

Electoral Responses to Economic Crises

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Abstract

How do voters respond to economic crises: do they turn against the incumbent, reward a certain political camp, polarize to the extremes, or perhaps continue to vote much like before? Analyzing extensive data on electorates, parties and individuals in 22 countries for over half a century, we document a systematic pattern whereby economic crises tend to disproportionately favor the right. Three main forces underlie this pattern. First, voters tend to decrease support for the party heading the government when the crisis erupts. Second, after crises voters tend to assign greater importance to issues typically owned by the right and turnout increases relatively among right-leaning voters. Third, when center-right parties preside over a crisis, their voters often drift further *rightward* to nationalist parties rather than defect to the left. The far-right thus serves as an effective lightning rod, keeping the center-right in power even when facing post-crisis disaffection by its voters.

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Introduction

The notion that political leaders dread economic crises erupting under their watch is almost a political truism. Crises tend to highlight the failures of government, sharpen debates over spending priorities, and stoke widespread anxiety and discontentment. As such, periods of economic crisis are widely regarded as ripe for political change, as opportune moments in which citizens are more likely to re-evaluate their situation and abandon old voting allegiances (Gourevitch, 1986; Remmer, 1991; Mayhew, 2000; Lindvall, 2013; Bellucci, Lobo, and Lewis-Beck, 2012). But how justified is this view? To what extent do economic crises actually reshape the electoral landscape, and if so, in what way?

The sources of economic crises, as well as their political ramifications, are major and long debated issues in political economy. Karl Marx, for example, offered a “Theory of Crisis”, arguing that economic crises are inevitable and will continue to worsen until the contradictions arising from the dynamics of capitalist production relations reach a breaking point (Marx, 1894). Famously, Marx and his followers believed that the culmination of that final crisis would be a revolutionary shift to the left, spearheaded by a major uprising of the working class (Clarke, 2016). Yet history, as we now know, had other plans: The economic crises that erupted in the first decades of the 20th century led to a popular turn to fascism rather than to socialism, thereby posing a serious quandary for Marxists: Why did those episodes of painful economic slumps lead the masses to embrace the far right rather than the leftist agenda for which they had advocated?

As the past century demonstrates so vividly, the response to economic crises can, in fact, take different shapes and forms. The American public’s embrace of the Democrats and President FDR’s New Deal in the aftermath of the Great Depression is often cited as an example of a leftward shift in response to a major economic slump (Key et al., 1955; Rosentiel, 2010). In contrast, the rightward shift in elections in the aftermath of the 2008

financial crisis—e.g., the Conservatives’ victory in the UK after more than a decade out of power, the threefold rise in support for right-wing populist parties in France and the Netherlands (Algan et al., 2017)—highlight the fact that parties from both sides of the ideological spectrum can benefit from a market crash.¹

While sharp economic downturns tend to crystallize citizens’ realization that something is amiss, the political implications of such episodes of crisis are less than crystal clear. This is partly because the sentiments economic crises evoke can differ starkly across the electorate: some may seek protection and assistance, others may wish to curb demands on government handouts, while others still may seek a target to blame and an outlet for their fury. These different sentiments are often manifested in the competing appeals of political parties in times of crisis: whereas politicians on the left tend to advocate for greater government assistance to the needy and a tighter social safety net, parties on the right tend to offer different responses to crises, ranging from hawkish fiscal management to an embrace of economic nationalism and the closing of borders. Which of these approaches is more appealing electorally in times of crisis is an empirical question that this study seeks to address.

The literature on the topic offers several important findings from which we depart. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) find that periods of economic crises bring about greater political polarization, which benefits the extremes, as well as an increased fractionalization of the vote. This fractionalization, they conclude, makes it harder for parties to form strong coalitions that can pursue the hard steps needed to address economic crises. In what is probably the most extensive study on the topic to date, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016) examine how different party types are affected by economic crises, analyzing elections held in 20 countries between 1870 and 2014. They find that periods of crisis tend to benefit extremist

¹The Front National’s vote share rose from 4.3 percent in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis erupted, to 13.6 percent in 2011; The Party for Freedom’s vote share rose from 5.8% in 2006 to 15.4% in 2010. Reflecting on this impact, the Financial Times header summarized such shifts: “Populism is the true legacy of the global financial crisis” (30/08/2018).

parties. Lindvall (2017) examines the coalitions that form after economic downturns, defined as a 12-month period of negative consumption growth, and finds that such episodes lead to a drop in the government's odds of reelection by an average of 20 percent. Moreover, he finds that short and long term downturns tend to produce different types of responses. Specifically, after short downturns (i.e., of less than a year) the likelihood of a rightward change in government is higher, but is equally likely to change either to the left or the right in the aftermath of longer term downturns.

We seek to add to these studies by taking a more panoramic approach, examining the political effects of crises by analyzing the responses of individuals, parties, and national electorates. Furthermore, we depart from previous research by incorporating the ideology of the incumbent, by focusing on shifts in party vote shares rather than on the identity of the coalition formed, and finally, by studying economic crises, which are more significant and painful events than 'mere' economic downturns. Taken together, these innovations allow us to provide new insight on the electoral consequences of crises.

Our study analyzes extensive data on financial crises and voting outcomes in elections held in 22 developed democracies between 1945-2015. We examine the electoral effects of crises both at the level of the ideological bloc (i.e, left versus right) and at the party level, distinguishing between different party families (e.g., social democratic, conservative and nationalist parties). Furthermore, we link data on economic crises with party level pre-election manifesto data, to examine whether and how parties change their appeals to voters during hard economic times. Finally, we assemble an additional individual-level dataset that allows us to analyze the link between economic crises and citizens' policy preferences. This data, spanning a period of two decades, allows us to evaluate different mechanisms that may explain the change in vote we observe nationally in the aftermath of crises. Using a range of empirical tests and inferential strategies, our analyses reveal several patterns of note.

First, we find that economic crises, even severe ones, have only a modest impact on the

volatility of the vote. On average, post-crisis shifts across-blocs in the vote are of similar magnitude to the average shift in election years that do not follow an economic crisis. Put differently, economic crises rarely bring about seismic shifts in the vote. Having said that, even relatively small shifts could still have dramatic consequences in terms of swaying the elections from one bloc to the other.

Second, in line with conventional wisdom, we find that governing parties that oversee the eruption of a crisis tend to lose votes in subsequent elections. Yet notably, we find a strong asymmetry in the response to crises: leaders from the right are a lot more likely to get elected in the aftermath of a crisis than leaders from the center-left. This asymmetry is also reflected in the anti-incumbent vote: When a party from the left holds the reigns as the crisis hits, the right bloc enjoys an average increase in its vote share of 4.5 percentage points, a statistically significant shift. Yet when a party from the right is in power as the crisis erupts, the left sees a much smaller and marginally significant bump (2 points) in its share of the vote. We provide further evidence that this asymmetry is not a result of other factors (such as violent conflict and wars) that may account for both the eruption of economic crises and increased support for the right.

We then try to disentangle the asymmetry using both party- and individual-level data. Analysis at the party level points to an important difference: When the center-left heads the government at the onset of a crisis, parties on the center-right are the chief beneficiaries. Yet, when center-right parties head government at the time the economic shock occurs, left-wing parties gain only a modest, statistically non-significant uptick in their vote share. Instead, nationalist parties experience the largest average increase. In other words, the asymmetric electoral impact of crises stems in part from the fact that the far-right is able to keep votes of disaffected center-right supporters within the right-wing bloc, rather than switching to the left. In contrast, the far left does not perform a similar role with disaffected voters of the mainstream left.

In the final part of the study we examine whether the right’s electoral advantage after crises is related to a change in parties’ offerings or to a change in the attitudes of voters. Analyzing the content of pre-election manifestos, we find very little evidence of change in the issues that parties focus on in elections that take place after crises. This may be because of the difficulty of doing so in a way that seems credible to voters, or without turning off the party’s traditional base of support. However, individual level data shows that after crises, voters tend to become more nationalistic and drift rightward on the issue of income inequality. These patterns suggest that the electoral shifts we observe post-crisis have more to do with a change in what voters want (i.e. demand driven) than with changes in what parties advocate (i.e., supply driven). The patterns also provide an explanation for why, as a bloc, the right is better able than the left to benefit electorally from the repercussions of economic crises.

The article’s findings contribute in several respects to research on the political consequences of economic crises at both the national (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2014; Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2016; Lindvall, 2017) and the individual level (Fernández-Albertos, Kuo, and Balcells, 2013; Bisgaard, 2015; Liu, Kuo, and Fernandez-Albertos, 2022). Most prominently, our study reveals a systematic advantage of the right bloc in the aftermath of crises. In addition, by showing an asymmetric response to crises that erupted under left versus right-led governments, our analysis highlights the importance of incorporating an interaction of incumbency and ideology into the study of post-crisis politics.

Furthermore, by broadening the empirical investigation to cover a combination of aggregate, party- and individual-level data, our analysis adds to prior research by offering new insight on the dynamics that underlie the right-wing advantage. Specifically, our results indicate that changes in demand rather than in supply—i.e., in policy preferences and voting behavior more than shifts in party positioning and appeals to voters—are the stronger factor explaining the pattern of post-crisis electoral shifts.

Finally, our study also makes headway in demonstrating the causal effects of crises on voting. Through a set of inferential tests, including the use of a new IV estimation, we show that the empirical association between economic crises and subsequent electoral shifts is not spurious. Rather, hard economic times have notable and theoretically predictable electoral consequences.

Politics in Hard Economic Times

The theory of retrospective voting predicts that in the aftermath of an economic crisis, voters will turn against the incumbent. However, even if support for the ruling party tends to suffer when the economy tanks, several factors suggest that the electoral response may be non-symmetric. Put differently, periods of economic hardship may systematically favor one side of the left-right divide more than the other. Let us explain why.

Hard economic times often generate widespread anxiety and disaffection. They also tend to instigate a debate over two central questions: “Who is to blame?” and “What should be done next?”. On the first question, times of crisis tend to call for a target, some form of villain whom the public can blame. The most natural target is, of course, the incumbent government, and thus one would expect to see governing parties that preside over a crisis suffering electorally in subsequent elections. Yet beyond the desire to punish the incumbent, changing economic interests can shape voters’ preferences regarding the question of how the government should deal with the crisis. If so, the electoral response, and specifically the parties that stand to gain from the incumbent’s struggles, may differ systematically as a function of the incumbent’s ideological standing.

Perhaps most obviously, crises tend to bring about a decline in economic activity, a rise in unemployment and a drop in incomes and job security. Such shifts presumably lead voters to seek greater economic protection in the form of increased government aid and

welfare assistance, (Jacobs and Skocpol, 2005; Wright, 2012; Margalit, 2013). Furthermore, harsher economic conditions and higher inequality may lead to growing class awareness among individuals of lower income (Andersen and Curtis, 2012; Newman, Johnston, and Lown, 2015). Such changes, in turn, could help galvanize support for the left.

Yet such a leftward shift is not inevitable. After all, crises typically have heterogeneous effects across the public, with some citizens bearing the brunt of the crises much more than others (Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller, 2012). As such, an increase in government spending on welfare assistance to those most harmed by the crisis is a redistributive measure that could benefit some, but spur opposition by those likely to shoulder a greater share of the fiscal burden. Unless sympathy toward, or solidarity with the losers from the economic shock serve as counter-weights, the public sentiment after crises should bifurcate across the electorate: the direct losers would opt for the policy offerings associated with the left, while others would be more likely to opt for right-leaning parties that oppose significant redistributive measures. Indeed, some studies provide empirical evidence consistent with this view (Margalit, 2013; Lindvall, 2017).

Beyond its obvious appeal to voters who favor less social spending, the right may also benefit from other downstream effects of crises that have less to do with its social-economic policy stance. First, collective threats, including those posed by economic downturns, can lead to heightened in-group identification and fuel nationalist sentiments (Stenner, 2005; Mansfield, Mutz, and Brackbill, 2019). Thus, in debating the causes of the crisis, parties that place blame on outside influences, be it immigrants, international financial institutions, or the actions of foreign powers, may find a more receptive audience. Second, as poor economic conditions tend to bring about higher rates of crime and social disorder (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Dix-Carneiro, Soares, and Ulyssea, 2018), parties advocating a law-and-order agenda are likely to gain a larger following. Indeed, if the experience of economic shocks leads voters to adopt more authoritarian values, as some recent studies suggest (Ballard-Rosa

et al., 2021; Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve, 2022), the more authoritarian rhetoric of some parties on the right could grow in appeal in the aftermath of crises.

Notably, nationalist and authoritarian messages are often associated with the far right. This suggests that in instances where the center-right presides over a crisis, center-right voters may show their disaffection not by switching their support to the left bloc, but instead will turn to parties located further to the ideological right. If that indeed is the case, the right may not be hurt as a voting bloc, even when a right-wing party is heading the government when the crisis hits.

These theoretical accounts paint a picture of potentially countervailing forces affecting voters in the aftermath of crises. Which of these forces operates more forcefully is ultimately an empirical question. Indeed, some studies have explored the electoral impact of crises and provide some important insights. Yet, for reasons we shall now explain—a different empirical puzzle, the use of different measures or a focus on certain political variables—they do not address the question we pose above.

Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) explore whether political gridlock and polarization occur more frequently in the aftermath of financial crises.² Using data from the World Values Survey on 60 countries between 1981-2008, as well as US data from the ANES (1948-2010), they show that after financial crises, people tend to adopt more ideologically extreme positions. Furthermore, they use data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions to document an increase in ideological polarization in the legislatures after crises.³ They find that crises lead to an increase in fractionalization of the vote, namely that more centrist parties tend to lose votes in favor of a larger number of small parties.⁴ They conclude that weaker ruling coalitions and stronger oppositions are a chief reason why governments

²This definition includes all types of crises coded in the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset

³Ideological polarization is defined as the maximal ideological distance between the chief executive’s party’s value and the three main government and opposition parties.

⁴More formally, fractionalization is defined as the probability that two representatives drawn at random within the assembly belong to different parties.

confront political gridlock after financial crises.

The different focus of the Mian et al study means that their analysis differs from ours in several important respects. Most pertinently, they do not assess the effects of crises on specific party types, do not differentiate between electoral effects on left versus right, nor do they examine the electoral effects as a function of who was heading the government when the crises erupted.

In a longer-run study going back to the 1870s, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016) examine the electoral impact of periods of systemic banking crises on support for parties on the ideological extremes. Building on an original dataset on elections in 20 countries, they analyze changes in electoral results at the country-election unit. They find that systemic banking crises tend to benefit parties on the far right, which see an increase of about 30% relative to their pre-crisis vote share in the five years following a systemic banking crisis. Yet they do not observe a similar shift in support of far left parties. In addition, and in line with Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014), they find that crises, particularly after WWII, are associated with smaller government majorities and an increase in support for opposition parties, as well as greater political fractionalization.

Notably, Funke et al focus on a narrower definition of financial crises, examining only the electoral consequences of systemic banking crises. In contrast, we also consider the effects associated with currency crises, periods of hyperinflation, or shocks resulting from sovereign default. Second, the electoral outcome they explore is the voteshare of parties on the extremes, whereas we assess the electoral effects on all party families across the entire spectrum. This choice allows us, for example, to show a systemic asymmetry in the responses within the left and right blocs. Moreover, and perhaps because of their interest in the electoral fortunes of extremist parties, Funke et al's analysis does not take account of the role of incumbency. Their results therefore do not differentiate between the electoral implications of banking crises when those erupt under a left or a right wing government.

Thus, while we are able to replicate Funke et al’s findings with our data, the conclusions we reach add to theirs as we consider a broader set of crises and assess their impact on a different set of electoral outcomes.

Finally, in a third related study, Lindvall (2017) examines whether an economic downturn during an election year increases the likelihood that the ideology of the head of government changes during that year. To make the comparison across countries and periods easier (the analysis goes back to 1870 and includes all regions), the analysis distinguishes between two ideological groupings: *left-center* and *right*. Furthermore, Lindvall defines a downturn as a drop in per capita consumption in a given year. Using this definition, which naturally includes a much broader set of elections than the more stringent definition of crises that we use, he finds that short downturns (defined as stretching over a single year) are associated with a higher likelihood of a shift to the right, while longer ones are not associated with such a shift.

Contra to the other studies noted above, Lindvall’s analysis does take account of the incumbent’s identity. However, the unit of analysis in his study is the ideological orientation of the head of government that gets elected after a downturn. As a result, the study does not measure the impact of the economic downturn on the vote share of different parties and precludes an examination of within bloc electoral shifts. These shifts, as we show, are an important outcome of crises that differs systematically across ideological camps. Furthermore, the focus on downturns—defined as any drop in per capita consumption—rather than on crises, means that the studies differ quite substantially in their main independent variable. Not only are , since crises are less frequent events, they represent a much stronger shock and hence are presumably a stronger instigator for voters to re-evaluate their prior beliefs and perhaps also change their political stance. .

Table 1 summarizes the chief characteristics of the three studies, and the ways in which they differ from ours. As the the table and discussion above make clear, no study to date has

Table (1) Empirical Approach in Related Studies

Study	Banking Crises	Inflation Crises	Currency Crises	Debt Crises	Vote Share by Party	Vote Share by Bloc	Elected Head of Government	Consider Incumbent's Ideology
Mian et al (2014)	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x
Funke et al (2016)	✓	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x
Lindvall (2017)	*	*	*	*	x	x	✓	✓
This study	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table summarizes the key similarities and differences in the empirical emphases of earlier studies related to the topic of economic crises and political outcomes. Note however that unlike the other studies, Lindvall's article examined the effect of periods of economic downturns, i.e. 12 month periods of negative consumption growth, not economic crises. * therefore denotes that the article's independent variable (i.e. downturn) may in some years capture the type of economic crisis in question, but the categories of downturn and crisis only partially overlap.

explored the electoral effects of economic crises (including the different types of crisis), while accounting for the interactive role of incumbency and ideology, and focusing on changes in vote share rather than in the ideological identity of the government formed. As we show below, this focus provides a host of new insights about the systemically different response to crisis that occurs under left vs. right governments and the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To get at the research questions we have posed, in the next section we turn to describe our data and empirical approach.

Data and Empirical Approach

This study centers on the electoral responses to economic crises by taking a panoramic approach, analyzing how the eruption of crises affects parties' campaign appeals, individual policy preferences, as well as aggregate voting behavior. Taken together, these interconnected analyses provide insight not only on the overall electoral shifts that occur after a crisis erupts, but also points to the mechanisms underlying these shifts.

To measure crises we utilize the Global Crises Data (henceforth, GCD), which records financial and debt crises in 70 countries over the past two centuries.⁵ Based on this data, we

⁵See Reinhart, Rogoff, Trebesch, and Reinhart (2020), available at: <https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-and-financial-stability/data/Pages/global.aspx>

define a post-crisis election if it followed a currency crash, a debt crisis, an inflation crisis, or a banking crisis. We use the measures employed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) to define the beginning of any such crisis. An inflation crisis is defined as an episode in which there was an annual inflation rate of 20 percent or higher; a currency crash is an episode in which there was an annual depreciation of the local currency versus the US dollar of 15 percent or more; a debt crisis is a case of a government default on the payment of external or domestic debt obligations. Finally, banking crises include episodes characterized by a high degree of fragility in the banking sector (closure, takeover, or large-scale government assistance) as well as bank runs that lead to the closure, merger, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions.

One major issue with classifying an election as whether or not it followed an economic crisis is identifying the relevant period of what we shall refer to as the crisis ‘treatment’. Specifically, it is unclear *ex ante* at what point the *political* impact of economic crises ends. If voters respond primarily to events that took place in the immediate aftermath of an economic shock rather than to lingering hardships, it may be more apt to consider elections as being treated by crisis only if they take place shortly after its eruption, and exclude elections that took place only later on, even if the economy had yet to recover. Of course, the concern with this approach is that it may classify some elections as untreated if they took place shortly after the official recovery, but while many citizens were still reeling from the pain that the crisis inflicted, and with the economic shock perhaps still very much on their minds when voting. For example, in the case of the 2008 financial crisis, it took seven years for the unemployment rate in the US to recover, and real median household income reached its pre-recession level only in 2016. Thus, focusing only on the elections in the immediate aftermath of the crisis’ onset (in this case, the 2008 elections), we could miss much of the likely impact the Great Recession exerted on voting.

Given these considerations, we analyze the electoral effects of economic crises using a

number of different definitions of the crisis period (and thus, the relevant elections affected by it). We label our key treatment as *onset-election*, which considers observations as treated only if they took place in the first election after the onset of the crisis. A second measure is *Onset+1*, which classifies as post-crisis elections all elections that took place in the year of the crisis onset or in the year that followed. In contrast, the *Onset+5* category expands the treatment period to up to five years after the year in which the crisis erupted (similar to the approach of Mian et al (2014) and Funke et al, 2016). A small share of the sample (7.5%) is comprised of elections that occurred in the year of crisis eruption itself. When the timing of the eruption relative to the date of the election is unclear, we exclude the observation from the main analysis to prevent a situation of incorrect classification as treatment or control units. As we show below, our key findings are robust to the use of these different classifications and to the inclusion of elections that took place in the year a crisis erupted.

Table 2 presents the average annual GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rate before and after the onset of crises. In non-crisis years, GDP growth is 3 percent, the inflation rate is 4.9 percent, and unemployment is 5.6 percent. Yet as the table makes clear, economic conditions deteriorate sharply following the eruption of crises. In crisis years, the average GDP growth rate drops to 1.3 percentage points, the inflation rate is over 18% and the unemployment rate rises to 7.2 percentage points. Clearly, the economic indicators are significantly worse in years of crisis.

Table 3 shows the distribution of observations between crisis vs. non-crisis years when using the different definitions described herein. With the narrowest measure, *Onset+1*, 8% of the cases are coded as treated. When we use the more expansive measure of *onset-election*, 19% of the observations are classified as cases of parties running in elections that occurred during a crisis episode and 37% of the observations are considered treated using the most expansive measure, *Onset+5*.

We augment the data from the GCD with data from the MARPOR Project, which

Table (2) Economic Conditions in Times of Crisis

	No Economic Crisis		Economic Crises	
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
GDP growth	3.0	0.09	1.3	0.38
Inflation	4.9	0.13	18.2	5.76
Unemployment rate	5.6	0.14	7.2	0.29

Note: The table presents all available data on unemployment (1955-2016), inflation (1945-2010) and GDP growth (1945-2016) from the Penn World Table and OECD database for all 22 countries in our sample. Data for missing years on unemployment is augmented by the World Bank database. $N=1,135$ observations for years of no economic crisis and $N=275$ for years of economic crisis, unless observations are missing. Crisis years include up to five years from the onset of a crisis. Inflation rate is curbed at 1,000%.

classifies and quantifies party appeals in their election manifestos (Volkens et al., 2019). Each country enters the panel in its first democratic election after WWII. In addition, to examine the conditional effect associated with the incumbent’s ideology, we utilize a new variable that tracks whether the party was a member of the governing coalition. This variable was manually coded by Margalit, Slough, and Ting (2021) based on electoral records and historical information. Data on the ideological orientation of the incumbent government is based on the the Heads-of-Government Dataset (Lindvall, 2017). Finally, data on periods of violent conflict is based on the magnitude score of episodes of international warfare, as documented by the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) project (Marshall, 2019). The result is a dataset that covers 377 elections that took place over 70 years (1945-2015), 1,789 party-year observations pertaining to 235 unique parties from 22 developed democracies.⁶ Overall, a total of 123 economic crises took place during this period across all countries under study. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables in our analysis.

Our empirical approach utilizes a number of empirical strategies to get closer to causal identification; reassuringly, all yield consistent results. First, we use a dynamic linear panel

⁶List of countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Table (3) Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Voteshare	1,789	17.8	14.9	0.0	67.9
Delta voteshare	1,789	-0.3	5.0	-35.8	25.4
<i>Economic Crisis</i>					
Onset-1	1,789	0.082	0.275	0	1
Onset-election	1,789	0.197	0.398	0	1
Onset-5	1,789	0.368	0.482	0	1
<i>Party Family</i>					
Left/socialist	1,789	0.117	0.321	0	1
Social democratic	1,789	0.221	0.415	0	1
Liberal	1,789	0.138	0.345	0	1
Christian democrat	1,789	0.122	0.328	0	1
Conservative	1,789	0.170	0.376	0	1
Nationalist	1,789	0.028	0.165	0	1
Agrarian	1,789	0.063	0.243	0	1
Ethnic-regional	1,789	0.064	0.245	0	1
Special issue	1,789	0.036	0.187	0	1
Ecologist	1,789	0.040	0.195	0	1
Rile: left to-right ideology	1,781	-3.9	22.7	-64.7	78.4
Coalition party	1,789	0.258	0.437	0	1
Party's age	1,789	23.661	17.463	0	70
Parties competing	1,789	6.651	2.546	2	13

Note: The table presents summary statistics for the chief variables we use throughout our analysis of party-level data from 1945 to 2015 (Volkens et al., 2019). Data on crises are based on Reinhart et al. (2020) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), available at <https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-and-financial-stability/data/Pages/global.aspx>.

model for parties' vote-share, which includes both country-year fixed effects and autoregressive dynamics. The assumption underlying this strategy is that financial crises are exogenous shocks conditional on country fixed effects and the lags of the government's ideological orientation and the party's vote-share.⁷ As an extension of this first strategy, in some model specifications we control for various types of political shocks that might potentially be confounders that affect both economic and electoral outcomes.

Even though we control for country fixed effects and observable confounders, the onset of a financial crisis could yet be driven by time-varying unobservables, potentially leading to

⁷Throughout the analysis, we include time fixed effects. In the party-level analysis, we use year fixed effects. Due to a relatively smaller sample size, our benchmark specification in the country-level analysis includes decade fixed effects. But as we show in appendix section A, our results are robust to using either year or decade fixed effects.

biased estimates. Our second strategy deals with this challenge by using an instrumental-variables (IV) approach. Specifically, we build on the observation that financial crises are often “contagious”—i.e., they are transmitted across the globe and accumulate into waves over time (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). With the removal of barriers to investment between and within countries, especially since the early 1970s, local financial markets became more affected by changes in an increasingly interconnected global economy.

We therefore use the incidence of crises—the lagged percentage of all countries in the GCD that experienced the onset of a financial crisis in a given year (excluding the own-country observation) as an instrument for the onset of a financial crisis at the country level. The instrument is meant to capture economic crises that are attributed to exogenous changes in global financial conditions, rather than to domestic factors that could potentially be correlated with the electoral outcomes. As we show below, the resulting IV estimates are consistent with the OLS estimates, bolstering our confidence in a causal interpretation of the results.⁸


The Electoral Implications of Economic Crises

Before addressing the question of who benefits from economic crises, we examine the degree of electoral change that crises bring about. To do so, we begin with a descriptive analysis of the electoral shifts that take place after a crisis erupts and compare them to periods that do not follow crises. Figure 1 presents the distribution of electoral shifts in parties’ vote share between consecutive elections. We divide all elections into those that occurred in the aftermath of a crisis—i.e. the first election that took place after the onset of the crisis—and periods of economic stability. This analysis yields several notable findings.

First, perhaps as expected, times of crisis are associated with greater electoral volatility.

⁸See appendix section B for a detailed explanation of how the instrument was constructed. We also show in the appendix that the IV results are robust to different constructions of the instrument.

Figure (1) Shifts in Voting Following Economic Crises, 1945-2015



Note: The figure shows kernel density estimates of the distribution of changes in parties' vote share between consecutive elections, by times of economic crisis. Positive (negative) values of $\Delta\text{voteshare}$ represent electoral gains (losses). $N=1,591$ (no crisis) and 395 (crisis) party-election year observations. For economic crises, we use the *onset-election* measure that equals 1 for all the first elections that took place after the crisis' onset. *No Crisis* captures elections taking place in all other years. The vertical red line is located on the zero point and represents no electoral change.

As the figure indicates, a higher share of observations is concentrated around the zero mark (i.e., no electoral change) in times of economic stability than in periods following crisis. In contrast, the distribution of electoral change in crisis periods exhibits slightly higher densities in the extreme ends (e.g., ± 10 points).⁹

However, what Figure 1 makes even more evident is not the electoral volatility in the aftermath of crises, but rather its lack thereof. In fact, the distribution of $\Delta\text{voteshare}$ before and after crises is strikingly similar, as the increase in volatility described above is clearly very modest. Put differently, the notion that economic downturns cause a major political realignment seems at odds with these results. To be sure, specific episodes of economic turmoil might still produce substantial electoral shifts. But more often than not, the electoral

⁹The standard deviation of $\Delta\text{voteshare}$ in the aftermath of crises is 6 as compared to 5.7 in other (i.e. non-crises) periods.

Table (4) Leader’s Ideology after Economic Crises

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Onset-election	0.165*	0.133*	0.130*	0.096 ⁺
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Left-wing leader _{t-1}				0.031
				(0.085)
Right-wing leader _{t-1}				0.295*
				(0.082)
Country FE		✓	✓	✓
Decade FE			✓	✓
Observations	354	354	354	354
R-squared	0.043	0.297	0.350	0.402

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the leader of the government after the elections is from the right, and 0 otherwise. Entries are estimates of linear probability models with standard errors in parentheses. All models control for the country’s effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of “ethnic” or “civic” violence or warfare (the full model results are shown in Table F-1). *Onset-election* equals 1 for the first election following an economic crisis, and 0 for other election years. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

landscape in the aftermath of economic crises does not change dramatically from times of economic stability. This suggests that a change in the ruling government in the aftermath of crisis is more likely to be the result of small shifts on the margin, rather than a large movement of voters from one political bloc to the other. Nonetheless, even if volatility is hardly affected by economic crises, this does not imply that no bloc or party systematically gains in votes after crises erupt.

In Table 4, we examine the ideological orientation of governments in the first post-crisis election. The dependent variable equals 1 if the head of the post-crisis government is a right-wing party leader, and 0 otherwise. As the table shows, in post-crisis elections the right is 9.6 percentage points more likely to form a government.¹⁰ Thus, while electoral shifts are moderate in an absolute sense, they can be highly consequential politically.¹¹

What explains this pattern whereby the right tends to benefit from economic crises

¹⁰Tables A-1 and A-2 show that the results are statistically similar when estimating logistic regressions instead of a linear probability model, and when controlling for year fixed effects.

¹¹In Figure A-1, we show that this effect is mainly concentrated in close elections, where relatively small electoral margins can determine which of the party leaders has the ability to form a coalition and be the head of government.

systematically more than the left? We focus on three explanations that are not mutually exclusive. The first has to do with the fact that the right bloc often includes parties on the far right, which traditionally attract some of the anti-establishment vote (Golder, 2016). As such, these parties may help keep disgruntled right-wing voters from defecting from their bloc in times of economic discontent, even if the crisis erupts when the right is in power. Second, it may be that the electoral gains on the right following crises represent a spurious correlation, whereby an omitted variable accounts for both the onset of economic crises and for the rising appeal of the right. Specifically, the eruption of violent conflict could both lead to a sharp drop in economic activity and spur nationalist sentiments to the benefit of the right. Third, economic crises may shift voters' attitudes rightward on certain issues or increase their perceived importance. If right-wing parties are seen as stronger on those issues (e.g., law and order, budget restraint), the right bloc may disproportionately benefit from hard economic times.

We begin with assessing the validity of the first explanation by shifting the focus of the analysis from ideological blocs to parties. Specifically, Table 5 presents estimates of the marginal effect of economic crises on the vote share of each party family, controlling for the parties' lagged vote share and an indicator for whether they were part of the ruling coalition before the election. Each model uses a different definition of the crisis period, beginning with column 1 in which the treatment captures the short-term effect, only in elections that took place in the first year after the eruption of the crisis. As we move further to the right, the models utilize longer-term measures of crisis. In all columns, the (omitted) baseline category is that of liberal parties.

The results are consistent with the findings of the bloc-level analysis, showing that parties on the right tend, on average, to benefit more in electoral terms following economic crises. Specifically, the marginal effect of crises on the vote share of conservative parties is positive and significant (3.2 percentage points) in elections that take place shortly after the eruption of

Table (5) Electoral Effects of Economic Crises

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Onset-1	Onset-election	Onset-5
Left/Socialists	0.550 (0.939)	0.296 (0.534)	0.848† (0.499)
Social Democrats	-0.022 (1.400)	0.070 (0.871)	0.328 (0.543)
Liberals	-2.033 (1.339)	-0.037 (0.984)	0.088 (0.913)
Christian Democrats	-1.508 (1.251)	-1.404 (0.854)	-0.474 (0.722)
Conservatives	3.307* (1.156)	1.209 (0.854)	0.799 (0.659)
Nationalists	4.402* (1.546)	4.408* (1.502)	2.949* (1.367)
Coalition party	✓	✓	✓
Lagged voteshare	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,789	1,789	1,789
R-squared	0.105	0.102	0.099

Note: OLS models of parties' $\Delta voteshare$ on economic crises interacted with party families. *Onset+1* and *Onset+5* equal '1' for elections that were held up to either 1 or up to 5 years after the crisis' onset, and '0' otherwise. *Onset-election* is equal to '1' for the first elections that were held up following the crisis' onset. The full model results are shown in Table F-2. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

the crisis. The electoral gains of nationalist parties are even larger—up to to 4.4 percentage points—and more consistent across different measures of the crisis period. Conservative parties tend to do better immediately after the onset of crises, while nationalist parties tend to make significant electoral gains both in the short-term as well as later on. Interestingly, this finding goes against the notion that the turn to nationalist parties is a reflexive anti-system vote in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Rather, it appears to be the result of both immediate and lingering disaffection.

The electoral impact of crises on other party families are not as clear-cut. The evidence

seemingly indicates that Liberal and Christian Democratic parties tend to lose votes following economic crises, but these effects are below statistical significance. It thus seems that the reservoir of votes that is the source of the shift to the right is not concentrated in one specific party family.

The right-wing’s electoral gain following economic crises is robust to a range of sensitivity analyses. This finding holds when we focus either on the first or the last five decades in our dataset (Table A-4). The findings also remain intact when non-European countries are dropped from the analysis, and when the most economically unstable countries in the sample—Hungary, Poland and Greece, each of which experienced more than 15 consecutive years of economic crisis—are excluded from the analysis.¹²

A second explanation for the positive impact of economic crises on the vote share of the right could be an omitted variable that both brings about economic downturns and makes right-wing parties more appealing to voters. Military conflicts, for example, might do just that: hurt the economy in a major way and spark a nationalist backlash that benefits the right. To explore this possibility, we examine whether various forms of political conflict account for the association between crises and rightward electoral shifts. We do so by including a lagged indicator of participation in an international military conflict as well as an indicator for lagged episodes of civil violence or warfare.¹³ As Columns 1-4 in Table 6 show, inclusion of these variables either separately or jointly does not alter our findings. In all specifications, nationalist parties on the right show a clear and consistent gain in vote share following economic crises.

¹²In Table A-3, we include parties that run in elections for the first-time. These first-time runners are dropped from the main analysis because some of the variables in the analysis, including the dependent variable $\Delta Voteshare$, require data from the previous election round. To include these first-time runners, we generate new variables that treat them as-if they were running in the previous elections but received 0 percent of the vote and were not part of the ruling coalition. We also control for a dummy that equals ‘1’ for these first-time runners. Results still show that conservative and nationalist parties are more likely to gain votes in the aftermath of an economic crisis.

¹³Defined as either “ethnic” or “civic” violence.

Another possibility is that our main results stem from a reverse causal relationship. Specifically, if periods of economic stability lead voters to elect governments from the left, and if the left then tends to mismanage the economy, we could observe a pattern of a weaker electoral performance for parties on the right in periods of economic stability, but the opposite picture after a crisis.

To explore this possibility, we examine the association between *pre*-crisis periods and parties' vote share. We thus replace the post-crisis treatment with an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the elections are held in the 5 years *before* the onset of an economic crisis. The results in Table 6 indicate that reverse causality is not a concern in this case. Column 6, in which we estimate the model with the pre-crisis placebo, shows that all marginal effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Specifically, whereas nationalist parties gain votes after economic crises, that is not the case in elections held before the onset of the crisis. These results strengthen our confidence in viewing the shock as the cause of the electoral shifts we observe in the aftermath of economic crises.

Economic Crises and Incumbent Ideology

So far we have looked at the overall electoral effects of economic crises, without taking account of who was in power when the crisis broke out. Next, we examine whether the electoral response to crises differs when the incumbent party is from the left or the right. To this end, we subset our dataset into two samples: crises that took place under the watch of a government headed by a center-left party (socialists, social democrats or liberals) and crises that took place when a party on the right was in charge (conservatives or Christian democrats).¹⁴

The results, presented in Figure 2, show that the political affiliation of incumbents strongly

¹⁴In this classification of liberal parties, we follow the logic of Gidron and Ziblatt (2019). They show that conservative and Christian democratic parties—unlike liberal parties—hold conservative positions on both economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition. However, Figure A-5 shows that all main findings hold also when we exclude from the analysis elections that follow the incumbency of Liberal parties.

Table (6) Alternative Explanations: Spurious Correlation and Reverse Causality

	Controlling for political shocks:				Placebo test:	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Placebo</i>
					original	pre-crisis
	(5)	(6)				
Left/Socialists	0.264 (0.574)	0.265 (0.582)	0.263 (0.574)	0.263 (0.582)	0.296 (0.534)	-0.058 (0.532)
Social Democrats	0.130 (0.962)	0.131 (0.974)	0.143 (0.964)	0.142 (0.975)	0.070 (0.871)	-0.808 (0.556)
Liberals	-0.169 (1.059)	-0.168 (1.065)	-0.153 (1.063)	-0.153 (1.069)	-0.037 (0.984)	-0.304 (0.576)
Christian Democrats	-1.087 (1.053)	-1.086 (1.064)	-1.087 (1.055)	-1.087 (1.066)	-1.404 (0.854)	-0.987 (0.762)
Conservatives	1.199 (0.940)	1.200 (0.940)	1.215 (0.942)	1.215 (0.941)	1.209 (0.854)	-0.061 (0.697)
Nationalists	4.445* (1.536)	4.444* (1.542)	4.441* (1.543)	4.441* (1.549)	4.408* (1.502)	1.119 (1.172)
Interstate warfare		✓		✓		
Civil violence			✓	✓		
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,674	1,674	1,674	1,674	1,789	1,789
R-squared	0.103	0.103	0.105	0.105	0.102	0.098

Note: Results from ordinary least squares models in which the outcome is the parties' Δ voteshare. All models control for lagged vote-share and pre-election membership in the coalition (full model results are shown in Table F-3). Columns 1-4 show that the effects of economic crises hold when we control for interstate wars and/or events of domestic disorder. Column 5 presents the placebo test, in which the post-crisis treatment estimated in Column 1 is replaced with a *pre-crisis* placebo. The model presented in column 1 is restricted to observations on which war and civil violence data is not missing. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.


conditions the electoral impact of the crisis.¹⁵

When an economic crisis breaks out under a center-left government, Conservative parties gain on average 3.4 points of the vote.¹⁶ Even Christian Democratic parties, which overall tend to lose votes in times of economic crisis, manage to gain 1.8 percentage points of the vote when an economic crisis breaks out and the ruling party is from the center-left. Furthermore, in those cases we observe a sizable anti-incumbent shift, with Social Democrats losing about

¹⁵Elections held in the year of the crisis' onset are excluded from the analysis since in these cases the exact timing, and hence attribution, of the crisis to a specific incumbent could be in question. As a robustness test, in Figure A-4 we run this analysis when including elections that took place during the year of the crisis' onset (representing 8% of the sample); the results remain substantively identical.

¹⁶See Table A-6 for additional results using alternative indicators of economic crisis.

Figure (2) Economic Shocks and Electoral Shifts by Incumbent’s Ideology



Note: Markers and lines indicate the marginal effect of the economic crisis on parties’ vote-share with 90 and 95% confidence intervals (full model results are shown in Table F-4). The effects are reported in percentage points, separately for each party family. The treatment variable is *onset-election*. The panel on the left shows the results of elections taking place following a crises when the center or left-wing party was in power. The panel on the right presents the results for elections conducted after a right-wing incumbent (christian democrats or conservatives).

2 points of their vote share.¹⁷

Yet notably, the electoral effects of economic crises are asymmetric. When crises erupt under the reign of moderate right-wing parties, a small portion of the electorate (1.1 points) turns to social democratic parties, but a much larger share of the vote turns toward nationalist parties on the right (5.7 points). At the same time, incumbents from the moderate-right (Christian Democrats) experience a statistically significant drop in their vote share, a drop that is smaller than the overall electoral gains of right-wing parties when the incumbent overseeing the onset of the crisis is either from the center-left or the right.

¹⁷Although this anti-incumbent effect is statistically significant only when we either include parties that run for the first time (Figure A-3) or when we use the *onset+5* treatment (Table A-6).

Overall then, the anti-incumbent effect in the aftermath of crises differs as a function of the incumbent's ideology. When left-leaning or liberal governments preside over an economic crisis, the likely result in the subsequent election is a shift toward the moderate right. But when economic crises break out under the tutelage of moderate right-wing governments, the result in the following election tends to be a shift from the moderate right to the far right. There is also some evidence of a modest gain by the moderate left, but the effect is imprecisely estimated.

Taken together, these results highlight a systematic asymmetry, whereby the right bloc tends, on average, to gain more electorally from the eruption of an economic crisis than the left. Moreover, the results highlight the importance of within-bloc dynamics, as nationalist parties seem to be an effective lightning rod in hard economic times. They do so by offering disaffected right-wing voters a way to sanction a moderate-right incumbent in the aftermath of a crisis, without abandoning their broader political camp.

In Table 7, we examine the extent to which this average advantage of right-wing parties translates to total gains at the bloc level. We use the aggregate vote-share of all Christian Democratic, Conservative, or Nationalist parties in each country-election to compute the electoral change of the right-wing bloc. Our OLS estimates in the first two columns suggest that when center-left governments preside over an economic crisis, the right-wing bloc gains 4.3 percentage points in total. Conversely, the right bloc loses only 2 points following a crisis under the rule of right-wing governments.

Columns (3) and (4) present our 2SLS estimates using the IV. (Recall, our IV is the lagged fraction of countries experiencing the onset of a financial crisis, excluding the instrumented country). As the results show, the F-statistic derived by each of the first-stage regressions is well above the conventional threshold of 10, indicating that the instrument is sufficiently strong. The 2SLS estimates are consistent with the OLS results in suggesting that the right-wing bloc gains votes in response to economic crises. Moreover, these gains are larger in

Table (7) Right-wing bloc’s $\Delta voteshare$ after crisis, by incumbent ideology

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Onset-election	4.574* (1.530)	-2.029† (1.216)	7.056* (3.514)	-1.401 (3.240)
Incumbent _{t-1}	CL	R	CL	R
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Decade FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	156	185	156	185
R-squared	0.229	0.151	0.213	0.149
First-stage F-statistic			23	20

Note: Entries are OLS/2SLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is right-wing bloc’s $\Delta voteshare$ (conservative, christian democratic, and nationalist parties). All models control for the country’s effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of “ethnic” or “civic” violence or warfare (the full model results are shown in Table F-5). † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

the IV estimation compared to the OLS models: the right gains 7 percentage points when a crisis erupts under the rule of the center-left, but loses slightly (or none at all) from crises that break out under its own incumbency. This difference in the magnitude of the effect is likely explained by the fact that the IV estimates represent a local average treatment effect of what are probably the more severe economic crises in the dataset, i.e., those induced by a global financial crisis.

Mechanism: Supply vs Demand

What accounts for the asymmetry that benefits parties on the right in the aftermath of crises? In theory, the answer could stem from a change in the positions of parties, of voters, or perhaps both. Next, we examine the extent to which parties change positions after crisis, whether along the left-right continuum or with respect to specific issues. Specifically, we focus on issues that prior research suggests could grow in appeal to voters during hard economic times (Margalit, 2013; Mansfield, Mutz, and Brackbill, 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021). These include economic issues (welfare provision, budget restraint), as well as non-economic

ones (nationalism, law an order).

As a measure of how prominent those issues were in parties’ appeals to voters, we focus on their salience in pre-election manifestos. To measure the salience of an issue, each variable denotes the share of statements (“quasi-sentences”) in the manifesto that discussed that issue. For example, the *welfare* variable takes the value of 9.6 among Social Democratic parties, indicating that 9.6% of the statements in the parties’ manifestos were, on average, devoted to the issue of welfare. The variable *Rile* captures the left (-100%) to right (100%) position of a party based on the sum of all main right-wing categories minus the sum of all main left-wing categories (Volkens et al., 2019).¹⁸

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8. Strikingly, they show that in the aftermath of economic crises, most parties neither re-position themselves in a significant manner along the left-right continuum nor concentrate more on the issues we examined. Focusing on Conservative and Nationalist parties—those that tend to gain votes after crises—neither appear to place a greater emphasis on the core issues they are identified with, be it budget restraint for the former or nationalism and law and order for the latter. On the other hand, the three groups of parties that do put slightly greater emphasis on the issue of nationalism in the aftermath of crises are Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals, none of which, on average, gains votes in hard economic times.

One explanation for this general stability may be that most party leaders do not believe that changing positions or making certain issues more salient after crises would better resonate with voters. Alternatively, party leaders might worry that a major shift in the issues the party emphasizes would come across as opportunistic or disingenuous, and hence might be ineffective in attracting new voters or perhaps even turn away some of the party’s base (Adams, 2012; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2019; Meijers and Williams, 2019). Indeed, the

¹⁸See Appendix C for more details on the classification of issues, and Volkens et al. (2019) for the specific categories included in the calculation of the *rile* score.

Table (8) Crisis and Issue Salience, by Party Family

DV:	(1) Left-Right (rile)	(2) Nationalism	(3) Law and order	(4) Welfare	(5) Budget restraint
Left/Socialists	-0.877 (4.770)	0.323 (0.203)	0.220 (0.259)	-0.231 (1.084)	0.494 (0.551)
Social Democrats	-0.238 (1.763)	0.357† (0.210)	-0.041 (0.367)	-0.651 (1.041)	-0.437 (0.270)
Liberals	5.229† (2.954)	0.483† (0.266)	-0.889 (0.727)	0.385 (1.279)	0.013 (0.804)
Christian Democrats	0.298 (2.311)	0.708* (0.256)	0.284 (0.602)	0.016 (0.859)	-0.155 (0.479)
Conservatives	1.589 (3.244)	0.568 (0.387)	0.082 (0.532)	-1.149 (1.074)	-1.008 (0.791)
Nationalists	-2.264 (5.254)	-0.533 (1.426)	-1.283 (1.504)	1.097 (0.881)	-0.764 (1.545)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,779	1,775	1,775	1,775	1,775
R-squared	0.073	0.061	0.098	0.090	0.094

Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties (the full model results are shown in Table F-6). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

small shifts we do observe in party positions do not seem to be electorally beneficial.

If parties do not change their offerings in a meaningful manner, the electoral impact of crises is likely driven by a change in voters' stance. Of course, this does not necessarily imply a shift in preferences; it could also reflect a change in the intensity of support, and perhaps in the proclivity to turn out to vote.

To assess these potential mechanisms, we merge our data on economic crises with data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The result is an individual-level dataset that tracks voters' behavior and preferences in elections held in 17 countries between 1999 and 2016. The ESS repeatedly asked survey respondents for their opinion on a set of items, on which we base the analysis that follows.

The first question we seek to answer is whether times of economic crises are associated with attitudinal shifts on a set of issues that could be electorally consequential. On the

economic front, these include income inequality and redistribution; with regard to other prominent issues—law and order and nationalism—we examine voters’ authoritarian dispositions and their stance on questions of national identity (Euroscepticism and perceived cultural threat from immigration).¹⁹ Furthermore, we examine whether voters are more likely in times of crisis to identify with the political right when asked to place themselves on the left-right continuum. Since voters’ attitudes are measured in both election and non-election years, we use the *onset+5* measure to estimate the attitudinal effects of crises, and return to the *onset-election* measure in the analysis of self-reported voting behavior in recent elections.

Figure 3 presents the estimated effects of economic crises on voters’ attitudes based on a series of regressions with country and year fixed effects, controlling for respondents’ demographics and socioeconomic characteristics.²⁰ The point estimates thus represent the association between economic crises and the attitudinal shift on each of the outcome variables.

The analysis reveals that in the aftermath of crises, voters are not more likely to identify with the political right. They also do not exhibit more authoritarian views.²¹ However, they are slightly more likely to perceive immigration as a cultural threat to their nation and to oppose further European unification (about a 0.1 and 0.15 standard deviations, respectively).²² In contrast, they assign lesser importance to issues of income equality. Specifically, in the aftermath of crises, voters become 0.1 SD less favorable of government initiatives to reduce differences in income levels.²³ Taken together, these results indicate that while voters

¹⁹See Appendix D for the exact question wording.


²⁰Table F-7 in the Appendix reports the full regression results.

²¹Notably, previous research shows that local exposure to trade shocks increases authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021). Yet, we focus on a different type of shock—economic crises at the national level—and our analysis is based on a different set of countries and time periods.

²²Although various dimensions of Euroscepticism exist among both the political left and right, Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and Brug (2016) show that opposition to increased European integration is predominantly a right-wing attitude.

²³See Margalit and Raviv (2022) for a detailed discussion of the sentiment this item taps into.

Figure (3) Voters' Attitudes after Economic Crises



Note: Markers indicate the effect of economic crises on voters' positions, with 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates are drawn from separate regressions for each outcome, controlling for respondents' gender, age, ethnicity, type of locality, and level of education, with year and country fixed effects (the full model results are shown in Table F-7). The treatment variable is *Onset+5*. For comparability, the outcome variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. See Appendix D for the exact question wording for each outcome.


do not change their ideological self-identification after economic crises, they do shift closer to the views of the right on a number of prominent issues considered pertinent to the vote.

These findings suggest that the electoral gains of the right that we observe after economic crises are most likely a result of a rightward shift among voters of the right bloc in their policy views and in their party identification. Notably, the observed shifts rightward, while statistically significant, are overall modest in magnitude, which is consistent with our party-level analysis: electoral volatility does not change dramatically in times of economic crisis, but the relatively small changes that do take place tend to disproportionately benefit the right.

However, these explanations may not account for the explanation in full. The rightward shift among voters may also translate into greater mobilization and higher voter turnout on the right, while perhaps suppressing turnout among voters on the left. Of course, both mechanisms might also operate simultaneously.

The ESS data does not allow us to directly assess whether economic crises also affect

Figure (4) Voter Turnout after Economic Crises



Note: $N=166,128$. Markers indicate the marginal effect of economic crises on voter turnout across respondents' self-placement on the left-right continuum with 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates are drawn from a linear probability model controlling for respondents' gender, age, years of schooling, a dummy variable for respondents who belong to an ethnic minority in the country, and year and country fixed effects (the full model results are shown in Table F-8). Post-crisis elections are the first elections that took place following the onset of an economic crisis.

voters' willingness to participate in the coming elections. However, using its measure of self-reported turnout, we generate a binary outcome that equals 1 for respondents who had voted in the last national elections.²⁴ We then interact economic crises with respondents' political identification to assess whether and to what extent crises mobilize voters or suppress turnout in one political camp more than the other.²⁵

Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of crises on voter turnout by self-placement on the left-right continuum. In times of crisis, two groups of voters exhibit significantly higher levels of participation in national elections. While moderate left-wing respondents are 1.2 percentage points more likely to cast a ballot after the onset of an economic crisis, respondents who place themselves on the far right are 2.6 points more likely to vote (the difference between

²⁴Specifically, we trace the years of the two most recent national elections in each country at the time of the interview and classify it as a postcrisis election if an economic crisis started (1) before the most recent national election took place; and (2) after the national election that preceded it. Respondents who were not eligible to vote are excluded from the analysis.

²⁵We recode the 11-point Left-Right scale as follows: 0-2=far left (10% of the sample); 3-4=moderate-left (21%); 5=center (33%); 6-7=moderate-right (21%); 8-10=far-right (13%). Appendix Section D shows that these results are robust to using the original left-right scale or alternative measures.

these marginal effects is statistically significant at $p = 0.061$).²⁶

In sum, the results indicate that the asymmetry in electoral gains following economic crises stems from the greater appeal of issues typically associated with the right. These electoral gains do not appear to be the result of systematic shifts in the parties' positions after crises. Rather, the longstanding positions of the right appear to receive greater traction when the economy turns sour. The electoral changes that follow crises therefore seem to reflect a change in demand among voters more than a shift in supply by parties. In turn, this demand shock translates into higher relative turnout on the right.

Discussion

Economic crises are often considered instigators of significant political change (Gourevitch, 1986; Bartels, 2014; Kriesi, 2014). Be it a leftward shift driven by a mobilization of the working-class, or an anti-establishment reaction of the disaffected toward the far right, prominent accounts tend to convey an image of major political realignments in the aftermath of crises. However, as this study demonstrates, the actual electoral shifts following crises tend to be modest. In fact, the share of voters changing party allegiances in such circumstances is quite similar to what it is in calmer days. This, of course, does not mean that economic crises do not matter politically; they can still be highly consequential, especially when they precede tight races that are determined by small electoral margins.

Examining who is more likely to gain from an economic crisis, we find a systematic right-wing edge. When crises break out under the watch of a left-wing government, the right

²⁶Ideally, we would have interacted voters' *pre-crisis* political identity with the onset of economic crises. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional data from the ESS does not allow us to do so. This data limitation could produce post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres, 2018), if voters' self-placement on the left-right continuum does not only condition the effect of crises on political behavior but is also affected by the treatment. To address this concern, in Figure A-7 we present evidence that voters of right-wing parties in past (non-crisis) elections are more likely to feel closer to a particular party and to participate in politics following an economic crisis than their center-left counterparts. This suggests that post-treatment bias is unlikely to be a major factor in this instance.

bloc sees a significant increase in its voteshare. But when the right is in power as the crisis hits, its electoral losses tend to be very modest. Yet, this does not mean that all right-wing parties benefit from all crises. As we show, Conservative parties tend to experience post-crisis electoral gains when the left is in office, while extreme nationalist parties tend to be the main beneficiaries when the moderate right holds the reigns as the crises occurs. In contrast, Christian Democrat parties tend to fare slightly worse after economic crises as compared to elections held in non-crisis periods.

This within-bloc dynamic merits further investigation, as it is pertinent to the implications of economic crises. For example, while moderate and far right parties nominally belong to the same ideological bloc, moderate right parties often prefer to form a coalition with their center-left opponents, at the expense of parties on the far right. Indeed, over the last decade far right parties were excluded from coalitions led by the moderate right in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, despite the far right garnering substantial electoral support.

Our findings indicate that electoral shifts after economic crises are driven primarily by changes in voters' preferences, be it in terms of the policies they support or in their willingness to turn out to vote, rather than by parties re-positioning themselves ideologically. More broadly, these patterns suggest that the electoral politics following economic crises are mostly fuelled by bottom-up forces, while top-down strategies seem to play less of a role. Exploring the nature of these demand-side shifts after crises seems a promising avenue for future research.

One route for doing so would be to combine analysis of longitudinal data that tracks the same voters over time. Indeed, some country-specific evidence of this kind has started to accumulate (see Margalit (2019) for a review). However, analyses of this type have overwhelmingly focused on those individuals who were significantly affected by the shock (e.g., people who lost their jobs or a sizable share of their income). The intuition underlying

this approach is obvious, since one might expect that an electoral change following a crisis would be driven by those most affected by it. But this approach ignores the fact that people strongly hit by an economic shock typically represent only a narrow electoral minority. Furthermore, the majority, relatively unaffected by the shock, may also experience a shift in political preferences, perhaps because they worry about needing to shoulder the costs for assisting the harmed minority. Future research should provide greater insight into the way people that were not hurt by the crisis conceive of the changes it brought about and subsequently update their political views.

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Online Appendix

Electoral Responses to Economic Crises

A	Robustness Tests	A-2
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A Robustness Tests

In Table 4 of the article we examined the association between economic crises and the ideological orientation of the post-crisis government using a linear probability model. In Table A-1, we show that the results remain similar when using logistic regression instead. The results remain consistent with those present in the main analysis. Holding all other covariates at their respective sample means, the estimated probability of a right-wing leader increases by 14.6 percentage points following an economic crisis. The results also remain intact using a linear probability model and controlling for year instead of decade fixed effects, as shown in Table A-2.

Table (A-1) Governments' ideology after economic crises, logistic regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Onset-election	0.683*	0.721*	0.734*	0.595 ⁺
	(0.254)	(0.304)	(0.325)	(0.340)
Left-wing leader _{t-1}				0.352
				(0.609)
Right-wing leader _{t-1}				1.609*
				(0.557)
Country FE		✓	✓	✓
Decade FE			✓	✓
Observations	354	348	348	348
Pseudo R-squared	0.032	0.241	0.296	0.341

Note: Entries are logistic regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the head of the government has a right-wing ideological orientation, and 0 otherwise. All models control for the country's effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of "ethnic" or "civic" violence or warfare. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.


Table (A-2) Leader’s Ideology after Economic Crises, controlling for year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Onset-election	0.165* (0.061)	0.133* (0.056)	0.178* (0.066)	0.139* (0.065)
Left-wing leader _{t-1}				0.015 (0.098)
Right-wing leader _{t-1}				0.263* (0.095)
Country FE		✓	✓	✓
Year FE			✓	✓
Observations	354	354	354	354
R-squared	0.043	0.297	0.463	0.498

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the leader of the government after the elections is from the right, and 0 otherwise. Entries are estimates of linear probability models with standard errors in parentheses. All models control for the country’s effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of “ethnic” or “civic” violence or warfare. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

Next, we examine the effect of economic shocks on the electoral outcome, separating cases in which the left and right blocs were evenly balanced in the previous elections and cases in which one of the blocs had a clear advantage. To this end, we calculate the vote margin in favor of the right-wing bloc (total vote share of christian democratic, conservative, and nationalist parties minus the total vote share of social democratic, socialist/left and liberal parties). We then sort elections into competitive (up to $\pm 5\%$) and non-competitive (greater than $\pm 5\%$) races. Figure A-1 presents the marginal effect of economic crises, showing that their effect in competitive races on the probability of a right-wing leader obtaining power is sizable and statistically significant (25 percentage points, $p=0.03$). The marginal effect of economic crises in non-competitive races, however, is a good deal smaller and not statistically significant (7 percentage points, $p=0.23$).


Figure (A-1) Leader's ideology after economic crises, by election competitiveness



Note: The figure presents the marginal effect of an economic crises on the probability of a right-wing leader as a head of government (vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals). The effects are estimated separately by the competitiveness of the previous elections that took place in the country. The measure for period of crisis is *onset-election*.

In the first two columns of Table 7, we present OLS estimates for the effect of economic crises on the right wing bloc's Δ voteshare using our onset-election measure. In Figure A-2, we show that the results remain statistically and substantively similar across other measures of economic crisis as well: the right bloc systematically gains votes in the aftermath of economic crises that erupt under center-left governments, while its electoral losses are small and not statistically significant when a crisis erupts under the rule of right-wing governments.

Figure (A-2) Right-bloc's Δ voteshare after crisis, by incumbent ideology and crisis measure



Note: Markers indicate the marginal effect of an economic crisis on changes in the right-wing bloc's vote share. Lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are drawn from six separate OLS models that use one of the three crisis measures and use cases of elections conducted following either a right-wing or a center-left incumbent government.

Table (A-3) Electoral effects of crises including parties running for the first-time

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Onset-1	Onset-election	Onset-5
Left/Socialists	-0.522 (1.169)	0.843 (0.592)	0.619 (0.600)
Social Democrats	0.124 (1.590)	-0.085 (0.965)	0.092 (0.712)
Liberals	-0.235 (1.741)	0.451 (0.903)	-0.379 (0.847)
Christian Democrats	-1.799 (1.581)	-2.085* (0.986)	-1.473 (0.924)
Conservatives	3.165* (1.236)	0.313 (0.928)	0.090 (0.844)
Nationalists	2.201 (1.910)	3.037* (1.362)	2.620* (1.257)
Coalition party	yes	yes	yes
Lagged voteshare	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
First-time running	yes	yes	yes
First election in data-set	yes	yes	yes
Observations	2,091	2,091	2,091
R-squared	0.390	0.388	0.388

Note: Dependent variable is $\Delta voteshare$. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

In the main analysis, parties running for the first time are excluded because of missing data on the dependent variable, $\Delta Voteshare$. To include those first-time runners, we generate new variables that treat them as-if they were running in the previous elections but received 0 percent of the vote and were not part of the ruling coalition. We also control for an indicator that equals ‘1’ for first-time runners and a dummy that equals ‘1’ for each first election in the data-set (where all parties are considered as first-time runners). As Table A-3 shows, the results are overall consistent with these first-time runners included.

Table (A-4) Electoral effects of crises using different subsamples

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample:	1945- 1995	1965- 2015	European countries	Stable economies
Left/Socialists	0.728 (0.478)	0.339 (0.652)	0.506 (0.608)	-0.739 (0.751)
Social Democrats	-0.037 (0.872)	0.561 (1.030)	0.240 (1.237)	0.463 (0.501)
Liberals	-1.595 (1.349)	0.175 (1.077)	0.657 (1.004)	-0.296 (0.539)
Christian Democrats	-2.922 (1.823)	-1.155 (0.952)	-1.359 (0.926)	-1.214 (0.823)
Conservatives	2.687* (1.224)	0.726 (0.959)	1.035 (0.891)	1.116 (0.856)
Nationalists	-0.274 (1.436)	3.738* (1.506)	4.832* (1.617)	4.778* (1.635)
Coalition party	yes	yes	yes	yes
Lagged voteshare	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,186	1,456	1,453	1,676
R-squared	0.108	0.116	0.107	0.102

Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties. Dependent variable is $\Delta voteshare$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

As another robustness test, in Table A-4 we run the analysis presented in Table 5 using different subsamples, to examine whether our results are sensitive to different time frames or country cases. Results remain similar when we focus either on the first or the last five decades in our dataset. Excluding non-European countries also does not alter the results. Finally, we drop outliers, i.e. economically unstable countries that experienced more than 15 consecutive years of economic crisis (Hungary, Poland and Greece). Again, the right-wing advantage after economic crises remains statistically significant in the smaller sample of relatively stable economies.

In our party-level analyses, our benchmark specification includes year fixed effects. Below, we show that controlling for decade instead of year fixed effects yields similar results (Table A-5).


Table (A-5) Electoral effects of crises controlling for decade fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Onset-1	Onset-election	Onset-5
Left/Socialists	0.557 (0.734)	0.374 (0.430)	0.759+ (0.414)
Social Democrats	-0.160 (1.390)	0.084 (0.863)	0.301 (0.543)
Liberals	-2.244+ (1.198)	-0.094 (1.017)	-0.031 (0.894)
Christian Democrats	-1.772 (1.170)	-1.662* (0.783)	-0.689 (0.701)
Conservatives	3.268* (1.128)	1.304 (0.837)	0.888 (0.645)
Nationalists	3.324* (1.047)	3.935* (1.298)	2.281* (1.108)
Coalition party	yes	yes	yes
Lagged voteshare	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,789	1,789	1,789
R-squared	0.093	0.090	0.087

Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties. Dependent variable is $\Delta voteshare$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

Columns 1-2 in Table A-6 are the tabular form of the analysis presented in Figure 2. The other columns test the extent to which the result of a right-wing advantage after crises remains significant using other measures of economic crisis. Some of the results lose statistical precision. For example, the electoral gains of nationalist parties after crises breaking out under the watch of moderate-right incumbents are not statistically significant at the first post-eruption period. Nevertheless, the electoral gains of conservative parties from crises erupting under the reign of the left remain statistically significant looking at this shorter post-eruption period. And shifting our focus to the longer-term period, the results remain substantively similar. The right-wing advantage also holds—with sizable and statistically significant electoral gains for nationalist parties—when we exclude liberal parties from our definition of center-left incumbents (see Figure A-5). Finally, in Figure A-4, we replicate the analysis but this time we include all elections taking place at the year of the crisis’ onset. As the figure shows, the results remain intact.

Figure (A-3) Electoral effects of crises by incumbent ideology, first-time runners included




Note: This Figure replicates Figure 2 including parties running for the first time in national elections. Markers and lines indicate the marginal effect of economic crisis (in percentage points) on parties’ vote-share in each party family with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The measure for period of crisis is *onset-election*.

Table (A-6) Electoral effects of crises by incumbent ideology across additional crisis measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Treatment:</i>	Onset-election		Onset-1		Onset-5	
<i>Leaving incumbent:</i>	CL	R	CL	R	CL	R
Left/Socialists	0.077 (0.919)	0.865 (0.582)	0.228 (1.411)	1.130 (0.990)	0.918 (0.786)	0.286 (0.522)
Social Democrats	-2.087 (1.431)	1.161 (0.999)	-0.923 (1.202)	0.360 (1.727)	-2.954* (1.007)	2.059* (0.946)
Liberals	1.018 (1.776)	-1.412+ (0.830)	-3.134 (1.933)	-1.333 (1.099)	0.091 (1.432)	-0.513 (1.008)
Christian Democrats	1.828+ (0.935)	-3.252* (1.163)	2.117 (1.862)	-3.223+ (1.716)	0.806 (0.911)	-2.280+ (1.199)
Conservatives	3.592* (1.525)	-0.212 (1.121)	6.943* (1.835)	0.981 (0.776)	3.720* (1.178)	-1.185 (1.026)
Nationalists	-1.046 (1.388)	5.760* (1.798)	–	4.150+ (2.139)	-3.196+ (1.683)	5.667* (1.850)
Lagged voteshare	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	824	861	824	861	824	861
R-squared	0.122	0.129	0.132	0.117	0.140	0.133


Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties. Dependent variable is $\Delta voteshare$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * p<0.05, †p<0.1.

Figure (A-4) Electoral effects of crises by incumbent ideology, including elections held during the year of the crisis' onset



Note: This Figure replicates Figure 2 while including elections held during the year of the crisis' onset. Markers and lines indicate, respectively, the marginal effect of economic crisis on parties' vote-share with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The measure for period of crisis is *onset-election*.

Figure (A-5) Electoral effects of crises by incumbent ideology, excluding crises erupting under Liberal parties



Note: This Figure replicates Figure 2 excluding cases where economic crises start under the reign of a liberal government. Markers indicate the marginal effect of economic crisis on parties' vote-share in each party family. Lines denote the 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The measure for period of crisis is *onset-election*. The panel on the left shows the results for elections taking place following a left-wing government; the panel on the right presents the results for elections conducted after a right-wing incumbent.

Table A-7 shows the OLS estimation results at the bloc-level controlling for either decade or year fixed effects. The analysis shows that the right-wing electoral advantage remains statistically similar using either one of the time units as fixed effects in the model specification. In addition, as columns 5 and 6 show, the results remain intact when we cluster standard errors at the country-decade level.

Table (A-7) Right-wing bloc's $\Delta voteshare$ after crisis, by incumbent ideology, controlling for year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Onset-election	4.574* (1.530)	-2.029+ (1.216)	6.264* (2.033)	-2.318 (1.782)	6.264* (2.003)	-2.318 (1.849)
Incumbent_t-1	CL	R	CL	R	CL	R
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-time FE	decade	decade	year	year	year	year
SE clustering					✓	✓
Observations	156	185	156	185	156	185
R-squared	0.229	0.151	0.538	0.392	0.538	0.392

Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country-decade level in columns 5 (91 clusters) and 6 (97 clusters). The dependent variable is the $\Delta voteshare$ of the right wing bloc. All models control for the country's effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of "ethnic" or "civic" violence or warfare. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$.

B Instrumental Variables Estimation

Instrument Construction and Additional Results

Below, we explain in detail the construction of our *global financial crisis* instrument and show that our results are robust to different constructions of the instrument.

To construct our instrument, we calculate the percentage of all seventy countries available in the GCD that experienced the onset of a financial crisis in a given year, leaving out the own-country observation. The list of countries is: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

A measurement challenge arises in constructing the instrument because of two features in the data: (1) The units of observation are observed in election years, which means that there are different time intervals between the crises and the elections across the different cases; and (2) the "treated" units are elections that took place one, two, three, or even four years after the onset of an economic crisis. Since a valid instrument must precede the onset of the crisis in a given country, we calculate whether a global financial crisis took place in the year before the onset of the crisis in the country of interest. This means that some of the treated units are classified as having a global financial crisis in the year that preceded the elections, while other treated units take the value of a global crisis anywhere between two to four years before the observed election year.

Since control units are by definition election years that did not follow the onset of an economic crisis, we cannot employ the same coding scheme that we used for treated units. Instead, in our benchmark construction of the instrument we use a 1-year lag. In other words, for control units, the instrument is equal to the fraction of countries embroiled in an economic crisis one year before the election year. We label this variable the first lag instrument.

As another robustness check, we also construct an alternative instrument that randomly selects one out of the four years preceding the election year. For that year we

Table (A-8) Right-wing bloc's $\Delta voteshare$ after crisis, by incumbent ideology, alternative instrument

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Onset-election	4.574* (1.530)	-2.029+ (1.216)	7.056* (3.514)	-1.401 (3.240)	7.019* (3.363)	-3.415 (4.304)
Incumbent _{t-1}	CL	R	CL	R	CL	R
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Decade FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	156	185	156	185	156	185
R-squared	0.229	0.151	0.213	0.149	0.214	0.144
IV			first-lag	first-lag	random-lag	random-lag
First-stage F-statistic			23	20	26	11

Note: Entries are OLS/2SLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the $\Delta voteshare$ of the right wing bloc. All models control for the country's effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of "ethnic" or "civic" violence or warfare. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$.

then calculate the percentage of countries experiencing the onset of a financial crisis. We label this alternative instrument the random lag instrument.

Table A-8 shows the 2SLS estimation results using our original, first lag instrument and the alternative, random lag instrument. The results show that the 2SLS estimates remain similarly signed and fairly stable using either of these instruments. As with the original estimates, we see again (columns 3 and 5) that the right bloc gains significant voteshare in elections that took place after a crises erupted under a center-left government. In contrast, when the right is in power and an economic crisis breaks out, the effect on the voteshare of the right (columns 4 and 6) is smaller and imprecisely estimated.

C Issue Salience by Party Family

In the main analysis, we show that in hard economic times parties typically do not significantly alter their positioning along the left-right scale, nor do they dramatically change their issue emphasis in terms of appeals to voters. Moreover, the limited shifts that we do observe are mostly made by parties that do not systematically gain votes in the aftermath of economic crises. Instead, the evidence suggests that the electoral advantage of right-wing parties in times of crisis is at least partly driven by voters' shift to the right on issues of nationalism and income inequality.

Below, we show that, indeed, right-wing parties—and conservative and nationalist parties in particular—put greater emphasis on issues that could appeal to voters in post-crisis periods than their center-left counterparts. Specifically, Table A-9 presents average ideological and policy positions by party family.¹ Right-wing parties tend to emphasize more than their counterparts on the left the issues of nationalism, law and order, and budget restraint, while the issue of welfare receives considerably less attention by the right.

For example, whereas 7.7 percent of nationalist parties' pre-election manifestos is devoted to issues related to nationalism,² less than 1 percent is devoted to nationalism in center-left parties' manifestos. On law and order, 3 and just under 5 percent of the manifestos of conservative and nationalist parties were devoted to this category, while the figure is less than 2 percent for left/socialist or social democratic parties.

Table (A-9) **Ideological Scores by Party Family**

MARPOR var:	rile Left-Right	per601 Nationalism	per605 Law and order	per504 Welfare	per414 Budget restraint
Left/Socialists	-25	0.34	0.97	8	0.94
Social Democrats	-18	0.68	1.8	9.6	1.8
Liberals	3.7	0.75	2.6	6.6	3.7
Christian Democrats	4.7	1.5	2.7	8.2	3
Conservatives	11	1.8	3.1	6.7	5
Nationalists	9.8	7.7	4.9	5.3	1.5

¹We use the original, ratio variables coded by MARPOR: per601 (national way of life +); per605 (law and order +); per414 (economic orthodoxy +); and per504 (welfare +).

²This means favorable mentions of the country's nation and history, and includes support for established national ideas, general appeals to pride of citizenship, appeals to patriotism and nationalism, or suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion.

D Individual-Level Analysis

Codebook, ESS

Outcome variables

left-right scale. We use a standardized 11-point scale based on the question: “In politics people sometimes talk of ”left” and ”right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”

Authoritarianism. we follow Norris and Inglehart (2019) and construct an standardized summary measure based on the following items: “Now I will briefly describe some people. How much each person is or is not like you. 1 indicates ‘Very much like me’ and 5 indicates ‘Not like me at all’:”

- 1 ipfrule: Important to do what is told and follow rules
- 2 impsafe: Important to live in secure and safe surroundings
- 3 ipbhprp: Important to behave properly
- 4 ipstrgv: Important that government is strong and ensures safety
- 5 imptrad: Important to follow traditions and customs

Anti-immigration. Respondents were asked “Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” Original response categories ranged from 0 (Cultural life undermined) to 10 (Cultural life enriched). We reversed and standardized this scale to indicate anti-immigration attitudes in terms of standard deviations.

Eurocepticism. Respondents were asked “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale best describes your position?” Original response categories ranged from 0 (Unification already gone too) to 10 (Unification go further). We reversed and standardized this scale to indicate Eurocepticism in terms of standard deviations.

Anti-inequality reduction. Respondents were told: “please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Answer categories were: 1. Agree strongly; 2. Agree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Disagree; and 5. Disagree strongly. We

standardized this 5-point scale to indicate anti-redistribution attitudes in terms of standard deviations.

Voted last election. A dummy that equals 1 for respondents who indicate that they voted for a political party in the recent national election. Respondents who were not eligible to vote in the recent election are coded as a missing observation.


Additional Results of Individual-Level Analysis: ESS Data

In the main text, we assess the effect of crises on voter turnout by political identification. Instead of using the original 11-point left-right scale, we classified respondents as follows: 0-2=“far left” (10% of the sample); 3-4=“moderate-left” (21%); 5=“center” (33%); 6-7=“moderate-right” (21%); 8-10=“far-right” (13%). In Figure A-6, we show that interacting the original, 11-point left-right scale with the onset-election treatment does not change the main finding—right-wing voters are likelier than their counterparts to cast a ballot in the aftermath of an economic crisis. However, since this model specification assumes linearity, it masks the positive, albeit smaller effect of crises on turnout among moderate-left voters.

Next, we examine the extent to which party-identification and political participation change following crises for each political bloc. To assess voters’ self-identification with a political party we use a survey item asking respondents whether they feel closer to a particular political party than all other parties. To measure political participation we construct a summary index that takes the standardized arithmetic mean of seven items that ask respondents whether they have taken part in various forms of political activity over the previous year: (1) contacted a politician or government official; (2) worked in a political party/action group; (3) worked in another organization/association (4) displayed a campaign badge/sticker; (5) signed a petition; (6) taken part in a demonstration; or (7) boycotted certain products.

As mentioned in the main text, one concern is the possibility of a post-treatment bias, since the *right-wing id* variable we interact with the crisis is probably also affected by the crisis that took place. To address this concern, we use respondents’ pre-crisis vote choice to classify them as center-left or right-wing voters. First, we focus on those respondents for whom the last national election was a non-crisis election. Second, we use MARPOR’s categorization of party families to identify right-wing respondents based on their past vote choice. Voters of Christian democratic, conservative, or nationalist parties

Figure (A-6) Voter Turnout after Economic Crises, 11-point left-right scale




Note: Markers indicate the marginal effect of economic crises on voter turnout across respondents' self-placement on the left-right continuum with 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates are drawn from a linear probability model that includes the standard set of controls (gender, age, level of education, ethnic minority status, year and country fixed effects.) Post-crisis elections are the first elections that took place following the onset of an economic crisis.

are classified as right-wing voters. Then, using OLS, we interact this pre-treatment measure of right-wing id with a crisis treatment that equals 1 if an economic crisis started after the recent national election but at least one year before the ESS interview.

The results in Figure A-7 show that right-wing voters are more likely to feel closer to a particular party and more likely to participate in politics up to three years after an economic crisis. Center-left voters, on the other hand, either exhibit no change or score lower on both outcomes following a recent economic crisis. In the longer term, up to five years following an economic crisis, both types of voters feel less attached to a particular party, but this negative association is significantly smaller among right-wing voters.

While we cannot use this pre-treatment measure of right-wing id in the turnout analysis (because we can only use vote choice in classifying voters' id for voters who did vote in the recent election), the analysis demonstrates more generally that the finding that economic crises make right-wing voters more likely to participate in politics compared to their center-left counterparts does not stem from post-treatment bias.

Figure (A-7) Political Identification and Participation after Economic Crises by Vote in Previous Elections



Note: Markers and lines indicate, respectively, the marginal effect of economic crisis on voters' party identification and participation in terms of standard deviation by their previous vote choice. Right-wing voters are those who voted for a Christian democratic, conservative, or a nationalist party. Point estimates are drawn from OLS regressions for each outcome, with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Controls include respondents' gender, age and years of education, a dummy variable for respondents living in rural areas, a dummy variable for respondents who belong to an ethnic minority group in the country, and year and country fixed effects. The sample is restricted to cases of no-crisis in the recent national election.

E List of Parties

Table (A-10) Left/Socialist Parties in the Dataset

#	Left/Socialists:
1	Ab People's Alliance
2	BE Left Bloc
3	CDU Unified Democratic Coalition
4	Coalition of the Radical Left - Unionist Social Front
5	Communist Party of Greece
6	Democratic Left
7	DIMAR Democratic Left
8	DKP Danish Communist Party
9	DLP Democratic Left Party
10	EL Red-Green Unity List
11	IU United Left
12	Japanese Communist Party
13	JCP Japanese Communist Party
14	KKE Communist Party of Greece
15	KPO Austrian Communist Party
16	LINKE The Left
17	NKP Norwegian Communist Party
18	PCE Communist Party of Spain
19	PCF French Communist Party
20	PCP Portuguese Communist Party
21	PDS Party of Democratic Socialism
22	SF Ourselves Alone
23	SF Socialist People's Party
24	SKDL Finnish People's Democratic Union
25	SKP Communist Party of Sweden
26	So United Socialist Party
27	Socialist People's Party
28	SP Socialist Party
29	SV Socialist Left Party
30	SYN Progressive Left Coalition
31	SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left
32	UDP Popular Democratic Union
33	V Left Party
34	VAS Left Wing Alliance
35	VPK Left Communists Party
36	VS Left Socialist Party
37	We Ourselves
38	WP Worker's Party

Table (A-11) Social Democratic Parties in the Dataset

#	Social Democrats:
1	A Social Democratic Party
2	AD Australian Democrats
3	Alliance The Alliance
4	ALP Australian Labor Party
5	BSP/PSB Belgian Socialist Party
6	CCF Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
7	Democrats Democratic Party
8	DLP Democratic Labor Party
9	DnA Norwegian Labour Party
10	DSP Democratic Socialist Party
11	JSP Japan Socialist Party
12	Labour Labour Party
13	Labour New Zealand Labour Party
14	Labour Party
15	MDP Popular Democratic Movement
16	MSzDP Hungarian Social Democratic Party
17	MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party
18	NDP New Democratic Party
19	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
20	PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement
21	PPR Radical Political Party
22	PRD Democratic Renewal Party
23	PS Francophone Socialist Party
24	PS Socialist Party
25	PSOE Spanish Socialist Worker's Party
26	PvdA Labour Party
27	S The Alliance
28	S The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland
29	SAP Social Democratic Labour Party
30	SD Social Democratic Party
31	SDF Social Democratic Federation
32	SDP Social Democratic Party
33	SDPJ Social Democratic Party of Japan
34	SFVM Union of Liberals and Leftists
35	SIFO French Section of the Workers' International
36	SLD Democratic Left Alliance
37	Social Democratic Party
38	SP Flemish Socialist Party
39	sp.a Socialist Party Different
40	sp.a-SPIRIT Socialist Party Different - Spirit
41	SPO Austrian Social Democratic Party
42	SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany
43	SSDP Finnish Social Democrats
44	The River
45	TPSL Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders
46	UD Democratic Union
47	UP Union of Labour

Table (A-12) Liberal Parties in the Dataset

#	Liberals:
1	ACT ACT New Zealand
2	Di66 DemocratsiÇ66
3	DU Independentsi Party
4	FDP Free Democratic Party
5	FF Liberal Party
6	FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
7	FP Liberal People's Party
8	FP People's Party
9	KE National Progressive Party
10	LC Liberal Centre
11	LDD List Dedecker
12	LibDems Liberal Democrats
13	Liberal Alliance
14	Liberal Democrats
15	Liberal Party
16	LIF Liberal Forum
17	LKP Liberal People's Party
18	LN Livable Netherlands
19	LP Liberal Party of Canada
20	LP/PL Liberal Party
21	MR Reform Movement
22	openVLD Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
23	PD Progressive Democrats
24	PDP Popular Democratic Party
25	PL Liberal Party
26	PLDP Liberal Democratic and Pluralist Party
27	PLP Party of Liberty and Progress
28	PO Civic Platform
29	PR Radical Party
30	PRL Liberal Reformation Party
31	PRLW Party of Walloon Reform and Liberty
32	Progressive Jim Andertonis Progressive
33	Progressive Progressive Party
34	PVV Party of Liberty and Progress
35	PVV/PLP Party of Liberty and Progress
36	RRRS Radical Socialist Party
37	RV Radical Party
38	SK Finnish People's Party
39	SzDSz Alliance of Free Democrats
40	UCD Union of the Democratic Centre/Centrist Bloc
41	United Future New Zealand
42	V Liberal Party
43	V Liberals
44	VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats
45	VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
46	Your Party

Table (A-13) Christian Democratic Parties in the Dataset

#	Christian Democrats:
1	OVP Austrian People's Party
2	ARP Anti-Revolutionary Party
3	CD&V Christian Democratic and Flemish
4	CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
5	CDS Centre Democrats
6	CDS Social Democratic Center Party
7	CDS-PP Social Democratic Center-Popular Party
8	CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
9	CGP Clean Government Party
10	CHU Christian Historical Union
11	CU Christian Union
12	CVP Christian People's Party
13	DSiÇ70 Democratic SocialistsÇ70
14	DZ Centre Party
15	EDIK Union of the Democratic Centre
16	Family of the Irish
17	Kd Christian Democrats
18	KD Christian Democrats in Finland
19	KDNP Christian Democratic People's Party
20	KdS Christian Democratic Community Party
21	KrF Christian People's Party
22	KVP Catholic People's Party
23	LPR League of Polish Families
24	MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum
25	MRP Popular Republican Movement
26	ND New Democracy
27	New Clean Government Party
28	New Democracy
29	NKP New Clean Government Party
30	PDM Progress and Modern Democracy
31	Pola Political Spring
32	PSC Christian Social Party
33	PSC/CVP Francophone Christian Social Party and Flemish Christian People's Party
34	SKL Finnish Christian Union

Table (A-14) Conservative Parties in the Dataset

#	Conservatives
1	AP Popular Alliance
2	CD Centre Democrats
3	CNIP National Centre of Independents and Peasants - Conservatives
4	Conservative Party
5	Conservatives Conservative Party
6	CP Conservative Party of Canada
7	Democratic Party of Japan
8	DP German Party
9	DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
10	FiDeSz Federation of Young Democrats
11	FiDeSz-MPP Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party
12	FiDeSz-MPP-MDF FiDeSz-MPP-MDF-Alliance
13	FiDeSz-MPSz Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union
14	H Conservative Party
15	KF Conservative People's Party
16	KK National Coalition
17	LDP Liberal Democratic Party
18	Liberal Democratic Party
19	LNP Liberal National Party of Queensland
20	LPA Liberal Party of Australia
21	MoDem Democratic Mouvement
22	MSP Moderate Coalition Party
23	National New Zealand National Party
24	NCP New Conservative Party
25	NLC New Liberal Club
26	NZF New Zealand First Party
27	PCP Progressive Conservative Party
28	People's New Party
29	PiS Law and Justice
30	PP Popular Party
31	PPD Popular Democratic Party
32	PSD Social Democratic Party
33	Republicans Republican Party
34	Right Party
35	RPC Reform Party of Canada
36	RPF Rally for the French People - Gaullists
37	RPR Rally for the Republic
38	RPR Rally for the Republic - Gaullists
39	Sj Independence Party
40	Soldiers of Destiny
41	UD-Ve Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic - Gaullists
42	UDF Union for French Democracy
43	UDR Union for the Defence of the Republic - Gaullists
44	UDR Union of Democrats for the Republic - Gaullists
45	Ulster Unionist Party
46	UMP Union for a Popular Movement
47	Union for a New Majority - Conservatives/Gaullists
48	Union for a New Majority - Gaullists/Conservatives
49	UNR Union for the New Republic - Gaullists
50	UUP Ulster Unionist Party

Table (A-15) Nationalist Parties in the Dataset

#	Nationalists
1	ANEL Independent Greeks
2	BZO Alliance for the Future of Austria
3	CnP Republican Party
4	DF Danish People's Party
5	FN National Front
6	FPO Austrian Freedom Party
7	Freedom Movement
8	Golden Dawn
9	Independent Greeks
10	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary
11	KPN Confederation for an Independent Poland
12	LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally
13	LPF List Pim Fortuyn
14	PPM Popular Monarchist Party
15	PVV Party of Freedom
16	VdU League of Independents
17	XA Golden Dawn

F Full Model Results

Table (F-1) Leader's Ideology after Economic Crises, Full Model Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Onset-election	0.165*	0.133*	0.130*	0.096 ⁺
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Left-wing leader_t-1				0.031
				(0.085)
Right-wing leader_t-1				0.295*
				(0.082)
International military conflict_t-1	0.169 ⁺	0.181 ⁺	0.285*	0.255*
	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.102)
Civil violence or warfare_t-1	0.025	-0.054	-0.094	-0.071
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.075)
Number of parties	-0.031	0.081*	0.073*	0.065*
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Country FE		✓	✓	✓
Decade FE			✓	✓
Observations	354	354	354	354
R-squared	0.043	0.297	0.350	0.402

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the leader of the government after the elections is from the right, and 0 otherwise. Entries are estimates of linear probability models with standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

Table (F-2) Electoral Effects of Economic Crises, Full Model Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Onset-1	Onset-election	Onset-5
Liberal	-2.033 (1.339)	-0.037 (0.984)	0.088 (0.913)
Left/Socialists	0.550 (0.939)	0.296 (0.534)	0.848+ (0.499)
Social Democrats	-0.022 (1.400)	0.070 (0.871)	0.328 (0.543)
Christian Democrats	-1.508 (1.251)	-1.404 (0.854)	-0.474 (0.722)
Conservatives	3.307* (1.156)	1.209 (0.854)	0.799 (0.659)
Nationalists	4.402* (1.546)	4.408* (1.502)	2.949* (1.367)
Agrarian	-0.308 (0.806)	-0.978 (0.841)	-0.613 (0.599)
Ethnic-regional	0.308 (1.406)	0.706 (1.188)	0.635 (0.612)
Special issue	1.740 (1.201)	0.964 (0.956)	0.223 (0.769)
Ecologist	0.062 (1.066)	0.348 (0.647)	0.730 (0.751)
Lagged voteshare	-0.102* (0.013)	-0.102* (0.013)	-0.102* (0.013)
Coalition party	-1.875* (0.312)	-1.883* (0.308)	-1.901* (0.307)
Country FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,789	1,789	1,789
R-squared	0.105	0.102	0.099

Note: OLS models of parties' $\Delta voteshare$ on economic crises interacted with party families. *Onset+1* and *Onset+5* equal '1' for elections that were held up to either 1 or up to 5 years after the crisis' onset, and '0' otherwise. *Onset-election* is equal to '1' for the first elections that were held up following the crisis' onset. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * p<0.05, †p<0.1.

Table (F-3) Alternative Explanations: Spurious Correlation and Reverse Causality, Full Model Results

	Controlling for political shocks:				Placebo test:	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<i>Treatment</i> original (5)	<i>Placebo</i> pre-crisis (6)
Left/Socialists	0.264 (0.574)	0.265 (0.582)	0.263 (0.574)	0.263 (0.582)	0.296 (0.534)	-0.058 (0.532)
Social Democrats	0.130 (0.962)	0.131 (0.974)	0.143 (0.964)	0.142 (0.975)	0.070 (0.871)	-0.808 (0.556)
Liberal	-0.169 (1.059)	-0.168 (1.065)	-0.153 (1.063)	-0.153 (1.069)	-0.037 (0.984)	-0.304 (0.576)
Christian Democrats	-1.087 (1.053)	-1.086 (1.064)	-1.087 (1.055)	-1.087 (1.066)	-1.404 (0.854)	-0.987 (0.762)
Conservatives	1.199 (0.940)	1.200 (0.940)	1.215 (0.942)	1.215 (0.941)	1.209 (0.854)	-0.061 (0.697)
Nationalists	4.445* (1.536)	4.444* (1.542)	4.441* (1.543)	4.441* (1.549)	4.408* (1.502)	1.119 (1.172)
Agrarian	-0.746 (0.983)	-0.746 (0.984)	-0.746 (0.981)	-0.746 (0.982)	-0.978 (0.841)	0.278 (0.680)
Ethnic-regional	0.714 (1.195)	0.714 (1.197)	0.707 (1.197)	0.707 (1.200)	0.706 (1.188)	-0.959 (0.618)
Special issue	1.408 (0.891)	1.408 (0.892)	1.413 (0.887)	1.413 (0.888)	0.964 (0.956)	1.304* (0.627)
Ecologist	0.604 (0.706)	0.603 (0.704)	0.621 (0.710)	0.621 (0.709)	0.348 (0.647)	-0.226 (0.691)
Coalition party	-0.104* (0.014)	-0.104* (0.013)	-0.104* (0.013)	-0.104* (0.013)	-0.102* (0.013)	-0.102* (0.013)
Lagged voteshare	-1.903* (0.333)	-1.903* (0.331)	-1.901* (0.333)	-1.901* (0.331)	-1.883* (0.308)	-1.944* (0.314)
Interstate warfare		-0.008 (0.495)		0.001 (0.500)		
Civil violence			-0.372 (0.792)	-0.372 (0.801)		
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,674	1,674	1,674	1,674	1,789	1,789
R-squared	0.103	0.103	0.105	0.105	0.102	0.098

Note: Results from ordinary least squares models in which the outcome is the parties' Δ voteshare. Columns 1-4 show that the effects of economic crises hold when we control for interstate wars and/or events of domestic disorder. Column 5 presents the placebo test, in which the post-crisis treatment estimated in Column 1 is replaced with a *pre-crisis* placebo. The model presented in column 1 is restricted to observations on which war and civil violence data is not missing. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * p<0.05, †p<0.1.

Table (F-4) Electoral effects of crises by incumbent ideology, full model results

Incumbent_{t-1}	(1) CL	(2) R
Left/Socialists	0.077 (0.919)	0.865 (0.582)
Social Democrats	-2.087 (1.431)	1.161 (0.999)
Liberal	1.018 (1.776)	-1.412+ (0.830)
Christian Democrats	1.828+ (0.935)	-3.252* (1.163)
Conservatives	3.592* (1.525)	-0.212 (1.121)
Nationalists	-1.046 (1.388)	5.760* (1.798)
Agrarian	-0.354 (1.668)	-1.658 (1.663)
Ethnic-regional	0.807 (0.641)	0.324 (1.979)
Special issue	3.751* (1.894)	-0.988 (1.422)
Ecologist	1.474+ (0.754)	-0.751 (0.686)
Lagged voteshare	-0.083* (0.024)	-0.101* (0.021)
Coalition party	-1.304* (0.402)	-2.332* (0.524)
Country FE	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes
Observations	824	861
R-squared	0.122	0.129

Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties. Dependent variable is $\Delta voteshare$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

Table (F-5) Right-wing bloc's $\Delta voteshare$ after crisis by incumbent ideology, full model results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Onset-election	4.574*	-2.029 ⁺	7.056*	-1.401
	(1.530)	(1.216)	(3.514)	(3.240)
Civil violence	1.138	1.032	0.886	0.894
	(2.646)	(2.353)	(2.425)	(2.242)
Interstate warfare	-0.348	0.681	-0.581	0.587
	(2.859)	(1.634)	(2.614)	(1.556)
Number of parties	-0.525	0.431	-0.643	0.405
	(0.870)	(0.646)	(0.805)	(0.601)
Incumbent_t-1	CL	R	CL	R
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-decade FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	156	185	156	185
R-squared	0.229	0.151	0.213	0.149
First-stage F-statistic			23	20

Note: Entries are OLS/2SLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is right-wing bloc's $\Delta voteshare$ (conservative, christian democratic, and nationalist parties). All models control for the country's effective number of parties, a lagged measure of international military conflicts, and a lagged measure of episodes of "ethnic" or "civic" violence or warfare. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

Table (F-6) Crisis and issue salience by party family, full model results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DV:	Left-Right (rile)	Nationalism	Law and order	Welfare	Budget restraint
Left/Socialists	-0.877 (4.770)	0.323 (0.203)	0.220 (0.259)	-0.231 (1.084)	0.494 (0.551)
Social Democrats	-0.238 (1.763)	0.357+ (0.210)	-0.041 (0.367)	-0.651 (1.041)	-0.437 (0.270)
Liberal	5.229+ (2.954)	0.483+ (0.266)	-0.889 (0.727)	0.385 (1.279)	0.013 (0.804)
Christian Democrats	0.298 (2.311)	0.708* (0.256)	0.284 (0.602)	0.016 (0.859)	-0.155 (0.479)
Conservatives	1.589 (3.244)	0.568 (0.387)	0.082 (0.532)	-1.149 (1.074)	-1.008 (0.791)
Nationalists	-2.264 (5.254)	-0.533 (1.426)	-1.283 (1.504)	1.097 (0.881)	-0.764 (1.545)
Agrarian	6.178* (2.403)	-0.200 (0.626)	0.364 (0.284)	-1.304 (1.478)	2.069* (0.595)
Ethnic-regional	-1.263 (5.153)	-0.718 (0.473)	0.398 (1.068)	-0.242 (3.702)	-1.006+ (0.557)
Special issue	-3.663 (2.604)	-0.207 (0.385)	0.494 (0.644)	-2.176 (1.455)	-2.399* (1.068)
Ecologist	1.381 (2.730)	0.149 (0.278)	0.062 (0.597)	-0.391 (0.880)	-0.005 (0.413)
Lagged voteshare	-0.007 (0.025)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)
Coalition party	-0.352 (1.057)	0.051 (0.153)	-0.047 (0.196)	0.140 (0.314)	-0.400 (0.260)
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,779	1,775	1,775	1,775	1,775
R-squared	0.073	0.061	0.098	0.090	0.094

Note: Ordinary Least Squares models controlling for lagged vote-share and pre-election coalition parties. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party; * p<0.05, †p<0.1.

Table (F-7) The effect of crisis on voters' preferences, full model results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Left-Right id	Authoritarianism	Anti-immigration	Anti-redistribution	Euroscepticism
Onset+5	-0.007 (0.008)	0.000 (0.007)	0.085** (0.008)	0.105** (0.008)	0.164** (0.009)
Lower secondary	0.025** (0.009)	-0.085** (0.008)	-0.111** (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.011)
Upper secondary	0.003 (0.008)	-0.102** (0.008)	-0.231** (0.008)	0.045** (0.008)	-0.010 (0.010)
Post-secondary non-tertiary	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.193** (0.013)	-0.413** (0.013)	0.122** (0.013)	-0.094** (0.016)
Tertiary education completed	-0.060** (0.008)	-0.299** (0.008)	-0.618** (0.008)	0.283** (0.008)	-0.249** (0.010)
education: other	0.109** (0.034)	-0.104** (0.031)	-0.338** (0.032)	0.170** (0.032)	-0.075 (0.047)
Ethnic minority	-0.074** (0.011)	0.374** (0.010)	-0.310** (0.011)	-0.124** (0.011)	-0.110** (0.014)
Male	0.050** (0.005)	-0.080** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.123** (0.005)	-0.022** (0.006)
Age	0.005** (0.000)	0.013** (0.000)	0.005** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)	0.004** (0.000)
Rural area	0.095** (0.005)	0.025** (0.005)	0.104** (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.086** (0.006)
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	160063	173456	172715	175757	115188
R-squared	0.042	0.164	0.124	0.088	0.075

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The measure for period of crisis is *onset+5*. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..

Table (F-8) Voter Turnout after Economic Crises, full model results

	(1)
Onset-election	0.002 (0.007)
Leaning Left	0.009* (0.004)
Center	-0.065* (0.004)
Leaning Right	0.015* (0.004)
Far-right	0.025* (0.005)
Onset-election × Leaning Left	0.011 (0.008)
Onset-election × Center	-0.001 (0.007)
Onset-election × Leaning Right	0.004 (0.008)
Onset-election × Far-right	0.025* (0.009)
Years of full-time education completed	0.016* (0.000)
Ethnic minority	-0.099* (0.005)
Male	0.000 (0.002)
Age	0.005* (0.000)
Country FE	✓
Year FE	✓
Observations	166128
R-squared	0.092

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.