MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE

NEW TRENDS IN MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE

Edited by P.W.A. Scholten & I. van Breugel

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Mainstreaming and Interculturalism's Elective Affinity

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INTRODUCTION: THE INTERCULTURAL DEBATE ACQUIT

The recent debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism probably illustrates that we are witnessing a *process of policy-paradigm change*. A policy paradigm has the role to frame policy-making, and we cannot deny that interculturalism has already attracted many cities and local policy makers from all over Europe and elsewhere (Quebec, most Latin-American countries, Australia, and even now some Asian and Maghreb cities such

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Mid-eighteenth century (as elective attraction): originally a technical term for the preferential combination of chemical substances, it was widely used figuratively in the nineteenth century, notably by Goethe (in his novel *Elective Affinities*) and by Weber (in describing the correspondence between aspects of protestantism and capitalism). In its common use 'elective affinity' means: 'A correspondence with, or feeling of sympathy or attraction towards, a particular idea, attitude, or person' English Oxford Living Dictionaries: @OxfordWords https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/elective_affinity

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as Tokyo and Tangier).[1] From the point of view of public acceptance, it has even reached a level of consensus between society, policies and politics that does not occur with other paradigms, such as civic nationalism[2] and multiculturalism. As has been argued, the emergence of interculturalism in Europe is directly related to the 'local turn' (see special issue edited by Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017a,b). Namely, there is a common trend in Europe to go from a state-centred to a local-centred approach in diversity policies, where cities are increasingly recognized not only as implementers of policies, but also as new players. This is why it is argued that this local turn produces poly-centric policy-making (Scholten et al. 2016) and can only be understood within the framework of multilevel governance. Interculturalism provides answers for local concerns and this city-based origin is probably one of the factors justifying the adoption of mainstreaming policy strategies (Zapata-Barrero 2017a). By applying the argument in this volume that there are multiple factors explaining the mainstreaming move of diversity policies, I will concentrate on the declining political support for multicultural policies in most European cities (Taras 2012; Lewis 2014).

Mainstreaming's conceptual core refers to incorporating the needs and issues of a particular service into a general area or system and into all aspects of an organization's policy and practice (Chap. 1). Applied to diversity management, it essentially means an overhaul of how we have been doing things in the past and to include a new policy perspective in all that we do. It is here that interculturalism meets the mainstreaming debate of this volume, since its principal aim is to promote *contact zones* among different people in diversity contexts (Zapata-Barrero 2016a: 56). And the dominant policy paradigm of diversity management of 'how we have been doing things in the past' has certainly been multiculturalism.

As a city policy paradigm, one anchor point is its *non-ideological* character, in the sense that the city does not take sides towards a particular ideology from the right-left spectrum. The international network of Intercultural Cities fostered by the Council of Europe[3] has not only shown that it is politically colour-blind, but also that it is resistant to city-government political changes[4] (cf. Chap. 4). It is a fact that interculturalism has more elements of political continuity than multiculturalism, which is not widely accepted by the whole political spectrum and its continuity over time in cities is not fully guaranteed when a change of government occurs. Multicultural policies have always had a certain problem being accepted within the realm of public opinion, even before such policies have been put into action (Crepaz 2006), and interculturalism seems to be

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more preventive to negative public opinion (Ludwineck 2015). There is also the technical and administrative argument in justifying that we are beginning a *policy-paradigm formation*, in the sense that interculturalism does not generate immediate social negative effects (such as segregation or separation) that can disturb policy-making plans in the medium or long term (cf. Zapata-Barrero 2017b). It is also a recognized feature in the emerging intercultural literature that one of its limits is that it has a certain, let us say, 'relative conservative' character in the sense that it does not favour radical structural changes that may affect the regular patterns of institutional action on policy. The emerging intercultural policy paradigm does not favour specific structures in society, and focuses on diversity policies on what is common among people from different national and cultural backgrounds, rather than differences. This overall feature which favours some sort of reflective equilibrium between majorities and minorities, paraphrasing G. Bouchard (2015: 58), is sometimes presented with the mainstreaming allegory of a policy lens, a wave with expanding purposes all over the basic structures of society. The only premise required for entering this policy paradigm is the recognition of diversity as an opportunity and as an advantage for the development of the city, as a community asset. This is why diversity-recognition and the diversity-advantage approach are preconditions of interculturalism, as is assumed in scholarly intercultural policy research (cf. Wood 2015; Cantle 2016).

It also belongs to the *intercultural acquit* that this policy paradigm is *sustainable*, both economically and in terms of human resources (Zapata-Barrero 2015b). This basically means that the possibility of implementation is much more a matter of political will and technical motivation (and imagination), than one of human and financial resources. If there is a common guiding thread to all the contributions of this volume, it is the conviction that the financial crisis has forced many governments and administrations to cut the budget originally destined for immigration policies, and forced them to produce immigration policies at zero costs. That mainstreaming is in part a consequence of this context of austerity seems to be a pattern to be considered (see Chaps. 3 and 6).

These *intercultural scholarly acquits* are probably the first point of connection with the emerging mainstreaming debate in migration studies. The current context of an ideological crisis of the multicultural policy paradigm is certainly a contextual factor favouring the *elective affinity* between interculturalism and mainstreaming, to the point that we can say today that mainstreaming is a distinctive feature to the intercultural

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policy philosophy. I would even defend the argument that this interface provides interculturalism with a powerful competitive policy tool, solving most of the concerns of policy makers with the multicultural approach. To strengthen this link, I will speak from now about 'Mainstreaming intercultural policy paradigm' as a way to designate a public-policy philosophy that emphasizes both the importance of promoting communication, interpersonal relations and even interactions (the core concept of interculturalism) in all spheres of public life and basic structures of society and for all the components of the diversity dynamics, including nationals and citizens (the core concept of mainstreaming). The logical relationship between them is clear: mainstreaming is one of the core attributes of interculturalism. In practical terms, this means that mainstreaming is the proper policy strategy to achieve interculturalism. Or to put it in the multiculturalism/interculturalism framework of discussion, mainstreaming is the condition of interculturalism and one of its main distinctions in relation to multiculturalism. The way we make visible this relationship is through this concept of 'Mainstreaming intercultural policy' (*MIc* from now onwards).

At this stage of the debate, it is probably difficult, and even adventurous to say what factor(s) provokes the attraction of this policy paradigm, but the fact is that we are in front of two policy trends that coincide in time and space, and even reinforce each other's legitimacy. That is, the interculturalism policy paradigm is justified because it has mainstreaming as its main strategy of implementation, and mainstreaming applied to immigration-related diversity management leads naturally to interculturalism. The affinity between mainstreaming and the intercultural policy paradigm seems then to be self-evident, but probably this needs to be assessed within the theoretical framework of policy-paradigm change. In this scholarly policy debate, *the argument I would like to put forward is that in migration-related diversity management we are in a process of policy-paradigm change, going from a multicultural to an intercultural policy paradigm, and that mainstreaming is a core driver of this process.*

A Process of Policy-Paradigm Change: A Theoretical Framework of Discussion

I propose to follow as a theoretical framework, the emerging literature coming from public-policy studies on *policy-paradigm change*,[5] following the *path-breaking* work of Hall (1993). The generating force of this

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literature is that policy paradigms are rather like the scientific paradigms that Th. Kuhn theorized in the last decade. He referred to a series of outcomes that were universally acknowledged by the scientific community that provided them—at least for a while—with patterns of problems and solutions (Kuhn 1962: 14).

The interest in policy paradigms begins with the recognition that ideas are important, and are key to identifying patterns and processes of policy dynamics (Hogan and Howlett 2015: 6). A policy paradigm constitutes a theoretical tool to understand the guiding principles or ideas, to create public policy, to identify the actors involved and to ascertain why they pursue the strategies they do (3). Following Hall (1993) we are in at the start of a third-order change,[6] where the new paradigm is becoming institutionalized by policy makers and politicians, and is being academically legitimated by a great variety of expert scholars. The main theoretical concern of P. Hall was to see whatever paradigm change comes from an interrelation between ideas, discourses and policies. In the case of interculturalism, we can even say that ideas come from practice, since this move of policy paradigm from multiculturalism to interculturalism also illustrates a *pragmatic turn* in diversity studies based on the nuclear idea that contact between different people is politically and socially relevant.[7] A policy paradigm provides some continuity to a policy content and discourse over time, as Hogan and Howlet (2015) remind us. It is a cognitive model shared by a particular community of actors, and which facilitates problem solving. A policy paradigm assumes therefore that ideas are shared by a given community, and it can also be defined as a set of coherent and well-established policy ideas capable of having an impact on the focus and content of a public policy.

Within this theoretical framework, the argument I will put forward, directly related to what P. Hall refers as anomalies from the former paradigm that the new policy paradigm needs to overcome,[8] is that *the mainstreaming approach to immigration policy plays here the role of solving the great part of contested arguments.* This means that the movement from one paradigm to another is likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing paradigms. Adapting Hall's focus on the effect of policy anomalies on policy-paradigm change, as anomalies accumulate, *ad hoc* attempts are generally made to stretch the terms of the paradigm to

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cover them, but this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Efforts to deal with such anomalies may also entail experiments to adjust existing lines of policy, but if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, these experiments will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the existing paradigm and its advocates even further. This process will end only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policy-making and are able to rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new *MIc policy paradigm*.

FRAMING THE POLICY-PARADIGM CHANGE: BEYOND THE IMMIGRANT/CITIZENSHIP DIVIDE OF THE POPULATION NARRATIVE FRAMEWORK—THE MAINSTREAMING TURN

In this section, I would like to highlight that the mainstreaming trend in migration policies is driving this policy-paradigm process of change from multiculturalism to interculturalism.

Reviewing the substantial criticisms received by the multicultural policy narrative, it has been accused of being too group-right based and of being the main source of a normative machinery for legitimating specific policies for specific ethnic differences, leaving aside interpersonal relations between people from different backgrounds. The assumption of this policy paradigm has always been that immigrants are cultural bearers of their own countries, and that these distinctions need to be recognized within liberal societies as some form of individual and cultural-group rights. The original focus of Kymlicka (1995) has been the most powerful foundation of this narrative, followed by an explosion of literature within diversity, immigration and citizenship studies.[9] We already know that one of the main efforts of Kymlicka has been to reconcile group-minority cultures with the national group majority, offering a community- or group-based perspective of culture, always taking for granted that culture has a political and social function in fostering the feeling of belonging and even loyalty.[10] Recently, Kymlicka (2016) has also proposed a new framework of discussion linking solidarity and diversity, arguing there is a trend in the debate that says that the increase in immigration, and the multiculturalism policies it often gives rise to, has weakened this sense of national solidarity.

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This creates a potential 'progressive's dilemma', forcing a choice between solidarity and diversity. Behind this focus there is the premise called by Banting and Kymlicka as the *corroding effect*, that 'multiculturalism policies are said to erode solidarity because they emphasize differences between citizens, rather than commonalities' (Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 11). B. Turner (2001), from citizenship studies, has also offered a cultural-empowerment, rights-based approach, exemplifying this national-based approach of culture, understood as the capacity to participate effectively and successfully within the national culture.

The epicentre of the debate in Europe is that this multicultural master narrative has neglected the social and political value of the contact hypothesis. The new intercultural policy narrative positions itself in contrast to this (based on substantial insights on the view of ethnicity and collective identity as being self-ascribed, flexible and dynamic) and emphasizes the need for communication. This is why its primary normative force is that it is viewed as a set of arguments sharing one basic idea: that contact among people from different backgrounds matters.

Consequently, interculturalism shares the premise that from a policy point of view, we cannot condemn people by their nationalities and culture of origin to self-identify with a fixed category of cultural identity. Many people simply do not like to be singled out or made to feel an example of their cultural group. This is the most flagrant evidence that the concept of diversity itself is a rather politically constructed category, and is far from neutral. The intercultural narrative expresses the challenge that we need to break this epistemological barrier in part created by the former multicultural narrative. Taking this perspective, we can even say that the multicultural narrative has more in common with civic nationalism (Mouritzen, 2009) and a homogeneous mindset, since it maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just one nation state (Castles 2000: 5). This is why we can state that the multicultural narrative suffers the so-called national methodology that most of the transnational literature denounces (Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Thränhardt and Bommes 2010; Amelina and Faist 2012). civic nationalism and multiculturalism share an interpretative framework of diversity, namely in the way that they categorize attributes such as nationality, race, religion and cultural community in a similar manner. From an intercultural strategy, groups can opt for internal monoculturalism, as the multicultural policy paradigm promotes, or external interculturalism (Fanning 2002). The multicultural narrative to my knowledge has never formulated a critical interpretative

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framework regarding the way homogeneous cultural and national states categorize diversity dynamics. The intercultural argument is that we cannot impose the majoritarian understanding of diversity categories on others. Ethnicity is self-ascribed, flexible and cannot be imposed by those with the power to define diversity categories. Ethnicity, understood as national self-identification, concerns the categories of ascription. Ethnic boundaries are also places of social interactions. The intercultural narrative reacts against the process of the political ethnicization of people. This substantial criticism of the multicultural narrative in the domains of ethnicity, nationalism and race is very close to what Brubaker calls 'groupism', namely, 'the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed' (2002: 164), or even 'solitarism' by A. Sen (2006: xii–xiii), criticizing this tendency to reduce people to singular, differentiated identity affiliations, to 'miniaturize' people into one dimension of their multiple identities.

This leads me to mention what I call the 'immigrant/citizenship divide' that has dominated the diversity debate in migration studies. What interests me from this divide is the consequence of always reproducing a certain discourse where 'we' citizens are not the object of diversity policies. That is, the fact that in the policy-making process, the division of the population between citizens and non-citizens, nationals and non-nationals, immigrants and citizens has always had the assumption of reproducing a certain power relation between the majority citizen and a minority ethnic. Instead of creating bridges among these two sets of people, this division actually consolidates separation in the same category of diversity and the same policy, which has been mainly aimed at one part of the population: be it immigrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities or whatever depending on countries and contexts.

The multicultural-based diversity narrative has contributed to reinforcing this division of the population. And we know from migration studies that what is really specific to immigration are basically three main stages of the migratory process: admission policies, reception policies and citizenship policies. The other policies, basically those that manage diversity accommodation, settlement and incorporation of immigrants into the main public sectors have been treated specifically but belong to policies that are also targeting citizens. So if there is some justification to the targeting of citizens with specific policies, it is because there are discriminatory reasons or reasons due to diversity (basically, language, religion, culture, physical differences having a social meaning). The specific has been centred on

differences within the diversity framework, and not the specific related to the concrete situations that an immigrant will encounter in his/her process of incorporation. The fact that the immigrant does not have political rights is specific to immigrants and has nothing to do with diversity. The idea that diversity must be based on the competences of immigrants and also on the context is what drives the concept of super-diversity, which is quite different from the concept of diversity as has been understood from multiculturalism. Mainstreaming policy directly breaks this narrative framework differentiating immigrants from citizens, and incorporating all the population as an object of policy. This is so substantial to the point that maybe we need to leave aside the name of immigration policy as a policy only aimed at migrants, and speak rather on mainstreaming policy, which has the feature of including all into the scope of diversity policies.

These trends therefore frame the policy-paradigm formation of *MIc* in cities. But as I have already explained, behind a policy paradigm there is a determinate way to identify what Hall called 'anomalies'. It is towards this philosophy that I now direct the reader.

MIc Policy-Paradigm Main Philosophy: Problem-Solving Approach and the Pragmatic Turn on Diversity Management

In targeting the broad population and incorporating diversity concerns within the general public-policy focus, the intercultural approach features the main dimensions of a mainstreaming policy and also seeks to be incorporated into policy-making at all city levels and in all departments (see Chap. 1). Let us say it has a mainstreaming purpose. The final goal is to create public services that are attuned to the needs of the whole population, regardless of their background. It has also been recently defined as an effort to reach people with a migration background through needs-based social programming and policies that also target the general population (Collet and Petrovic 2014: 2).

It is in this sense that we may say that *MIc* becomes a new policy paradigm, since it frames the focus of several public policies, and even all basic pillars of the structure of local societies, both through *mainstreaming public discourse* which explicitly incorporates intercultural priorities into other goals, such as social inclusion, cohesion, tradition and political stability narratives, and through *mainstreaming governance* involving coordinating

a range of public and civil society actors participating in the policy-making, either horizontally (by involving other policy departments at the same level) or vertically (by distributing responsibilities across multiple territorial levels of government). As a policy paradigm, *MIc* refers then to the adaptations of general policies that incorporate intercultural priorities. This policy adaptation is designed to better serve the diverse populations that benefit from public policies by responding to their specific needs rather than preconceptions of the needs of national cultural groups.

If we take, for instance, the categories indexing intercultural cities (ICC),[11] we see that it has both an integral dimension and an expansive scope in all the main spheres of the society (from media, to governance, public spheres, mediators and other city realms). Interculturalism features this mainstreaming approach in the sense that it does not legitimize any specific policy justified in ethnic and whatever cultural-group terms. As Cantle (2012) insists, interculturalism seeks to go beyond any racial specific claim. Interculturalism as a mainstreaming policy is then a departure from ethnicity-based diversity paradigms, which are also blind to the internal diversity and stratification of ethnic groups and fail to address the key challenge of integration of second generations through social mobility and full citizenship.

This policy paradigm has also been named *intercultural integration* (Guidikova 2015) and can be the basis of the Intercultural citizenship approach (Zapata-Barrero 2016a). This dimension is important. The accommodation of diversity and incorporation of immigrants has been thought of as always connecting the immigrant with the general pattern of the society, through reception policies at the beginning and throughout different public sectors. Now the fact that interculturalism becomes a policy paradigm also means for current integration policies' debates, that it assumes the premise that integration is better performed by fostering communication and interactions among people from different backgrounds. Integration is not done in a unique way or through a set of public sector avenues, but through a network of many avenues placing people in the public sphere and the web of relations in everyday life (Wood 2015). This further assumes another hypothesis, that mainstreaming interculturalism helps to achieve social integration.

By placing our view within this interplay, we can also state that *MIc* illustrates a certain *pragmatic turn* in how to deal with diversity dynamics. The public philosophy behind this rejects any presocial categorization of people into whatever cultural and ethnic attributes. Furthermore, it refuses to take group differences as a criterion for policy design. It

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focuses on differences rather than on what is common among people. Consequently, this approach leaves autonomy to people to choose their own cultural identities and rank their multiple (transnational) identities. It is in this sense that *MIc* has to be interpreted as the most pragmatic answer to concrete diversity-based concerns. It is within this pragmatic logic that we can incorporate socio-economic inequality constraints as well. Here, we may find some limits to this new policy-paradigm formation. A major challenge across European cities is precisely the lack of physical contact between different groups, and it is hard to draw a sharp line between class and ethnic/immigrant status as determining social disadvantage. Poor national and immigrant-origin citizens typically cohabit the least attractive housing areas; this points to some degree of 'interaction' in these kinds of dwellings. Thus, we could legitimately ask, why would interaction necessarily lead to better relationships, especially in times of financial crisis and increased competition over jobs? Despite having argued that promoting interpersonal contact is important, it is also crucial to problematize this question and the significance of the context in which these relations would take place (what we may call *contact zones*). This is a significant point, since it highlights that *MIc* is a proximate policy, always performance oriented, with the aim of inverting diversity's negative impact and of promoting a view of diversity as an opportunity and advantage for personal and social development as a community asset.

According to the policy-paradigm change debate, the problem-solving dimension is an essential feature. It is in the very nature of *MIc* formation to follow this approach. This is the case, for instance, of G. Bouchard himself, who recognizes that his last book (2015) summarizes his own position after the much-discussed practical and public debate of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Cantle, meanwhile, has been a key player in policy orientations surrounding the British government's concern for local social disturbances in northern towns in August 2011. These events directly linked social conflicts with the failure of British multicultural policy. His book *Community Cohesion* (2008), based on a first approach presented in a previous report (the so-called Cantle Report 2001), proposes reducing tension in local communities by promoting cross-cultural contact and by developing support for diversity and promoting unity. This work has had a direct influence on changing state behaviour and policy focus in Britain. Ph. Wood (2004) and other interculturalists connected, to different degrees, to the Intercultural Cities Programme (Council of Europe 2008) are policy-oriented practitioners,

coming from urban and management studies, as well as sociology, anthropology and political science. To my knowledge, multiculturalism has not shown such policy-oriented attractiveness at the city level in such a relatively short time. There is empirical evidence that we are seeing an interculturalist wave, but we cannot say that there is a multiculturalist wave in cities. I would even contend that cities opting for the intercultural approach are aware, as has been so brilliantly illustrated by one of the foundational documents of the Intercultural Cities Programme of the Council of Europe, that 'one of the defining factors that will determine, over coming years, which cities flourish and which decline will be the extent to which they allow their diversity to be their asset, or their handicap. Whilst national and supra-national bodies will continue to wield an influence it will increasingly be the choices that cities themselves make which will seal their future' (Council of Europe 2008: 22).

MIc is a More Appropriate Framework for Dealing with the Complexity of Current Super-Diverse Societies and Transnational Minds[12]

Until now, we have examined this policy-paradigm change as a reaction against a former multicultural policy paradigm. It is now time to stop looking in the rear-view mirror and look forward. At this stage, I would like to highlight that most of the former features are process-dependent on current social and political dynamics, and can be considered as the outcome of the rising awareness that any diversity category also needs to be incorporated into the mainstreaming public culture. As I said earlier, without this precondition of diversity-recognition and diversity-advantage awareness, interculturalism will have difficulties to gain authority as a policy paradigm.

As is argued in this volume, there is certainly a link between the emergent interest on mainstreaming and super-diversity literature (Chap. 6), in the sense that mainstreaming is an appropriate policy strategy in situations where specific policies are no longer feasible. I here state that this new contextual diagnosis is also shared by interculturalism, which incorporates the fact of transnationalism, or the evidence that people could have different national identities without being willing to rank them, even if certain contexts force them to decide which is preferable to activate. We know that although there is a pending debate between transnationalism

and multiculturalism, there is also a positive relation ('affinity' in my own terms) between interculturalism and transnationalism. If the rough idea of transnationalism is to live with at least two identities, to have a bicultural mind, then this internal dialogue of transnational people is by itself an intercultural internal dialogue. This is why there is probably a link between transnational minds and intercultural minds that need to be explored empirically. The hypothesis of course is that transnational people tend to be more intercultural, and that transnational people tend to favour mainstreaming intercultural policies.

With regard to the field of immigrant integration, contemporary discussions on super-diversity (Vertovec 2007) suggest that there are now so many different and heterogeneous migrant groups that single out specific target groups for policies that it has become too complex and ineffective (Chap. 6). This is connected to the framing of the globalization process, as Cantle (2012) rightly views it. The fact is that there is no universal ranking of identities. Identities arise in given practices and according to determinate contexts. If I go to see a football match, my identity as a supporter will come first, but in other contexts, other identities would emerge first. To rank identities without taking context into account is what certain multiculturalists seem to promote, as if there were primary identities that are permanently active in any given context. In the same vein, a diversity of loyalties amidst growing global mobility and increasing cross-border human movement is becoming the rule. The new debate on super-diversity also belongs to this track of incorporating complexity into diversity studies (Vertovec 2014), as does the literature on network societies arising from the seminal work of Castells (2010), showing that the question of personal identity is much more connected to how people relate to each other, rather than the traditional 'Who am I?' based on where I was born (territory) or who my parents are (descent). We can even add some generational arguments of intercultural conflict. People already socialized into diverse societies are facing the challenge of reconciling national and city identities on the one hand, with different cultural strands and multiple identities in everyday social life on the other (Crul et al. 2012). The multicultural policy-paradigm debate has difficulties here to incorporate the practical implications of these new trends that were first academically articulated by sociologists and demographers.

From the above section, it follows that the multicultural policy paradigm is becoming out of tune with complex new diversity dynamics that demand a focus on interpersonal relations, rather than on agents seen as

cultural bearers of their own national origin. It follows that *MIc* is a better tool for dealing with the complexity of our super-diverse societies, with transnational and multiple identities and cultural affiliations. It has a much more dynamic view of ethnicity and assumes the interactive nature of culture, instead of a simplistic, ready-made view of current diverse societies, as multiculturalists illustrate. Culture is interactive, following again Brubaker's (2002: 167) statement: 'Ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring "groups" encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms.' This also means that a category of diversity does not entail a group. A category of diversity, such as religion, language and so on, can be a potential basis for group formation or 'groupness', but it must be initially treated from above as a set of individuals, without any entailed generalization. For instance, a Moroccan person is not necessarily a Muslim. In essence, the multicultural policy-paradigm paradox is that it tends to view groups in terms of nationality, and from there assumes a culture and a religion, without asking people about personal religious or cultural experiences in their everyday lives in a context that has not been constructed with this assumption. *MIc* is about asking first how people sense their identities, and it then respects their self-identification. Its premise is that we cannot impose our ethnic categories onto others. This also includes a respect for the diversity of identities within the same national cultural category. I am thinking, for instance, that even if Morocco does not recognize cultural diversity among their own nationals (for instance, Amazigh or Berber culture), the multicultural policy paradigm followed by certain societies contributes to this homogenization of Moroccan culture by being too national-dependent in ascribing the cultural identities of people of Moroccan origin. Reality seems again to contradict some assumptions of the multicultural policy paradigm. It is here that the policy-anomaly identification plays a role in analysing policy-paradigm change from multiculturalism to interculturalism.

Conclusions: The Advantages of *MIc*

The debate of *policy-paradigm change* is neither only centred on the changing features of a policy focus, nor only interested in identifying the explanatory factors and patterns that give light to the reasons of

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this change, but also on the benefits, which play an important role for definitively consolidating the policy-paradigm formation. The debate on the benefits of interculturalism is maybe consubstantial to its same emergence, since one of the key dimensions is to consider diversity as an opportunity and a community asset. It is certainly here that the descriptive meaning of interculturalism leaves room in the normative sense. The descriptive sense tells us that interculturalism is a policy that basically seeks to favour contact zones and to foster contact among people from different backgrounds. There can be different degrees of contact, from a simple circumstantial encounter, to a dialogue and communication, exchange, collaboration and interdependent relations and even inter-actions (involving sharing a common project of action). The normative drivers of interculturalism are multifaceted: the most important one is certainly the social hypothesis which says that interculturalism fosters more inclusion and cohesion in diverse societies, and the political hypothesis emphasizing more the fact that interculturalism contributes to stability and the formation of a shared common public culture and tradition (see Zapata-Barrero 2015a).

The diversity-advantage approach of interculturalism (Wood and Landry 2008)[13] certainly emerges assuming the *economic development hypothesis* leading the debate, surely due because this approach has been imported to intercultural studies from economics and business. This line of discussion fits very well with other existing migration studies following the classical view on the economic benefits of immigration (Borjas 1995). The argument that the intercultural policy paradigm contributes to cities' economic development is really a powerful hypothesis which is still in the process of producing more case studies and comparative research.[14] But this economic development hypothesis is maybe less connected to the mainstreaming dimension of the intercultural policy paradigm.

This is why I think there is a need to further research on a less explored field of research: the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*. Roughly speaking, the argument is that *MIc* can contribute to reducing the space of anti-immigration populism and be a tool for anti-racism policies.[15]

It is maybe in this hypothesis that the argument I defend in this chapter also becomes prominent. The key idea here is that mainstreaming contributes not only to the process of policy change from multiculturalism to interculturalism, but also reinforces the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*,

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namely reducing ethno-national narratives, racism, prejudice, false stereotypes and negative public opinions, which restricts reasons for contact between people from different backgrounds. It is here that many programmes, which are aimed at fighting rumours, prejudices and negative perceptions towards diversity are in expansion in Europe (see Antirumours Networks for Diversity, http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/c4i). This hypothesis is related to a line of thought seeking the conditions for reducing spaces of xenophobia and racism. The non-ideological feature of this policy paradigm, and hence its potential for neutrality, also reinforces it, as I pointed out at the beginning. We can also say that even if mainstreaming and interculturalism is a strategic non-neutral decision it has impartiality as its main justification in not favouring any specific ethnic circumstances.

The operationalization of this hypothesis is still to be done, and can take different levels of analysis. From a political party point of view, the hypothesis can mean that intercultural cities tend to leave no place for political parties with clear national xenophobic narratives. From a public opinion perspective, it can also mean that once the intercultural policy has been put in place, the negative attitudes towards diversity tend to reduce also. In addition, we know that some of the main discursive frameworks of xenophobia are social welfare, identity and security (Helbling 2012), which raise the question that multiculturalism, as it generates specific policies, contributes to in-group monoculturalism and could also be at the forefront of prejudices and rumours related to immigration that are directly hyper-emphasized by xenophobic parties. So probably the main argument that can consolidate these emerging trends of mainstreaming and interculturalism is that universal policies can contribute to reducing the two main drivers of xenophobic narrative: specific policies increase (a) public budgets for (b) a privileged cultural-differentiated group of people. The near future of course needs to do further research on strengthening this dimension, namely that *MIc* is a strategic anti-racist tool.[16] It even becomes more prominent today to explore this link given the context of rising radicalization in most xenophobic narratives. So, even if it is a newcomer in the debates over diversity management, *MIc* certainly needs to show its power of seduction for policy makers ('authority power' in Hall's terms), who basically understand that this approach contributes to reducing the main factors of negative public opinion, the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant discourses (Zapata-Barrero 2011). *MIc* can be considered as a tool for the main concern in

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European countries today: extremism: political and social xenophobia on the one hand and terrorist attacks and Islamism on the other hand. The consolidation of this evidence will also certainly consolidate *MIc* as an appropriate policy paradigm for managing post-urban super-diverse societies.

Notes

1. For instance, the intercultural cities network promoted by the Council of Europe counts on more than 100 cities, without including national networks in Spain, Italy, Norway, Ukraine, Portugal, and Morocco.
2. On civic nationalism, see Joppke (2004, 2007), Baubock & Joppke (2010), Meer et al. (2015); Mouritzen (2008, 2011); Zapata-Barrero (2009).
3. See the website: http://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/home.
4. Most intercultural cities have passed the test of elections and changing leadership, as I. Guidikova (2015) and Zapata-Barrero (2016b) have indicated, among others.
5. See, among the seminal ones, J. Hogan and M. Howlett eds. 2015; Baumgartner, 2013; Daigneault, 2014, M. Wilder and M. Howlett, 2014:, Carson, Burns, Calvo, 2009.
6. P. Hall (1993) distinguished three orders of policy change: first-order change affecting instruments settings, second-order change affecting policy instruments and goals hierarchy, and third-order change affecting simultaneously settings, instruments and goals hierarchy.
7. The relevant dimensions stressing commonalities and differences are the basic focus of N. Meer, T. Modood and R. Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2016. See also R. Zapata-Barrero contribution in this volume, 2016.
8. P. Hall (1993) highlights, like scientific paradigms, a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments of outcomes (such as segregation in our case taking the multicultural policy paradigm) that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm.
9. See, for instance, B. Parekh (2000), B. Barry (2001), N. Stevenson (ed. 2001) and E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner (eds. 2002), T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds. 2006), A. Phillips (2007), T. Modood (2007), S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf (eds. 2010), R. Taras (2012), G. Crowder (2013), V. Uberoi and T. Modood (eds. 2015).
10. See, for instance, a summary of his focus in Kymlicka (2012). With some variants we can also mention J. Carens (2000) and B. Parekh (2000), and even T. Modood (2007), falling also within this broad perspective of culture that is national based.

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11. See http://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about-the-index.
12. I update some of the findings in intercultural citizenship chapter. See R. Zapata-Barrero (2016).
13. The concept of diversity advantage has been introduced by the UK think tank Comedia directed by Ph. Wood (see), mainly inspired by G.P. Zachary's (2003) seminal work.
14. See, among others, A. Alesina and E. LaFerrara (2005), M. Janssens et al. (eds. 2009), E. Bellini et al. (2009), Bakbasel (2011), K. Khovanova-Rubicondo and D. Pinelli (2012), A. Wagner (2015).
15. The first time I defended this argument was in a discussion paper. See R. Zapata-Barrero (2011).
16. The anti-racist dimension of interculturalism has been examined in depth by education studies. P.J.S Gundara (2000) incorporates, for instance, the argument that intercultural education is a remedy against racism, xenophobia and anti-immigration rhetoric (see his chap. 5, 105–144), and that interculturalism is a strategy to build a common and shared value system (chap. 7, 145–160). See also Gundara (2005). It is also applied in the policy studies only recently (R. Pinxten and M. Cornelis, 2002; B. Ravinder, 2012; J. Carr, 2016) and as a key strategic line by some national plans, such as the debated Irish one (B. Fanning, 2002), which seeks to foster positive local interculturalism to inform place-based anti-racism interventions.

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