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Global Comparative Urban Governance Cities as leaders and targets of the XXIrst century

> Patrick Le Galès

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Metropolis, Political actors, leaders and targets the XXIst century

The XXIrst century is the century of global urbanization : in Asia, in Africa, the population is urbanizing. The urban growth takes different form, but informal urbanization is the most important dynamics in particular in African and Asian cities like in Dhacca in Bengladesh, in Cairo, in Lima, in Manilla. There are many urban worlds (Storper 1997). In some cases, the urban concentration leads to the making of mega urban region : Jin Ji Ji (Beijing and surroundings) planned for 100 M inhabitants seen as the future capital of the world by the Chinese government, but also Delhi Gurgaon Gazhiabad in India or Tokyo Osaka, urban corridors on the North America West coast. There are also large metropolis from Nairobi to Tokyo, Sao Paolo to Istanbul with increasing resources, capacity, populations to govern. However, beyond the world of large urban concentration, urbanization mostly takes place in dynamic medium size cities in Canada, Africa, in India, in China also, and Europe. The world of cities comprises many sizes, not just the huge and most visible ones. Among them informal urbanization (Palermo or Indian cities) contrasts with high income cities (Vancouver) or shrinking cities (Leipzig, Detroit, Yichun in China)….not to mention the return of city states such as Singapore, Panama or Dubai. Brief examples set the terrain for our research programme :

- In Mexico, in the aftermath of the democratization process in 1988, Mexico city has its first elected mayor in 1997, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a powerful political figure. Quite often, mayors of the capital cities become, or try to become national political president or prime ministers (Seoul, London, Lagos, Sao Paolo). Although Mexico is rumoured to be ungovernable, successive administration have included a pension system, built an important public transport system (including the metro), renovated the education system and managed to limit air pollution. Many metropolis all over the world are now governed in part at the urban level, with implemented public policies, protest, budgets, conflicting negotiations with the central governments, money from development banks, implementation failures. They become collective actors with increasing resources, transnational networks or cities, strategies, policies and huge problems to deal with, experimenting with forms of democratic participation in policy implementation. But that's only part of the story : in Mexico, the governance of the urban areas is also multilevel, faced corruption and

implementation failure and includes other organisations with powerful resources: the police, the drugs cartels, the churches, some trade unions, rich business leaders and private developers, small mafias running the waste services or the informal bus system, the universities.. . The globalization of gangs, NGO's and churches is a powerful factor of changes in some cities (Hazen Rogers, 2014).

- After a decade of severe economic crisis Lisbon in Portugal seems dynamic and there is something in the air which sounds different. For decades, Portuguese have migrated to Brazil. With the economic crisis, nearly a million Portuguese left, partly in Europe, partly in Rio and Sao Paolo. Lula's triumphant Brazil accelerated the trend and many Portuguese were to be seen to get a job. But Portugal is getting better and Brazil is facing a dramatic economic and political crisis. Poor Brazilians went first to look for a job followed by scores of Brazilian middle classes, in particular from Rio, investing in Lisbon, buying flats, investing in the cultural life, happy so escape violence and the instability of institutions. Lisbon has never before been so influenced and transformed by high income high education Brazilian immigration. This is not uncommon, Toronto, London, Los Angelès are well known multi ethnic cities. Migrations transform cities.

- The last IOM report (2018), states that in 2015, 244 millions people went in another country, about 3,3% of the world population, 40% of them in Asia. They massively migrate in cities and the key word is "interconnection", for instance between Los Angeles and Mexico or Algiers and Paris, increasing links between the place of departure and the place of arrival. Cities, metropolis are the place of immigration, of transnational networks of "super diversity" (Vertovec 2014) of integration within a political framework usually set at the national level. The urban governance of migration is now a crucial issue (IOM 2015) because interaction between different groups, old migrants, new migrants, national migrants, established populations, visitors and tourists, not to mention refugees, can take all sorts of forms and lead to the best, forms of diverse urban societies or the worse of science fiction nightmares : organized systematic violence between groups, social exclusion and poverty.

• Delhi and Cape town are facing severe water crisis and narrowly avoided a complete shortage this year. Bangalore, 12 millions inhabitants will not have any water reserves left in 7 years, all the water will have to be delivered by trucks from far away. Water epitomizes the ecological and human catastrophe that requires new ways of governing, experimenting in order to profoundly change behaviours, a formidable challenge for collective action and not just in the Global South. In New York the infrastructure is ageing and deteriorating. The bill to modernize the subway, much delayed but much required, is increasing to astronomic levels. There is not enough money. But the modernization of the "signals" is on the way, it might be done by ....2050. Meanwhile, a remarkable new metro system is operating in Shangai. All over the world, the quest to build infrastructure and utilities for water, energy, transport, housing telecoms, waste is a priority. But they are many ways to do it : beyond tax, the financialization of the city, the assetisation of land and buildings often means the use of financial instruments and different funds to pay for a waste incinerator, a water recycling plant, a new airport. But the informal sector is an essential part of most cities in those different domains, organizing alternative system of water provision, recycling waste, or providing informal small collective transport in Nairobi, Bogota, Djakarta. Regulation battles are central for major cities.

• Big brother is watching you …in Singapore, in Beijing, new technology and the analysis of big data is transforming the organization and the governance of metropolis. Beyond the naïve technologically driven (large firms) dream of the smart cities, CISCO or HUAWEI become major providers of infrastructure to collect and analyse huge amount of new data in cities and metropolis, in particular in the field of security and policing. "Tactical driven data urbanism" is on the rise. In Toronto, Alphabet is experimenting a new world of data driven public private partnership. The production of big data is opening new avenues to represent the metropolis and its complex interactions, to invest, to govern. In the fantasy world of Dubai, ie the smartest city in the world according to a ranking paid by the Dubai authorities, the social order is maintained thanks to big data. But beyond the hyper rational world of Singapore, informal data gathering and digitalization are on the increase in Accra or Dhacca where the informal population is beyond 40% for instance, the digitalization

of the city seems to take informal road, as powerful as the formal ones in relation to transport and pollution for instance

• Divided cities : young generations and educated middle classes are back to town in different part of the world. However, at the same time, as usual, part of the elites and the upper middle classes is flying out of the city to recreate orderly cities to avoid the urban chaos like the new town of Gurgaon in the south of Delhi, in some Chinese and Latin American new towns or the new projects developed in Africa. The dream of "Geneva" or "Singapore" of orderly quiet cities is a common representation in particular in Africa and India. In the most violent cases like Karachi in Pakistan, violence is structuring the urban with barricaded elites on the one hand, but a sort of routine on the other with a sense of "ordered disorder" urban context (Gayer, 2014).

• The increase of inequalities documented by Piketty and others is also leading to social classes organized around wealth, but housing becomes a major component, ie the patrimonialization of wealth. Massive housing prices increases in Tokyo, San Francisco, Paris, Shangai, Vancouver or Luanda creates new rentiers groups, local or transnational and make access to the metropolis more unlikely for other groups. Cities metropolis become the engines of inequalities opposing property owners to the rest. Social interactions combine different dimensions from mobility to cultural preference, race, income and ownership or sexual identities and age. The "super diversity" of many metropolis create different urban worlds where lines of cleavages and modes of interaction are sometimes very structured, but often more blurred. Particular forms of the urban experience develop nowadays. A new generation of comparative research on the streets show how classic public private dichotomy are broken down (Zukin and al., 2015, Labbe, Boudreau 2015), how the physical and digital cities are completely intertwined through digital and face-to-face interactions. The combination of social and virtual interactions creates different collective spaces, social life stimulated by the virtual, different networks of contacts. In parallel, violence and crime remain central for the urban experience, urban socialization takes different form at the neighbourhood level and beyond and complex games of distance and proximity pave the way for renewed forms of segregation that have to be compared.

• The museum district of Abu Dhabi on Saadiyat Island is taking shape : Jean Nouvel has completed "Le Louvre Abu Dhabit", Frank Gehry is complety the Guggenheim and Norman Foster is working on the Sheikh Zayed National museum. Some urban forms are spreading in many metropolis from the business financial districts to the water front, from the museified historical (sometimes colonial) city centre (In Bogota) to the informal neighborhood (Gecekundu in Istanbul, Barrios in Santiago, slums in Mumbai or Cairo, favelas in Rio, shanty towns, bidonvilles in Paris but also cases of systemic deprivation like in the American ghettoes (Sampson, 2012……), from the logistics zone of the international airport (in Dubai) to the exotic middle class gated community named after prestigious symbolic location (Versailles gated communities in China or Latin America), from the exclusive shopping mall to the high rise industrialised social housing. High rise condominium combine with ethnically hyper diverse neighborhoods in Toronto, London, Sao Paolo, Sidney or Hong Kong. Star architects work with private developers and public authorities to create airports, ecological neighborhood or fancy high rise buildings all over the world. At the same time, the housing crisis is a systematic question in more or less every city and metropolis and raise key questions of collective action and governance.

Our starting point is the following : Cities and metropolises are at the same time sites of cultural innovation, economic development, diversity, public policies, experimentation, integration, engines of growth, a social melting pot for diverse social and ethnic groups, escalator regions for social mobility, sources of innovation but also of insecurity, oligarchies, violence, political disorder, gangs, environmental disasters, decline, ungovernability, violent, and corrupt, places of disorder, inequality, planning failures, financial speculation, predatory elites, and inter-group conflict. Cities really do tend to make people on average, better off economically, more mobile socially, and healthier. But cities also create systemic deprivation, and this systemic deprivation in cities is different from the old rural deprivation in developing countries. So, if the 21st century is intensively urban, then – at a global scale – we need to examine the new forms of specifically urban economic dynamics, urban deprivation, urban environmental threats, social interactions that are emerging. Thus, metropolitan areas are more or less governed by many different formal and informal

types of order, usually with no master plan, and consisting of overlap, fragmentation, and disorder as well. The landscape of institutional orders is also changing rapidly, stimulated by the emergence of new technologies, new physical "real" and "virtual" urban spaces, new forms of physical movement (transportation), environmental threat and risks, and motivated by new lifestyles, identities and political claims. Cities, Metropolis are becoming key sites, places, governance concentrations to deal with some of the most important issues of the planet : climate change, job creation and economic development, water, interactions between different ethnic and religious group, social mobility, poverty, policing. The making of collective good is increasingly an urban question but "Seeing like a city" might be quite different from "Seeing like a state" (Scott, 1998, Magnusson, 2013, Amin and Thrift, 2017, Boudreau 2017, Le Galès 2018).

This research project is timely because globalisation processes and states reconfiguration processes are opening new venues for collective action and policy making in cities and metropolis (King, Le Galès 2017). From time to time capitalism is marked either by major crisis or by surge of innovations (possibly both) that reshuffle the deck, leading to major transformations of states, the relocalisation of wealth creation centres and poor areas, the structuring of inequalities and different urban worlds : that was the case with medieval merchant capitalism, with the first industrial revolution, at the time of the great depression. Now financial capitalism, high tech, globalised mega firms, profound changing scale and relocalisation together with the threat of climate changes, the rise of big data and interconnected migrations are setting a very different world scene. Cities, metropolis are both major actors and problems to solve for the decades to come. Already the literature on cities and climate change provides ample evidence of massive mobilisation and search for experimentation (Bulkeley 2010) If major governance problems are not solved from access to water to dynamic integration of various groups, dramatic political conflicts might be on the cards again.

In light of this, cities are a key site at which social science can understand the ways that humanity will order, and possibly disorder, itself in the 21st century. Responding to this challenge, the proposed project aims to generate an unprecedented global and comparative urban research agenda, spanning Asia

(China, India), Latin America and Africa, as well as the North America and Europe. Despite claims in the literature, such a systematic project marks a rather radical innovation in social science because of the effort on conceptualization, research agenda and empirical research, with expected strong results in terms of knowledge and policies.

What is novel transformative and different from the literature

In urban studies, several intellectual projects have been elaborated, more or less successfully, in order to make sense of the globalizing urban world, including Neil Brenner "Planetary urbanization"(2017), Ananya Roy more based in humanities and post colonial theory calling for "new geographies' of imagination and epistemology in the production of urban and regional theory », or Loretta Lees search for « planetary gentrification » (2013) , Jenny Robinson to develop a global comparative urbanism based upon ordinary cities (2016), or Brenner Theodore and Peck 's attemps to make sense of « neo liberal urbanism » (2010). We are engaged in critical discussion with those projects and groups. However our programme radically departs from those programmes.

1)   Following Henri Lefevre, urban geographers have stressed the fact that the rescaling of societies, capitalism, the state and the increasing urbanization of the world appear to dissolve metropolis within a vast urban world. This generalisation of the "urban way of life" leads to the marginalisation of the question of cities and metropolises as an object of study. By contrast we want to articulate the question of urbanisation with the making of cities, metropolis, sometimes neighbourhood as engines, collectives actors, sites of mobilisation and strategies, where collective choices make a massive difference for inhabitants. We do not follow the Marxist inspired great schemes on planetary or neo liberal urbanisation nor the wrong assumptions about the triumph of gentrification. Our empirical research contradicts those explanations.

2)   We are not post-modernist scholars, we believe in empirical research, clear conceptualisation and we are moderately constructivist. We dispute the view of the urban world where everything is changing all the time at different scales. We

combine different disciplins including the most positivist economists and the more cultural anthropologists

3)	We want to articulate and compare processes and mechanisms of change at the micro, meso, macro levels. There is a limit to what can be explained by macro theory, but also by micro studies.

4)	We want through comparative research, to articulate urbanisation processes and the transformation of cities. By contrast to a lot of urban studies, we agree that cities and metropolis are part of a world of cities, but also a world of large urban spaces, or territorial differentiation, of states, of large firms of NGO's hence the search for a global comparative urban world (Robinson, XX, Boudreau, 2017). Relations matter, and not just between cities. Cities, metropolis are "des lieux et des liens", historical places and the centres of circulations and networks. They attract migrants and various groups, and reject some of them. They concentrate economic development and the production of wealth, and become key sites for the most cosmopolitan groups (poor and rich). As the Trump/Brexit/Hungary vote is showing (and also in China to a less visible extent for obvious reasons) cities and metropolis are also increasingly seen not just as leaders but also as targets for those who cannot access or who reject them and what they represent.

5)	Politics and governance matters and should not be rejected as only the interest of the capitalist class or the world of western dominance. By contrast to mainstream neo classic economists we also argue that cities are not just the result of the search for efficiency, or the rational choice of individuals maximising their interest, but we won't exclude it either, urban economics is becoming an exciting field of research. Governance matters for Djakarta as much as Dar El Salaam, Bogota, Montreal or Berlin and that includes the debate about the direction of societies, the collective goals. Huge issues are at take that will not be solved neither by engineers and big data alone nor by spontaneous social movements. But both will be part of the governance question. Urban politics might be more and more differentiated from national politics.

6)   We do not think that urban theory should be reinvented from scratch in the supposed « global south ». We want to see the limits of the existing theories in metropolis in different parts of the world and to use new research in Africa or Asia to develop new conceptualisation. Our programme aimed at refining and innovating intellectual tools based upon comparative research in different parts of the world. But we also argue that the case for « exceptionnalism » is classically greatly exagerated in different cities all over the world. Comparison might prove more or less fruitful, but at the very least, it is usually very powerful to undermined overblown claims on never ending radical changes of cultural exceptionnalism from Mumbai to Los Angelès, Marseilles to Shangai.

In other words, many contemporary urban scholars stress different forms of urbanization, the ever expanding suburbs, the development of 'non-places' (Augé, 1995), anonymously similar urban spaces (motorways, shopping centres, residential developments, areas of commodified leisure facilities, car parks, railway stations and airports, office blocks, and leisure parks), and megalopolises ('post-cities') in different parts of the world. In that line of analysis, the dissolution of the city is taking place within a large fragmented, chaotic, unstable urban world. In short, we live in the time of the "ungovernable metropolis", of 'citizens without cities' (Agier, 1999), or of 'insurgent citizenship' (Holston, 2008) where new urban forms and experiences are being invented within an ungoverned chaos. Some urban studies scholars but also architects and urban planners are fantasising a new urban world, apparently liberated from the classic constraints (of the state, of rules, of slowness, of the social substrate, of fixedness, of social conflicts, of inheritance from the past), and dazzled by the speed, fluidity, and scales of urbanization of Asian or African megalopolises, by a globalization of innovative urban thought at the cutting edge of the cyberworld, and by the invention of new urban forms that are feasible thanks to new technologies. This, however, is partly an illusion. We argue that many of those processes of urbanisation are regulated and governed, albeit to a greater or smaller extent. For example, in squatted/occupied spaces, there are interactions between squatters and police, while the self governance or legalisation of informal settlements is a very political processes. In some other cases where there appears to be no 'governance', 'non-decision' is a strategy. Urban sprawl and suburbanisation result from forms of regulations (Hamel and Keil 2015) influenced by bankers and

developers. What may appear as depoliticisation (for instance technical discussion and indicators replacing a political debate) is often the result of political coalitions using invisible or technical instruments (standards, algorithms, budget formula, Halpern, Lascoumes, Le Galès,2013). Even constructivist scholar A.Simone emphasises the fact that if inhabitants make their lifes and experiences in Kinshasha or Djakarta that he studies (2010) , they also have "to be kept in line", there is a world of infrastructures, institutions, norms, organisations, policies that define the life of inhabitants.

We define Cities or metropolis in terms of accumulation and concentration (density) of individuals, groups, buildings, infrastructures, social relations (formal or informal), representations, organisations, institutions and political projects, « places of concentrated meaningful built environment where people live and interact, delimited bundles of social processes" (Therborn 2011, p.15), a multiplicator of exchanges against the backdrop of inequalities. Cities and urban regions are more or less governed and regulated by policies, markets, informal arrangements, political elites, corporations, NGOs, community groups, families, institutions, social movements, state officials, churches or gangs and mafias. They are built, organized and managed by people, usually belonging to organizations and institutions, who have ideas about how to make them change, how to control and exercise authority, how to develop services and foster prosperity and quality of life and/or how to exclude various people. Most cities or urbanized areas are complex systems of representation and interaction between many types of human agents, groups, technologies and organizations in close proximity, combined with sophisticated physical infrastructure which is more or less governed and regulated. There are attempts to create those forms of collective action, and more deliberative form of urban governance. In all cities of the world, urban citizens learn about the quality of services. The more they travel, the more they compare transport services of the quality of air. The pressure for better services and the systematic measures and comparison are powerful mechanisms to foster an urban politics more organised around urban policies and the delivery of services. The growing salience of the environmental question, the visibility of risk (earthquakes in Istanbul and Kyoto, Sandy in New York, the rise of water level, air pollution in Beijing…) are stressing interdependences and the need for collective action. Climate change may become,

slowly, a major trigger to transform modes of exercise of political authority, including the creation of different modes of exercising some collective constraint.

In any metropolis or city, or more or less legal forms of urban space, various groups are in competition for land and space - the famous urban land nexus identified by economic geographers (Storper, 2015). They have to compete and/or to agree about rules to live next to each other, to include or reject other people. Cities are historically sites of dense interaction and exchanges structuring different hierarchies or undermining social order, creating different social worlds. Services are provided, housing is built, projects are discussed, developed and contested. Forms of incomplete democracy are at play - against authoritarian regimes, capitalist exploitation, large firms, oligarchies and technocracies. The participation of citizens to the political process is always partial, a mix of formal and informal activities. This is sorted out through conflicts, rules, institutions, violence, power relations - i.e. political mechanisms - together with market and social mechanisms. Furthermore, some social order, however fragile and unstable, is established and forms of policing, however effective or corrupt, are taking place. Cities and large metropolises are not just reflecting inequalities, they become major engines producing inequalities.

Current academic debates underline globalisation processes, the rise of the world beyond the West, more relations and interdependence between cities. All this evokes similarly passionate debates of the start of the twentieth century when German sociologists Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel discussed the relationship between cities, culture, arts, technological developments, and domination. They asked questions about the influence of a particular set of structural social, economic, political, markets and cultural conditions - such as the ones characterizing capitalism - on cities or on individual and collective behaviour, modes of thinking, ways of life or processes of cultural creation, the role of groups and communities in the economy. The rise of mobility and transnational flows within more globalized capitalist metropolises raises new issues about assimilation, social order, politics and culture in cities. Today's urban sociologists are returning to those classic questions: what sort of cities' way of life, socialisation, and politics is being reinvented (in some cities or urban spaces), and what sort of differentiation processes are taking place between different urban worlds. Cities are also reshaped

by local groups and cultures interacting, adapting or protesting against globalized flows.

The research programme aims at doing several things :

1)   *To convene a group of comparative interdisciplinary researchers from the different continents to develop a conceptual framework, theoretical tools to compare the dynamics and transformation of metropolis of the planet.*

To develop and critically research our key hypothesis : Following the massive urbanization process, globalization and the reconfiguration of states, some cities and metropolis become sites of governance, groups in cities are able to develop forms of collective action with increasing resources to shape the transformations of those cities. In other words, urban modes of governance increasing explain the trajectories of cities and metropolis and their capacity to produce collective goods, to solve conflicts, to give a direction to their societies, in other words to govern. We argue that original forms of political regulations in cooperation/tension with national states and transnational regulators are shaping the urban fabrics. Canadian political theorist Warren Magnusson has developed a strong argument around the opposition between state political authority and the politics of urbanism more organised around horizontal networks, collective action, forms of deliberation. Public policies are implemented, new policy instruments change collective action results, experimentations are spreading. Governance failures, policy failures have also to be understood more systematically.

2)   *In order to conceptualize and develop empirical research our programme articulates five dimensions:*
- Public policies and governance, order and disorder
- Social interactions in cities, segregation and virtual interactions between locals and mobile population, in neighborhoods and the metropolitan scale
- The digitalization of cities
- City building
- Environment, risk, climate change

3)   *To work on methods.* The world of comparative global urban studies requires different methods, innovative comparison at different levels, the mobilization of different kinds of data, the analysis of big data, the production of original data to answer some key questions. Systematic empirical work has to be initiated.

For instance, in order to compare globally cities' governance a solution might be to collect systematic data inside different cities by asking how people deal with universal problems (How do you access to water? How do you register a property? How do you resolve your disputes? How do you treat your diseases? How do you educate your children?). This method should produce comparative thick descriptions of what people do and how they deal with public authorities

4)   *This investment in an ambitious research agenda should lead to a whole range of knowledge* : how cities will be able to come together to make necessary decisions/choices for themselves in the 21st century, in the face of these complex fractures. Where are the innovations to be had, to avoid paralysis and temper injustice? This will have to be mobilized and disseminated through policy briefs, massive on line course, short videos, documentaries and some indepth interactions in UN Habitat, OECD, International Development banks,

5)   We briefly develop each theme

Urban politics and policies, governance, order and disorder

Metropolitan governance, or governance altogether, is not a linear process, is not always rational (Vitale, 2010), is often incomplete (Le Galès, 2011) and prone to discontinuities. Governments govern - so what? Important questions are : to what extent do they govern (i.e. more or less? How? What? And for which results? Illegal practices are not disconnected from public authorities, as Foucault explained the rise of illegalism in relation to the state. 'Rational' governments create grey zones governments create illegal activities : prostitution, trafficking, norms not implemented or illegal police behavior. Large metropolises are not completely governed, not

always in a rational way. Government policies do not explain everything about the development of those urban areas.

Urban societies are more or less governed over different periods – hence the call for a non-linear view of governance. What is not governed in a classic governmental rational way may be more central to understand what works in a city. Koonings and Kruijt (2009) make an important point in their edited collection on megacities: they are becoming a site of deprivation and violence and the lack of effective governance in the peripheries of those cities is a massive problem for the poor: "urban policies are of direct importance in a broad range of issues related to poverty alleviation and social inclusion. [...] Violence has become the alternative for "parallel" forms of order, control, resources distribution, legitimacy and identity" (ibid., p. 2). In large cities even more than in other contexts, policy failures are the norm, governments do not often achieve very much, inequalities remain massive, informal arrangements are crucial.

Therefore, governance is not the only and principal factor explaining urban change -it is an incomplete and discontinuous process. But the mode of governance and the capacity for steering collective action at the metropolitan level is one of the most relevant topics for understanding and explaining current metropolitan developments and to contribute to the life of millions of poor dwellers. In other words: there are actors that try to govern large metropolises, there are activities of governance and there are results – often very different from the objectives of the goals. The political sociology of urbanization on the one hand, cities and metropolises on the other, require us to think both in terms of turbulences, riots, inequality and mobilization, together with institutions, policies, governance, policing and relative social order on the other. Urban scholars are interested in collective action, inequalities, representations, beliefs, mobilizations, actors, institutions, organisations, devices and instruments, the legacy of the past, social differentiation, segregation and exclusion. The participation of citizens to the political process is always partial, a mix of formal and informal activities, which are more or less democratic. This is sorted out through conflicts, rules, institutions, violence, power relations - i.e. political mechanisms - together with market and social mechanisms.

Furthermore, some social order, however fragile and unstable, is established and forms of policing, however effective or corrupt, are taking place

Cities and metropolises are gaining resources, new urban worlds are more diversified, and politics is more disembedded from the nation state. Urban sociologists, political economists, anthropologists, geographers and planners attempt to identify different forms of urban politics. more politics is taking place in relation to policies. Urban politics is more defined by urban policies. In large metropolises of the world, a lot of political activities takes place around the creation of infrastructure, urban renovation, transport, water, housing, energy, or around contested mega projects. Utility networks and infrastructure result from major collective action efforts (Lorrain, 2014). By contrast, the waste disposal crisis in Beyrouth, the tranport crisis in Djakarta, the water crisis in Delhi are major political issues. The question of implementation of urban policy is central for two reasons: policy goals are usually very general (building an environmentally friendly, socially inclusive, economically dynamic, democratically and culturally vibrant and sustainable city region) and many interest groups are in competition. Urban policy has to be understood in the details of its operationalisation, instrumentation (Halpern Le Galès 2011) and implementation (Pressman Wildavsky, 1973): the winners and the loosers, and the real policygoals are defined in the process of implementation. By contrast to large generalisation, urban policy implementation often reveals contradictions, power relations, and a weak top down capacity of coercion. In most countries, the coherence of urban policy is an illusion created by discourse (and discourses are important). Urban scholars too often take for granted the importance of national plans, scenarios and maps to analyse urban policy.

Governance is about collective action, institutions, collective actors, protest, and implementation. Analysing urban governance requires to articulate the question of what is governed – and not governed - and how, with the question of who is governed in large metropolises. This includes looking at the "dark" side of governance, i.e. corruption, clientelism and violence (Le Galès and Vitale 2011). Governing is a two way process. A lot depends upon the population which is governed. Governing a large city is a difficult task because the population is fluid, divided and mobile. The question about who is governed implies to reflect on the

supply side of governing, and about who receives what kind of services and public goods. Issues of school segregation, housing segregation, accessibility to downtown and city centers, inequalities in infrastructure, absence of legality and police control, or police violence and excessive discretion in some neighbourhoods… all these phenomena signal that part of the population of these large metropolises is not really governed. Who governs when nobody governs? Corrupt elite networks, sometimes. Churches, or other kinds of vertical networks, in other cases. Illegal organizations are also classic cases when they can run, arrange, and possibly govern, some sectors, some neighbourhoods, some part of the city. Processes of discontinuous and incomplete government and governance are always work in progress, but make crucial differences over time. In many cities, the question of governance is raising the « James Scott » question (1999) i.e. how to make the city legible when more people are mobile and where a good deal of the population is either undocumented, involved in illegal activities or living in informal settlements (about 1 billion people in the world according to the UN).

Urban life is characterized by the proliferation of forms and locales of governance and practices of self-government, which generate an order that is unstable and that is not susceptible to complete control by the state, the market, religion, or anything else. A politics of the urban must deal with this complexity. One person's disorder may be another's coherent governance. The segregated city can be orderly, yet fundamentally violent in denying opportunities and possibilities to vast swathes of an urban population.

Disorder produces policy innovations. Our task, through comparative research, would be to highlight the mechanisms through which disorder produces innovation. Disorder can be a generator of innovation and dynamism.

For instance, gangs are associable with a range of fundamental governance activities, such as the exercise of power, capital accumulation, socialization, identity formation, territorial control, or the articulation of gender relations. At the same time, they are also unquestionably sources of violence, disruption, fear, and insecurity. Rogers work on gang dynamics in Nicaragua, for example, has highlighted how under certain conditions certain forms of violence can be socially constitutive rather

than deconstructive. For instance, the high levels of chronic crime and delinquency that respectively plagued New York in the 1970s, Medellin in the 1980s, or Patna in the 1990s can arguably be the cause for the well-known urban "renaissances" that these cities subsequently underwent respectively in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. (Dennis Rogers)

The production of orders in large metropolises might be seen as plural as competing authorities produce different, conflicting and overlapping orders which have moral, social, political, economic and religious dimensions. In just one neighbourhood in Lagos (Fourchard, 2018) it is possible to find police forces with different mandates (Nigerian Police Force, Lagos State environmental police, the Kick against Discipline police...), unemployed youth known as area boys paid by traders watching the market by night, road transport union members policing motor parks, vigilante groups patrolling voluntarily the neighborhood by night, guards paid by landlord associations to control the gate of an enclosed set of streets, Pentecostal gated communities renting flats to church members and allowing only residents following specific moral and religious codes.

Who is the state when its regulations enable and financially support autonomous groups (religious groups, political parties) in the provision and management of social and urban services? How to rethink the state when it delegates such core services, including the monopoly of legitimate violence? What is the state when there are multiple layers and co-existing sources of "public" authority with different degrees of legitimacy in various sectors of society? It is crucial to think i the political change in urban systems where the oligarchic/clientelistic/authoritarian political system keeps reproducing itself. This requires to take into account the non-conventional modes of organization and mobilizations, and the related novel forms of knowledge production (legal research, visualization, performances, installations, squatting, etc.). (Mona harb)

The recent work on segregation and diversity in the USA is emphasizing how there are many unintended effects of policies, in housing and transportation. EG transport policy, in the context of institutionalized racism, leads to segregation, even though the intended outcome of the transport policy was not segregation.

- Governance failure, disorder : disorder is also about infrastructure failure, informal street occupation (e.g. street vending). It is also about the breakdown of Cartesian forms of representing a policy problem

- Corruption : urban middle classes, especially in developing countries. For example in Sao Paulo, they are a strong "wedge" constituency, sometimes leaning Left, sometimes attracted to right wing populism, but in any case a bigger part of the picture in some developing world cities.

Contemporary cities and metropolises are part of states. However, networks and relations have increased and cities or metropolises are not only national but also increasingly 'cities within a world of cities' (Robinson, 2005), but also in a world of states, transnational organisations, private regulatory bodies, large firms, NGOs and medium size cities. The contemporary period is therefore marked by some confusion of powers with the erosion of nation states hence the emergence of growing urban centres with some autonomy (King, Le Galès)

The three foundations on which collective power (Patrick Heller) first one is fiscal and bureaucratic capacity. The second one is political authority: the authority to issue commands whose effectiveness is based on legitimacy. Political authority has to enjoy a high degree of local autonomy (otherwise, without local authority, no local politics) and to be able to manage and harness organizational capacity. The third foundation of collective power is the embeddedness of local states, that is to say, the ties to societal actors. The comparative success with which Brazilian cities have delivered basic services and social housing largely through a range of participatory institutional processes that have seen governance agencies work closely with civil society actors and social movements is illustrative. In India in contrast, urban citizens are hard pressed to even find the state giving its limited institutional surface area. And to the extent they do engage, they do so more as clients or supplicants than as citizens. The comparison underscores the need for moving beyond generalizations about representation and accountability, or for that matter regimes types, and focusing more closely on the actual institutional forms and

modalities through which citizens and civil society actors engage the state on a routinized basis.

Tomorrow, the new business metropolises imagined in different corners of the globe may well be the consequence of globalisation processes and the confusing rescaling of state and authority. Moreover, this is changing the relationship between the major metropolises and the states, leading towards more autonomy for metropolises in close cooperation/competition with the nation-state, but increasingly slightly less connected to the national society. The case of London springs to mind, but regular tensions between Shanghai, Hong Kong and the Chinese state, between capital cities and their state, encapsulate this process. The state versus the city dimension has also a long legacy in the case of post-colonial cities. Colonisation was about the violent extraction of resources and the imposition of economically unequal relations. Colonial cities had to be run by representatives of the colonising state in a climate of threats, contested legitimacy, resistance,, of unknowns, of risks, and of violence. It introduced the rationale of the modern state through modern ways of exercising authority: rationalisation, infrastructures, plantations In short, colonialism meant political control and economic exploitation… and a legacy of economic control by oligarchies. Over time, some of those colonial cities were also designed, planned, governed by the modern nation-state elite. Colonising elites progressively planned and restructured existing cities, "modernised", "westernised" according to Spanish (Mexico), Porguguese (Rio), British (New Delhi), Dutch (Recife) or French (Algiers) ideas of a modern city. Water networks were created, major buildings, new neighbourhoods, or new cities were sometimes erected. Investments in transport to boost economic development or to increase political control were central in this strategy

Social interactions in cities, segregation and virtual interactions between locals and mobile population, in neighbourhoods and the metropolitan scale

Certain forms of specifically urban political polarization that hamper governance are rising in cities.
International migration and social integration.
Domestic migration in developing countries : country to city

In developed world, the extreme skill selectivity of migration and how this is massively gentrifying developed world cities and creating extreme income and neighborhood polarization in them, as well as animating populism at the national level in those countries. This leads to super-star cities dominating everything economically, while secondary cities are losing out as economic and power centers. This is a complete reversal from the end of the 20th century.

The active debate over segregation and diversity today: in most of the world, there are actually not that many really diverse neighbourhoods, especially economically diverse ones. Segregation is a cause of diversity/not diversity, but it's not the same thing, in the sense that there is segregation subie versus segregation by affinity. And it's really spatial segregation that is subie and that leads to systemic deprivation neighbourhood effects.

". The attractiveness of the metropolitan areas lead to an urban growth largely due to immigration that have increased the diversity and the cosmopolitanism of large metropolis. However, the global flows of migrants and capital have resulted in a huge increase of housing price. This key feature of the today urban world raises serious questions about affordability and groups of people especially penalized by these growing inequalities, such as immigrants and youth

On the other hand, the diversity debate is taking new turns. Because it turns out that (as we know) we don't know much about what the positive benefits of different populations living together might be, since people don't automatically interact merely by being in proximity. The latest generation of research is going beyond mere residential co-location to two other themes: (a) are there institutions and organizations that transform spatial proximity into interaction? (b) how much of this depends on economic structure (work interactions)?

Moreover, there is an emerging consensus that the nexus of segregation-diversity-gentrification is not only under-studied empirically (e.g. there is actually not that much gentrification occurring in the USA – roughly 1700 census tracts out of 50,000 urban census tracts, and mostly in just a few cities). More importantly, we don't have much of a general theory framework for understanding the city as a

complex system of sorting and moving and grouping of people in different spaces. The old trope of "white flight" was only partially true: some of that was simply groups moving up the economic ladder and seeking new amenities, but it might have appeared as white flight. How does this work out at a global level today? What will be the geography of groups in developing world cities? (On the other hand, it does seem to be true that gentrifiers in the USA only move into neighborhoods that have less than 40% African-American, something like a threshold-racism effect – does this exist in other societies with particularly stigmatized groups that suffer systemic and strong discrimination? Are there societies whose cities behave according to other principles?)

Social relations are supposed to become de-territorialized, and, the feeling of belonging to the local context (the city and the neighborhood) is called into question. Drivers of these major changes are, among others: mobility, a further increase in social heterogeneity (which is an outcome also of the increased mobility) and the so-called "third revolution", e.g. the Internet and Social Media, allowing people to be connected (but not necessarily linked) everywhere in space and time. The fact that social relations are no longer bounded to a single circle and/or territory, and that the freedom to select has increased is not questionable (though more for some social groups, much less for others). Yet urban place and physical proximity still matter in creating and shaping urban relations and the structure these relations may assume. Furthermore, Social Media platforms seem to give a "second life" to urban bonds. The so-called sharing or collaborative economy is a good case in point, and it is not by chance that it is spreading mostly in cities. Sharing of goods/services/spaces is indeed fostered and sustained exactly by those urban features – size, social density, and social heterogeneity – that used to be considered negatively

The investigation of networks in producing regulation, not only in the absence/failure of state or market regulation could bring important elements to the understanding of how the city functions and the features of the city. Networks do not function/regulate only at the neighborhood level, or in poor/disadvantaged local contexts (favelas?) where the public sector seems lacking. Yet, assessing the importance of networks is not enough, how social networks crystallize or evolve in different fields (taking a historical perspective) within the city can help in

understanding the distribution of power within actors (both collective and individual actors) and the functioning of the city (or at least some domains in the city). Secondly, the increased heterogeneity and the higher freedom to choose bring at the forefront the dynamics of social differentiation between social groups: what are the new (and/or) old drivers of social differentiation for the different social groups (each group wishing to differentiate from the lower ones in the social ladder)? How do the different scale levels and multiple identities play in this process? Thirdly, we might investigate and compare how cities deal with the recomposition of heterogeneity, creating bridges between different actors, creating the lieux fostering actors' belonging to the city.

Bart Wissink defined 'cityness' as the ability to overcome differences, which is a critical issue as cities are both places of meeting and places of segregation. He put forward four axes to analyze new forms of cityness. First, he suggested to study how 'superdiverse' are different cities in different ways (according to income, race and ethnicity, religion, etc.) taking into account the differences between social groups inside each city. Then, he noted the lack of research about the different kinds of urbanity between enclaves: How are residential enclaves assembled in different cities, and how does this relate to access to services and cross-group encounters? Thirdly, Bart suggested to consider not only residential spaces but also activity spaces such as modes of travel and various types of public and private meeting spaces. What are the characteristics of these activity spaces? Do they accommodate encounters or are they highly segregated? How does this relate to mechanisms to negotiate diversity? And what are differences between groups; and between cities? Lastly, he opened the debate by asking: With realities of residential enclaves and segregated activity spaces, maybe the city is increasingly not the place for openness and confrontation with otherness? Maybe the fringes and outsides accommodate openness and innovation better? Is there a "great inversion" that relocates 'cityness' outside the cities?

With global fluidities, the world becomes staffed by temps, sojourners, and tourists rather than stable populations which create cultural and civic thickness. Gulf cities puts focus on hyper-mobility. What are the interconnections of the geographic movements? Who is going where? Under what conditions of push and pull -- and

with what effect? We need a cartography of the de jure and the de facto. How do they link up in a world system of expulsions, welcomings, and accompanying rights and privileges?

- The digitalization of cities
  a.   How does data search change interaction with the urban-as-material ?
  b.   Big data representations, graphics, tools.
- « The smart city driven by digital technology, is poised to replace the typical networked city of the industrial era, whose success was built on its hard infrastructure, from roads to water supply and sanitation systems, not only as a technological optimum but also as a social and political project » (Picon, 2015). Many digital urban development are already in place in many cities and influence the efficiency of flux, the aggregation of data. In relation to the Sociology of Science and Technology, many questions are opened about the transformation of services, the provision of collective goods, the implementation of public policies, the new hybrid nature of logistic and utilities, the active role of prosumers in the coproduction of value and the sharing of planning knowledge,   ….and the making of new bureaucracies, the privatization of data, and different exclusionary processes. Two models are put forward: the classic "Big Brother is watching you" where centralising systems are put in place to gather data, optimise management, develop even more top-down processes, the great fantasies of engineers and technocrats to rationalise unruly cities. In many way the hyper-rational metropolis would not be urban anymore ! The second model stresses horizontal networks, bottom up processes, innovation, shared and collaborative economy, decentralised deliberation.

Big data technologies afford new possibilities for two-way communication (both conscious and unconscious, passive and intentional) between citizens and central authorities (or their agents). What channels are open, how effective are they? Do they enhance either democratic responsiveness or policy provision/efficiency? How do public officials actually use these data in making policy decisions? lack of skills and tools inside local authorities to use this vast amount of data. They need to partner with private companies or civil society actors, such as university and hobbyist civic tech communities, to both collect relevant data and analyze it. This raises the issue of disempowerment of local bureaucracy. Secondly, Big data (both diverse data

collection modes as well as new and flexible ways of practically analyzing that data in useful ways) make cities and societies more legible.

Direct applications include real-time information systems; rapid feedback on e.g. travel flows, public services or health issues; forecasting and prediction of the same. Today these applications are often delivered as public-private partnerships, in which cities are data providers to private firms. This raises a huge issue of political economy of big data, with few big tech firms that concentrates enormous quantity of datasets. The question of access to these data will be an important economic and political issue in the coming years. On the other hand, big data have significant affordances for urban researchers. Most notably scale and cost – datasets are very large, and often low cost (to researchers) as others have paid for data collection. Also, big data often exhibit great reach and frequency - getting at things conventional datasets can't easily measure, and/or doing so faster than before. Conversely, using big data also throws up many challenges in academic research design, and in policy design. The fundamental point that bears repeating is that having a huge dataset does not substitute for an actual research design. Nor does it get you away from data quality issues (especially data holes and data bias), or from broader concerns around access and incentives. Bias is probably the biggest topic in critical discussions of big data right now. At the moment, most machine learning methods rely on large amounts of training data. How good is the training data? Biased inputs give us biased outputs, which feed directly into research results and maybe policy actions.

The second point of interest is the effect of digitalization on urban governance. Through ICT, non-urban actors, such as IT firms (Cisco, IBM, etc.) or digital platforms (Uber, Airbnb, etc.), have come into urban governance. They seem to strongly destabilize public authorities and traditional modes of regulation. However, in some cities, political authorities have seized digital technologies to strengthen their power. For instance, there is a strong fascination of authoritarian cities about smart technologies and the production and use of big data, which raises important democratic issues. On the other hand, the cheapest and easiest modalities of production and use of data is also an opportunity for social movements to produce counter-representations of an issue, what some scholars have called "statactivism".

The analysis of urban governance should thus take into account these new modalities of competing orders produced by digital technologies and big data.

City building

Who builds cities today? Finance and consultancy have become important drivers of urban development: city building is no longer local. What are the political projects behind that? To what extent the urban fabric has changed? What are the similarities and the differences between the French "villes nouvelles" of the sixties and the top-down Gulf cities' project? One of the objectives of this group of research is to put in evidence different kinds of urban political projects and their impact on urban forms and sociability. Is city a political project in itself? By whom? Is the city State one similar kind of urban world? How does the urbanity happen despite the top-down urban fabric?

Emerging urban form issues --- one of these is how "central cities" are being built in the developing world (e.g. Corbusian towers in China), but also the immense wave of developing world suburbanization and how that revives and changes the classic dilemmas of suburban-type settlement patterns……(India and China are big suburbanizers). And how urban peripheries are caught (as always) between these two "formal built forms".

Informal housing. Housing is a critical policy issue for governance, especially in developing countries where urban population is rapidly growing and many live in informal settlements. Secondly, while informal housing is often considered equivalent to slums, the term "slum" masks considerable heterogeneity. There are important distinctions within the informal sector based on housing type and tenure status. What are the different types of informal settlements? What different modes of informal accumulation and informal politics do they mark off? Thirdly, housing is about citizenship and inclusion. Despite citizens' equal constitutional rights on paper, people living in informal settlements are not seen as having full rights. They have only limited access to infrastructure, services, education and job opportunities, and social welfare. Moreover, their relations to government officials are largely based on clientelism, since the vulnerability of their housing status disables their political rights.

Then, there is entrenched stigma against dwellers of informal settlements in the society. How to deal with differentiated citizenship? And how to enhance the inclusiveness of cities? Fourth, there have been various types of policy intervention in informal settlements over decades, major ones including clearance and relocation, upgrading, and in-situ redevelopment. The recent in-situ redevelopment of informal settlements in China and India is both market-driven but has different mechanisms and outcomes. What explains the different outcomes of policy intervention in the informal space? Do some approaches work better than others?

Environment, risk, climate change