkey*, London/New York, Routledge, 1993 (chap. 2).

⁵⁵ The continuity of this legacy is, for example, emphasized by Semil Deringil, “Aspects of continuity in Turkish foreign policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, n°1, summer 1987, pp. 39-54.

⁵⁶ İsmail Cem, *op. cit.*, p. 26 (talk given in August 1998).

strikes on the FRY intensified this new discourse. At this point (1999), the claim to an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, which previously had been exclusively made in nationalist and Islamist circles,⁵⁷ emerged in official speeches. Former President Demirel mentioned the “duty to save our Kosovar brethren”⁵⁸ and the “historical and moral responsibility of Turkey”⁵⁹; İsmail Cem pointed to the “500 years of experience in Kosovo”;⁶⁰ and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that “the Kosovars are our brothers and the legacy of our history”,⁶¹ “the heritage presented to us by history”.⁶² However, it should be pointed out that this discourse appeared indeed after the Luxembourg summit but as well during the electoral campaign for the legislative elections (18 April 1999). Actually, the beginning of NATO strikes and massive expulsions of the Albanians from the Kosovo province fell right in the middle of this electoral campaign. It motivated, of course, some competition among Turkish politicians. Tansu Çiller (at the time leader of the conservative party *Doğru Yol Partisi*) criticized the government for its “apathy over Kosovo”⁶³, Prime Minister Ecevit visited the Kırklareli camp (where Albanian refugees were settled) a few days before the elections⁶⁴, etc. In addition, the fear that the Islamist party (renamed *Fazilet Partisi*) would gain votes – it had received 21,3 percent of the votes in the previous elections, which had led to constant political crisis – incited the ‘secular’ politicians to compete with the *Fazilet* in terms of solidarity with the oppressed brothers.

The Ottoman legacy is still subject to speculations and its place in the collective memory subject to reconstruction. However, whatever the weakening of Kemalist ideology and the reintegration of this Ottoman legacy in the country’s identity might be, this process does not imply any change in its foreign policy which still relies on strategic, economic or political considerations. And, above all, this process does not bear any irredentism. Although political discourse has been gradually more inclined to acknowledge this heritage, there is no real nostalgia for this Empire.

⁵⁷ See, for example, about Kosovo, “The orphans of the Ottoman Empire claim their rights”, *Zaman*, October 19, 1996; or the editorialist of *Türkiye*, Necati Özfatıra, who almost systematically referred to the Ottoman Empire in his numerous articles on Kosovo. His articles on Kosovo had been compiled and published at the end of 1998: Necati Özfatıra, *Hedefteki ülke. Kosova* [Kosovo. A threatened country], Istanbul, İzci, 1998.

⁵⁸ Anadolu Ajansı, April 8, 1999.

⁵⁹ Anadolu Ajansı, April 11, 1999.

⁶⁰ İsmail Cem, *Turkey in the 21st Century*, Mersin, Rustem, 2000, p. 29.

⁶¹ Declaration of former Prime Minister B. Ecevit during his visit to the Kırklareli camp. *Hürriyet*, April 8, 1999.

⁶² *Akşam*, April 8, 1999.

⁶³ *Milliyet*, January 28, 1999.

⁶⁴ *Milliyet*, April 7, 1999; *Akşam*, April 8, 1999.

CONCLUSION

Historical, cultural and affective ties between Turkey and Turks and Muslims in the Balkans are real. The Balkans weighs heavily in the collective memory of the Turks and they occupy a noticeable place in the country's historiography.⁶⁵ The loss of the Balkans was heavily resented and the energy deployed in "forgetting" the "European lands of the Empire" not less heavy.⁶⁶

However, first, these ties have not generated a move to any kind of sacrifice for people who, in the final analysis, are not considered as being part of Turkish nation. The only real action undertaken to rescue Muslim 'brothers' was the military intervention in Cyprus, but although it was officially presented as a fraternal operation, it bears more strategic value than anything else.

Second, the influence of this Ottoman legacy in the collective memory of the Turks is as much positive (it generates an interest) as negative. In other words, the perception spread among the Turks is that the people of the Balkans should not be trusted. They are viewed, in the most extreme schemes of Turkish history, as traitors (they betrayed the Ottomans who allowed them to prosper), and in the best case, as troublesome. Plus, the Balkan Wars created a specific trauma as they spelled the end of the Empire. On the political level, the Ottoman legacy is in fact viewed more as a burden.⁶⁷

The implications of Turkey's relations with the E.U. has barely been mentioned in this study. However, one should keep in mind that if Turkey is kept out of Europe, it has to re-center its policy and its identity – but probably not, or to a lesser extent, its economy – on new areas and, among others, areas that had been under the Ottoman domination. Cultural features – as well as economical, geographical or political 'advantages' – can be put forward to promote this role in new areas as it already had been the case (but without much success) in approaching Central Asia after 1992 (Turkey presented as a "model" of secularism in Muslim lands, model of westernization, etc.).


⁶⁵ See the study of Etienne Copeaux who shows, for example, that maps representing the Balkans are recurrent in school textbooks Etienne Copeaux (1994), *op. cit.*, p. 27. On the couple Balkans-Anatolia, see pp. 294-297.

⁶⁶ Oliver Abel, "Le conflit des mémoires. Débris ottomans et Turquie contemporaine", *Esprit*, n°271, January 2001, pp. 134-135.

⁶⁷ But the Turks, contrary to the Germans who have to deal as well with a very negative historical legacy in central Europe, can not profit from a financial and economical appeal.

Last, the Kemalist adage of “non interference in the affairs of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire”, broken for the first time – not without a wave of stormy debates – in the Gulf War, was again challenged with the participation of Turkish troops in peacekeeping missions in the area (UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR). Above all, for the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish troops passed through the Balkans on their way to Kosovo in July 1999 (through Bulgaria and Macedonia). The prospect of the participation of a Turkish contingent in the UNPROFOR in 1994 had motivated negative, if not angry, reactions from the Balkan leaders. A few years latter, however, this deployment of forces did not generate the expected – or at least feared by Ankara – reactions. The event was widely covered by the press, prompt to describe the “enthusiastic” and “fervent” welcome given to the Turkish troops.⁶⁸

The Ottoman legacy has not been subjected to critical and objective analyses, in the Balkans as well as in Turkey. But the relation to this legacy is slowly changing. Turkey and the Balkan countries have renewed ties since 1991 and, in the long term, these relations should contribute to overcoming the weight of the past: “Turkish boots have not tread on Bulgarian soil since 1878, (...) but we must not fear ghosts: the Turks are our allies and for nearly 90 years now we have had perfect relations and they have never in the past century attacked as ruthlessly like all other neighbors have done”.⁶⁹



⁶⁸ “Türk askeri 87 yıl sonar Kosova’da” [Turkish soldiers back in Kosovo after 87 years] headlined *Hürriyet* on the 5th of July 1999; Associated Press, July 5, 1999 / *Turkish Daily News*, July 6, 1999. The Greeks, however, strongly objected this deployment.

⁶⁹ 24 *Chassa* reprinted in Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, July 4, 1999.

Vient de paraître / just published

**LA PERCEPTION DE L'HÉRITAGE OTTOMAN DANS LES BALKANS
THE PERCEPTION OF THE OTTOMAN LEGACY IN THE BALKANS**

Sous la direction de Sylvie GANGLOFF

Paris, L'Harmattan, "Varia Turcica", 2005, 226 p.

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