A cosmopolitan approach to the explanation of social change: social mechanisms, processes, modernity

Gerard Delanty

Abstract

In recent years social science has been characterized by a cosmopolitan turn. Of the many questions that arise from this the most important are those that concern the implications for explaining social change. While cosmopolitanism is centrally about social change, much cosmopolitan theory due to its normative orientation lacks a capacity for explanation. The problem of explanation is also a problem that besets all 'big question' approaches in social science. In this paper a broad definition of cosmopolitanism is given and elucidated by an outline of its epistemological, ontological and methodological frameworks. Emphasizing the latter two, a relational conception of cosmopolitanism is developed as an alternative to dispositional/agency based and systemic accounts. First I argue that there are four main kinds of cosmopolitan relationships, which together constitute the social ontology of cosmopolitanism. These are the relativization of identity, the positive recognition of the other, the mutual evaluation of cultures, and the creation of a normative world culture. A methodological framework is advanced that distinguishes between the preconditions of cosmopolitanism, its social mechanisms and processes (of which three are specified: generative, transformational and institutionalizing) and trajectories of historical change. The argument is made that cosmopolitan phenomena can be accounted for in terms of this ontological and methodological framework. The advantage of this approach is that it offers cosmopolitan analysis a macro level account of social change that is broadly explanatory and which can also account for both the diachronic and synchronic levels of the emergence of cosmopolitanism as both a counter-factual normative cultural model and as a part of social and political practices and institutional arrangements.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, explanation, methodology, ontology, social mechanisms, processes, social change, modernity

Introduction

A challenge for social and political analysis today is to account for and explain major transformations in the moral and political horizons of contemporary society. Sadly, current theorizing is not best equipped for this task. The reasons are various and include a certain retreat in social science from long-term

historical analysis of major societal trends and a general preference for micro-analysis that does not connect with macro-level analysis. Additionally, within explanatory accounts there is often an over emphasis on the diachronic level to the cost of the synchronic. The topic under discussion, sociological approaches to cosmopolitanism, has been much discussed within political theory and theorists of globalization have much to offer on the level of a general theory of the transformation of political community. What is missing, though, is a sociological method of analysis and a theoretical framework capable of offering an account of how such processes might be explained and how macro and micro dimensions and the diachronic and synchronic levels of analysis might be connected.

In this paper I highlight some perspectives on how we might go about explaining major socio-cultural shifts in the moral and political horizons of contemporary societies and which could be understood in terms of a critical social theory of cosmopolitanism. It is important for social science to explain macro processes and not simply to offer general interpretations or normative assessments of a phenomenon which, it can be assumed, takes historically various forms. By explanation I mean an attempt to show how a social phenomenon is created, what its main characteristics or properties are, how these are related, and what is its significance or implications.

An explanation in this view has an empirical reference and is normatively guided; it is based on an ontological theory – a theory of society or social reality – and a normatively guided epistemology. In what follows I outline an explanatory approach for cosmopolitan analysis. This is particularly relevant, for cosmopolitanism is centrally concerned with social change and in particular with shifts in moral and political values. It is of course the case that cosmopolitanism is also an approach in normative political theory, but it is also an analytical approach in social science that incorporates a degree of normative assessment. Explanation, however, also requires a methodological framework that can account for empirical reality in terms of diachronic and synchronic dimensions, that is levels of analysis that can account for long-run historical trends and also the emergence of specific phenomena at a given time. In other words, with respect to cosmopolitanism, an important question is to account for the emergence of new cultural models that challenge the normative and cognitive assumptions of society and, following from this, how such models become embroiled in political praxis and enter into institutional arrangements. In sum, the objective of the paper is to enhance the explanatory dimension of cosmopolitanism conceived of as an analytical approach in social science and to apply it to questions of major social change where this concerns shifts in normativity, modes of cognition and major societal change.

Questions of definition

Cosmopolitanism is both a normative theory (which makes cognitive claims) and also a particular kind of social phenomenon. As is increasingly recognized

in the expanding literature, it is both an experience of reality – in the sense of a lived experience and a measurable empirical condition – and an interpretation of such experiences. As an interpretative process normative aspects enter into it. The theoretical difficulty, then, is that cosmopolitanism belongs to those phenomena that are both empirical and normative. In so far as it entails interpretative elements, it can in addition be characterized as having an evaluative dimension. In this latter sense cosmopolitanism can be held to be a critical attitude and, from the perspective of social science, a particular kind of analysis concerned with the identification of transformative potentials within the present. This is an analysis that is essentially critical in that it is an approach that views social reality not only as an empirical phenomenon, but also as one given form by counter-factuals of a moral and political nature. It is the nature of these counter-factuals that they involve normative ideas. In this view, then, normative criteria do not transcend social reality, but are immanent in social reality. So, to begin, cosmopolitanism concerns empirical phenomena or reality, interpretations (which are also empirical but normatively guided), and evaluations (which are on a higher order and require explanations, and which is where social science comes in). It therefore needs to be theorized in a way that does not counter-oppose the normative and the empirical.

The literature on cosmopolitanism is now huge and encompasses conceptions that are largely concerned with normative accounts of political community – moral and political cosmopolitanism – or with cultural globalization and hybridization (cultural cosmopolitanism). Other approaches, deriving from postcolonial theory, often combine the cultural and political. Sociological cosmopolitanism has become increasingly to the fore in recent years and here the emphasis is less on normative theory than on empirical phenomena. In this paper, for reasons of space, I will not attempt to sum up these developments and their different conceptions of cosmopolitanism, but will instead attempt to take from them a rough working definition of cosmopolitanism (for an overview see Beck and Sznaider, 2006; Delanty and Inglis, 2010; Kendall *et al.*, 2009; Turner, 2006). Although my objective is to arrive at a more advanced sociological account of cosmopolitanism, there is a broader aim to link sociological theory with historical sociology, political theory and cultural analysis. Cosmopolitanism suggests itself as an appropriate means of linking these different kinds of analysis. The emphasis in this paper is on the ontological dimension of cosmopolitanism analysis and on a corresponding method of analysis.

The general characteristics of cosmopolitanism include: the centrality of openness and overcoming of divisions, interaction, the logic of exchange, encounter and dialogue, deliberative communication, self and societal transformation, critical evaluation. Despite the western genealogy of the word cosmopolitanism, the term is used today in a 'post-western' register of meaning. Cosmopolitanism, as used here, does not assume the generalizability of western historical experiences and instead takes experiences that are relevant to all societies and for which there may be different conceptual genealogies. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is a 'post-western' orientation that is

located neither on the national nor global level, but at the interface of the local and the global. These characteristics are empirical in the sense of being expressed in social reality as particular kinds of experience, but they are also forms of experience that entail their own interpretation as well as being the reference points for more reflexive forms of evaluation.

Taken together, these dimensions and characteristics of cosmopolitanism suggest a broad definition of cosmopolitanism as a condition of openness to the world[1] and entailing self and societal transformation in light of the encounter with the Other. Central to such transformation is pluralization and the possibility of deliberation. It is evident, too, and it follows from the above that cosmopolitanism is not reducible to internationalism, globalization, internationalism or transnationalism. Thus cosmopolitanism is better seen in terms of a normative critique of globalization and as an alternative to inter-nationalism. Transnationalism is more a non-necessary precondition of cosmopolitanism and one should resist the equation of cosmopolitanism with mobility per se.

One final preliminary point must be made at the outset. Cosmopolitanism, understood in the above terms, refers to phenomena that are generally in tension with their social context, which they seek to transform. In the most general sense, cosmopolitanism is therefore by definition a transformative condition that is concerned with possibilities in the present. This is what makes it particularly difficult to specify since it is a discourse or phenomenon that is expressed in its effects on social contexts and in its response to social problems that are experienced by people in different contexts. It is in this sense that cosmopolitanism is inextricably bound up with counter-factual claims.

My approach to cosmopolitanism as a sociological concept involves distinguishing the epistemological, ontological and methodological levels of analysis. These are considered in turn.

The epistemological framework of cosmopolitanism

On the epistemological framework of cosmopolitanism I shall be brief since the philosophical and normative character of cosmopolitanism has been much discussed. The presuppositions about knowledge that are entailed by the idea of cosmopolitanism concern explicitly normative claims. That brings cosmopolitanism into the domain of normativity and critique. Cosmopolitan arguments are primarily critical assessments relating to particular kinds of human experiences that arise as a result of new ways of seeing the world. As such, cosmopolitanism concerns an empirically grounded normativity wherein universalistic orientations emerge from a critical engagement with one's situation, the particular, the here and now in so far as this is a situation involving a relation with others. The emergence of cosmopolitan orientations derives from the interactions of a plurality of social actors, who in encountering each other, critically engage with their situations. They critically engage with each other by

reference to universalistic norms and rules, which provide meta-frameworks of interpretation, but not much more.

The kind of critical engagement that is characteristic of cosmopolitanism is essentially a dialogic one. The cosmopolitan condition emerges out of the logic of the encounter, exchange and dialogue and the emergence of universalistic rules rather than by the assertion of a higher order of truths. It has been recognized in classical sociological theory in the interactionist tradition (G.H. Mead) and in genetic psychology (Piaget) that processes of universalization, such as generalization and abstraction, emerge from the inter-relation of different points of view and also from the formation of second-order reflexive or cognitive meta-rules (see Aboulafa, 2006; Strydom, 1999, 2011). It is in this sense, then, of a relativatization of universalism that the epistemological framework of cosmopolitanism is a post-universalism since it stands for a universalism that does not demand universal assent or that everyone identifies with a single interpretation. Depending on the social context or historical situation, social actors will interpret universal rules differently and put them to different uses.

It is this feature of cosmopolitanism that distinguishes it from older conceptions of universalism in the sense of a universal order of values. Cosmopolitanism, properly understood, is rather characterized by a 'post-universalistic' conception of truth. By this is simply meant that statements of truth and justice etc are not absolute, immutable or derivable from an objective order of universal values, but nonetheless it is still possible to make judgements and evaluations, the universalistic strength of which will vary depending on the context of application. Universalist claims in science, for instance, are stronger than claims in the domain of culture and morality (Chernilo, 2012). For cosmopolitanism, then, universalism is best understood as differentiated and a matter of degree than a zero sum condition. This understanding of universalism has been variously recognized by philosophers as different as Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Jürgen Habermas or Martha Nussbaum, and virtually all of the analytical tradition. In other words, cosmopolitanism entails a weak universalism that is compatible with a conception of relativism, understood, in Sahlins' formulation as, 'the provisional suspension of one's own judgments in order to situate the practices at issue in the historical and cultural order that made them possible' (Sahlins, 2000: 21).

In political philosophy cosmopolitanism is often related to the liberal legacy and the political philosophy of Kant (Brook and Brighouse, 2005; Tan, 2004). In its epistemological assumptions, especially if we take a broader view of cosmopolitanism, it is closer to the critical heritage of Kant and of Marx, who for Balibar (2012) constitute the two strands within modern cosmopolitanism. Some of the key features of critique are close to the cosmopolitan imagination and define its epistemological framework (see Delanty, 2009). These include the centrality of a communicative or discursive conception of truth, problem resolution through collective deliberation, politics as world-disclosure. The concept of 'world-disclosure' – or a 'disclosing critique' to use Axel Honneth's

formulation – can be taken to be the core defining tenet of the epistemological framework of cosmopolitanism.[2] This notion of critique very closely resonates with the cosmopolitan character of world-openness, which as discussed above is a defining feature of the cosmopolitan condition. It can be additionally commented, as above, that cosmopolitanism suggests a critical direction in social analysis in the assumption that social reality is imbued with normative counter-factuals, such notions of social justice, the universality of rights, and, as was the case for Kant, the principle of hospitality and the critical tradition he influenced leading to the notion of what Habermas (2001) has called a 'solidarity among strangers'.[3] This brings us to the ontological framework of cosmopolitanism and closer to the sociological perspective.

The ontological framework of cosmopolitanism

As noted in the foregoing, cosmopolitanism refers to a specific kind of reality and is not merely a normative or interpretative approach that can be conducted without reference to social reality. The sociologically oriented approach I am advocating stresses the ontological framework of cosmopolitanism and thus offers a more elaborate theorization than one that is confined to the epistemological/normative level of analysis where this is separated from reality or those realms of experience that can be regarded as constituting social reality.

The cosmopolitan turn in much of social science does of course make implicit, if not explicit, assumptions about social ontology. The ontological framework put forward in this paper differs from some of the main current conceptions. These tend to fall into two broad positions on the nature of social reality and can be contrasted to a third position, which I argue is more in tune with the epistemological conception of cosmopolitanism discussed above.

Charles Tilly (2008) has identified three broad categories that offer general descriptions and explanations of social processes: systemic accounts, dispositional accounts, and transactional or relational accounts. These are of course very wide and include within them very diverse approaches, for example methodological individualist approaches such as rational choice can be included within dispositional accounts and systemic accounts would include systems theory and Marxism. Clearly there are many approaches, such as much of recent cultural theory in sociology and anthropology, that do not fall into these categories. With such qualifications, for present purposes, these three categories are relevant to cosmopolitan research in social science, since cosmopolitan research tends to fall into all three categories, depending on the particular approaches adopted in terms of their ontological and methodological assumptions. Following Tilly, these three accounts assume competing ontological positions that posit different sorts of phenomena as constituting and causing social processes, namely systemic accounts, dispositional, accounts and transactional or relational accounts.

Systemic accounts typically take a self-sustaining entity such as a society, community or organization as the social reality in question. Such accounts explain a given phenomenon or trend in relation to the overall entity. In the case of cosmopolitan analysis the approach of Ulrich Beck is a good example of this mode of theorizing which is addressed to macro-level analysis. As Tilly notes, two problems with holistic or systemic accounts are the twin difficulties of specifying the limits of the entity in question – which in the case of cosmopolitanism would suggest the open-ended nature of societal systems – and the problem that besets Beck's work of specifying cause and effect (Beck, 2006). Such holistic accounts are useful on the level of a general description of social processes, but lack explanatory power (in the sense of showing how a social phenomenon is created, what its main characteristics or properties are, how these are related, and what is its significance or implications).

Dispositional accounts take as the primary reference point social actors and are concerned with the analysis of the orientations, attitudes and incentives that guide largely individual action. Such approaches tend to focus on individual social actors. Unlike systemic accounts, dispositional accounts are more amenable to empirical research and can be more readily tied into an explanatory methodology, as is illustrated by the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu for whom dispositions are tied to structural processes such as class. A considerable amount of useful social research, both qualitative and quantitative, on cosmopolitanism has recently been undertaken that broadly is in this direction (Kendall *et al.*, 2009; Pichler, 2009). Some accounts variously propose attachments. Roudemetof's (2006) model has these attachments: attachment to a locality (city, region), state/country, local culture, cultural/economic protectionism. However, this approach to cosmopolitanism has its limits, confined as it is to the dispositions of social actors and their milieux. Ultimately such dispositional accounts can only tell us about social actors who, to varying degrees, can be categorized as cosmopolitan or as locals. While it is useful to know who the carriers of the phenomena in question are, such an analysis does not tell us much about why and how they have become cosmopolitan or of the wider societal consequences.

Transactional accounts take interactions between social actors as the starting point. Tilly sees relationalism as an extended version of transactional analysis when it focused on features of transactions that acquire durable characteristics. In such accounts neither social actors nor a whole society or large-scale entities are the specific focus, but sites and processes of interaction. Such accounts are potentially better equipped to address the sort of problems that cosmopolitanism phenomena tend to be embroiled in, such as communication, socio-cognitive or cultural models, collective learning processes and which cannot be reduced to social actors or to social units. Transactional or relational accounts have not been noticeably present in cosmopolitan literature.

The ontological framework I am proposing for cosmopolitan analysis assumes a relational conception of the social, broadly defined (see also Delanty, 2012). This is not the place to consider the competing relational

approaches; for example, Actor Network Theory (ANT) is one such contender (and one hostile to critical and normative theory), as is the sociological analysis of Charles Tilly, and various schools of network analysis and more broadly relational sociology (see Emirbayer, 1997). Elias's figurational sociology is another relational approach. For the purpose of this paper, I would like simply to assert the primary ontological focus of cosmopolitan analysis as relational and to highlight in particular cosmopolitanism as comprised of different kinds of relationships. The kinds of relationships in question are those between Self and Other and World. Self and Other relationships are worked out in the context of engagements with the wider context of the World.

There are four main kinds of cosmopolitan relationships which can be said to constitute the ontological framework of cosmopolitan analysis.[4] In this account, dispositional and systemic considerations are subordinated to a relational conception of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism dispositions/attitudes or orientations and values should be seen in the context of particular kinds of relationships which are the focus of analysis rather than specific social actors. They are embodied in cultural forms, such as frames, socio-cognitive structures, cultural repertoires, discourses, quasi-objective cultural phenomena. In these cultural forms universalistic meta-rules are present to varying degrees. All involve different levels of reflexivity.

The first is the relativization of one's own identity. This is a type of relationship in which a reinterpretation of culture occurs as a result of the encounter of one culture with another. The use of the other to reinterpret one's own culture has been a feature of many forms of everyday cosmopolitanism, such as what is often called 'cultural omnivorousness' based on consumption, but also includes 'soft' kinds of cosmopolitanism around curiosity/appreciation of other cultures, and which are often found in educational programmes. In terms of dispositions, it is characterized by an orientation towards tolerance of diversity, recognition of interconnectness and a general disposition of openness to others.

The second is the positive recognition of the other. This is a type of relationship in which self and other encounters take a stronger form involving political and ethical commitments. In this instance a step in the direction of cosmopolitan citizenship occurs whereby universalistic meta-rules play a greater role. It is a stronger reflexive relationship entailing the inclusion of the other, not just awareness as in the previous type of relationship. Such types of relationship can be found in the so-called politics of recognition, as in liberal multiculturalism, the awareness of vulnerability, ethical and political consciousness and responsibility for others. One major expression of cosmopolitanism on this level is in the internationalization of law.

The third type of relationship concerns the mutual evaluation of cultures or identities, both one's own and that of the other. This is a self-reflexive mode of relationship that is based on cultural distance, scepticism, and critique and makes possible for people to mediate between cultures. It will typically be found in dialogic encounters and is sustained by deliberative style communi-

cation. Such kinds of relationships make possible the critique of cultures. Expressions of reflexivity can be found in varieties of postnationalism and what are often referred to as rooted or embedded forms of cosmopolitanism.

The fourth type of cosmopolitan relationships is a shared normative culture in which self and other relations are mediated through an orientation towards world consciousness. In this case global issues are predominant. This kind of cosmopolitanism entails the formation of a moral consciousness rooted in emotional responses to global issues, concern with global ethics, putting the non-national interest before the national interest. One of the main expressions of such kinds of relationship is in new forms of civil society, such as global or cosmopolitan civil society. This, then, is a yet stronger expression of cosmopolitanism relating mostly to legal, institutional arrangements and major societal transformation whereby cosmopolitanism becomes constitutive of a new politics, global civil society etc.

It should be noted that these four types are not necessarily preconditions of each other, for they can be combined in different ways and one level may not presuppose another. It has also been noted in research on cosmopolitanism that people (or social units) are not cosmopolitan equally in all levels. Within each level there will also be contradictions. For instance, in the first type instead of being a homogeneous and tolerant group, cultural omnivores are heterogeneous and internally divided (Tampubolon, 2010). However, as 'ideal typifications' of cosmopolitanism – the sense of Weber's 'empirical science of concrete reality' – these types represent generic forms of relationships and varying degrees of 'thin' and 'thickness' (Weber, 1949).

Taken as a whole, these relationships, as constitutive of cosmopolitan phenomena, such as specific discourses that could be considered cosmopolitan, have the character of being in tension with the environment or social context in which they find themselves. This is because cosmopolitanism is like other such phenomena – be they political ideologies, cultural movements, ethical positions, collective identities – both a product of social context and also in tension with it. It can be hypothesized that the history of cosmopolitanism can be traced in terms of a normative ideal and cultural model that has become progressively embroiled in social context as a result of historical struggles. In this process it acquires an empirical reference. The methodological approach developed in this paper offers a framework in which to research this unfolding relation between social context and the transformative project of cosmopolitanism.

The methodological framework of cosmopolitanism

The previous analysis has attempted to clarify the ontological framework of cosmopolitanism as consisting of particular kinds of relationships that entail reflexively worked out normative orientations. In accordance with this ontology, a relational analysis was proposed as an alternative to dispositional/

agency based or systemic accounts. However, in order to advance the explanatory level of analysis a firmer methodological framework, in the sense of a method of analysis, is needed beyond the level of a general descriptive approach, which often does not go much beyond the identification of relevant questions for analysis. While an attempt was made to theorize the ontological framework of cosmopolitanism in a manner that could be related to empirical phenomena, such as the aforementioned levels of reflexivity, a sociological analysis will ideally need to provide a methodological framework in order to become explanatory. Relational theories, such as ANT, generally are not explanatory, but descriptive and operate on the level of a broad theory of society. Now, one way to deal with this would be to resort to a social indicator approach and simply pursue the measurement of the phenomena identified in the ontological framework. This may indeed provide useful results. However, the argument put forward in this paper is that more is needed in order to understand the significance of cosmopolitanism as a historical condition that has come about as a result of major socio-cultural and political transformation. In other words, two kinds of theory need to be used: a theory of the nature of the object under investigation – its ontological structure – and a theory of how the phenomena in question have come into existence and undergo change. The latter requires a method of analysis that is primarily explanatory and which, as I shall argue, can offer both a diachronic as well as a synchronic account of the social phenomena under examination.

The big question for cosmopolitan analysis – as opposed to a normative conception of cosmopolitanism or what I have characterized as an account confined to social ontology – is the challenge of explanation, namely how to explain major socio-cultural change entailing shifts in moral and political values (and which can be defined in the relational terms of the ontological framework discussed above). Such an analysis will need to connect micro and macro levels of analysis and it will need to devise methodological tools appropriate to the task of explaining social change. Indeed, the very notion of cosmopolitanism is inextricably bound up with the problem of social change and therefore with the identification of long-term historical trends, including models of modernity (see Haferkamp and Smelser, 1992; Tilly, 1984; Wagner, 2009). The kind of explanation that is needed for a cosmopolitan analysis is one that can connect a diachronic level analysis – in the sense of earlier events causing later ones – with a synchronic analysis, in the sense of an account of how long-run structural variables become transformed in an extended period of political contestation. This is because the 'switching tracks' of social change are manifested in intense periods of interaction in which historically embedded paths become re-oriented, re-combined or transformed. Such an approach will require both causal as well as interpretative modes of explanation since historical outcomes are never determined by structural forces or unfold in a linear pattern.[5]

Research on cosmopolitanism frequently fails to clarify whether a phenomenon held to be cosmopolitanism is an explanatory variable to account in

whole or in part for another cosmopolitan phenomenon or whether the objective is to account for cosmopolitanism as a general condition. This is a difficulty not specific to cosmopolitanism analysis. One of the problems in empirical research in cosmopolitanism – and more generally a problem in much of cultural research in social science – is the failure to distinguish the *explanandum* (the phenomenon to be explained) from the *explanans* (the causal factor, or another phenomenon that explains the *explanandum*). This has been illuminated brilliantly by Jon Elster (2007). However, Elster's proposed solution of methodological individualism is not well equipped for problems that cannot be accounted for in terms of individual choices and in his case there is also a general neglect of the diachronic level of analysis. In order to resolve such problems and provide a methodological framework appropriate to the relational ontological framework outlined above, I argue for four methodological tools to be specified and clearly demarcated from each other and from the *explanandum* in order to avoid the circular reasoning that has often been a feature of cosmopolitan theory, whereby cosmopolitanism causes itself. The problem derives from an over-general concept of cosmopolitanism. The difficulty is that cosmopolitanism – like other such phenomena such as democratization, individualism – cannot itself be investigated as a self-explanatory phenomenon, but needs to be accounted for diachronically in terms of other events and phenomena.

As a methodological solution to the problem of the explanation of social change and specifically to the explanation of cosmopolitan phenomena, I propose a four-fold methodological framework which will serve as providing the *explanans* in order to account for the *explanandum*, the ontological framework. The four tools are: preconditions, social mechanisms, social processes and trajectories of historical change. Of these the main tool is social mechanisms, on which an extensive literature now exists and I argue cosmopolitan analysis can benefit from engaging with such methodological tools. However, a theory of mechanisms alone is insufficient – since it is generally not well adapted to long-run analysis as opposed to the short-run – and therefore as a corrective needs to be combined with additional levels of analysis in which the diachronic level is given more weight (here the emphasis on processes and trajectories of historical change becomes relevant). Moreover, the notion of mechanisms needs to be embedded in a more developed synchronic analysis. The literature on cosmopolitanism has generally not engaged with these methodological approaches – which of course are not specific to cosmopolitan analysis – and a lot can be gained from incorporating the insights from more grounded and middle range approaches for the analysis of phenomena that are rarely considered outside the realm of theory and normative critique.

Preconditions

These refer to the triggering conditions and can be necessary or non-necessary conditions. More generally they constitute the wider social context in which

social action occurs. Preconditions are the structural determinants that give rise to the problems to which cosmopolitanism is a response. As with many conditions, they are not easily discernible and social scientists are therefore best advised to confine their causal analysis to mechanisms. A processual approach, such as the one advocated in this paper, cannot easily separate conditions from the events or phenomena it is attempting to explain, since those events shape the conditions, which are not static but temporal and undergo change along with the social relations that define them. The conditions thus change as a result of the recursive effects of new cultural phenomena – cosmopolitan phenomena, for instance – acting on the conditions after they become sufficiently established (international law and European law would be examples of this). Nonetheless, it makes sense for heuristic reasons to specify preconditions, as part of a larger explanatory framework, without attributing to them causal powers as such (see also Delanty and He, 2008).

Generally speaking, three generic kinds of preconditions are relevant, in particular for the analysis of cosmopolitan phenomena, but which of course have a wider sphere of application: civilizational contexts, environmental contexts, institutional contexts. The latter two are borrowed from Wuthnow (1989, 1992)[6] and are complemented by the additional condition of civilizational contexts, as suggested by the theoretical approach called civilizational analysis (Arnason, 2003; Arjomand and Tiryakian, 2004). Civilizational contexts concern the influences exerted by historically shaped complexes of meaning, as for instance those associated with major world religions; environmental contexts concern issues such as demographic changes, food and water supply, the effects of war, ecological conditions, generally geographical, economic and demographic forces; institutional contexts concern the nature of state formation, power, the class structure and modes of stratification and the distribution of wealth.

The relevant preconditions for cosmopolitanism analysis are broadly those pertaining to environmental conditions and can be related to globalization, including the increased impact of global events and the diffusion of global communications. A general precondition, understood as a triggering condition, is major shifts in the organization of territory and populations, such as in the case of cosmopolitanism increased transnationalism and global mobility. However, this is not itself a causal factor and nor is it to be equated with cosmopolitanism, conceived of as a particular reality or phenomenon.[7] As argued above, the discovery of a relevant precondition is simply the first step in a causal analysis, but it itself cannot offer a causal explanation. Other preconditions might be civilizational factors, such as particular cultural orientations that are variously present in different world cultures.

In simple terms, then, the first step is the identification of preconditions, which can be furthermore extended into the specification of certain problems, such as those pertinent to cosmopolitanism, namely issues relating to global problems around justice and the environment, the integration of minorities and the extension of citizenship, conflicts over heritage, etc. Such problems

constitute the preconditions of an analysis that will require additional methodological tools.

Social mechanisms

Explanation by recourse to social mechanisms offers a more specific and rigorous way to solve the problem of distinguishing between cosmopolitanism as an *explanandum* from the events or phenomena that give rise to it. A large body of methodological literature now exists on social mechanisms (see Elster, 2007; Givan *et al.*, 2010; Gross, 2009; Tilly, 2001a, 2001b). This is not the place to review it in detail. It will suffice to mention that social mechanisms offer a means of explanation, but not of prediction. Mechanisms frequently employed in social science include competition, adaptation, conflict, diffusion, conformism. Social mechanisms are causal forces that not only generate and establish discourses, structures, institutions and other macro-level entities, but also transform such emergent phenomena. Mechanisms could therefore also be seen as intermediary links between cause and effect. In this latter capacity, they work synchronically, for instance, to connect social action with discourses, structures, institutions and other macro-level entities.

Elster defines a 'mechanism as a frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal pattern' and is 'triggered under generally unknown conditions with indeterminate consequences' (Elster, 2007: 36–9). Gross (2009: 368) argues for an interpretative conception of social mechanisms 'as composed of chains or aggregations of actors confronting problem situations and mobilizing more or less habitual responses'. Marxist analysis has traditionally presupposed a notion of class conflict as a mechanism of social change, but this could be broadened to include a range of other kinds of generative mechanisms, as in the case of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989) or social contradictions, as in the case of critical theory (Habermas, 1987; Honneth, 2004; Strydom, 2011). Luhmannian theory – which is not normally seen as compatible with cosmopolitan analysis – assumes a basic model of autopoesis, or self-generation, as a mechanism of systemic change. Tilly (2001a: 24) highlights 'relational mechanisms' which alter connections between social groups, 'cognitive mechanisms' which operate through changes in perceptions, and 'environmental mechanisms' that exert external influences on social processes. Eder's classification of mechanisms into the stages of variation, selection and stabilization draws attention to different kinds of learning processes that unfold in these phases (Eder, 1992). Strydom's (2011) cognitive model of mechanisms is also highly relevant. His four-fold model is as follows: generative mechanisms, which are responsible for the generation of variety; the second is cognitive relational, which takes the form of association building between a plurality of actors; cognitive transformational, which concerns collective learning; and cognitive structural context setting mechanisms, which involve broader societal structures, including institutional arrangements and cultural models. For Strydom, a key feature of a social mechanism is that it is a means of learning, whether on a personal

(micro) or collective (meso) or institutional (macro) levels.[8] The emphasis on learning processes is also reflected in Gross's pragmatist definition of social mechanisms as problem-solving strategies (Gross, 2009). But there are of course other features of mechanisms, such as those to which Tilly refers above (Tilly, 2001a, 2001b). Givan *et al*. (2010) highlight the importance of diffusion as a mechanism in social movement research, though this is a broad category which covers a variety of more specific mechanisms.

To simplify a large and diverse field and to identify some mechanisms that have causal powers for cosmopolitanism, I propose to outline, first, three broad types of social mechanisms and to relate these to the different kinds of cosmopolitan phenomena discussed earlier. These are as follows: generative mechanisms, transformative mechanisms and institutionalizing mechanisms. The triad of mechanisms approximately relate to the personal, collective and institutional levels of learning. It is important to see such mechanisms as operating synchronically in the sense that longer-run structural forces, such as those that can be described as preconditions, are ordered according to functional, normative or evaluative criteria that are communicatively constructed. The synchronic dimension arises in that in a given possible state of society certain preferences are selected in action/interaction sequences characteristic of a stage of societal development, for example to illustrate the emergence of cosmopolitanism, the incorporation of human rights into the national legislatures in the late 20th century. In such periods, it is not only the strength of supra-actor structural forces, but the communicative reorientation of cultural models that become significant.

Major examples of mechanisms relevant to cosmopolitan analysis are education, democracy and environmentalism. These are not themselves instances of cosmopolitanism – and can have counter-cosmopolitanism consequences – but are generally more likely to enhance cosmopolitanism since they involve learning processes that are more likely to lead to cosmopolitan outcomes. This is best illustrated by taking some specific examples of the three types of mechanisms.

Generative mechanisms. These are mechanisms that trigger change or convert perceptions into more general frames in which new definitions of problems become compelling. Such mechanisms may be expressed in increased empathy with others in claim-making. Relevant to cosmopolitanism would be mechanisms of pluralization by which people experience self, other and world relations in a new key. Generative mechanisms largely operate on the level of the organization of experience and are thus phenomenological and cognitive. They relate specifically to the first two kinds of cosmopolitanism (discussed above in the ontological framework), namely processes of relativization and the mutual recognition of the other and can be illustrated by increased levels of self-reflexivity, reciprocity and cultural creativity. Some specific generative mechanisms relating to the more general examples of education, democracy and environmentalism would be, respectively, inter-cultural awareness and

cross-cultural experiences stimulated by education, claim making in which universal norms of justice and democracy are involved, and in relation to environmentalism relevant generative mechanisms are risk perception and its generalization though risk communication up to the point of the formation of global norms securing ecosystems and the guaranteeing of cosmopolitan rights.

Transformative mechanisms. These concern the selection of certain ideas or models over others and the construction of new cultural frames or cultural models which open the way for societal transformation. In the terms of cosmopolitanism this is where the dimensions of interpretation and evaluation are most pertinent; it is where experience is subject to new schemata of interpretation and critical evaluation. In terms of the four-fold account of cosmopolitan relations, these mechanisms are relevant to all types, but especially to the latter three. One possible way to approach this in terms of a model of mechanisms is to see it as a form of diffusion (Givan *et al.*, 2010). However, as previously noted, diffusion lacks specificity, especially when it comes to accounting for the ways in which foreign ideas and models are taken up in very different contexts by social actors to advance their claims. More transformative mechanisms are the capacities for detachment and scepticism, critical publics, cultural translation and re-contextualization. In relation to the more general examples of education, democracy and environmentalism, relevant mechanisms are, in education, the trend towards internationalization; public deliberation and the articulation of needs in the case of democracy; and in environmentalism the impact of international non-governmental movements on public awareness and political communication.

Institutionalizing mechanisms. These concern the ways in which new models become embodied in institutional forms. Institutionalizing mechanisms are more complex and can be related specifically to the fourth kind of cosmopolitanism, the notion of a shared cognitive culture in which universalizing orientations are more developed. Some specific institutionalizing mechanisms with respect to the examples of education, democracy and environmentalism are, in education, the curriculum design to reflect the idea of what Popkewitz (2008) calls 'the lifelong learner who acts as the global citizen', the institutionalization of rights of inclusion, and in environmentalism new global norms for the reduction of greenhouse gases.

It may be objected that some of these mechanisms may look like the phenomena to be explained and thus no real distinction exists between the *explanans* and the *explanandum*. Against this objection the point is that the specification of mechanisms, such as those identified above, make possible the emergence and diffusion of cosmopolitan relationships. The mechanisms themselves are not relationships. However, the objection has some validity in that certain kinds of mechanisms can themselves become institutionalized and thus become part of the phenomenon to be explained (for example, elections

are the institutionalized mechanism of democracy and often equated with democracy, which properly understood is wider than parliamentary elections). Notwithstanding this objection it is nonetheless the case that mechanisms are analytically distinct in the sense that elections are distinct from the kind of political culture that they enable and they explain different political outcomes. This is the case, too, with cosmopolitanism: the expansion in rights, for example, to follow Benhabib (2008) has the 'iterative' effect of producing new claims which in turn lead to the formation of cosmopolitanism in the sense of the positive recognition of the other and in the sense of movement towards a shared normative culture.

To refute another possible objection, a social mechanisms approach, when located as part of a larger theoretical framework, is not a mechanistic view of social relations, but requires a developed synchronic perspective. The workings of social mechanisms are always ultimately in the hands of social actors and reflect their interests and aspirations. Moreover, it involves a complex, highly contingent and multidimensional field of interactions with social context and the impact of cultural models. So, social mechanisms are anything but mechanistic.

Processes

Sociological theory has traditionally employed diachronic theories of processes to explain major trends. Some of the main examples are those of commodification, as in Marxist theory, differentiation, as in Spencer and Durkheim, and rationalization, as in Weber. Other processes familiar to sociologists are social and system integration, processes of polarization, convergence and divergence.

Social mechanism approaches attempt to break down such concepts to more manageable units of analysis. The result is that processes are often equated or reduced to mechanisms.[9] However, it is important to retain the specificity of the notion of a process in order to capture long-run mechanisms of change as a diachronic process. Tilly (2001a, 2008) has argued for the salience of processes as a distinct concept of analysis. Processes concern causal patterns that take shape from combinations of mechanisms. Thus a critical point will be the nature of the interaction of the various mechanisms. As such, processes then are of a more general nature than mechanisms and, moreover, are recurrent patterns. Mechanisms, he argues, concatenate into broader processes: 'Processes are frequently occurring combinations or sequences of mechanisms' (Tilly, 2001a: 26). So if generative and transformative mechanisms coincide it is possible to speak of a process resulting and which could be described as either generative or transformative, and which may in turn combine with institutionalizing mechanisms to lead to a cosmopolitan process. A process can of course also simply be the outcome of a combination of mechanisms of just one sort. However, the important point is that in order to make generalizable claims it will be necessary to demonstrate the operation of

the process in a variety of different contexts. This is one of the main tasks for cosmopolitan analysis.

In a seminal study on cultural change and ideological innovation, Robert Wuthnow (1989, see also 1992) used three processes to explain the fact that major shifts in culture and ideology do not simply take the form of one ideology replacing a new one in a direct and linear fashion. His processes, which unfold in distinct phases, are the phases of production, selection and institutionalization. In the production phase new ideas are generated which in the selection phase are reduced or transformed to articulate with social contexts and a dominant idea or approach emerges, which in the institutionalization phase becomes the dominant discourse as a result of various kinds of routinized mechanisms, including access to networks, resources, established organizations, control over processes of evaluation. These phases are not unlike Eder's (1992) previously mentioned mechanisms of variation, selection and stabilization.

For present purposes, and drawing from Eder, Strydom, Tilly and Wuthnow,[10] I distinguish three broad processes that are relevant to cosmopolitanism and which are aligned with the earlier discussion of social mechanisms, namely generative, transformative and institutionalizing processes. The above-mentioned social mechanisms operate variously on these broader and more general processes, which represent macro trends and causal patterns by which cosmopolitan reality is created. Processes, such as those pertinent to cosmopolitan phenomena, should be seen as clearly identifiable developmental logics in which different kinds of learning and innovation occur. Generative, transformative and institutionalizing processes are respectively related to the generation of variety, selection from variety and a resulting stabilization or institutionalization of new norms or ideas.

As argued, following Eder and Strydom, a feature of mechanisms and processes that is specifically relevant to cosmopolitanism is learning, that is the means by which individuals, groups, societies etc undergo changes in their self-understanding. The reflexive definition of cosmopolitanism discussed earlier would bring this definition in the direction of forms of learning that occur in the context of cultural encounters and in the context of global problems. So the research objective becomes rather one of identifying the relevant mechanisms and processes of such forms of learning. The working thesis, then, is that the mechanisms and processes that give rise to cosmopolitan phenomena embody progressive forms of learning by which social actors seek solutions to problems in the objective order of society (and can be related to what was discussed earlier under the heading of 'preconditions'). In this model, in so far as it relates to cosmopolitanism, processes need to be theorized as developmental processes that provide the basic diachronic level of analysis.

Some pertinent developmental processes are those relating to the generation of variety, selection from variety and a resulting stabilization or institutionalization. In the first case, cultural pluralization results in the relativization of identities and the articulation of claims and different points of view on

major social problems. Selection from variety occurs when a discernable movement takes shape around a new social actor, discourse, collective identity and a heightened tension exists with social context. This may be reflected in the emergence of global civil society, for instance. On this level there is likely to be still considerable tension between the cosmopolitan project or phenomena and social context. Stabilization or institutionalization takes place where new normative horizons become established – such as new legal and regulatory frameworks in response to diverse claims – and cosmopolitanism becomes a less oppositional force.

Trajectories of historical change

No sociological approach can have any credibility if it does not address the problems of power and conflict, since social struggles constitute the basis of social life. For sociological research, if it is to have critical intent, social problems are the starting point and open up a normative direction. In the case of cosmopolitanism the normative component is important and can be related to the specific mechanisms and processes that come about in response to conflicts and struggles over power. The vast spread of cosmopolitan phenomena in the present day can be seen as a continuation of earlier developments in the formation of modern societies when major social and political transformation took place around the emergence of civil society and the gradual extension of democratization and communicatively based solutions to societal problems. This historical trend can be found today in shifts in beliefs about social justice, the rights of others, environmental sustainability, the need to go beyond the national interest. These cultural and social shifts constitute the core features of cosmopolitanism and define the scope of cosmopolitan analysis conceived of as an account of historical or major social change in which normative and cognitive shifts occur in the moral and political horizons of societies.

The final methodological tool of analysis is a less finely tuned one and one which I term 'trajectories of historical change'.[11] On this level, the aim is to identify the broad directions of societal change, the developmental or evolutionary dynamics of societies, their temporalities as well as to situate the present in the context of the past. This is where the wider historical significance of the phenomenon becomes the focus. On this level the core dynamics are more than processes and are best specified by reference to broader diachronic frameworks of analysis. But these must be capable of accommodating specific phenomena, events and empirical reality, since it is far from a linear process but dependent on the outcome of historical struggles and thus requires the synchronic perspective. As William Sewell (2005: 123) has commented in relation to Michael Mann's work on the directionalities of historical change, an empirically based 'eventful sociology, should not, indeed, must not, eschew the issue of the developmental dynamics of societies'.

The most useful approach, I argue, is to take the concept of modernity as a unit of analysis in order to make larger claims about the nature and direction

of social change. This is where social theory and long-term historical analysis meet and where some of the concerns of classical sociological theory can be revitalized around a theory of social change that takes into account the range of issues that cosmopolitan analysis highlights. From the perspective of an analysis that has operated with the concepts of preconditions, mechanisms and processes, it can be hypothesized that long-term trends such as historical directions or trajectories of change can be identified in terms of new combinations of not just social mechanisms but of processes. So combinations of processes ultimately lead to social change. In this, the key dynamic will be the nature of the interaction of the combinations. How can this be understood? A possible way forward is to conceptualize such combinations and interactions in terms of a conception of modernity. Social change, as Tilly has argued, is not a general condition, but 'a catchall name for very different processes varying greatly in their connection to each other' (Tilly, 1984: 12). The key point, which requires going beyond Tilly's particular approach, which is not well equipped to deal with changes in consciousness, is on the temporal level; that is, to see synchronic episodes in which communicatively animated cognitive reorientation can happen and in which transformative counter-factuals can come alive (these reorientations do not always lead to cosmopolitan outcomes of course, and this can only be empirically established against the theoretical framework).

For reasons of space, the notion of modernity as a sociological concept will not be discussed further, but it can be noted, following Peter Wagner, that modernity, which is now a key concept in social theory, has become increasingly pluralized and related to a variety of historical contexts and trajectories (Wagner, 2009, 2012). In the approach put forward in this paper, modernity would be theorized in terms of the inter-relations of major societal processes and the variety of its forms an expression of the different combinations of processes. Cosmopolitan trends will be part of modernity, but the nature and extent of these can be settled only by empirical research in a variety of different settings. To pursue this further is beyond the scope of the present paper.

Conclusion

An adequate social scientific theory of cosmopolitanism must be explanatory. The logic of explanation requires a theory capable of showing how a particular phenomenon has been created, what its main properties or characteristics are, and what its significance or consequences are. For these reasons, I have argued that explanation requires a critical commitment in that it is inescapably bound up with normative issues in the sense of moral and political counter-factuals and how these enter into the social life and political practice. In the case of cosmopolitanism, I have argued that an explanatory methodology is needed in order to avoid the problems that have beset much of the literature which

either tries to use cosmopolitanism to explain cosmopolitanism or, in those accounts that are more successful in offering explanatory models, reduces cosmopolitanism to the dispositions of social actors or to other processes, such as globalization. The critical cosmopolitan approach I have put forward would thus approach the question of social change, in terms of an account that distinguishes between conditions, social mechanisms, processes and trajectories of historical change. In this way cosmopolitanism can be seen as a particular kind of a learning process that makes social change possible and which needs to be temporally situated to show how long-run variables become transformed in certain situations. In this regard, a key problem to explain how cultural models embodying normative counter-factual ideas arise in the first instance and then enter into social and political practice.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1 This has also been noted by Wardle (2007).
2 The terms 'world-disclosure' and a 'disclosing critique' have been variously used by Habermas and Honneth.
3 This has been reflected in much of recent cosmopolitan scholarship: Beck (2006), Benhabib (2008), Delanty (2009).
4 In an earlier publication (Delanty, 2009) I referred to these as capacities, but I now think they need to be considered as relationships and should be located within a broader ontological framework.
5 For an example of such an approach see O'Mahony and Delanty (1998).
6 Wuthnow also speaks of what he calls 'action sequences', which will not be considered here due to the different focus of the present paper.
7 This is one of the problems with Norris and Inglehart (2009).
8 Space does not permit a discussion of sociological theories of collective or societal learning. See Strydom (1999); Eder (1999).
9 Eg Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998).
10 Eder's (1992) learning approach to mechanisms and Strydom's (2011) cognitive model of mechanisms, referred to above, can be understood in these broader terms of analysis as closer to processes.
11 The term is suggested by recent papers by Wagner on 'trajectories of modernity' (2009, 2011, 2012) and Therborn's (1994) analysis of the trajectory of European modernity.

References

Aboulafa, M., (2006), *The Cosmopolitan Self: George Herbert Mead and the Continental Philosophy*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Arjomand, S. and Tiryakian, E. (eds), (2004), *Rethinking Civilizational Analysis*, London: Sage.

Arnason, J., (2003), *Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions*, Leiden: Brill.

Balibar, E., (2012), 'Citizenship of the world revisited', in Delanty, G. (ed.), *Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*, London: Routledge.

Beck, U., (2006), *The Cosmopolitan Outlook*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, U. and Sznaider, N., (2006), 'Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57 (1): 1–23.

Benhabib, S., (2008), *Another Cosmopolitanism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bhaskar, R., (1989), *The Possibility of Naturalism*, London: Harvester.

Brook, G. and Brighouse, H. (eds), (2005), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chernilo, D., (2012), 'Cosmopolitanism and the problem of universalism', in Delanty, G. (ed.), *Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*, London: Routledge.

Delanty, G., (2009), *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Delanty, G., (2012), 'Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of cosmopolitanism: A theory of cultural encounters', *British Journal of Sociology*, 63: 4.

Delanty, G. and He, B., (2008), 'Comparative perspectives on cosmopolitanism: Assessing European and Asian perspectives', *International Sociology*, 23 (3): 323–344.

Delanty, G. and Inglis, D. (eds), (2010), *Cosmopolitanism: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences*, 4 vols, London: Routledge.

Eder, K., (1992), 'Contradictions and evolution: A theory of the social evolution of modernity', in Haferkamp, H. and Smelser, N. (eds), *Social Change and Modernity*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Eder, K., (1999), 'Societies learn and yet the world is hard to change', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2 (2): 195–215.

Elster, J., (2007), *Explaining Social Behaviour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emirbayer, M., (1997), 'A manifesto for a relational sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, 103: 281–317.

Givan, R., Roberts, K. and Soule, S. (eds), (2010), *The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gross, N., (2009), 'A pragmatist theory of social mechanisms', *American Sociological Review*, 74: 358–379.

Habermas, J., (1987), *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, J., (2001), 'Why European needs a constitution?' *New Left Review*, 11 (September–October): 5–26.

Haferkamp, H. and Smelser, N. (eds), (1992), *Social Change and Modernity*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hedstrom, P. and Swedberg, R., (1998), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Honneth, A., (2004), 'Organized self-realization: Some paradoxes of individualization', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7 (4): 463–478.

Kendall, G., Woodward, I. and Skribis, Z., (2009), *The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism*, London: Sage.

Norris, P. and Inglehart, R., (2009), *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Mahony, P. and Delanty, G., (1998), *Rethinking Irish History: Nationalism, Identity and Ideology*, London: Macmillan.

Gerard Delanty

Pichler, F., (2009), ' "Down-to-earth" cosmopolitanism: Subjective and objective measurements of cosmopolitanism in survey research', *Current Sociology*, 57 (5): 704–732.

Popkewitz, T.S., (2008), *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child*, New York: Routledge.

Roudemetof, V., (2006), 'Transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and glocalization', *Current Sociology*, 53 (1): 113–115.

Sahlins, M., (2000), *Culture in Practice: Selected Essays*, New York: Zone Books.

Sewell, W., (2005), *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strydom, P., (1999), 'Triple contingency: The theoretical problem of the public in communication societies', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 25 (2): 1–25.

Strydom, P., (2011), 'The cognitive and metacognitive dimension of social and political theory', in Delanty, G. and Turner, S. (eds), *International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory*, London: Routledge.

Strydom, P., (2011), *Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology*, London: Routledge.

Tampubolon, G., (2010), 'Social stratification and cultures hierarchy among the omnivores: Evidence from the Arts Council of England surveys', *Sociological Review*, 58 (1): 1–25.

Tan, K.-C., (2004), *Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Therborn, G., (1994), *European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000*, London: Sage.

Tilly, C., (1984), *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Tilly, C., (2001a), 'Mechanisms in political processes', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4: 21–41.

Tilly, C., (2001b), 'The historical analysis of political processes', in Turner, J. (ed.), *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, New York: Springer.

Tilly, C., (2008), *Explaining Social Processes*, London: Paradigm.

Turner, B.S., (2006), 'Classical sociology and cosmopolitanism: A critical defence of the social', *British Journal of Sociology*, 57 (1): 133–151.

Wagner, P., (2009), *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Wagner, P., (2011), 'From interpretation to civilization – and back: Analyzing the trajectories of non-European modernities', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 14 (1): 89–106.

Wagner, P., (2012), *Modernity: Understanding the Present*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Wardle, H., (2007), 'A groundwork for West Indian cultural openness', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13: 567–583.

Weber, M., (1949), *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, New York: The Free Press.

Wuthnow, R., (1989), *Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wuthnow, R., (1992), 'Cultural change and sociological theory', in Haferkamp, H. and Smelser, N. (eds), *Social Change and Modernity*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.