Réévaluer le Parlement ? La révision constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008 à l’épreuve du temps

Journée d'étude, le vendredi 16 décembre 2016
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Réévaluer le Parlement ? La révision constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008

à l’épreuve du temps

L'axe "Evaluation de la démocratie" du LIEPP a le plaisir de vous convier à cette journée d'étude le :

Vendredi 16 décembre 2016, 9h30 -12h30

Salle de séminaire du LIEPP

1er étage, 254 boulevard Saint Germain, 75007 Paris

Entrée libre dans la limite des places disponibles.

Inscription obligatoire. 

Merci de vous inscrire en cliquant sur le lien suivant.

Retrouvez le Working Paper du LIEPP sur l’évaluation de la révision constitutionnelle de 2008.

 

Présentation :

La révision constitutionnelle fut, quantitativement, la plus importante de l’histoire de la Ve République avec la modification de plus de la moitié des articles de la Constitution. Pourtant, cette réforme n’a pas modifié les fondamentaux du régime : élection directe du Président, pouvoirs du Président vis-à-vis du Premier ministre et de l’Assemblée nationale, responsabilité parlementaire du gouvernement. Par ailleurs, un aperçu rapide des mesures phares de cette réforme permet de saisir son caractère contradictoire : extension du droit du Parlement s’agissant de la procédure législative ou du contrôle des nominations mais limitation inédite des capacités d’obstruction de l’opposition. Aussi l’évaluation de l’impact de cette réforme s’impose-t-elle en 2016, alors qu’une alternance a permis d’en éprouver la pratique.

Cette journée d'étude présentera l'évaluation de la révision constitutionnelle du point de vue interdisciplinaire des politistes, juristes et des praticiens alliant une diversité de méthodologies. 

Organisation : Guillaume TUSSEAU & Olivier ROZENBERG

Consultez le programme de la journée. 

The Quality of Democracy & Populism in Western Balkans

Seminar with Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Oct 6th 2016
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Seminar with Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos:

The Quality of Democracy & Populism in Western Balkans in the Comparative Perspective of Contemporary European Politics

LIEPP is glad to invite you to attend the seminar held on:

Thursday, October 6th, 2016

12:30 pm - 2:30 pm

LIEPP's Conference Room

LIEPP's Office, 1st Floor, 254 bvd Saint-Germain

75007 Paris

Registration closed.

Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (University of Athens, Greece) 

Abstract of the paper:

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases to the point of almost reaching a breaking point, without however becoming an outright dictatorship. Populism can be both a mode of political participation and a means of political domination. The linguistic turn in the study of populism has sidelined the study of social and organizational means which populist leaders use, after they ascent to power.

Populism in power, showing authoritarian tendencies, is on the rise in Europe and particularly so in the Western Balkans, where there is a theoretically interesting combination of populism with clientelism and corruption. These three phenomena combine as means of political domination in democratic regimes which have been derailed. Spanning the grey zone between illiberal democracy and outright authoritarianism, the regimes of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia and Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia purposefully use corruption and clientelism. They also rely on a distinct populist discourse, but also on social class bases and organizational means which are characteristic of populism.

Evidence from recent field research in Belgrade and Skopje is used to discuss how populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with a backsliding from electoral democracy, the reproduction of the same governing elites in power and the emergence of a new type of political regime. Comparable trends of derailment of democracy, based on a variety of other causes, can be traced in other West Balkan and East European countries.  

Policy Priorities Workshop

21-22 June 2016
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A Workshop on Policy Priorities

Co-organised by Sciences Po/CEVIPOF, Sciences Po/LIEPP and Université Sorbonne Paris Cité

21-22 June 2016

LIEPP

254, bd Saint Germain

75007 Paris 

The LIEPP Evaluation of Democracy research group funded project “Barometer for policy priorities” will support and host an international workshop on policy priorities on 21-22 June, 2016. The Barometer project has produced public opinion survey results on policy priorities in France. The aim of this workshop is to introduce results collected thus far and present a project based on an innovative empirical framework specifically dedicated to the study of policy priorities, simultaneously measuring preference and salience as well as the party best able to implement individual preferences. With feedback from international participants who are some of the top scholars in the area of public policy, project researchers also aim to plan the next phase of the research project.

Background:

Longitudinally tracking public opinion is particularly necessary to understand political dynamics, and particularly policy representation and public responsiveness processes. Despite numerous studies, particularly in a thermostatic perspective, the knowledge of the impact of the evolution of issue salience and issue preference in public opinion on the policy agenda as well as the effect of the policy agenda on citizens’ policy priorities remains incomplete, particularly in France. Until now, longitudinal approaches of public opinion have not investigated satisfyingly policy priorities, their changes as well as their effects and determinants.

Public opinion’s policy priorities have two dimensions: salience and preference. Indicators commonly used in the literature to study preference have not included salience. Conversely, the most common indicator to salience - « most important problem (MIP) » and « most important issue » - have two severe limits. First the key one is that they are not appropriate indicators of issue importance or issue salience. Second the MIP responses are not preference indicators even if some scholar uses them so. 

Workshop Program

 

Baromètre des priorités publiques project page

Institutional Change

The Origins and Evolution of Political Institutions, 26-27 mai 2016
  • Actualité Sciences PoActualité Sciences Po

Institutional Change:
The Origins and Evolution of Political Institutions

An Evaluation of Democracy Research Group Workshop

26 & 27 May 2016

Sciences Po, Paris

The emergence of new institutions and institutional change constitute central questions for political science. Institutions have a profound and active role in explaining the political realities we analyze. Since institutions influence actors’ behavior, we often seek to understand their effect to ultimately understand the political phenomena we study. Given the importance of institutions the question arises why certain institutions are implemented and amended in some polities but not in others. To fully understand political institutions requires an understanding of why they were put in place and how they are changed. The workshop will have two parts, which structure the contributions. The first one focuses directly on the emergence of institutions and the second one concentrates on how existing institutions evolve and are changed.

The workshop will have two parts which structure the contributions. The first one focuses directly on the emergence of institutions and the second one concentrates on how existing institutions evolve and are changed.

Session 1: How do new institutions emerge?

In this first part, we will focus on particular moments and on key periods where new institutions are generated and adopted. This can be a key moment such as the period of regime change where many institutions are changed at once but it also covers singular changes where e.g. income taxation is introduced, or a federalism reform is implemented. Conceptually relevant is the idea of punctuated equilibrium, where one expects a profound and sudden change following long periods of stability, the notion of national trajectory that insists on the unique character of each national configuration when institutions are put in place, or the premise of rational actors or transition. Do certain configurations of actors and certain factors foster the emergence of new institutions? How important are ideas, national history, and values of the reformers in these processes?

Session 2: How do institutions evolve and get reformed?

When put in place, institutions are remarkably enduring and able to survive many challenges, so much that their evolution and the reforms following their implementation tend to be overlooked by institutional analysts. Indeed, they tend to focus mostly on the consequences of reform or on the emergence of the institution. Nevertheless, even without being fully replaced, institutions are constantly adapted and reformed. A starting point to this endeavor is provided by Thelen, Mahoney and Streeck who have developed typologies of institutional change. How do institutions evolve after they have been put in place? Can they be reformed to overcome inefficiencies and unintended negative consequences? One of the challenges which arises in this line of inquiry is how to disentangle the change of the formal rules and the change of the informal practices, behavior, and values. These two sessions hope to contribute to these questions.

Lead Organizers:

  • Camille Bedock (Sciences Po, Bordeaux)
  • Lucas Leemann (University College London)

 

View the workshop program here. 

And visit the project’s page here.

Find here the summary of the workshop


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Strengthening Parliaments

3-4 December, 2015
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STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTS THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING

a conference organised by

PADEMIA / Centre d'études européennes / LIEPP


December 3-4, 2015

Salle Goguel

Sciences Po , 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75007 Paris

Conference Summary:

During the two day conference, 25 scholars from all across Europe discussed the politics, features and evaluation of institutional reforms aimes at strengthening parliaments. Of many discussed topics were: Why do those reforms tend to be more numerous all around Europe? How are they developed, realized and implemented? And, what are their consequences? Case studies from many countries (Iceland, Israel, Spain, Finland, UK, France...) made clear that beyond idiosyncratic features, institutional engineering reforms face similar challenges and processes, especially the fitness between the reforms and good practices on the one hand, and MPs' individual interests on the other. Institutional development paths also matter for adopting successfully parliamentary reforms. In the end, the great interest of the workshop confirms that the issue of reforms in parliament and institutional engineering tend to be increasingly central to the attention of the scientific community.

Conference theme:

Institutional Engineering refers to various changes in the organizational rules established with a precise aim. In the case of parliaments and parliamentary democracy, institutional engineering therefore accounts for the efforts made in order to strengthen parliaments. In most cases, the change of rules takes place at a constitutional level through amendments to the Constitution but it can also be realized at a lower stage such as ordinary laws or standing orders.

The workshop originates from the observation that many of recent or on-going institutional engineering reforms officially aim at empowering, if not restoring, parliaments within their institutional system. This has not always been the case. Throughout the 20th century, many constitutional changes aimed at strengthening the executive power decisional capacity by implementing various ways of rationalizing parliaments. Converging examples from the control over military operations to the budgetary powers of the parliament indicate that this is seemingly no longer the case. In developed democracies but also elsewhere, many institutional reforms officially aim at deepening parliamentary democracies. Yet, other institutional reforms can be driven by other aims, for instance controlling budgetary deficits, adapting to a country’s participation to regional organizations, strengthening judicial review or transparency, implementing better regulation agendas, etc. The multiplicity of agendas for institutional reforms inevitably raises the issue of the coherence and compatibility between them.

The workshop addresses classical questions to that trend: ‘why and how?’ ‘so what?’

1. With the ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ issues, we aim at entering into the politics of institutional engineering. Why are constitutional or standing orders reforms affecting legislatures launched? In which political contexts? Are those reforms more likely when national parliaments are comparatively weaker? What is the input provided by regional organizations, international treaties and transnational organizations from the OECD to the Inter-Parliamentary Union?

The point also requires to address the specific role played individually and collectively by MPs in the process. Are agendas for institutional reforms decided thanks to their pressure and initiatives? Or are they imposed by external actors such as ministers, judges, legal scholars, etc.?

2. The workshop also holds the ambition to assess the effects of institutional engineering. At the end of day, does changing the rules really impact on the legislatures’ role? We know that there could be many factors contributing to limit or cancel the effects of such reforms: the weight of inherited institutional routines, the lack of relevance of an institutional agenda from an MP interest based perspective, the lacking fit of institutional transfers given domestic idiosyncrasies, etc. Many claims can be put for explaining the absence of change. Yet, there are cases where a change of rules does impact on political behavior and even policy outputs even if it is sometimes the case indirectly or unexpectedly. Why do some reforms succeed and others not? Does their impact depend on the quality of the ‘engineer’ or on the capacity of MPs to adapt?

The evaluation of institutional engineering reforms can also be made from the perspective of the legislatures’ influence. Given the multiplicity of the official aims addressed by the reforms, and their possible inconsistency, which kind of reforms - or which mixture – eventually contributes to empower legislatures? Beyond the assessment of a specific case, is institutional engineering able to fight back against the centennial trend of domination of the executive power?

ConvenersSelma Bendjaballah, Olivier Rozenberg, Guillaume Tusseau.

Organisation:

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