

Electoral Mandates and Responsiveness: Comparing Government Reactions to Public Opinion in 'Normal' and 'Unexpected' Policy Junctures

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
MOTIVATION, GOALS & QUESTIONS

Motivation:

- Normative disagreement about whether governments ought to respond to the public's demands <u>between elections</u>.
- The role of mandates (and their role for accountability) is critical in this discussion.

Two views (cf. Mansbridge & Rehfeld):

- Promissory view/form of representation: Elections confer mandates based on electoral platforms, and governments are legitimized to 'resist' the pressures of multiple sectors of the public between elections
- Anticipatory view/form of representation: Elections provide incentives for governments to engage in deliberative dynamics and switch policies between elections, thus it is 'natural' to expect responsiveness between elections.



- Normative debate focuses considerably on role of elections, pledges and electoral mandates.
- But very little empirical work on whether electoral mandates matter for responsive behaviour.
- The comparison of non-mandated or 'unexpected' or 'shock-driven' situations with 'normal' policy making situations is potentially interesting, from both normative and empirical perspectives.
- Goal of the (future) paper: A first empirical take at the different dynamics of responsiveness in 'mandated' and 'non-mandated' situations.
- Main question addressed: Are governments <u>more</u> likely to respond to the pressures of the public when claiming a mandate is less straightforward?



The intuition

- The existence of 'electoral mandates' is disputed
- Parties bundle positions on many issues in their party manifestos / electoral pledges
- Some issues are not covered in (any) detail in manifestos for any given election
- Even if covered in manifestos, many/most issues are not discussed during electoral campaigns
- In countries with coalition govts, the notion of an electoral mandate often makes no sense
- Yet, elected officials claim to have 'electoral mandates'...



The intuition (cont.)

Examples:

- "Provisions contained within the legislation in relation to the superannuation guarantee, are about providing businesses certainty.
 [...] We have an electoral mandate to repeal the mining tax." (Steven Ciobo, MP and Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Australia, interview 2/09/2014)
- "Recibimos un mandato, que es arreglar los problemas. [...] El Gobierno de España tiene un mandato claro, fue elegido para un periodo de cuatro años, y los balances se hacen en su momento" (We received a mandate, which is to fix problems. [...] The Spanish Government has a clear mandate, it was elected for a 4-year period, and evaluations are done when it comes the time.) (Mariano Rajoy, PM of Spain, in public statement 7 months after his inauguration and after taking a number of decisions counter to electoral pledges, 4/08/2012)
- "We have an electoral mandate, and we're going to fulfill that mandate with this bill. The president is right about one thing, that the soldiers and their families deserve better. And this bill is finally going to take their concerns into mind." (US Congressman Jim Moran, interview 15/11/2007)



The intuition (cont.)

- Parties and representatives constantly claim to have an electoral mandate to do what they want to do
- Mandates are a legitimizing rhetorical tool to neutralize opposition to policy initiatives (or to status quo)
- Yet, when 'unexpected' circumstances emerge (e.g. shocks), this alters the capacity to legitimately and validly claim a mandate
- When major shocks (or focusing events) happen, the information voters have can drastically change and invalidate whatever information was used to cast a vote in the past
- Thus, responsiveness is more likely because gov'ts find it more difficult to legitimately resist opposition




What counts as responsiveness?

- In a different paper I argue that...
- There are multiple forms in which governments can respond to the policy demands of citizens.
- A 'processual' notion of democratic responsiveness might be useful: responsiveness viewed as a series of steps or stages
- That rhetorical reactions also matter (as argued by deliberative theorists) but are just a 'minimal' stage in the responsiveness process.



Figure 1. Democratic (governmental) responsiveness as a process





- Following this processual understanding of responsiveness...
- Ordinal conceptualization of responsiveness proposed:
 - 0. No reaction, no change in attention or in position.
 - 1. Increased attention to the issue by the Government but no change in position.
 - 2. Rhetorical reaction/change: increased attention to the issue and some symbolic yielding to opposing actors without substantive change in policy.
 - 3. Moderate policy reaction/change: substantive change in a (relatively) minor aspect of the policy.
 - 4. Substantial policy reaction/change: in the case of major policy changes, u-turns in relation to initial policy positions or proposals, or when major legislation is enacted.



Other relevant conceptual issues

- •What do we mean by public opinion?
 - Opinions expressed in surveys: survey information imperfect in many contexts, but how do gov'ts get their cues from the public?
 - Collective action: visible vs. 'concealed' action (e.g. lobby action). How to approach the latter?
- How do we measure citizens' preferences and demands?
 - Information imperfect: we have chosen to measure what is in public domain only.

Assumptions:

- On most policies, governments have 'preferred policy' option
- In absence of opposition, this is the policy course they would follow
- Governmental actors are 'anticipators' who need to balance vote maximization, policy seeking and office seeking goals.

Expectations on governmental responsiveness

- Absence of protest → little incentive for responsiveness between elections, regardless of position of 'median' voter (H1)
- If protest substantial and consistent with 'median' voter → substantial responsiveness much more likely (H2)
- If protest substantial but inconsistent with 'median' voter → reaction conditional on single vs. coalition gov't, and if protesters in line with 'core' voters (of any gov't party). (H3)
- Above expectations conditional on how close election day is (H4)
- 'Unexpected' vs 'normal' policy-making situations: responsiveness more likely in 'unexpected' junctures (H5)



Research Design Policy 'Junctures' as the Focus of Analysis

- Innovative approach to the subject by not looking at continuous aggregate-level time series.
- Instead, focusing on policy 'junctures', as moments of policy formulation, reform or decisionmaking.
- Process-tracing approach possible relying on event-history logic.
- 'Normal' vs 'non-mandated' junctures compared.



Research Design Policy 'Junctures' as the Focus of Analysis

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Table L	Classinc	anon or	noncv	cases to study
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Policy area	Unexpected situation	s "Normal" situations	
Industry & Environment-related policies	1. Nuclear energy after Fukushima (pilot) [Shock = Fukushima]	3. Regulations on genetically modified crops (GMCs)	
Economy-related reforms: productive sectors	4. Mortgage laws regulations after 2008 crisis [Shock = banking crisis/recession]	2. Intellectual property and internet reforms (pilot)	
Welfare/social reform policies	7. Pensions reform after 2008 crisis [Shock = banking crisis/recession]	8. Pensions reforms pre-2008 crisis (and post-1996)	
	11. Immigration reform after unexpected immigration/asylur seekers crisis [Shock = country specific]		
Moral policies	(No unexpected cases found)	9. Same-sex marriage reforms	
Foreign affairs policy	5. Participation in Afghanistan war [Shock = 9/11]	6. Participation in Iraq war/invasion (2003)	

Note: The numbers rank-order temporal precedence in the data collection process. The lighter type font indicates case studies for which we might run out of time given delays in coding.



Case selection, data & methods

- Eventually, data on 8-11 policy junctures (12-23 countries per policy juncture)
- At present, data available for 2 policy junctures: nuclear energy policy after Fukushima (non-mandated / shock case) & intellectual property and internet reforms (mandated / normal case) [Pilot case studies]
- Own manual coding of:
 - ✓ All claims made by different actors as covered by the national press agency newswires.
 - ✓ All relevant survey reports measuring public opinion during the coding time periods.
 - ✓ Newspaper editorials for 2 newspapers in each country.
 - ✓ Parliamentary questions and legislation databases
- Unit of coding and analysis:
 - ✓ An "event" = claim, statement, action, survey result;
 - ✓ An "actor" (up to 3 actors coded per "event").
 - ✓ Use of comprehensive dictionary of keywords to track all relevant events.




The nuclear energy policy after Fukushima study

- Policy juncture starts with the date of the 'shock' (March 11, 2011)
- From this date all 'events' relating to nuclear energy policy are tracked and coded
- Coding continues until:
 - The gov't changes substantially policy position (substantial policy responsiveness), or
 - Elections take place 6 months or later from shock date, or
 - The date of March 30, 2011 is reached
- Data collected for 14 cases for this study
- Cases with & without nuclear energy, but at least a debate, included



Table 1. Criteria and classification for case selection

		Substantial debate immediately prior to Fukushima		
		YES		NO
	YES	(1) Belgium Germany Spain Switzerland	France N	inland etherlands nited Kingdom
Nuclear energy prior to Fukushima	NO	(3) Italy	(4) Australia Austria Denmark Ireland New Zealand Norway	Cyprus Greece Iceland Malta Portugal



- Policy juncture starts with:
 - An electoral pledge to reform intellectual property regulations to protect from copyright infringements on the internet, or
 - An announcement of intention to introduce a reform in coalition or any other government statement
- From this date all 'events' relating to this policy area are tracked and coded
- Coding continues until resolution is given to pledge/commitment:
 - The gov't changes substantially policy position (substantial policy responsiveness), or
 - National general elections happens
- Data collection completed for 6 countries, and 8 cases only
- Eventually data for 21 countries, and probably around 40-50 junctures in total



Cases that will be included in Copyright

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
Country	Number of policy	Completed
	junctures	
Australia	2	0
Austria	Pending	0
Belgium	6	0
Canada	Pending	0
Cyprus	2	1
Denmark	3	1
Finland	Pending	0
France	3	3
Germany	3	3
Greece	1	1
Iceland	1	1
Ireland	4	0
Italy	4	1
Netherlands	Pending	0
Norway	2	2
Portugal	3	0
Spain	Pending	0
Sweden	3	1
Switzerland	Pending	0
UK	4	2
US	3	0
Total	44+ (probably close to 5	0) 16




How data matrix looks like

ResponsiveGo


(http://www.responsivegov.eu/index.php/data)















A SENSE OF HOW THE DATA CAN BE ANALYZED

Figure 2. Number of events by event type for the first 6 months, per country and week (Fukushima case)



democratic responsiveness in comparative perspective Figure 3. Evolution of pro- and anti-government events in the first 6 months, per country and week





Preliminary findings

Protest	Consistency vocal	Case	Outcome
	& median voter		
Intense	Yes	IT-nuclear	Substantial policy responsiveness (4)
		DE-nuclear	Substantial policy responsiveness (4)
		CH-nuclear	Substantial policy responsiveness (4)
	No		
	Fluctuating/ unclear		
Moderate	Yes	FR-internet2	Increased attention to the issue (1)
		SE-internet1	Rhetorical responsiveness (2)
	No	FI-nuclear	FI1 Kiviniemi govt: Increased attention to the issue (1)
			FI2 Katainen govt: No reaction (0) [but initial position
			moderated during coalition negotiations]
	Fluctuating/ unclear	ES-nuclear	Rhetorical responsiveness (2)
		FR-nuclear	Rhetorical responsiveness (2)
		DE-internet1	Increased attention to the issue (1)
Small/	Yes	BE-nuclear	BE1: Increased attention to the issue (1)
Negligible			BE2: Substantial policy change but counter-responsive
			move (0)
		SE-nuclear	Increased attention to the issue (1)
		FR-internet1	Rhetorical responsiveness (2)
		FR-internet3	Increased attention to the issue (1)
	No	UK-nuclear	Increased attention to the issue (1)
		NL-nuclear	Rhetorical responsiveness (2)
		UK-internet3	Moderate policy responsiveness (3) [to industry]
	Fluctuating/ unclear	CA-nuclear	No reaction (0)
		US-nuclear	Increased attention to the issue (1)
		NO-internet1	Increased attention to the issue (1)
		NO-internet2	No reaction (0)
None	Yes		
	No		
	Fluctuating/ unclear	CY-internet1	No reaction (0)
		GR-internet1	No reaction (0)
		GR-internet2	No reaction (0)
		GR-internet3	No reaction (0)
		GR-internet4	No reaction (0)
		<i>IS-internet</i>	No reaction (0)
		IT-internet1	No reaction (0)
		UK-internet4	Increased attention to the issue (1)
T T 1'		DK-internet1	Increased attention to the issue (1)

In Italics, countries with elections during period coded.



Preliminary conclusions

- Effect of protests (H1): moderate/small protests in most cases and gov'ts almost never changed position; large in CH, DE & IT and gov't changed. [consistent with expectations]
- Effects depending on consistency with surveys (H2 & H3): in CH, IT & DE, overwhelmingly consistent and gov't changed course. [in line with expectations]
- Effects dependent on closeness to elections (H4): mixed findings: IT, CH & DE consistent but elections almost omnipresent. Effect conditional on protest?
- Effect of shocks / lack of mandate (H5): substantial responsiveness (and higher degree responsiveness modes) seem more likely in shock-driven juncture [consistent with expectations]

These are preliminary and rest of cases needed for robust conclusions. More to follow soon!



Project website with papers, data codebooks and intermediate findings:

http://www.responsivegov.eu

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