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\u00ab Le livre de Beno\u00eet Pelopidas constitue une pr\u00e9cieuse contribution au d\u00e9bat en cours sur l\u2019armement nucl\u00e9aire. [\u2026] \u00c0 travers un examen approfondi des recherches les plus r\u00e9centes consacr\u00e9es \u00e0 la politique nucl\u00e9aire et \u00e0 l\u2019histoire de ces armements, Beno\u00eet Pelopidas propose une analyse perspicace et originale de notre dilemme actuel. Il b\u00e2tit une argumentation solide \u00e0 l\u2019encontre du discours qui voudrait nous faire croire que la d\u00e9tention d\u2019armes nucl\u00e9aires et leur prolif\u00e9ration sont in\u00e9vitables, tandis que leur abandon serait inconcevable. [\u2026] Explorant les conditions requises pour un choix \u00e9clair\u00e9 et d\u00e9mocratique sur cette question, il s\u2019attache \u00e0 fournir tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension des diff\u00e9rentes options disponibles. [\u2026] En pr\u00e9sentant de mani\u00e8re p\u00e9dagogique l\u2019alternative \u00e0 laquelle nous sommes confront\u00e9s, l\u2019ouvrage de Beno\u00eet Pelopidas apporte une contribution d\u00e9cisive au d\u00e9bat en cours sur l\u2019avenir nucl\u00e9aire de la plan\u00e8te. [\u2026] Il nous aide \u00e0 mieux comprendre le probl\u00e8me nucl\u00e9aire auquel nous sommes tous confront\u00e9s et comment nous devrions y faire face. \u00bb<\/p>\n
David Holloway, Professeur \u00e9m\u00e9rite d\u2019histoire internationale et de science politique \u00e0 l\u2019Universit\u00e9 Stanford (USA), auteur de Stalin and the Bomb<\/em> et The Soviet Union and the Arms Race<\/em>, (extraits de la pr\u00e9face) <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00ab Dans un livre riche et reposant sur une argumentation brillante, P\u00e9lopidas met en cause le raisonnement selon lequel les armes nucl\u00e9aires sont essentielles \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et le d\u00e9sarmement constitue le r\u00eave des na\u00effs. De mani\u00e8re convaincante, il d\u00e9montre au contraire que ces deux choix politiques, la dissuasion et le d\u00e9sarmement, sont des paris sur des vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s trop souvent obscurcies par les activistes des deux bords. Il les expose et montre notamment que les partisans de la dissuasion sous-estiment le r\u00f4le de la chance dans l’\u00e9vitement d’explosions nucl\u00e9aires non-d\u00e9sir\u00e9es. \u00bb<\/p>\n Richard Ned Lebow, Professeur de th\u00e9orie politique internationale, d\u00e9partement de War Studies<\/em>, King\u2019s College, Londres, auteur de Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations<\/em> et We all lost the Cold War<\/em> (avec Janice Stein).<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00ab Un livre important. Fruit d\u2019une recherche minutieuse dans les archives de participants cl\u00e9s de l\u2019histoire nucl\u00e9aire doubl\u00e9e d\u2019entretiens, Repenser les choix nucl\u00e9aires<\/em> offre une analyse et une critique originales de la politique nucl\u00e9aire de la France et des compr\u00e9hensions usuelles des armes nucl\u00e9aires en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Tout comme les travaux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents de son auteur, cette \u00e9tude bouleverse en profondeur les id\u00e9es re\u00e7ues. Que vous soyez d\u2019accord ou pas, Repenser les choix nucl\u00e9aires est incontournable<\/em>. \u00bb<\/p>\n Matthew Evangelista, Professeur d\u2019histoire et de science politique \u00e0 l\u2019Universit\u00e9 de Cornell (USA) auteur de Innovation and the Arms Race et Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement that ended the Cold War<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Misremembering the ACRS: economic imaginations and nuclear negotiations in the Middle East<\/a> The Birth of Nuclear Eternity <\/a> European nuclear weapons. Zombie debates and nuclear realities<\/a> What Europeans believe about Hiroshima and Nagasaki\u2014and why it matters<\/a> Correspondence. New Era or New Error? Technology and the Future of Deterrence<\/a> Donald Trump could lose the election by authorizing new nuclear weapons tests<\/a> France: nuclear command, control and communications<\/a>
\nHebatalla Taha
\nReceived 02 Feb 2021, Accepted 12 Jul 2021, Published online: 28 Jul 2021
\nThis article examines the political economy of Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the first half of the 1990s, specifically the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). It focuses on the misplaced memorialization of the ACRS process as a lost opportunity for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, which has resulted in a continuous \u201creturn\u201d to ACRS in policy discussions. The article contends that rather than producing mechanisms for disarmament, the ACRS process was part of a larger economic restructuring and served as a platform for militarized economic relations. Seeking to destabilize dominant repertoires on peacemaking in the Middle East, the article demonstrates the overlap between processes of nuclear entrenchment and economic imaginaries. It offers a deeper understanding of how the nuclear realm interacts with motifs of peace and prosperity.<\/p>\n
\nin Jenny Andersson and Sandra Kemp (eds.), Futures<\/em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021
\nThis chapter reconnects modes of futures-making with the requirements of democracy by focusing on the naturalization of nuclear weapons and their removal from the realm of democratic choice at a particular point in time. The chapter revolves around the concept of \u2018nuclear eternity\u2019 as a means of reducing public choices about the use of nuclear weapons. It critiques the idea that nuclear weapons have always been perceived as \u2018here to stay\u2019 and reassesses the dominant narrative about the 1960s as an emancipatory decade by arguing that the decade actually witnessed a significant shrinking of future political possibilities. Finally, the chapter identifies three shapes of the future which produce \u2018nuclear eternity\u2019\u2014an absent post-nuclear future<\/em>, an inconsistent post-nuclear future<\/em>, and a disconnected post-nuclear future<\/em>\u2014and illustrates them with historical examples.<\/p>\n
\nIn February 2020, French president Emmanuel Macron invited all interested European states to a \u201cstrategic dialogue\u201d on the supposed contribution of France\u2019s nuclear arsenal to European collective security. While certain media commentators relayed Macron\u2019s intervention with approbation and excitement, framing the proposal as an exciting new idea that, if implemented, might boost Europe\u2019s clout on the world stage, the dominant reaction was one of ennui. After all, the argument for Euro-nukes is far from new. In fact, several (mostly French) actors have unsuccessfully attempted to persuade European policymakers of the necessity of European nuclear weapons cooperation for more than half a century. In this article, we investigate the history, merits, and longevity of the case for European nuclear arms. Drawing on secondary literature, policymakers\u2019 writings, and two hitherto untapped surveys of European public opinion conducted by one of the authors, we argue that the case for Euro-nukes is critically flawed with respect to security, strategic autonomy, futurity, and democratic good governance. We maintain that the continuous resurfacing of the \u201czombie\u201d case for Euro-nukes is made possible by powerful organisational interests, as well as conceptual reversification resulting in enduring contradictions between nuclear vulnerabilities and claims of protection and autonomy.<\/p>\n
\nDid the atomic bombings of\u00a0Hiroshima and Nagasaki\u00a0shorten the war, and were they necessary to force the Japanese surrender? Many people believe the answer to both questions is yes: In dropping the Bomb, America chose the lesser of two evils. Although historians have long challenged this narrative as wrong or misleading, a significant number of Europeans still believe it. That is the primary result of a recent survey of European views on nuclear affairs generally and the atomic bombings of Japan specifically. The survey, carried out in October 2019, involved approximately 7,000 respondents aged 18 and upward, carefully selected to ensure representative samples from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n
\nA debate on imagined futures and the material vulnerability of nuclear weapons systems<\/p>\n
\nPolls in the United States and nine allied countries in Europe and Asia show that public support for a nuclear test is very low. If the Trump administration conducts a test, then it shouldn\u2019t expect backing from Americans or its closest U.S. partners.
\nThis evidence was used in the U.S. Congress in the Fall of 2020<\/p>\n
\nIn this essay, Beno\u00eet\u00a0Pelopidas<\/span>\u00a0outlines what is known about French NC3 and identifies discursive, sociological and temporal challenges to assessing the validity of claims on this topic. After reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension between legitimacy and robustness of the chain of command, the role of military authority in the launch order, inadequate code transfer, and accidents and close calls, he concludes: \u201cBeyond the problems of arbitrariness, mismanagement, incidents and accidents outlined above, there are key components of the French nuclear command and control system about which we either do not know much or have partial and conflicting accounts<\/p>\n