Human Security: Concepts and Implications

with an Application
to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan

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Abstract

Is the concept of “human security”, which has been discussed and debated in international organizations and academic circles since 1994, simply “hot air”, as its critics claim? Or does it provide a suitable framework for proposing multi-sectoral, integrated solutions in a world that is increasingly interconnected? While there is no consensus as to the exact definition of the term, human security goes beyond traditional notions of security to focus on such issues as development and respect for human rights. To some the concept is attractive, but analytically weak since it introduces too many variables that are not necessarily linked together. To others, human security concerns should be limited to situations marked by the threat or outbreak of violence. For those who favour a broad definition (as does this author), the human security agenda provides the means to assess the root causes of conflict (whether intra-state or inter-state), to propose adequate policies for resolving crises, and to provide the means for sustainable peace-building. In so doing human security policies focus on social and economic issues as they affect the individual, arguing that security (in the narrow sense of the term) is dependent on a wide-ranging network of factors that require a comprehensive approach to be effective. The paper introduces the various documents on the subject produced by international organizations, takes up the problem of the relation between academic research and policy-making, and points to a certain number of cases in which nations or regional organizations have included human security as a foreign policy option. Throughout the paper reference is made to the case of Afghanistan that is treated in the study reproduced in annex.

La sécurité humaine: concepts et implications
Application aux défis de la situation afghane après l'intervention

Résumé

Le concept de « sécurité humaine », en discussion dans les organisations internationales et les milieux académiques depuis 1994, n’est-il que du vent, comment l'affirment ses détracteurs ? Ou bien offre-t-il un cadre pertinent pour élaborer des solutions multisectorielles et intégrées, mieux adaptées à notre monde de plus en plus « interconnecté » ? S’il n’en existe pas de définition consensuelle précise, on peut dire du moins qu’il s’agit de dépasser la notion habituelle de sécurité pour s’intéresser plus spécifiquement à des considérations de développement et de respect des droits de l’homme. Pour certains, c’est là une notion séduisante mais faible sur le plan analytique, car elle fait intervenir trop de variables qui ne sont pas nécessairement liées entre elles. Pour d’autres, il faut en limiter l’usage aux situations marquées par une poussée ou une menace de violence. Pour ceux qui préfèrent en donner une définition plus large (c’est le cas du présent auteur), l’approche en question offre des moyens d’apprécier les causes profondes d’un conflit (inter- ou intra-étatique), de proposer des politiques adéquates pour résoudre les crises et d’aboutir à l’établissement d’une paix durable. A cette fin, les politiques de sécurité humaine prennent en compte de manière privilégiée les questions sociales et économiques en ce qu’elles affectent l’individu, considérant que la sécurité (au sens étroit) dépend de tout un tissu de facteurs qui exigent une approche globale. L’auteur présente les divers écrits sur le sujet produits par les organisations internationales, examine le problème de la relation entre recherche académique et production des politiques, et relève un certain nombre de cas où des nations ou des organisations régionales ont fait entrer la sécurité humaine parmi leurs options de politique étrangère. Tout au long de l’article, il est spécialement fait référence à l’Afghanistan, dont le cas est traité dans l’étude reproduite en annexe.
Human Security: Concepts and Implications
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DEFINITIONS, CRITICISMS, AND INSTITUTIONAL USES

Expanding the Traditional Security Narrative: Merging Development and Security

In March 2005 – at a time when 1) the US Senate was approving an $82 billion dollar emergency spending bill to fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2) NATO, after three years of deliberation, had decided to expand its International Security Assistant Forces (ISAF) contingent and dispatch it to Afghanistan (the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO’s history, and 3) the OECD/DAC was considering whether military assistance could be included as part of Official Development Assistance (ODA) – an op-ed piece appeared in Le Monde arguing that in Afghanistan, poverty was more threatening to the everyday lives of Afghans than terrorism. This assertion, based on comprehensive research on the poverty and insecurity in Afghanistan, reintroduced the guns versus butter debate. Was the priority given to stabilizing Afghanistan militarily in terms of international security not in contradiction with the state-building project?

1 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Daud Saba and Omar Zakhilwal, « En Afghanistan, la pauvreté est plus redoutable que le terrorisme », Le Monde, 23 March 2005.
As the first comprehensive analysis of the development situation in Afghanistan since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghanistan National Human Development Report argued that in a county where GDP per capita was $200, life expectancy 44.5 years, and the literacy rate 28.7 %, the priority of the new government should be to provide “human security” as a public good for all. This responsibility, to be assumed by the newly appointed president, was to take precedence over what the American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, had set as the agenda for the government, namely, eliminating the threat of the Taliban, demobilizing the remaining Afghan militias and suppressing the narcotics trade. The policy position that this report took was that the “human security” of the Afghan people, defined as freedom from both fear and want, should not take a back-seat to the security interests of the state or to those of the international community which is currently using Afghanistan as a base from which to conduct a global war against terror. Ultimately, the report argued, allowing grievances and insecurities to continue was both dangerous and immoral. Between 2001 and 2004 the twin terms, danger and morality, constantly reappeared in analyses of the situation in Afghanistan. Unless urgent steps were taken to deal with underdevelopment there was danger of conflict breaking out anew. Morality required that the new government and the international community establish viable, responsible institutions.

This approach meant that security was to be redefined as a subjective experience at the micro level. It sought to find answers to questions such as “security from what?”, “whose security?”, and “security by what means?” And to find answers to such questions in terms of people’s experience. “Security” for a farmer growing poppies in Badakhshan or Helmand was the livelihood he gained from selling his crops to a middleman, but this form of security was very different from the “security” interests of recipient states concerned about their drug addicts and about the terror-crime-drug-mafia networks. For a school teacher in Jalalabad security was the fact that he could properly clothe and educate his children and invest in the construction of his house, confident that the little he had today would not be taken away from him tomorrow. His security was quite a different matter from that of the coalition troops in Paktika, fearful of a suicide attack or a renewal of insurgency by the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

The redefinition of security (security from the point of view of people, as opposed to that of other “referents”) was initiated in 1994. In this new perspective, the answers, and more importantly the questions, were not what traditional security studies had been engaged with. Security, seen as the Westphalian prerogative of the nation, was a contract between sovereign states. At the domestic level, the state would enter into a Hobbesian bargain with subjects who would trade in certain rights in exchange for protection by the Leviathan against war. What this bargain had failed to foresee was a situation in which the state was unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, when threats were not of a military nature coming from other states, but consisted of gross violations of human rights practiced by the state itself or of underdevelopment that the state did nothing to correct. In such cases the state could no longer claim that its use of force was legitimate. These are the realities of Afghanistan today.

A human security approach attempted to transform traditional notions of security, framed in terms of national and regional stability and the stability of political and economic systems, and to focus on human beings. This meant that the primary threats to be dealt with were no longer the exclusive domain of military forces. Primary threats were seen as internal:
economic failure, violation of human rights, political discrimination. Hence, the guarantee of national security no longer lay in military power, but in favorable social, political and economic conditions, the promotion of human development, and the protection of human rights.

This paper is divided into two parts. Part One examines the definitions of human security and its reception by the international community. The second part analyses the implications that the adoption of a human security approach imply in deciding policies and applying programs. The inserts that appear throughout the paper apply the analysis to Afghanistan based on research conducted for the National Human Development Report between 2001 and 2004 (see Appendices)².

What Is Human Security?

To begin with, there is no single definition of human security. In the literature devoted to international relations and to development issues it has been referred to in various terms: as a new theory or concept, as a starting point for analysis, a world view, a political agenda, or as a policy framework. Although the definition of human security remains an open question, there is consensus among its advocates that there should be a shift of attention from a state-centered to a people-centered approach to security, that concern with the security of state borders should give way to concern with the security of the people who live within those borders.

The simplest definition of security is “absence of insecurity and threats”. To be secure is to be free from both fear (of physical, sexual or psychological abuse, violence, persecution, or death) and from want (of gainful employment, food, and health). Human security therefore deals with the capacity to identify threats, to avoid them when possible, and to mitigate their effects when they do occur. It means helping victims cope with the consequences of the widespread insecurity resulting from armed conflict, human rights violations and massive underdevelopment. This broadened use of the word “security” encompasses two ideas: one is the notion of “safety” that goes beyond the concept of mere physical security in the traditional sense, and the other the idea that people’s livelihoods should be guaranteed through “social security” against sudden disruptions.

The concept of human security was elaborated on the basis of empirical research conducted after the end of the post-Cold War period. Respect for sovereignty was shaken by too many examples where states themselves became perpetrators of insecurities, not only failing to fulfill their obligations toward their subjects but threatening their very existence. At the same time, this era saw a variety of new and often unsuccessful international interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. While conflicts seemed to be settled, the very reasons that had led to conflict in the first place were not dealt with through

² All inserts are adapted from the UNDP National Human Development Report of Afghanistan: Security with a Human Face, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, editor in chief, Daud Saba, Omar Zakhilwal principal writers, and Michael Schoiswohl and Aby Masefield contributing writers.
rehabilitation and long-term peace-building efforts. The end of bi-polar competition also led to the appearance of new phenomena. New actors appeared on the scene: international organizations, private investment companies, NGOs and non-state entities that were to play an active role in international relations. At the same time, while the risks of global confrontation and major inter-state conflicts decreased, the end of the bipolar era marked the rise of new threats – or to be more accurate, marked a new awareness of the prevalence of threats that has been insufficiently taken into account: intra-state conflicts, ethnic confrontations, terrorism, and forced displacement, extreme poverty, HIV/AIDS etc. – threats that were borderless, closely connected, and potentially crippling in their effects on societies worldwide.

In the academic and policy-making circles, the need to analyze root causes and find solutions to end misery, born of conflict or underdevelopment, prompted focus on the expansion of the idea of security. In a September 2004 issue of Security Dialogue, for example, 21 scholars were asked to explain what they understood by human security, and whether such a concept could ultimately find a place in academic studies and policy research organizations. Debate centered on the definitions given the term, its advantages and weak points, and on the changes that would be necessary to develop its theoretical and practical implications.

Scholars and policy makers fall into three categories: those for whom human security represents an attractive idea but one that lacks analytical rigor; those who, while accepting the term, insist on limiting it to a narrowly conceived definition; and those for whom a broad definition of the human security concept is an essential tool for understanding contemporary crises.

Human security comes under harshest attack from members of the first group who argue that shifting the focus to concentrate on people does nothing to render analysis more pertinent. Furthermore, the increase in the number of elements labeled as threats only makes it more difficult to study the connections between them. Among the most adamant critics are realist scholars of security studies, who, in the tradition of Kenneth Waltz, warn against treating as security issues phenomena that do not represent a direct threat to human life. Barry Buzan, although a proponent of extending the concept of security to include economic and ethnic factors, notes the risk inherent in the excessive broadening of the definition of security and the treating of human rights issues as urgent elements of the agenda. Championing such concerns, it is argued, represents an attempt on the part of development agencies to gain acceptance for their programs, or for a coalition of like-minded states to impose their will. Proponents of human security are accused of trying to establish causal relations – between socio-economic issues and political issues or between the safety of the individual and the maintenance of international peace – which are unwarranted. And yet, whatever approach is adopted, one taking a minimal definition of “security” as point of departure or one (such as human security) that gives primary importance to “development”, the tendency to blur the distinction between dependent and independent variables makes causal analysis almost impossible. Insecurity, for example, can be both a cause and a consequence of violence. Any threat can be studied as a dependent or as an independent variable.

3 Taylor Owen, “Proposal for a Threshold Definition”, in What is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors,
Advocates of human security are divided between those who are content with a narrow definition, focusing exclusively on factors that perpetuate violence and those for whom a broad definition which encompasses issues of human rights and underdevelopment is to be preferred.

Proponents of a broad definition argue that instead of lamenting the lack of workable definitions, research should be concerned with the way in which the definitions insisted on by security studies circumvent political, moral and ethical concerns in order to concentrate on relations of power\textsuperscript{4}. In this perspective the lack of an agreed-upon definition is not a conceptual weakness but represents a refusal to succumb to the dominant political agenda. A broad definition is therefore critical to transforming the ethos and engaging in the “political” act of raising questions that are peripheral to security studies. This approach encourages comprehensive measures which can be applied to issues that affect the everyday lives of people. For these advocates, human security provides a language and rationale for taking into account the concerns of the majority of humanity; these concerns may be subjective, but it is nonetheless the subjective sense of the security of individuals that in the last analysis is of paramount importance. If security is ultimately a feeling, then human security must be a felt experience.

The main challenge within the academic community is twofold. First, as an interdisciplinary concept human security has to forge a dialogue between security and development specialists so as to find common ground in at least two different and up-to-now seemingly unrelated fields. A comprehensive, pluralistic approach to the establishment of a human security framework creates tangible difficulties given current compartmentalization of disciplines within academia and policy-making institutions. Within the university, interdisciplinary studies, although desirable, are difficult to put in place given the rigidity of administrative structures\textsuperscript{5}. Within policy circles and international institutions, the difficulty is compounded by the lack of interdisciplinary approaches among donors and governments, each with different “mandates” in the case of the former, and different ministries in the case of the latter. While multi-disciplinary or multi-sectoral approaches have been experimented with, for example through the creation of commissions on cross-cutting issues such as poverty or gender, the real difficulty is the lack of experience in this domain, and the lack of methodological know-how.

Second, debate has also taken place between academic researchers and policy makers, who for the most part clash when they don’t simply avoid all form of dialogue. It is not here a question of choosing a narrow or a broad-based definition of human security, but a question of whether academic research has an effect on policy setting. Is it simply the availability of funds and the attraction of innovating concepts that stimulates academic research, unconnected to any practical application? Or can there be a successful marriage


\textsuperscript{4} Kyle Grayson, in \textit{What is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors}, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{5} The Tufts Center for Human Security is one of the few universities that has been able to create a multi-disciplinary program (a human security certificate) that integrates research in the disciplines of development, human rights and conflict resolution. The University of British Columbia offers another (successful) program of a similar kind.
between research and policy? Are policy decisions taken on theoretical grounds, or do we act first and then adjust the theory later? Human security is in an uncomfortable position, caught between the normative and positivist approaches, caught in the dichotomy between the pragmatic and the theoretical.

Human security still has a long way to go before there is agreement on one precise definition; however it may prove to be more effective as a broad flexible framework rather than being codified in rigorous terms. More important than discussion of definitions is analysis of the consequences (both positive and negative) when a human-security type of approach is adopted.

If addressing security issues entails the necessity to establish priorities for action and policy, which of the many threats that exist deserve the most attention? Human security as a policy tool has been criticized by those who claim that crowding the list of threats makes the prioritization of political action impossible and leaves “securitization” (by which is meant a call for rapid military solutions) as the only option. Critics lament that prioritizing everything is equivalent to prioritizing nothing, and therefore leads to inaction. They argue that a human security definition which includes so many components, ranging from the physical to the psychological, without a clearly established hierarchy, presents difficulties for policy makers forced to choose between competing goals and to concentrate their resources on specific solutions to immediate problems. Such criticism stems from the fear that the result of expanding the definition of security will be an increased use of force considered as the “responsibility” of the international community. One can counter this criticism by recalling two obvious but often forgotten facts: states alone are not the only “policy” actors, and “interventions” should not only be through military means but should involve longer-term engagements, including incentives such as trade expansion and delivering on promises of aid and debt relief, as well as “sticks” such as judicial prosecutions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Securitization should not be taken to mean militarization. The discourse on human security does not seek to raise every possible issue to the highest policy priority; it only seeks to establish thresholds below which people’s lives are in danger and their dignity threatened.

On the question of priorities, it should be said that the fallacy is in assuming that viable policies are to be made by top “political actors”, who sift through competing demands in order to choose one or two suitable targets for attention and resources; their decisions ignore that reality may in fact be many-faceted, involving a host of interconnected factors. Policy-making should not be a vertical process but a networked, flexible and horizontal coalition of approaches corresponding to a complex paradigm. Furthermore, to “hierarchize” and prioritise among human security goals may be a futile exercise, as the concept is based on the postulate that all threats are interdependent: the eradication of one of them is of little effect without the implementation of comprehensive security to restore individuals’ dignity. Perhaps then it is less a question of prioritisation among competing goals for policy makers than about identification of thresholds of minimal welfare and human dignity. Such thresholds, which involve setting up criteria for the measurement of human security, are difficult to establish given the distinction between objective and subjective factors; security, at whatever level, will always remain in part a subjective feeling, and thresholds of tolerance will be different in different cultures, at different times, and in different places. That these thresholds are defined circumstantially does not make them
invalid. Thresholds of human security are not to be defined in terms of isolated violent acts or by sporadic human rights violations, but as structural in nature.

Where is the bar to be set then? The answer depends on the impact these thresholds have for national and international policy. A threshold-based approach to human security requires choosing policies on the basis of their concrete effects on people’s welfare and dignity. These effects do not necessarily entail violence, but create conditions of livelihood below an acceptable level of human dignity. They cannot always be quantitatively monitored, for example through indicators such as the cost of living, life expectancy and mortality rates, wage scales, etc., as they are qualitatively defined in terms of what is intolerable and inhuman. At the same time, the exercise is political as it points up a wide range of issues for the national and international actors who are responsible for providing human security as a public good. A threshold-based definition recognizes that certain threats cannot be dealt with by traditional institutions but are severe enough to require immediate action, both in the short term to handle the crisis and in the long term to prevent reoccurrence.

Whose Agenda Is It? Human Security as Political Discourse

• New Questions Concerning the State and Intervention Policies

Beyond the academic dialogue as to whether security should be broadened and deepened as an analytical framework, human security introduces a number of new ideas for policy interventions. As a policy tool it allows a re-examination of the changing norms of sovereignty, collective security, and power politics. Ultimately, the question is posed as to who is in the best position to “provide” human security as a public good. Who are the actors, what are their duties, and what are the factors that impinge on their responsibility to protect?

The responsibility to provide human security falls first and foremost on the states. This conclusion is based on a reexamination of the changing nature of sovereignty, broadening the definition so as to go beyond the protection of borders and to include responsibility to provide for the well-being of the population. If sovereignty is seen as simply negative sovereignty, that is to say as freedom from outside intervention, we are reminded of the Hobbesian social contract that was supposed to accompany the Westphalian bargain between states. A truly effective state is one that plays a central role in economic and social development, if not as a direct provider of growth at least as a partner, catalyst, facilitator and regulator – one that can provide for human security and deal with social breakdowns. The strength or weakness of a state is therefore to be judged not simply on the basis of its capacity to handle problems that threaten its security (such as for example armed insurgency or ethnic strife) but on the basis of its capacity to ward off threats to the health, welfare and

6 Taylor Owen, art. cit.
level of life of its citizens. Hence, if a failed state is traditionally considered as one that threatens regional security, from a human security point of view, a weak or failed state is primarily one which cannot deliver on the state-society bargain inside its own borders.

When states are not willing or capable of bearing the ‘responsibility’ of their own sovereignty, other actors, such as international organisations, have, if not an obligation, a moral responsibility to act. The discussion of who should provide human security in the case of weak or collapsed states is therefore closely linked to the debates on international intervention. It prompts a shift in both the ends and means of intervention, and focuses the debate on new ways of engagement at the international level. The new forms of engagement for collective human security involve not only military intervention as a reaction to crisis, but a responsibility for the prevention of crises and the rebuilding of society. Human security interventions and engagements should therefore be long-term and focus on eradication of grievances, and not only come into play when a breakdown has already occurred.

One of the most important challenges is to determine whether in fact this approach will result in the widening of the North/South divide. To many G77 countries, “human security” is seen as yet another criterion that challenges, on moral grounds, the sovereign role of the state by threatening intervention by the international community on behalf of the population. Its focus on the individual is considered as misplaced by proponents of the Asian model of social development, while others fear that the result will be the adoption of a double standard, whereby rich western nations will use human security as a pretext for adopting punishing measures in dealing with developing countries, without abiding by its tenets themselves. Critics among the G77 argue that human security is yet another ethnocentric paradigm which emphasizes subjective aspects and values while reinforcing the economic might of the North; it represents yet another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies. Their concern is strengthened by their belief that rich countries, faced with economic and social underdevelopment in the South which, if allowed to continue, will breed political instability that will eventually spill over to North, will decide to press for further militarization, as has been the case in the current global war against terrorism. They argue that it is precisely this security dilemma and militarization that threatens a South already weakened by interventions, economic sanctions and debt crisis.

Such fears are confirmed by the fact that most of the literature on human security treats it exclusively as part of an internationalist agenda. Some countries have adopted it as a foreign policy, but no Western country has made use of the concept in a domestic context to analyze the needs of its own citizens.

• Human Security on the International Scene

The concept of human security has been adopted by a number of states, as well as regional and international organizations. Chronologically, we can establish three broad stages: 1) a world debut was the Global Human Development Report of the UNDP in 1994 that sought to seize the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War, but was met with scepticism from the G77 for fear it would lead to violations of state sovereignty; 2) between
2001 and 2003, the concept was revived in the debate on the “responsibility to protect”, spearheaded by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and in the discussions on the “responsibility for development” initiated by the Japanese Commission on Human Security (CHS), with the two governments – Canada and Japan – providing the necessary leadership and funding for including human security on the global agenda; 3) in the years 2004-2005, as the need to readjust to the new realities of the 21st century and in particular to find means of mounting concerted, collective responses to new threats became increasingly clear, human security, conceived of as the linking of security to development, became a topic of reform agendas in the UN and in such regional organizations as the European Union.

From its debut as a concern of international development agencies, to its adoption as a foreign policy option by some Western countries, to its acceptance today as a framework for reforming global institutions, the concept has gradually moved into mainstream politics. What does acceptance of such an approach imply about the political identity of the states and institutions that have adopted it? Will human security be proposed and voted on as a resolution of the General Assembly within the next few years? Will a consensus on a definition be found? As in the case of terrorism, the lack of agreement on a definition has for decades been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. Terminology consensus will be necessary if a comprehensive human security program is to be decided on and implemented. But there is little chance that a globally satisfying definition will be found in the near future, and equally little chance that the UN will adopt human security resolutions. Critics of the concept, including China, India, France and the US – acting out of fear that such an approach would provide new excuses for unwarranted interventions and thus violate state sovereignty and convinced, as well, that there would be no agreement on enforcement mechanisms – would most likely block any such resolution.

– For the UNDP an opportunity to take advantage of the end of the Cold War and promote “secure” human development

Much of literature on human security attributes the official “launching” of the concept in global politics to the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994, which treated it as an extension of the human development paradigm. For the 1994 HDR definition, human security, characterized as “freedom from fear and freedom from want”, had two aspects: first, protection from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and second, protection from sudden, harmful upheavals of daily existence, touching on housing, employment and community life. The 1994 definition was broken down into seven components: the economy, food, health, the environment, security of persons, community security, and freedom to engage in political activities. Going beyond the more traditional weaknesses associated with underdevelopment (poverty, hunger, disease, pollution etc.) an attempt was made to define insecurity as a form of structural violence. This human development approach to human security was not only concerned with gross violations of human rights, armed conflicts, and natural disasters, but encompassed wide-ranging aspects of underdevelopment: inequality, public health, international crime, population growth and environmental degradation. These were to be the new focuses of development assistance for the international community; preventing them would be less costly than having to deal with their subsequent consequences.
To traditional security concerns, human security added new issues and targeted new objectives of “security”. It was thus a precondition for the process of human development and a necessity for its sustainability. Human development was about expanding people’s freedom to live a life of their choice by providing an equitable, participatory process of economic growth; human security, on the other hand, focused on the “downside risks”, abrupt changes or disruptions that threatened people’s livelihoods. In terms of the UNDP definition, human security means that people should be able to exercise their choices safely and freely, while being relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not lost tomorrow. The need to go beyond simply improving conditions of life was for example highlighted by the Asian economic crisis. While the region had made significant progress in terms of human development, the sudden economic downturn starting in 1997 had real and devastating effects on the lives of individuals, with consequences that traditional human development programs were not prepared to deal with and which required a different approach.

– For the United Nations, an occasion to rethink collective security and its relevance to peace-building mandates

Within the UN, the concept of human security was first formulated in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, proposed by Boutros Boutros Ghali, which stressed the indispensable role of the UN “in an integrated approach to human security” as one of the new requisites in peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict management. But it was Kofi Annan who first adopted the human security agenda in a personal quest for a new UN mandate, which he first proposed in the 1999 Millennium Declaration. Defining peace as “much more than the absence of war” he called for human security to encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. The adoption of a human security agenda by the UN stemmed from a recognition of the failure of its peacekeeping efforts and its desire to compensate for these failures by involving the UN in a more global forum where NGOs could dialogue with, or exert pressure on, governments in order to implement more feasible development agenda.

By the end of 2004, two documents had appeared in which attempts were made to clarify human security threats and what the international community should do about them. One was the report from the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, and the other was the reform agenda proposed by Kofi Annan in Towards All Freedom. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was established in late 2003 by the Secretary General to look beyond the traditional security concerns of the era. In the post-Iraq world it was first of all necessary to clearly define the new issues: terrorism, the doctrine of preemptive intervention, and humanitarian intervention in the name of human security. Second was the need to define the proper role for the UN, whose responsibility was challenged by both globalization and the emergence of one superpower prepared to use force unilaterally to serve its own national interests. In several ways the report the panel released in December

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of 2004, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* advanced the cause of human security. It set a broad framework for collective programs to address new and exacerbated security threats. The panel grouped today’s threats into six clusters: economic and social threats, such as poverty and deadly infectious disease; inter-state conflict and rivalry; internal violence including civil war, state collapse and genocide; nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. But beyond recognition of these threats, it also made clear the connections between them. Poverty, infectious disease and war were recognized as feeding on one another in a deadly cycle. Poverty was closely associated with the outbreak of civil wars – wars that disrupted and destabilized societies and their economies. Diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS caused large numbers of deaths and so contributed to increased poverty. The High-Level Panel thus argued that broadly based development was indispensable for the establishment of the new collective security, development that would entail greater intergovernmental cooperation and for which partnership between national, regional and civil society actors was an essential element.

The High-Level Panel outlined a reform package which Kofi Annan proposed to the member states in March of 2005 aimed at restoring UN credibility and relevance for this new era of collective security. Although the report, entitled *In Larger Freedom*, did not specifically employ the term “human security” for fear of raising questions concerning a concept not yet debated by the General Assembly, it clearly underscored the linkages between human rights, development and security as three imperatives which reinforced each other. “While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to “cause” civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence […] And countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to development”. The report stressed the fact that poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation could have “consequences as catastrophic” as civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Alluding to the widespread preoccupation with conditions created when states failed to provide for the basic needs of their citizens, the report stressed that these threats could undermine not only people’s survival but also “the state as the basic unit of the international system”.

While it did not establish a policy framework, the document was important in terms of the institutional reform proposals it made, notably four that – even though they have not been adopted so far – are under active consideration: expanding the UN Security Council, defining terrorism, increasing foreign aid, and replacing the UN Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council. Underlying these proposals was the basic issue of how the UN could effectively learn from its failures in places like Bosnia and Rwanda a

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10. Ibid.
decade ago, Darfur and the Congo today. Yet, the validity of collective action on the part of the UN has been challenged by new interventions, especially unilateral ones as in the case of Iraq, interventions based on national interest but undertaken using human security as a cover. For example, among the many arguments advanced for the invasion of Iraq were, on one hand, the supposed existence of WMDs, which were said to threaten the security of the American people, and on the other hand the goal of “bringing democracy” to the people of Iraq as a way of providing peace and prosperity. Both were human security arguments, but were used to justify what many consider an illegal and immoral unilateralism. In order to counter such attempts to misapply the human security concept in this manner, the UN sought to position itself as the sole authority capable of organizing multilateral initiatives and global networks, functioning as a neutral supra-national body.

– For global commissions, the need to redefine the conditions for intervention and engagement

One of the most salient criticisms of a human security approach, especially when promoted by states on behalf of the people of other states, is the fear that it will turn into a carte blanche for intervention. To alleviate such fears and clarify the conditions and modalities for intervention, the Canadian government launched an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) co-chaired by Gareth Evans, ICG Director and Mohamed Sahnoun, the Algerian Special Advisor to the Secretary General. By the time the Commission began its work in November 2000, the international community had encountered serious problems regarding intervention policies and practices that it had undertaken: the uncertain status of the campaign waged in Kosovo, the failure to intervene in Rwanda, the precipitous withdrawal from Somalia that left the country in shambles, and the failure to protect vulnerable communities in Bosnia – in short a dismal record that prompted review of the policy of intervention in general. Responding to the Secretary General’s challenge to take into account the existence of people’s sovereignty within state sovereignty, the ICISS was to examine new actors and institutions, new security issues and new demands and expectations, using human security as a conceptual framework that in a world characterized by globalization and the spread of technology would provide expanded opportunities for common action.

The final report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect, by way of answer to critics of military interventions in sovereign states for humanitarian purposes, made a number of important points. First it redefined the meaning of sovereignty to include a dual responsibility: in foreign affairs respect for the sovereignty of other states and within its borders respect for the dignity and basic rights of all its people. The report echoed Kofi Annan’s insistence that sovereignty belonged to the people as well as to the state. Second, it redefined interventions as actions taken against a state or leader, with or without its or his consent, for purposes defined as humanitarian or protective. These could mean both military interventions as well as alternatives such as economic sanctions, criminal prosecution, etc., used as preventive measures (to forestall the need for military action). However, the Commission also set a number of conditions that had to be fulfilled before intervention was to take place, conditions which in fact severely limited reliance on the military. Responsibility to protect also entailed the responsibility to prevent crisis by taking measures early on to deal with the underlying causes. There was a duty to intervene in crisis...
situations, but also a duty to rebuild in the post-crisis period. The report clarified aspects of post-intervention policy: the return to peace and order, the establishment of justice, reconciliation, local development, and emphasized as well the necessity of setting a time limit on the duration of foreign occupation.

It was not, as some feared, a report that endorsed military interventions in the name of human security. The decision to intervene was to be taken only in extreme cases where other measures, such as arms embargos, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure, had not been effective as coercive measures. The report identified six criteria that had to be met for military intervention to be justified: a) the authority to intervene (to be obtained from the UN Security Council), b) a situation that could lead to large-scale loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing, c) the necessity to halt or avert massive human suffering, d) the reliance on the military as a last resort, e) the use of appropriate methods, and f) reasonable prospects of success. Although the report was primarily focused on the causes of conflict, making of prevention the single most important aspect, the sections devoted to military-type responses received the most attention due to the timing of its publication. The launching of the report coincided with new security interests that came to the fore in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, when world attention was taken by the rapid reactive and preemptive strikes by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The occupation of Iraq then led to further reluctance to accept any doctrine that could be used to justify ill-conceived Northern-led military interventions initiated without taking into account any of the conditions the report had carefully set out and without any assessment of costs and benefits.

The atmosphere of the post-September 11th world also explains the lukewarm reception that greeted the report of the Global Commission on Human Security in April of 2003, a report which argued that human security was a public good that, in the aftermath of conflict situations, should be provided by states and communities instead of through military interventions by the international community. The Commission on Human Security (CHS), co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former head of UNHCR, and Noble Prize laureate Amartya Sen had been created by the Japanese Government in 2001 as an attempt to examine new responsibilities with a focus on communities and states in the process of development. In its final report, Human Security Now, the Commission defined human security as the necessity to protect vital freedoms by building on people’s strengths and aspirations (Sen’s approach to “capabilities”), and by protecting them from hostile incursions and disruptions (Ogata’s approach). The CHS Report stressed twin strategies – empowerment and protection. Empowerment would enable people to develop their full potential and become active participants in decision-making. Protection would shield people from danger by a concerted effort to set up institutions that would address the problems of insecurity and establish norms for law-abiding existence. The Commission’s report, despite the fact that it received a halfhearted reception because of its failure to further clarify the notion of human security, became the backbone of the largest trust fund in the history of the UN, established by the Japanese government to finance human security projects. It provided impetus for coordinated action among UN agencies and civil society organizations in advocating alternative concepts of security. Ultimately, it gave the Japanese government a leading role in lobbying for alternative modalities of power distribution in the UN Security Council.
For regional actors, the occasion to rethink collective security policies

Both of these Commissions stressed the importance of regional intergovernmental organizations as better placed then the states themselves to ensure human security within their defined boundaries, a role endorsed by Article 52 of the UN Charter. Three arguments were advanced in asserting the primary role of regional actors in providing preventive and protective human security. First, regional bodies are quick to recognize the importance of dealing swiftly and effectively with catastrophes that have significant direct effects on neighboring countries through spill-over across national borders (for example the passage of refugee flows or rebel groups across state borders). Second, regional actors may well be in a position to understand the cultural dynamics of strife more intimately than outsiders. Finally, involvement by other regional powers is less likely to be perceived as illegitimate interference than when other states intervene. But their effectiveness is also limited by several factors. Regional organizations are often structurally weak and reluctant to become involved in civil wars; they may also be partial, having a stake in particular aspects of a conflict; and finally the lead role may be taken up by one player for its own foreign policy interests. Nevertheless, two regional organizations have spearheaded attempts to include human security as a part of their regional agenda: the European Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The EU. Human security was proposed as a foreign security policy for the EU by a group of experts from LSE who presented The Human Security Doctrine for Europe to Javier Solana in September 2004 at the Barcelona Forum. The rationale for acceptance of the doctrine by the EU, the largest contributor to humanitarian and development assistance in the world, was twofold. First, as an outward-looking strategy, it could reinforce the image of the EU as a successful example of peaceful development based on cooperation, and on core values: respect for diversity, the rule of law, human rights, democracy and citizen participation. Second, as a defense strategy, the report argued that a contribution to global human security was now the most realistic security policy for Europe, given that where people lived in poverty, where violence and lawlessness reigned under dogmatic ideologies, there was fertile ground for human rights violations, for criminal networks and for terrorism with as consequence the importation of hard drugs and weapons into the European Union. The aim of the doctrine was to stress the need to address the increasing insecurity that existed beyond the borders of Europe.

The doctrine defined human security as the freedom for individuals from the harm caused by human rights violations. The proposal came in three separate parts. First a set of seven principles that would serve as guidelines in terms of objectives and methods of operation. These guidelines concerned 1) the type of operation, 2) the necessity to pay primary attention to human rights, 3) adoption of a regional focus, 4) a bottom-up approach directed at the mass of the population, 5) dialogue and consultation, 6) intelligence gathering, and 7) sustainability. Second, the report proposed a “Human Security Response Force”, composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). This force would be drawn from troops and from civilian organizations made available by member

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states as well as from a proposed “Human Security Volunteer Service”. Third, the report proposed a new legal framework that would govern both the decision to intervene and the operations on the ground. This new legal framework would be based on the laws and practices of the intervening states and on international criminal and human rights law.

The proposed doctrine was an elaboration of the European Union’s attempts to develop a common security policy, based on preventive engagement and effective multilateralism, a policy which had previously been formulated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) report, A Secure Europe in a Better World, in December of 2003. It reflected as well changes in the strategic environment after September 11th and Iraq, where Europe hoped to play a more active role in the responsibility for global security and for the protection of its own borders from new global threats. The doctrine reaffirmed the close connections between conflict, insecurity and poverty and called for the courage to tackle root causes. Nonetheless, the recommendations that were made still granted the leading role to military rather than to civilian campaigns. While the report did recognize non-military considerations – such as competition for natural resources – policy recommendations remained vague on issues such as the handling of incipient crises, avoiding conflicts, and addressing the underlying causes of instability.

If the policies set forth in the European report can be considered as an enhanced defense strategy that focused in large part on avoiding the dangers inherent in immigration and terrorism, another more human-security oriented proposal was the framework prepared by the Dochas (The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations) for the Irish EU Presidency in 2004. This proposal’s human security perspective for European policy adopted a more developmental approach by emphasizing human rights, democratic participation and strict standards of accountability. Among the issues raised were European trade policy, EU commitment to multilateralism, the fight against HIV, and the financing of developmental projects. The paper claimed that the EU could make of its own accomplishments an effective foreign policy argument, demonstrating how economic integration and the adoption of a common set of rules and regulations could reduce the probability of warfare. It remains to be seen how such an enhanced security and development agenda can be implemented by a region in which 25 member states have to agree on a common doctrine, while at the same time including human security provisions as part of their own national policy.

The ASEAN. For South-East Asian countries, except for Thailand, the 1994 UNDP definition of human security was initially seen as a critique of the region’s comprehensive security approach. In the mid-1980s this approach had been developed on the basis of the Japanese sogo anzen hoshō, which considered the states and their ruling regimes as the source of political stability, economic development and social harmony. The concept called for cooperation within the region based on respect for sovereignty and a policy of non-interference. There was no common definition of what an outside menace might consist of; threats to individual states were seen as threats to the security of all the states, given the close ties that bound the societies of the region together. The 10 ASEAN countries, although set apart by their differing colonial experiences, their wide variety of political systems, their

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varying patterns of trade and alliance, and the discrepancies between them in economic terms, sought regional development and integration through creating a region-wide market and through strengthening regional competition. Security cooperation was handled by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which sought to build mutual confidence and trust regarding military policy among its 23 members that included countries in the broader Pacific sphere.

The inter-connectedness of the regional economies was tested by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which had deep-seated impact on the people of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines leading to increased poverty, inflation, and unemployment. The crisis sparked debate and discussion concerning a human security approach that would recognize and protect human rights while at the same time meeting people’s basic needs. The debate was spearheaded by Thailand, which proposed a common approach to problems shared by all, problems such as HIV/AIDS and poverty, which could have disturbing effects on the entire region. Thailand’s then Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, who later became one of the commissioners on the Human Security Commission, proposed a caucus on social safety nets to the ASEAN in 1998. He also proposed a flexible intervention policy that would allow member states to engage in discussions about sensitive political, economic and social problems with neighboring states that were encountering difficulties without, however, interfering with their sovereignty. But the discussions on adopting a human security approach, coupled with flexible engagement, were rejected by countries such as Myanmar among others. Yet, since the 1997 crisis, other non-military threats such as the SARS outbreak, bird flu, human trafficking, the tsunami disaster, and cross-border smuggling have revived the debate. Although no single regional approach to human security has been proposed, the ASEAN Vision 2020 has adopted as a goal “Freedom from want, freedom from fear for future generations”.

The distinction between comprehensive security and human security lies in three areas. First, comprehensive security focuses on human needs, while human security stresses human rights. Secondly, while comprehensive security seeks to determine the origins of security threats, the core concern of human security is to determine whose security is at stake. Thirdly, comprehensive security focuses on “order” and “stability”, while human security is geared more to justice and emancipation. Today, most of the literature on human security, be it critical or supportive, is produced by South-East Asian scholars. Most of these observers recognize the lack of human rights and the neglect of the quality of life (factors that characterize the security visions of the region) and most of them recognize as well that non-military threats such as environmental degradation, could undermine the stability of both the state and society, adversely affecting the people. They differ, however, as to the solutions: some suggest increased participation by NGOs, while others propose regional cooperation among “like-minded countries”.

Ultimately, if human security is to be adopted by ASEAN countries as a doctrine for combining the defense of the state and the defense of human rights, and as one that promises more than simply replying to military threats, interference for the common good will have to be rethought. The adoption of multilateralism on the basis of human security will require discussions on the need to reform the ASEAN and the ARF and the

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strengthening of their roles in the regional order. The failure of a collective response to the East Timor crisis should serve as a lesson. The challenge for the ASEAN is also to enhance the capacity of its weak states, such as Cambodia and Laos, as there remains widespread belief in the crucial role of the state in providing human security for the public good. A number of countries still view human security with suspicion, considering it as a potential obstacle to regime survival; this attitude deepens the North/South divide concerning human security issues. The ARF, with its diverse membership, is yet to forge a consensus on the principles of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; the ASEAN is still in the discussion stage concerning means to protect people and markets in the region against sudden downturns and global financial volatility. Yet the increased inter-dependence of East Asian countries is making regional cooperation for human security mandatory. Despite commitments to new approaches designed to combine security issues with development, it is likely that these regional organizations will continue to concentrate primarily on state (or regime) security rather than on human security. This is due on the one hand to the nature of the intergovernmental regional bodies which are hesitant to interfere with state sovereignty. On the other hand, the difficulty is compounded by a global environment where there is a clear tension between a commitment to disarmament that involves a non-military approach to security and a simultaneous commitment to developing a force for mutual defense and peacekeeping. It remains to be seen how the ASEAN, and the EU will manage this tension and how they will evolve.

– For national governments: human security as a foreign policy tool

Is human security a concept that in the last analysis serves only the interests of the state? There are two inherent problems concerning the adoption of the human security concept as a policy tool. One is that despite the fact that human security seeks to establish “justice” and provide for the protection and safety of the individual, it has raised fears that in practice it will lead to interventions that threaten state sovereignty. Second is the fact that although it has been propounded as a doctrine that downplays the importance of state-centered security interests, it is the states that have adopted it as a foreign policy tool – states such as Canada, Norway and Japan – while it has largely been ignored as a domestic policy on development and human rights.

The reasons why some states have adopted human security as their foreign policy option, and other have not, are twofold. One factor is the dynamics of the state’s domestic politics (as in the case of Canada), and another the desire by elite sectors of society to adopt the policy as a way to enhance the role of their country on the international scene. Human security as foreign policy is as an opportunity to draw attention to states with middle-power influence and status in the international arena. Yet, how can a people-centered approach to security be promoted by a state as a foreign policy without becoming an interest-based agenda used as a vehicle for furthering national power? As a foreign policy option it serves as a demonstration of a government’s interest in the well-being of people of other states, rather than its own. This interest is open to suspicion when the state in question pursues its own “traditional” security concerns for itself. Japan presents a good example. While supporting a human security mandate for its ODA, national military expenditures remained high. The North Korean issue has strengthened defensive policy and Japan has built a substantial nuclear power industry to reduce its reliance on imported oil. Although Japanese
citizens are economically well taken care of, human rights practices remain a concern: namely, racism and discrimination in Japanese society, the refugee issue and the issue of capital punishment.

Ultimately, when human security is adopted as a government’s diplomatic policy, and thus endorsed by the state, the paradigm is redefined so as to serve particular state-centered national interests. This has been the course taken by Canada and Norway for example, who have seen in the issue of human security an opportunity for “middle-power” states to gain greater independence vis-à-vis international institutions, greater influence in the United Nations, and increased credibility on the international stage, particularly (in the case of Canada and Japan) as regards the United States. For Japan, contributions of approximately $170 million to the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN Secretariat has cemented its status as a primary donor to Overseas Development Assistance and reinforces the country as an economic power not only regionally but internationally. Through the Ottawa Process, Canada focused on gaining recognition for its handling of post-conflict situations as peacekeepers – an area in which it had already established a reputation. These countries used the new human security paradigm to turn situations to their own advantage.

Japan: Freedom from Want. Japan has been one of the leading countries that has provided leadership and funding for human security, prompted by its desire to accede to a permanent seat at the UN. It is the second largest donor in the field. The Japanese approach to human security concentrates on “Freedom from Want”, one of the two goals set by the 1994 UNDP report. It promotes measures designed to protect people from threats to their livelihoods and dignity while supporting self-empowerment to bring out the people’s potential. In December 1998, in the context of the “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi launched the Japanese program on human security, citing it as a foreign policy based on “comprehensively seizing all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and strengthening efforts to confront threats.” To add credibility to its initiative, Japan established a Commission on Human Security and set up the largest Trust Fund in the United Nations.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the use of force to solve disputes, leaving Japan possessing only self-defense forces for international security purposes. Japan has used its engagement in developmental assistance as a way to circumvent its military limitations while at the same time playing an important economic role in the region. Beyond the constitutional constraints that prevent any kind of involvement in the field of traditional security, there are other reasons for the Japanese government’s commitment to human security. These include the goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the desire to play a leading regional role in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. The Asian crisis began as a monetary crisis, quickly became a financial crisis, then broadened into a full-scale economic crisis that had socio-political consequences that threatened regional security – proof, if needed, of the inter-dependence of the countries involved. The events of 1997 made the Japanese government aware of the fragility of the region’s economic base and the need for Japan to play a greater role in stabilizing the area’s economy by adopting a long-term agenda which the human security concept was in a position to provide. Through the Trust Fund, Japan also sought to open up the region, a region that held out great economic promise with China’s entry into the WTO, but which was also fraught with danger due to North Korean nuclear proliferation. The Japanese human security policy took
as model a ministerial-level program which had proved itself to be successful in the area of ODA, and which was very popular with the Japanese public. The Japanese diplomatic Bluebook claimed that human security, as defined by the CHS’s Human Security Now report, was “identical to the concept of development assistance which Japan has been implementing”. Yet Japan’s foreign aid, based on reciprocal agreements and the reliance on multiple credit sources, has drawn criticism from those who see it as a way to promote Japan’s own economic status. Furthermore, despite Japan’s official claim that its foreign policy is based on human security, it continues to pursue traditional security interests in the region, especially since the beginning of the North Korean nuclear threat in December of 2002. Thus the human security agenda in Japanese foreign policy is not a replacement of traditional security concerns but a complement. Nevertheless, the funding and leadership on human security issues provided by Japan has stimulated the emergence of programs concerned with development.

Canada: Freedom from Fear. While initially criticizing the UNDP definition of human security as so all-inclusive as to render it “an unwieldy policy instrument because of the breadth of its approach”, Canada concentrated as of 1996 on the UNDP’s goal of “freedom from fear”, calling for “safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats [...] a condition characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives”. Much of Canada’s interest can be attributed to the efforts of Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2000, who recognized the need to revamp Canada’s foreign policy with new measures needed to deal with post-Cold War problems: the situation of children caught in the war zones, the dangers of terrorism, the increase in drug traffic, and the circulation of arms. He called for addressing these issues through rapid humanitarian-inspired interventions for which responsibility would be shared. Canada’s adoption of the human security concept was considered by some as an attempt to rescue the country from military irrelevance. As a middle power with limited military capacity, Canada had to carve out for itself an international role so as to stand apart from its powerful neighbor to the south. The inclusion of human security on the foreign policy agenda was an attempt to combine a strong tradition of non-intervention with the ambition of playing a more important role in international affairs, while at the same time reducing threats to its own security by curbing immigration. Canada’s stance was also taken in response to the pressures exercised by a broad coalition of NGOs that, in formal partnership with the government and through Axworthy’s efforts, successfully lobbied for the adoption of the treaty banning landmines and for the creation of the ICC.

Canada’s human security policy is based on five priorities: a) public safety (building international expertise with the capacity to counter the growing cross-border threats posed by terrorism, drug trafficking and the spread of crime); b) protection of civilians (establishment of legal norms, reduction of the human costs of armed conflict, human rights field operations, and the deployment of military forces in extreme situations to bring atrocities and war crimes to a halt); c) conflict prevention (strengthening the capacity of the international community to resolve violent conflicts, building national and local capacity to manage political and social tensions without resort to violence by using targeted economic

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sanctions to reduce the chances of civil war breaking out); d) governance and accountability (fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions, with emphasis on building an effective International Criminal Court (ICC) and promoting reform of security institutions – including military, policy and judiciary – reducing corruption, promoting freedom of expression and encouraging corporate social responsibility) and e) peace support operations (bolstering international capacity to undertake peace missions, dealing with issues related to women, providing policy and civil experts to undertake complex missions).

A human security agenda allowed Canada to play a leading role in the campaign banning the deployment of landmines; the Ottawa Process, which led in December of 1997 to the signing by 122 countries of the “Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Destruction”, was seen as a successful implementation of Canada’s new policy agenda. Other results were the creation of the International Criminal Court, the Kimberley Process on conflicts in the diamond trade, and the launching of the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention with its landmark report, Responsibility to Protect, published in September 2000 by the the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade which addressed some of the criticisms of the interventionist elements of its "freedom from fear" approach.
WHAT IMPLICATIONS DOES THIS REDEFINITION OF SECURITY HAVE WHEN ADOPTED AS A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK IN PRAGMATIC TERMS?

We have discussed the problems attendant on the definition of human security and pointed to the uses made of it by certain states and international organizations. It is now time for us to examine the implications that this redefinition of security has for policy interventions, illustrating our discussion with examples taken from the situation in Afghanistan. We will analyze the issues involved under six headings: a framework of responsibility, redefining threats and actors, understanding the root causes of conflict, reevaluating military/development funding and expenditures, rethinking developmental assistance, and integrated solutions.

A Framework of Responsibility

By highlighting the interconnectedness of security threats, and according moral priority to the security of individuals, the human security paradigm emphasizes the need to protect populations and provide them with the means of existence, as well as the ethical obligation to intervene in cases when their security is in danger.

In order to ensure the people’s survival, livelihood and dignity, those in a position of power (the state and the international community) are responsible for both protecting and empowering them. For those on the receiving end, the responsibility entails formulating their needs and taking charge of their lives.

With an expanded notion of security come new types of responsibilities.

– First and foremost, that of the state: if sovereignty once meant monopoly over the use of violence and the defense of territory from external threats, it now has to integrate the idea of responsibility to protect and to empower.

The raison d’être of any actor or institution consists of their contribution to the well-being of the people, for it is the people who are, at least in theory, the source of their legitimacy. Seen in this perspective, the creation of the state is a means and not an end in itself; the end is the safety and the welfare of people. Agents of the state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts, both of commission and omission.

Human security is not an alternative to state security for it is up to the state to establish the rule of law and maintain social cohesion; when these conditions are not met the situation becomes dangerous. Neither is human security an alternative to national security. It is the taking into account of socio-economic factors as root causes of conflicts; as such, it is as important to national security as military or political measures to combat "national

enemies”. The focus on human security, therefore, does not mean an end to the role of the state in the management of development or security. The institutions of the state remain fundamental, and the absence of the state or its lack of effectiveness can be detrimental to human security. Indeed, “order requires rules, rules require authority, and authority is exercised on behalf of people by states”\(^\text{16}\). For this order to be socially, economically and environmentally sustainable, a strong and viable state is needed to act as mediator.

The responsibility of a viable state is then to provide stability, fostering equitable economic growth, ensuring essential social services, regulating the markets to prevent massive fluctuations, and allowing the people to take part in the decision-making processes. Providing education and employment can break the vicious cycle which threatens many countries, a cycle of poverty linked to malnutrition, compounded by lack of family planning as well as by the risk of HIV infection. Adopting a human security framework as a policy orientation allows states to address basic human needs, reduce inequalities and provide social safety nets for people who are impoverished or whose lives are disrupted by sudden and severe economic crises.

The heart of the question is the will and the capacity of those in a position of power to take care of their national or regional interests and protect their citizens. The achievement of such goals can be handicapped by natural causes or by poor handling of political, socio-economic and security issues. It is a fact that some states are incapable, or unwilling to take up their human security responsibilities. A state can open up its markets to unregulated competition without providing people with social safety nets, or an authoritarian state can suppress human rights and establish a reign of fear. In these cases, the state, instead of acting as a protector of human security, becomes a threat to the security of its own people. The capacity of a state to handle its own affairs may in fact also be weakened by conditions imposed by international institutions. When states are weakened by conflict or, as in the case of the former Soviet countries, undergo painful economic transformation, how can they fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens? For foreign-sponsored states, such as Afghanistan, where most of the operational and developmental budget is provided by the international community, accountability to the citizens is particularly problematic.

Second, an expanded notion of human security requires growing recognition of the role of people – of individuals and communities – in ensuring their own security.

Human security as public good constitutes a responsibility for the state, but there is a complementary duty for the people themselves to become engaged in the process. It is the response of the people that will allow the state to assume its true role and achieve moral legitimacy. As the Human Security Now report puts it, “achieving Human Security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves”\(^\text{17}\). Human security is thus not simply the challenge of “protecting” and “providing” but involves fostering the empowerment of the people and their participation. If the state is to be


entrusted with the responsibility to provide public goods, people have to play an active role in order to be in a position to hold it accountable. People are not passive recipients of “security”, or victims of its absence, but active subjects who can contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to security problems. Security cannot be compared to material goods that can be imported from the outside; it is a shared public good which involves subjective feelings and which requires people to formulate requests and demands, and to be prepared to make effective use of what they are granted.

Hence, empowering measures and education are key elements that the state and the international community can provide. The responsibility of individuals and local communities is to take in hand their own destinies. People can contribute directly by calling attention to security threats and proposing solutions. In post-conflict situations, bringing the diverse sectors of the population together to rebuild their communities can help ease security problems while involving them in the reconstruction process, fostering their sense of responsibility and sharpening their sense of the true nature of their needs. Empowered people can demand that their dignity be respected when their rights are violated. They can create new opportunities for economic development through their activities and find local answers to many problems. And they can mobilize as well for the sake of the security of others, by giving early warning of food shortages so as to prevent famines or by protesting human rights violations.

Supporting people’s ability to act on their own behalf means providing education and information so that they can be aware of social obligations and take collective action. It means furnishing a public arena that tolerates opposition, encourages local leadership and cultivates public discussion. It also means creating a global environment in which freedom of speech and of the press is respected, in which people are free to hold the religious beliefs of their choice, follow the dictates of their conscience and organize as they see fit. But the people also have the responsibility to act for the common good and not solely in self-interest. Criticizing others and creating a climate of suspicion does little to contribute to enhancing a society’s well-being.

- Third, the adoption of a human security paradigm in no way bars a role for the international community in cases where the state in question is unable – or unwilling – to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens, providing them with the necessities of life and opportunities for empowerment.

For the international community, human development concerns are considered as “domestic” matters; the individual states have a responsibility to provide for the welfare of their citizens. However, as the menaces to the safety of people have become trans-national, responses need to involve multilateral cooperation. Human security has the added advantage of stipulating that if a state fails not only to protect its people from inter-state conflicts or civil strife, but fails as well to take care of their basic needs and to furnish opportunities for development, then the international community can act to limit the damage and circumscribe the danger. As a preventive measure, human security calls for a new modality of global cooperation that falls just short of intervention.

The residual responsibility that belongs to the international community should not be interpreted as an excuse for ad-hoc military interventions for “humanitarian” reasons. Rather it should encourage the global community of nations to become responsible for taking
measures to prevent not only conflict, but also mass underdevelopment, hunger, disease, and environmental degradation, etc. Curbing the impact of violent conflicts through military means is not enough. Pledging and delivering sufficient funds, providing humanitarian aid, pursuing broad-based, equitable development, and upholding standards of human rights through respect for individual dignity and community diversity are key essentials of this responsibility.

Despite the desirability of assuming these new "responsibilities", the shift of focus that consists of recognizing the need to prevent threats is neither simple nor politically easy as it requires a re-examination of priorities and of the respective roles of the states and the international institutions. In addition, it raises the question of the participation of rich nations in the destitution of poor and conflict-ridden countries. The former were accomplices to the subversion of democracy in Africa and Latin America during the Cold War; in addition they profited from lucrative trading in arms, and from the maintenance of inequalities in the global economy. Responsibility as a concept means being accountable both for actions taken and for failures to take action. Violence results when opportunities to avert suffering, starvation, or premature death are not taken. The Human Security Commission emphasized the need to determine "who in particular has what obligations", and distinguished between the "perfect obligations" of those whose primary role it was to help and the "imperfect obligations" of those who could be called upon to provide assistance when warranted by the circumstances. The "responsibilization" of actors within a human security framework stems not only from a sense of moral obligation or duty but from a more pragmatic sense of responsibility based on self-interest, since the close links that exist between all sectors of the globe mean that all are vulnerable. Similarly, when developmental measures are promoted as a way to prevent conflict, it is the practical benefits which ensue for those that promote these measures that can count for more than the moral questions involved. Yet taking this approach is fraught with danger; for if it is only the spillover advantages that argue in favor of launching human security programs, then, if it can be shown that the promoters do not benefit from these collateral advantages, they may well decide to let the whole matter drop and give up their efforts to eradicate poverty. Thus the eradication of poverty should be pursued as a moral goal in and of itself, independent of the side effects it may or may not have.

Human security programs are for the most part underfunded because states are either incapable (because their economies are weak or their efforts directed elsewhere) or unwilling to provide sufficient backing. In addition the benefits of human security are often confined to a small circle (or "in-group") consisting of rich states and the elites that hold power in countries situated on the periphery. The reasons for this "human security deficit" range from domestic, political and economic failures of states, to the distributive failures of markets that perpetuate inequalities within and among states, to the unfair levels of international playing fields. The debate as to what organizations are in the best position to provide human security as a public good in a fair and efficient manner touches on issues concerning the capacity of states to act and the legitimacy and effectiveness of interventions sponsored by international institutions or non-governmental organizations. Some observers

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18 Ibid.
claim that the latter are the more dynamic since they are closer to the people concerned and more sensitive to their needs. Many questions remain as to how the costs are to be shared and how the risks are to be managed in this process of promoting the national or global public good.

Redefining Actors and Threats: Whose Security and Security from What?

The shift from state-based to individual-based security introduces two new questions: security of whom and security from what?

The human security approach considers human beings as the fundamental basis of security. In the last analysis, international security depends on the security of individuals. The international system is only as strong as its weakest link, and since weakness is contagious failures on the periphery can threaten the entire network of international interdependence. If the safety of individuals is the key to global security, then if this safety is threatened, so is international security. In this perspective the status of the individual is transformed from that of a simple citizen of his state into that of an actor involved in international relations. The individual becomes an “agent” who can be actively engaged in defining potential security threats, and who can participate in efforts to mitigate them. The survival, well-being and dignity of the individual become the ultimate goal, and constructs such as the state, the institutions of political democracy, and the marketplace are relegated to secondary status as simply means to achieve that goal. Threats to the power and sovereignty of states or to the solvability of markets or to the processes of democracy are to be taken seriously because they ultimately affect the well-being, capabilities, opportunities, and freedoms of the people.

Although the various definitions of human security differ as to the relative value to be accorded each element and the strategy to be employed, a simplified table can illustrate the differences between a state-centered and a human-centered approach to security.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Referent (object)</th>
<th>State-centered Security (a neorealist vision)</th>
<th>Human-centered Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security: if the state is secure, then those who live within it are secure.</td>
<td>Individuals are co-equal with the state. State security is the means, not the end</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Security Value            | Sovereignty, power, territorial integrity, national independence | Personal safety, well-being and individual freedom.  
1) Physical safety and provision for basic needs  
2) Personal freedom (liberty of association)  
3) Human rights; economic and social rights |
| Security Threats          | Direct organized violence from other states, violence and coercion by other states | Direct and indirect violence, from identifiable sources (such as states or non-state actors) or from structural sources (relations of power ranging from family to the global economy)  
- Direct violence: death, drugs, dehumanization, discrimination, international disputes, WMD  
- Indirect violence: deprivation, disease, natural disasters, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality |
| By what means              | Retaliatory force or threat of its use, balance of power, military means, strengthening of economic might, little attention paid to respect for law or institutions. | Promoting human development: basic needs plus equality, sustainability, and greater democratization and participation at all levels. Promoting political development: global norms and institutions plus collective use of force as well as sanctions if and when necessary, cooperation between states, reliance on international institutions, networks and coalitions, and international organizations. |
Shifting the Traditional “Security” Narrative in Afghanistan

In the case of Afghanistan presented in the Appendices (see Appendix 1) applying a human security approach means identifying the everyday insecurities of the Afghan people as opposed to the threats posed to the international community by a failed Afghan state. It means shifting away from the traditional security narrative for Afghanistan which continues to focus on the insecurity of the state, the fragility of the market, the dangers for humanitarian workers and the fate of international troops deployed in the country. It means arguing that the interests of other nations are not to be confused with the interests of the Afghan people as they are not the same (as exemplified by recent attempts to deal with the “drug problem”). Sticking to traditional views of security has led to the increased militarization of Afghan society and the privatization of security. In contrast to this traditional narrative of the “security problem” in Afghanistan, a human security approach asserts that the real security problem is that the reconstruction process has still not generated the means to provide services and jobs and protect human rights and human welfare in the country, especially in rural areas.

Because human security is concerned with the quality of life and not simply with mere survival, because it stresses the primary importance of a life lived in dignity, it takes as point of departure three essential principles: first, equal weight has to be given to underdevelopment and human rights violations on one hand and traditional “threats” to security on the other; secondly these threats are closely interconnected; which means that, thirdly, no one type of threat should be accorded priority over the others.

– First, the definition of what constitute a risk needs to be broadened beyond military threats to encompass a wider range of socio-economic and political factors essential to the survival, dignity and well-being of individuals.

Human security threats are of two kinds. Some are objective in nature, involving tangible, measurable elements, such as insufficient income, chronic unemployment, lack of access to adequate health care and quality education. Others are subjective: the sense that one is unable to control one’s destiny, a feeling of unworthiness or indignity, fear of crime or potentially violent conflict, etc. These threats can be direct (those that are deliberately orchestrated, such as systematic persecutions, or drug-related criminal networks) or indirect (those that stem from underlying structural factors such as a low level of investment in public services, health care and education).

Human insecurity consists of a multitude of varying types of threats that go beyond military or traditional security risks, and include

– socio-economic threats pertaining to employment, wage levels or access to major public services such as healthcare, housing, and education. Beyond the more traditional threats of underdevelopment (poverty, hunger, disease, pollution etc.) structural violence is also included in this category. Food should not only be available, but should be affordable in terms of the population’s income level. This dimension of human security, which can be measured quantitatively, is generally associated with “freedom from want” in the broadest sense;

– personal security threats, should be recognized as not limited to criminal violence but encompassing an individual’s state of apprehension. For example the fear of
losing access to health services when health insurance programs undergo reform, or the fear of losing a job when companies go through periods of restructuring, both of which contribute to increased stress. Threats can also emanate from the state (state use of torture), from invasion by other states, from international or cross-border terrorism, from menaces emanating from ethnic or religious groups or from gangs (street violence), domestic violence, violence against children (abuse, prostitution, labor) or even violence against one’s self (suicide or drug abuse). This dimension of human security is generally associated with “freedom from fear” and is most effectively measured by studies based on field work and first-hand observation;

– environmental threats, defined in this framework as not simply threats to the environment (destruction of natural resources for example) but how such destruction affects people concretely and increases their vulnerability (increased pollution leading to a scarcity of food supplies and fresh water);

– political threats, which include civil rights and human rights violations, violence stemming from armed conflicts, as well as irresponsible behaviour on the part of public officials, a corrupt civil service, institutions characterized by instability, a deficient judicial system, lack of law enforcement, etc. These issues are also generally associated with “freedom from fear”. In this category one can include the UNDP 1994 definition of “community security” which refers both to the security of the community as a functioning whole with its own specific identity and the security of the individuals within the community who should be protected from discriminatory practices instituted by the community itself.

– Second, threats are interlinked and interconnected.

Threats to human security are interconnected in two ways. First, they are mutually linked in domino patterns: the deterioration of health care can lead to poverty, which can lead to a lack of education, etc. When the environment is poisoned, the degradation can instigate population movements into other more fragile ecological settings, threatening the livelihood and health of those forced to move. Second, the various threats can spread across a given country (with impoverished areas, for example, upsetting the stability of more progressive sectors), or spill over into other regions (through massive migration due to unemployment, the export of arms, the increased drain on natural resources and so on) with as a result a negative impact on global security as a whole. In the complex global network in which we live, the breakdown of one element of the system leads to breakdowns throughout the system, producing a vicious cycle of cause and effect. These interconnections should increase our sense of urgency when dealing with crises that, on first appearance, appear to be local and circumscribed in nature.

– Third, the interdependence of threats means, ultimately, that no hierarchy of threats should be established.

It has often been argued that security is a pre-requisite for development. Threat analysis however, indicates that absence of development can in and of itself create conditions of insecurity, thus proving that developmental concerns deserve urgent attention on a par with efforts limited to security alone. Poverty and inequality for example can foster insecurity and conflict, in addition to being “inhumane” in themselves. It is imperative therefore to work
simultaneously on “freedom from fear”, which entails measures to ensure violence-free day-to-day life for everyone, and “freedom from want”, which calls for providing not only the basic needs of food and shelter, but also the more long-term need for a form of development that will prove to be sustainable in the future.

Insert 2

Identifying New Insecurities in Afghanistan

Peace is not just the absence of war, but a life that can be lived in dignity. Appendix 2 analyzes how the lives of the Afghan people are threatened by a series of factors that belong to the paradigm of human security: a) poverty, inequality and job insecurity, b) lack of education and health care c) food shortages and environmental degradation d) violation of human rights and gender discrimination, and e) political discrimination. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of these factors both reveal the extent to which Afghanistan has been deprived of the basic protections included in the concept of human security.

Understanding the Root Causes of Conflict: Greed and Grievance

A human security analysis can be of service in understanding the root causes of conflicts. Many reasons have been put forth to explain the causes of civil wars, including misunderstandings and failures of communication, deep-seated ethnic or religious hostility and intercultural animosity. Until very recently, however, studies of such conflicts in academic or policy circles have rarely gone beyond questions dealing with the economic consequences of these forms of violence. The human security approach, that is interested in understanding the root causes of conflict, and basing its analysis on the role of people as actors, has attempted to deal with both the objective realities that are involved in such strife as well as the more subjective perceptions and motivations that are part of the total picture. We will refer to the first aspect of the problem under the heading “greed”, and the second under the heading “grievance”.

• The Greed Model

Greed means grabbing hold of power and controlling resources. Given the opportunity, a corrupt leader recruits followers at little cost and uses them to enlarge his power base. There is little need for such a leader to command large sums, since the rebels or criminal gangs who serve as his militia have no choice but to accept what he grants them as they have no alternative source of income, and have little to lose in the process.

According to research by the World Bank and the International Peace Academy that analyzed the economic practices of armed factions, violent conflict most often occurs when
groups set out to accumulate booty. Their research findings, published in *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War*, concluded that much of post-Cold War conflict was caused not by political frictions, but was the result of operations undertaken for economic motives. Instead of regarding war as the continuation of politics by other means, as traditional wisdom would claim, *Greed and Grievance* concluded that conflict should be seen rather as the continuation of economics by other means. Warfare was better understood as “an instrument of enterprise and violence, as a mode of accumulation.”

Further findings of World Bank research argued that three key economic factors made a country susceptible to civil war. Paul Collier’s empirical/econometric research into the causes of large-scale civil conflicts from 1965 to the present concluded that the best indicators of coming conflict were, all other things being equal, firstly low average incomes, secondly the availability of a high proportion of young men with inadequate access to educational opportunities, and thirdly a low rate of growth with an economy largely dependent on exports of primary commodities such as oil, timber, or diamonds (products that could easily be stolen). The first two factors produced a pool of potential recruits among disaffected young men, while the third was a potential source of financing conflicts.

*The Grievance Model*

In the cases studied, however, the above factors interacted to varying degrees with long-standing socioeconomic and political grievances caused by inter-ethnic disputes or by the absence of security due to weak and ineffective governments. Hence, it was argued, the greed model was not sufficient in itself to explain the outbreak of conflict.

The grievance model, that was developed by Frances Steward and researchers at Oxford University, concentrated on the failure to respect the social contract as the root cause. When governments failed to live up to their obligations, when institutions were weak, public services inadequate, poverty and social inequality widespread, then conflict was likely. They noted that while wars were essentially group activities, individual grievances were often instrumental in prolonging conflict. In studying the economic and social causes of conflict for their report, *War and Underdevelopment*, they classified social groups in terms of religion, class, and ethnicity, taking into account as well clan and regional identities. They then analyzed the political and economic differences between these groups, concluding that “horizontal inequalities”, defined as a unequal levels of access to socio-economic opportunities, to resources or to power-sharing, could lead to deep-rooted conflicts, especially when these inequalities existed in a setting in which group identity provided an emotionally charged context often based on historical factors. It is not the mere existence of

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22 Mats Berdal, and David Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. 
inequalities that precipitates violence but a collective feeling of “unfairness” stemming from
the perception of a skewed distribution of development benefits among the different groups.
The likelihood of violence is increased when political power and the right to be heard are
also seen as reserved for a minority. A regime that does not recognize the existence of such
problems and does nothing to treat the causes and correct the abuses is a regime that is
derelict.

Inequality and poverty have been proven to be the roots of conflicts and uprisings
throughout the world, most recently in the March Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Poverty can
create situations in which soldiers, left to fend for themselves, engage in criminality or
terrorist activities considering that they have nothing to lose. Social tensions, that result from
exacerbated horizontal inequalities, can lead to antisocial behavior at all levels, ranging
from an increase in the number of divorces to a general breakdown of moral standards,
domestic violence, crime and forced migration. There are also direct links between the
absence of opportunities to make oneself heard and the decision to express oneself through
violent means. Poverty and inequality-induced violence stem ultimately from a lack of trust
in government and lack of respect for the social contract that ties people to their states.
Violence is rarely gratuitous: it is a means by which one group intends to achieve its goal of
dominating the others. Religious extremism, for example, constitutes a menace when it takes
as its target an individual’s cherished values, his way of life, his position in society or his
ideology.

• Failure of a Single-Model Approach

The vast majority of the academic debate on the causes of armed conflict have taken as
subject the greed versus grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing “loot-seeking” with “justice-
seeking” rebellions, and, more generally, comparing and contrasting the significance
of economic origins and socio-political origins of civil war. However, there is emerging
recognition of the analytical limits that taking this dichotomy as central to the debate
imposes on what are in reality extremely complex systems of interactions. While there is
overall agreement that economic factors contribute to generating conflict, there is little
agreement as to what extent they matter and little agreement as to the relative importance to
be accorded on one hand to economic factors and on the other to political and socio-
cultural factors. What therefore is needed is a synthesis of these two approaches, since both
models are to a certain extent valid.

Amartya Sen, for example, sees no strict causal relationship between violent, persistent
conflict and massive economic inequality and poverty, but only a relation of probability.
He warns against “economic reductionism”, against assuming that all social and political
strife is explained by hidden economic roots. His main concern is to have us understand that
such relationships are complex, and that to reduce everything to a question of poverty is a
misleading simplification. When taken as the basis for policy decisions, economic
reductionism downplays the intrinsic importance of eradicating poverty as an end in itself

23 Amartya Sen, “Global Inequality and Persistent Conflicts”, Paper presented at the Nobel Peace Prize
and treats it as simply a means of resolving conflicts and achieving political peace. Yet he
does concede that conditions for conflict and poverty do often co-exist. A deeply felt sense
of inequity and political dissatisfaction can trigger conflict, and poverty can be a fertile
recruiting ground for enrolling soldiers. Poverty can also increase tolerance for violence.
However it is not clear exactly what factors act as causes and what factors are effects: war
can cause famine, but famines can also lead to wars. For Sen, the establishment of peace
and the eradication of poverty stand in a complex relationship; each is both an end and a
means for the other.

Sen argues that, ultimately, the factors that characterize underdevelopment are also
present in pre-conflict situations. Sudden interruptions in economic and social progress
(such as those resulting from a financial crisis as in East Asia in 1997, or those that can come
about because of the collapse of state authority) can have the same impact on people’s
everyday livelihoods and dignity – and even on their survival – as open conflict. For
example, if, as a result of a financial crisis or a political upheaval, an individual sees his
savings completely wiped out, loses his job and his home, and falls ill, the personal
experience can be as traumatic as that occasioned by war or civil strife. While
underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, inadequate social, economic and
environmental conditions, as well as weak or ineffective political institutions, certainly
diminish the capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner. Neither the greed
nor the grievance model can alone account for the outbreak of conflict and the continued
spread of violence; the crucial issue is to ascertain the threshold of tolerance below which
social tensions become so exacerbated that conflict ensues. Adopting this approach would
lead to more effective policies for conflict prevention. Ultimately, research and policy
proposals should focus on the interaction of both greed and grievance motivations as a way
to improve understanding of the causes, character, and dynamics of civil strife.

Insert 3

Greed and Grievance as Motives Explaining Conflict in Afghanistan

A human security analysis of the Afghanistan situation (see Appendix 3) today argues that both
grievances and greed continue to exist in Afghanistan and have not been dealt with adequately so as to
establish a viable, peaceful society. Analysis of the conflict that has raged over the past 23 years points to
the continued existence of grievance factors: “horizontal inequalities” between groups, whether ethnic,
religious, regional or social, and the perception among the entire population of skewed distribution of
resources and justice. Greed factors can also be seen as playing a role: an illicit economy based on the
opium trade and smuggled gems, external interventions of foreign states, and the formation and
maintenance of a ‘prosperous’ war economy financed by the flow of foreign aid into Afghanistan.
Reevaluating Military versus Development Funding

• The Guns or Butter Dilemma: Warfare or Welfare?

Debates about military expenditures versus investments in human development and social programs, or in other words, the tug of war between “warfare” and “well-fare” (the guns or butter dilemma) are based on the presumption that development and security, in the narrow sense of the term, are two independent variables and that the choice between them is one of either/or. This way of approaching the problem stems from the narrow conception of security promoted during the Cold War as defense by a sovereign state against external aggression. The widening of security to embrace social, economic and political issues, as well as both trans-national and sub-national factors, requires a reformulation of the debate. Issues of security and development in an international context need to be re-examined in terms of their mutual interaction rather than as distinct and separate areas of analysis and policymaking.

Military spending can have a number of influences, both positive and negative, on the civilian economy. Economists argue that, on one hand, the defense sector can take skilled labor away from civilian production, but on the other hand it can also train workers through providing educational opportunities, particularly in developing economies, or it can create jobs in cases where a nation exports its military know-how. While military spending does cut down on investment in projects that are valuable for the domestic economy, it also on occasion provides positive contributions to the development of public infrastructures, stimulates technological innovation, and provides capital for new ventures. In certain circumstances it has been shown that increased investment in the military and defense industries can serve to kick-start an industrialization process. Yet economists tend to agree that high or increasing levels of military spending and the funneling of funds to the defense industry tend to detract from economic growth in developing countries, especially over the long term.

Military spending may in fact boost economic growth but growth as measured by the GDP may be extremely uneven and marginalize certain groups by focusing on the accumulation of capital rather than on the provision of social services, health and education. It is a common sense conclusion that countries which devote a great part of their spending and resources to armament production will neglect programs more directly beneficial to the population. The UNDP argued in 1994 that developing countries needed to de-emphasize defense spending, the primary beneficiaries of which tended most often to be the regimes in power, and step up human security policies.

The end of the Cold War bipolar rivalry kindled hope that sufficient military security could be achieved at far lower levels of spending. By reducing global military spending, demilitarizing societies, and developing concrete plans for regional conflict prevention, global security in the 21st century would thus be preserved and enhanced. With savings from reduced military spending, developing nations could then implement essential reforms, such as conversion to a domestic economy, landmine clearance and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Ideally, industrialized nations would forgive the debts of developing
countries in exchange for the dismantlement of militarized economies, the promotion of transparency and reductions in defense budgets that would end military involvement in the civilian economies. However, the post-September 11th increase in military spending, both in industrialized and developing countries, put an end to these hopes. The close of the Cold War was meant to provide a peace dividend, but instead military expenditures have gone up as the war on terror takes precedence over the war on poverty and inequality.

Since 2002, debates on national military spending have continued to be focused on the need to augment defense budgets so as to meet increasing risks and dangers on the global level. According to the SIRPI24 military expenditures today are twenty times larger than aid outlays. In 2002 and 2003, world military spending increased by about 18 per cent in real terms, with high-income countries accounting for about 75 per cent of this spending. In 2001, the combined military spending of OECD countries was slightly higher than the aggregate foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10 times higher than their combined levels of development assistance in 2001. The main reason for the increase in world military spending is the massive increase in the US defense budget alone, which accounts for almost half of the world total. After a decade of reductions in military expenditure in the period 1987–98 and moderate increases in 1998–2001, the changes in US military doctrine and strategy after the terrorist attacks of September 11th brought about a sudden rise in US military spending in 2002 and 2003. While other countries were not able or willing to match this level of increase, military expenditure trends in other major countries have been upwards between 1999 and 2003.

Not only are industrialized countries big military spenders, but they are also responsible for 90 per cent of the arms transfers to developing nations, prompting developing countries to spend billions on their armed forces, which represents a drain on their already limited resources. Military spending imposes a particularly heavy burden on the social sector in the developing world and too often means that their domestic programs are sacrificed for the sake of equipping their armed forces with sophisticated weapons, with resulting negative consequences for society as a whole. Developing countries’ spending on defense peaked at the end of the 1980s and has been declining since then, although the process is uneven, as expenditures in East Asia have risen rapidly. The decreases that have taken place can hardly be said to represent a reorientation of the policies pursued by the political elites; they are due, rather, to the increased burden of the national debt, pressures exercised by donors, a decline in the client-like relationships to the superpowers, and pressing domestic demands for expenditures in the field of welfare.

• Post-September 11th Military Assistance: a Quantitative Increase with Greater Focus on Traditional Security Concerns

The increased attention paid to the war against terrorism raised concerns that development policies risked being subordinated to a narrow security agenda, with aid allocated according to geo-strategic priorities. The “Coalition of the Willing” for example, was richly rewarded in

2003, with economic aid allocated to Turkey ($1 billion), Jordan ($0.7 billion) and Egypt ($0.3 billion). These sums were matched by an immense increase in military assistance that was granted as well to new allies of the US in its war against terrorism, including the new Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus, and to both India and Pakistan.

There have been attempts in the post-September era to include these increases in military assistance programs as part of the ODA budget. The US, for example, currently devotes 0.18 percent of its GDP to foreign aid, but government spokesmen say that the figure does not take into account other forms of US assistance, such as military aid and funding of international organizations. The pressure to include military assistance as part of the ODA, led by the US, prompted the OECD to examine the question over a period of 18 months, culminating in the DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies in March 2005. The DAC sought to clarify the directives that assigned expenditures for purposes of conflict prevention and peace-building, in particular to determine what type of aid could be included in ODA, addressing such issues as improved civilian control over security systems, civilian peace-building, the ban on the enrollment of child soldiers and traffic in small arms. Since 2003, with the adoption of the guidelines set out in “A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action”, OECD/DAC had been resisting pressure, coming mostly from the US, to open the door to re-defining ODA aid so as to include expenditures relating to donor-initiated counter-terrorism agendas. The DAC guidelines state that: “Development co-operation does have an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support, and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular […] This may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria.”

At present, with no standard international policy on military assistance, “defense diplomacy” or “military assistance” is included under the category “Other Official Flows” (OOF) by the DAC. Funds that are used to acquire military equipment and train military personnel are not considered to be part of ODA programs, even when the personnel in question may be involved in non-military tasks such as civil engineering or the re-establishment of law in cases of civil disorder. Only the additional costs incurred by military personnel when delivering humanitarian aid are included in ODA, not the cost of maintaining such personnel on active duty. The OECD/DAC review however was under considerable pressure to incorporate military assistance expenditures (called Southern peacekeeping) into ODA budgets. OECD/DAC consultations finally produced a consensus on six areas that could be considered to fall within the ODA’s purview: 1) improved civilian oversight of security expenditures; 2) democratic control over security system budgets, ensuring transparency and accountability; 3) support for legislation outlawing the recruitment of child soldiers; 4) security system reform; 5) civilian participation in peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and 6) measures designed to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. DAC consultations concluded that training the military in nonmilitary matters, such as enforcing human rights or providing for forces involved in peacekeeping activities, were not appropriate uses of ODA budgets. Unlike the six areas agreed on for which expenditures were relatively modest, these latter issues
involved large sums, that were to come for the most part from defense budgets, and could not be considered as part of the ODA’s mission. It was agreed, however that these questions would be taken up again in consultations scheduled for 2007.

• The Call Goes out for Increased Welfare

There is clearly a large gap between on one hand what countries are prepared to allocate for military purposes to provide security and maintain their global and regional power status, and on the other hand the funds they are willing to make available in order to alleviate poverty and promote economic development. It is thus essential to monitor the uses to which ODA funds are put and to follow up on the changing nature of development cooperation required by the new human security agenda.

The War Against Terrorism is costing the United States more than $1 billion each month, while far less is being spent on curbing the poverty that breeds extremism. Globally, overall aid is still rising but is increasingly focused on traditional security needs. According to one study conducted by Christian Aid, the year 2004 saw $1 billion in aid diverted to the war on terrorism at the expense of the war on poverty and MDGs. The US Congress reduced its aid package from $1.6 billion to just $650 million globally, and the UK spent £150 million earmarked for development on the re-building of Iraq. Furthermore, rich countries’ development budgets, including those of Japan and Australia, are being re-defined to include items such counter-terrorism training, which limits the money left for poverty reduction programs. While the European Commission was requesting that priority be given to the fight against terrorism, Japan increased its ODA budget for conflict resolution initiatives, namely through the Japanese Peace Diplomacy program in Afghanistan, Aceh, and Sri Lanka.

Given that the governments of developing countries are usually threatened by internal unrest originating in social deprivation, poverty, environmental degradation and ethnic exclusion, the rationale of spending more money on defense as opposed to social programs remains an enigma. The international arms market which patronizes the elite social classes and provides considerable political support for the military in weak states, together with the marginal place that these weak states occupy in the world economy, may explain, in part, the focus on security issues from which the military benefit. Human security advocates argue that a better guarantee for security would be to use the cost of one modern jet fighter to offer schooling to a million children.

Jeffrey Sachs, the leading development economist today, argues that if the well-off countries of the world increased their development aid to just 0.5 % of their GDP, millions of lives could be saved from preventable and treatable diseases and the number of people mired in extreme poverty throughout the world could be cut in half. This would cost the U.S. about $60 billion per year, less than it is now spending on the war in Iraq each year and a fraction of its overall military budget. Increasing foreign assistance to 0.7 percent of GNI, first proposed at the UN in 1972 and reiterated at numerous summits, is now seen as a

key to reaching the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Official development assistance from OECD countries rose to a record level of $78.6 billion in 2004. While most countries reported increases in assistance, only five – Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – reached the 0.7 percent target of gross national income. The European Union announced in April 2005 a series of proposals to increase EU spending and improve the quality of development assistance. According to the new plan, the 15 older EU member states would increase their aid spending to 0.51 percent of gross national income by 2010, and to 0.7 percent by 2015. The 10 new member countries should reach an interim target of 0.17 percent by 2010.

Promises of more aid however do not always translate into quality programs or effective assistance in eradicating poverty. According to Oxfam and ActionAid, currently, just one fifth of aid funds actually go to the very poorest countries, and only half to basic services such as education and health care where aid could make a decisive difference in ending poverty. 40% of aid continues to be tied to overpriced goods and services coming from the donors’ own countries. 80 official agencies are responsible for 35,000 aid transactions a year that are imposing a massive administrative burden on some of the poorest countries. Aid continues to be tied to the acceptance of donor countries’ requirements, such as trade liberalization and privatization of essential services, with often devastating results for poor people.

Hence, while the guns or butter debate continues unabated in the age of the War Against Terrorism, the coherence of development assistance programs in general is being questioned in terms of both quantity and quality.

Rethinking Development Assistance

Within the community of donors, the growing interest in the relationships between security and development has led to a renewed concept of development assistance as a means of conflict prevention, a concept has been referred to as “the securitization of aid”. This notion resulted from empirical observations that conflict was a major obstacle to development. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has seen 58 armed conflicts in 46 locations, most of them in developing countries. While the causal links between war and underdevelopment still remain to be fully explored, available evidence suggests that the economic, social, political and environmental costs of war can slow down, stop or even reverse development processes. Obviously, this holds particularly true for poor countries where development is in its early stages and progress is gradual. Moreover, poor countries tend to suffer on the average more internal conflicts than richer countries. From this evidence came the consensus that there existed a direct causal link between poverty and conflict, that poor countries were more likely to be plunged into war: in brief, conflict in “peripheral” states resulted from development failures. This explanation of war modified the notion that underdevelopment was the consequence of a structural relationship that had been established between rich and poor countries, and suggested that donor countries had a direct responsibility as regards development in other areas of the world.

If conflict could be considered as an impediment to development, then underdevelopment
was potentially dangerous for global security, because it not led not only to intra-state conflicts, but also to the “export” of new threats to the more affluent societies, such as the migration of the unemployed and the poor, the transmission of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS that crossed borders, drug trafficking and criminality. If underdevelopment was seen in these terms as potentially “dangerous”, then aiding development could be seen as a way of reducing the likelihood of conflicts spreading and affecting the donor countries themselves. In other words, development could be re-conceptualized as a security strategy.

The redefinition of development also coincided with the global acceptance of the “liberal” model of peace. The break-up of the Soviet Union, and with it the end of the Cold War, marked the end of attempts to construct economic systems that would challenge liberalism. The triumph of liberalism meant a shift from isolated national policy-making to the adoption of common policies by national elites and international actors, linked together through common outlooks and experiences. War became identified as an “anti-development” phenomenon and peace was to be achieved by increasing inter-dependence and economic connections among states. The end of the cold war thus provided an optimal opportunity for a re-conceptualization of “development” as a social transformation of entire societies based on new hegemonic norms. Societies were to be changed in such a way as to ensure that past patterns would not be repeated. The liberal model of peace, born of the merging of development and security, counted on the spread worldwide of liberal economic institutions and democratic practices characteristic of “open” societies as a means of enforcing peace.

By the mid-1990s there emerged a consensus among international organizations, including the UN and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), on the need for opening up the political and economic systems and encouraging economic interdependence and the spread of democratic institutions as twin instruments for promoting international peace. By the mid-1990s, democracy came to be considered by the UN as the best form of government to fight poverty and encourage development, and therefore promote peace and stability. (Democracies, it was argued, were less likely to go to war against each other.) Underdevelopment was dangerous, but its dangers could be mitigated by promoting the adoption of a liberal model that, by supporting local and national efforts to bring about social transformation and an open market economy, would be addressing the root causes of violent conflict.

This consensus entailed a number of implications: peacemakers had to understand the need for development in order to achieve sustainable peace. Development practitioners had to recognize the risk that their interventions might exacerbate conflict. Humanitarian organizations were to appreciate the need for long term interventions. Post-conflict situations were seen as opportunities to promote change, and to fundamentally recast the social, political and economic foundations of power so as to incorporate the excluded and erase inequalities. This consensus also meant that relief, development, and reconstruction were all part of the same ongoing process in which development was re-conceptualized as synonymous with peace-building.

Within the OCED/DAC, this commitment has led to a shift away from advocating a focus on “good performers” to include attention to “fragile” states through for example the joint EC, DAC, UN and World Bank initiatives designed to improve counseling methods and reduce obstacles to effective cooperation in cases where partnerships encountered problems. To lend credence to the consensus, the OECD/DAC developed guidelines in a
1997 document entitled “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict” on ways in which the international community should address conflict prevention, peace building and reconstruction, and published in 2003 a policy document, “Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action”. The OECD/DAC’s principles for viable international engagement in fragile states include a set of 12 directives which, taken together, encourage the donor community to adapt measures to the local context, shift from reaction to prevention, focus on state building, recognize the political-security-development nexus, and act quickly, but remain engaged long enough for there to be a chance that success be permanent.

At the World Bank, application of this new approach, prompted by a finding that since 1980 Bank loans to countries in post-conflict situations had increased over 800 % to $6.2 billion, led to the creation of a Post-Conflict Unit and the adoption in 2001 of an operational policy document on development and conflict. The research on “breaking the conflict trap” which the WB had conducted, resulted in the creation of a Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) to enhance the conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention potential of World Bank assistance. The CAF established 9 indicators as early warning signs of a country’s deteriorating environment. In addition to the more traditional causes of conflict, such as political factors (instability through frequent regime change and the breakdown of law and order) and militarization (a high level of defense spending, large armies, etc.), the CAF drew on the recent analyses of greed and grievance motivations to take into account social issues (ethnic domination and control of state institutions, a high level of unemployed youth), economic indicators (a low GNI, dependence on raw material exports), and historical factors (the record of conflicts that had taken place over the preceding ten years), as well as the regional context. Although none of these elements were alone necessary or sufficient for violent conflict, the WB concluded that each of them could contribute to increase tensions and render violence more likely. The CAF was developed as a tool for preliminary evaluation of countries at risk so as to determine the different tactics that the World Bank could adopt in order to provide assistance. However, it is one thing to have developed an early warning system and another to apply it in a pre-conflict situation: too often organizations on the ground are too caught up by the pressing demands that arise from implementing ongoing developmental programs to recognize the signs that point to impending crisis. The Bank also failed to recognize the extent of the impact of its own interventions on generating social unrest.

For UNDP, merging security and development issues meant focusing on elaborating a set of guiding principles for development interventions in crisis countries. Consultations were held among its 135 country offices in the fall of 2005, leading to the creation of a Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery. UNDP also developed assessment criteria for its country-level assistance, known as the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA), which was based on the experiences in conflict-prevention undertaken in Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau and Tajikistan. The CDA was to be tried out in 2004 in the Solomon Islands as well as in West Africa in order to furnish preparatory analyses and preliminary programming in 2004. It remains to be seen whether criteria based on research (as in the case of the WB) or on prior experience (as in the case of the UNDP) will actually be used to change the way in which organizations structure their interventions, and more importantly, whether they will lead to more effective means of reducing tensions on the ground.
Evaluating Aid: Does Aid Harm or Do Good?

Because the human security approach is focused on the intended beneficiaries of international assistance, namely the people, it can serve as a useful tool by which donor countries can measure the true impact of their aid (both relief-oriented and developmental). It is thus in a privileged position to evaluate whether aid actually is more likely to do harm rather than good in the long term. In all development situations, donors have a responsibility to ensure that their actions are not simply a means of reinforcing powerful factions which may only exacerbate existing tensions. Human security provides the framework in which to pose the essential questions and assess both the positive and the negative impacts of relief or developmental interventions and their secondary effects international repercussions.

Critics of the “securitization” of aid point to the potential hazards of large scale, uncoordinated aid, especially humanitarian aid. The policy of using aid as a tool for peace-building, is also contested by those who argue that this inevitably leads to the distortion of the principles of impartiality and neutrality that should guide humanitarian actions. Instead of being used for political objectives, it is argued, humanitarian aid should be autonomous, for both ethical and pragmatic reasons. But since aid is always introduced in politically charged environments it can tip the balance of power between actors competing for influence. Aid that is not well targeted, implemented, monitored and coordinated could increase the dependency, power and patronage of certain groups, and have negative impacts on coping mechanisms. Aid ultimately affects not only the size of the resource pie and how it is sliced but also the balance of power among the competing actors and the rules of the game by which they compete.

Ways in which aid can actually harm the peace-building process include the following scenarios:

- Massive aid that arrives suddenly may exacerbate conflict. It can be appropriated by military groups, as, for instance, when aid to Afghanistan became an integral part of the war economy by furnishing support and supplies for armed groups.

- Insufficient aid cannot provide states with the capacity to deal with human security demands. Yet too much aid can be a curse rather than a blessing since it can lead to lower rates of domestic savings, and higher exchange rates, which hamper the competitiveness of the country’s products in domestic and foreign markets. Large amounts of aid can mean that both donors and the recipient states are obliged to adhere to short-term methods of accountability required for the management of short, fixed-term budgets measured by indicators of expenditures. Funding is far too often ad hoc and dependent on financial probity and timely disbursement rather than being geared to the more difficult task of measuring its effectiveness through social impact evaluations of lasting improvements in society. In such situations when post-conflict states are heavily dependent on foreign funding, they have to conform to the dictates of international financial institutions and taxpayers in donor countries.

- Aid can also increase unfair competition if institutional mechanisms for equitable distribution have not already been established. Aid may not have the countrywide impact it seeks. Aid agencies target specific groups, focusing on the greatest needs, but their resources are limited and they cannot provide supplies for everyone. Partiality can accentuate tensions.
between ethnic or social groups, between men and women, or between settled populations and repatriated refugees. High profile relief, especially programs in urban areas, are prone to corruption with aid siphoned off to privileged clients.

– Massive relief assistance provided in answer to crisis situations, while helpful in the immediate period can subsequently prolong dependence on external sources. On the other hand, small-scale temporary project interventions that are limited in scope may not be sustainable on a permanent basis; in Afghanistan, for instance, foreign-inspired economic initiatives could in no way replace the advantages drawn from poppy cultivation. Relief aid may potentially fuel corruption and dependency, while at the same time reducing local responsibility for welfare. Aid can negatively affect markets and distort economies by importing manufactured goods instead of hiring a minimum contingent of the local population to produce locally. Humanitarian agencies do hire local people as guards, for instance, to protect their supplies and staff, but the salaries that these guards receive distort the local employment wage scales. These agencies also import and distribute at no cost goods that could be produced locally. While aid is supposed to be temporary, it can end up competing with local economies leading to greater dependence.) Artificial “islands of development” can result from an intense influx of relief aid that is likely to be abruptly halted as soon as the crisis nears resolution.

– Aid programs can take over some of the normal functions of the state when the latter cannot provide food, health, and other social services throughout the country, which only serves to contribute to the crisis of legitimacy of post-conflict states. Assistance strategies which bypass the central government and work directly with regional administrations risk heightening tensions between the center and the provinces and skew distribution of assistance to favored regions. On the other hand, aid that is funneled solely through a centralized administration may not reach intended beneficiaries if not well planned out in advance.

– For budgetary reasons donor funds are often tied to tight disbursement schedules requiring that they be spent rapidly, which can create conflicts with long-term planning that involves continued, support for a number of years. Furthermore, the necessity to deliver aid expeditiously often means that funds are wasted.

– Aid can be distributed on the basis of specific contractual arrangements or it can be granted when the political, economic and military situation of the country concerned appears to call for it. The decision whether or not to accord assistance can be made for positive or negative reasons: positive when it is a question of rewarding compliant countries, negative when aid is suspended or when certain conditions are attached (for instance requiring specific types of economic and political reforms or respect for human rights, as was the case during the Taliban years). Although laying down the rules by which aid is to be distributed is necessary in order to assure that assistance is placed in the hands of responsible elements of society and that loans are reimbursed and investments safeguarded, the fact that the donor countries fix the criteria means that they hold the upper hand. Setting criteria for aid distribution in war-torn societies is even more problematic since in such cases the state administration is too weak to bargain effectively with the donors. Although the setting of conditions is essential in order to assure that assistance is used to fund “right policies” and “good governance” – and that loans are reimbursed and investments safeguarded – the problem involved in setting the required conditions stems from the
asymmetries of power and voice between the donor and the recipient country. The constraints involved can appear even more problematic when the extreme vulnerability of the war-torn populations is taken into account as well as the weakened powers of the administrative structures still in place.

These potential drawbacks do not mean that aid should be withheld but that it should be better organized and targeted. Programs that are well managed and well monitored can effectively avoid such pitfalls. In addition to directly improving people’s livelihoods, aid can act as a positive incentive for social renewal. Programs established at the local level, which bring people from different sectors of society together for the joint management of projects such as irrigation systems, the establishment of trading networks, or the rehabilitation of regional infrastructures, can promote peaceful, cooperative co-existence. Education programs not only raise levels of literacy but have a host of beneficial secondary effects including improving household health management, enhancing decision-making expertise, and communicating information on resource management, all of which significantly improve human security. Aid can also have positive impacts in more intangible ways by releasing individual energies and spurring cooperation, serving in this way to bolster resistance to regimes controlled by warlords.

Although such activities may not always “bring peace”, they do play a role in establishing common strategies for coping with crisis and providing alternatives to the war economy. When at their best, aid agencies will be providing a mixture of humanitarian and rehabilitation-oriented assistance, in partnership with a wide range of actors including central governments, regional authorities, local actors and community-based organizations. The least that one is entitled to expect is that aid (both humanitarian and development assistance) will not undercut peace-building efforts and other policy instruments aimed at restoring the institutions of the state.

While aid cannot be the main factor tipping the scale in favor of peace, it can play an important role in consolidating a fragile peace – but this is only possible when new approaches are adopted. For aid not to increase social tensions or fuel existing conflicts, it must be part of a thought-out human security approach. In assessing the situation so as to plan for an effective program that will avoid the errors outlined above, inquiry should not be confined to technical questions such as the coordination of relief and developmental efforts. The political and economic context should be taken into account as well so as to understand the underlying causes of deprivation and conflict. It is essential for the donors to be aware of the negative consequences that misguided or misused aid can give rise to. Particular attention should be paid to the following factors: a) equitable distribution of benefits, b) flexibility in terms of planning and implementation, c) monitoring and evaluation of results in terms of conflict prevention, and d) insertion of the aid programs in the social texture of the country in question. Peace-building and reconstruction should be based on a clear understanding of the issues involved in politicization of the conflict (for instance, ethnicity or religion), but should also take into account the prior failures of governance. This requires aid actors to think historically while at the same time elaborating plans for the long-term future.
• Assessing Needs

The first challenge is the lack of a systematic definition of what the “needs” are. Who is ultimately “at risk”? On the basis of what criteria? Improving needs assessment demands that criteria be framed in a consistent manner. The way in which needs are defined and prioritized will pay a crucial role in determining the level of success of the intervention. A proper assessment requires determining not only the nature of the needs, but also the minimal level of aid required to ensure people’s survival in acceptable conditions. Viable assessment practices depend on having sufficient relevant information on which to base the choice of the kind of response that is the most fitting.

There are two different ways to assess the basis for aid: the first takes into account needs (a demand approach), and the second is supply oriented.

– Aid based on needs and rights

Aid based on the needs (basic needs approach) or the entitlements (rights based approach) of a population are the twin pillars of a human security policy. Four “core elements” constitute the essence: protection of human life, health care, provision of the means of subsistence and protection from violence, coercion and fear. A needs-based approach of this kind is value-neutral. It requires assessing the specific needs of the population on the basis of close observation (which may be difficult in countries torn by war), rather than depending on generalized criteria that may not be relevant to the situation at hand.

– Aid based on costs of meeting long-term targets

Aid based on cost assessment implies confidence that the recipient country’s institutions and ministries that establish priorities and manage the implementation of programs will act responsibly. When the government of Afghanistan presented to donors in Berlin in March 2004 a request for $27 billion for sustaining the state in its peace-building efforts, it argued in its proposal (Securing Afghanistan’s Future) that its administrative structures were to be trusted. A National Development Budget was set up by the Minister of Finance as a way for Afghan institutions to take the lead role in determining the amount and allocation of resources pledged to the country. In cases where the capacity of a state’s institutions to deliver aid effectively is open to question, other solutions can be envisaged, for instance the adoption of programs based on the Millenium Development Goals or on the assessments by donor countries of what is needed to achieve development targets by 2015.

– Aid based on supply

Perhaps one of the least productive ways, from a human security point of view, that aid can be allocated is on the basis of what donor countries are willing to contribute, often decided in the heat of the crisis. When a country is in the media spotlight, a call goes out for pledges to invest in peace-building programs. Assessments of actual needs come second to publicity efforts designed to collect funds, with the result that the objectivity of the analysis and the success of the projects are threatened. Needs are tailored to fit donor proposals, and the absence of independent “reality checks” often makes it difficult to ensure that responses are appropriate, and impartial. In such circumstances, the political interests of the international community, or the interests of certain agencies, national or international, intent
on ‘marketing’ their services, take precedence over objective evaluation of the situation.

Pledges to supply funds for reconstruction in post-intervention countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq have been adopted in haste in the course of international conferences, during which it was urgent to obtain results. They were a hasty “knee-jerk” reaction to the events following the September 11th terrorist attack, rather than being based on detailed needs analysis or on agreements between the parties concerned.

Insert 4

Applying a Human Security Approach to Development Assistance in Afghanistan

Appendix 4 defines the challenges of assessing needs in Afghanistan as first and foremost a problem of absence of reliable data concerning the country. A human security policy also calls for an evaluation of development assistance. Was the “Light Footprint” approach adequately implemented by the international community in Afghanistan? International assistance programs are caught between conflicting options: a) top down interventions versus interventions initiated from below (bottom up) b) quick fix programs versus long term assistance, c) reliance on international organizations versus reliance on local authorities d) private versus public ownership.

Integrated Solutions: In Search of Comprehensive Human Security Strategies

What would, ultimately, a set of human security policies consist of? We could answer: preventing conflicts before they break out, managing their human costs effectively when they do, and building mechanisms to avoid their reoccurrence. It thus requires both short-term emergency responses and long-term, preventive strategies. Policies should include measures designed to provide safety nets for the population, measures intended to restructure the economy and ultimately, measures to implement empowerment policies (such as promotion of active participation on the part of the population and strengthening of the educational system) which could serve people both during times of crisis and also during periods of peace and prosperity. Policies should also be multi-dimensional as threats to human security are many-sided and interconnected. Given the multiplicity of causes of crisis, an interdisciplinary approach is needed, through combining economic, political and sociological strategies. They should be flexible and capable of responding to rapidly changing scenarios.

• Preventive Policies Based on an Understanding of Root Causes

In the last analysis, human security furnishes a framework for preventive policies based on an understanding of root causes: for this author, this means, for example, going beyond providing short-term relief and coping mechanisms to preventing poverty, beyond fighting terrorism to dealing with political issues, beyond reacting to new diseases to providing
preventive healthcare, and beyond instituting measure to reduce unemployment to reinforcing the educational system. Prevention in the end is less costly than waiting for crises to occur, but in addition to being more efficient and successful than urgent intervention, it constitutes a moral imperative. Its implementation has to be based on a thorough analysis of the origins of the crisis and the risks involved in interceding, which supposes an effective early warning system, as well as adequate coordination between development and conflict-management organizations. Although natural calamities cannot be prevented, the extent of their impact on human lives can be mitigated through adequate preparation.

**Long-term Security and Development Strategies**

A viable human security strategy requires a gradual shift of perspective from short- to medium- to long-term development. The elaboration of sustainable development policies means abandoning stop-gap measures, such as quick impact projects and short-term planning in order to focus on medium and long term interventions.

In many countries emerging from war, overt armed conflict may come to an end while low-level violence continues for many years, involving former factions, demobilized combatants, bandits and militias. Military and diplomatic measures, though important, are unlikely by themselves to secure a transition towards a stable peace. For development and democracy to take root, the manner in which the reconstruction is structured (needs assessed, resources allocated, partners chosen, programs implemented and results monitored) can either provide a positive incentive to nation-building, or, on the other hand, destroy its very foundations. In this perspective, reconstruction should be carefully planned as an integral part of the overall peace-building agenda, one that generates trust in institutions, promotes participation, heals wounds and restores dignity.

Adopting a human security approach would require reorienting development and security programs and plans to respond to new challenges. It would mean a) correlating programs in areas that are interconnected but which have often been handled by separate initiatives that act at cross-purposes b) recognizing potential threats through systematic human security assessments sensitive to early warning signs c) building capacity for dialogue among communities and d) enhancing participatory development, the rule of law, and good governance through institutional reform aimed at improving representation of the various sectors of the population and creating legal means of redress for grievances.

**Comprehensive Development and Pro-poor Strategies**

Because of the connections between poverty and insecurity, the way poverty is tackled has a determining influence on the way in which peace can be maintained in countries recently emerged from conflict. As stated in the Millennium Declaration, “[…] every step taken toward reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth […] is a step towards conflict prevention. All who are engaged in conflict prevention and development, therefore — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, governments and civil
society organizations — must address these challenges in a more integrated fashion.”

Poverty reduction should also therefore be seen as a critical dimension of a strategy for conflict resolution, peace building and national reconciliation. Regional and global political and economic policies have to be given equal weight alongside national initiatives in the elaboration of poverty eradication strategies. Even in cases where countries adopt policies of democratic governance and fiscal reform, external factors (such as a decline in the price of certain commodities, the influx of foreign capital or the outbreak of war in neighboring countries) can prevent the achievement of development goals.

Peace therefore needs to be understood as a dynamic process. Even when growth occurs in some developing countries, it often does not benefit the poor. This has led, in the international development community, to an increasing focus on identifying policies that can foster “pro-poor growth”, growth that not only improves the “absolute conditions” of poor households (by raising their level of real income as part of the process of raising the average level) but also can enhance their “relative” conditions vis-à-vis non-poor households (by reducing inequality between the poor and non-poor). Unfortunately, in most cases, growth has been too slow and decidedly pro-rich.

Bearing in mind that institutional reforms and behavioral changes need time to take effect, the short to medium term development plans, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) which countries are required to present to the World Bank in order to obtain loans from the IMF, should make a point of linking development strategies with plans fostering peace and security. The PRSP process can help sustain human security by addressing root causes of conflict so as to prevent future outbreaks, strengthening public institutions, especially at the national and local levels, and encouraging inclusive development processes that focus on the generation of employment. In this context, rural development remains crucial for poverty reduction, since a large majority of the poor are located in rural areas, with their livelihoods tied directly to agriculture.

**Evaluation and Impact Analysis**

Finally, the most important contribution of human security policies is the establishment of an evaluative framework. All policies should be assessed through their effects, both positive and negative, on human welfare and dignity. What is the ultimate impact on people? How do the strategies employed affect their lives, livelihoods, and opportunities? The human factor must be analyzed through a variety of processes: the international environment and the globalization process, state-building and the transition to peaceful economies, decisions concerning budgetary allocations, and issues such as social welfare policies, decentralization, and rural development.

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• The Added Challenge of Post-Conflict Situations

Post-conflict situations present a number of additional difficulties: among them is the inherent contradiction between short-term programs directed at re-establishing stability and the measures required for a long-term state-building process.

In fragile transitional situations, many of the causes of conflict remain to be addressed if the country is to not to backslide into violence. Greater development — economic, social, and political — can help build peace and reduce the dangers of open conflict. Yet development itself can initiate transformations which turn out to be de-stabilizing. Even when it is successful, development raises expectations and highlights disparities, sometimes igniting the very issues that can trigger violent conflicts. Ultimately, “achieving” human security in a post-conflict situation requires integrated solutions based on three principles: application of a political economy approach to understand root causes, monitoring implementation of aid so as to avoid unfair distribution policies that can have negative consequences, and using a multi-disciplinary type of analysis.

If conventional thinking considers peace as a requisite for development, the new thinking, based on an increasing body of evidence, considers that lack of development may also leads to conflict, and furthermore that ill-conceived development interventions can aggravate existing conflicts. More understanding is needed on the interplay between underdevelopment and conflict and between the internal and external dynamics that sustain conflict. In the meantime, this new thinking requires a revision of existing conflict resolution methods, in order to concentrate not only on the ruling political class but on the role of people, and to propose comprehensive policies that target both human development and the eradication of potential sources of discord. Such practices can serve to avoid wars and provide incentives for alternative economic, political and educational opportunities.

- Peace-building: long term resolution of conflicts

War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. Peace is not a quick fix but a development process that must be initiated and nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered, and which needs to be sustained through years of “post-war recovery”27. For post-conflict situations, ensuring human security means achieving a transformation that not only restores and reforms the economic and social structures destroyed by the conflict, but also changes incentives that fueled conflict in the first place. This requires first and foremost the ability to understand a very complex and rapidly changing reality. Although many of the problems facing post-conflict societies existed before the outbreak of conflict, the consequences of violent clashes can radically alter the political, demographic and economic structure of a country. For example, the gender balance changes when women become household heads in the absence of men. Migration of educated classes deprives the country of essential human capital. Displacement of populations creates ethnically polarized zones. Hence, for an effective human security policy to be implemented the changes brought about by the conflict and the inequalities that are the consequence need to be identified and incorporated.

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in rehabilitation and assistance strategies

Because human security involves more than military and policing issues, a peace-building process is necessary that is different from peace-making, which is usually concerned only with political, diplomatic and military efforts to bring opposing parties to an agreement. Peace-building efforts need to involve everyone, from individuals to communities, in the state-building process. Peace-building is also a transformative process, which requires analysis of the impact that all interventions have on the longer term human security agenda. Building peace requires sound foundations based on a commitment to right wrongs and establish an acceptable level of social justice and accountability. In this perspective, if it is to achieve more than repair damage done and restore the status quo – if it is to make certain that investments provide lasting benefits – then from the very inception of an intervention the nations and international organizations that take part should understand the nature and limits of their efforts, and realize that their effectiveness depends to a large extent on the relationships that they are capable of establishing with the actors within the given country.

- Is the neo-liberal model adequate for post-conflict situations?

The main dilemma for international interventions in the period following conflict is the inherent contradiction between the economic measures that are taken on an emergency basis and the state-building requirements. As post-conflict countries are in dire need of money, and because economic growth is needed to secure and stabilize the situation, states are willing to accept the conditions imposed on them by the IFIs based on economic stabilization (reducing inflation, restoring the currency, etc.) and structural adjustment (market liberalization, removing regulation, privatization).

There may, however, be an inherent contradiction between economic stabilization (which requires a cut-back of state expenditures) and peace-building (which requires an increase in government spending for rehabilitating the infrastructure, mine clearance, provision of social services and so on). Furthermore, the economic models proposed by IFIs in post-conflict situations often rely first and foremost on the private sector as the main engine of growth. Yet, experience has proved that a market-based approach to economic growth may have immediate negative effects, increasing the cost of living, threatening the livelihood of the population and disrupting survival strategies. Increased inequalities, although to a certain extent inevitable, may undo the positive aspects of interventions; inequality, it should be remembered, is one of the primary factors leading to the outbreak of conflict.

In Afghanistan, for example, the National Development Framework, agreed upon within a few months of the Bonn Process in 2002, featured as its primary provision the setting up of a state framework to promote broad-based private sector growth. Emphasis was put on the establishment of favorable conditions for the promotion of direct foreign investment. But this strategy, whatever its intrinsic merits, was problematic when applied to Afghanistan. The markets that existed at the end of 2004 were controlled by the traditional power brokers and only contributed to widespread horizontal inequalities. There had been, of course, much informal free trade throughout the years of communist government in Afghanistan. One could argue that it was precisely this free market sector of the economy, involving arms, drugs and gems, that had fueled conflict in the first place. Reinforcing the role of the private sector as the engine of growth in post-conflict Afghanistan was then apt to be
counterproductive. What the country needed was more concerted public interventions by the state.

Experience in postwar situations suggests that the enforced imposition of neo-liberal economic reforms as a corollary to democratization programs may not necessarily serve the long-term interests of the country. The increment in disposable income for a tiny minority, combined with the abolition of many import controls, can lead to an increase in the range of goods available, but it also means that energies will be engaged in stimulating the consumer market, rather than responding to the needs of the people. In addition, the introduction of cost-recovery schemes in health care and education, combined with the abolition of welfare provisions, may lead to further poverty and increase indebtedness, as people are forced to borrow in order to pay for health care and education. In line with the market approach, contracts are awarded through competitive bidding. However, privatized delivery of health services may not be suitable in view of Afghanistan’s geographic diversity and the difficulty in reaching some areas. Reforms may mean that poor and remote villages may be even worse off than before.

Economic growth in post-conflict situations is indeed needed to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and provide much needed employment. But this should be achieved through indigenous production, by stimulating domestic industries instead of relying on the infusion of capital provided by international aid. The growth should be structured in such a way as to create jobs and reduce poverty; it should result in fairer distribution of wealth and be so conceived as to balance the interests of urban areas against those of rural areas, thus maintaining equilibrium between the various regions. Economic growth can be based on private initiative, but for this growth to translate into advantages for the people, the state has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the objectives mentioned above are met. This role requires that the state institutions have the capacity to raise revenues, deliver services, properly distribute accumulated wealth and regulate the market so as to prevent discrimination. In brief, what is required is the combination of a market economy and state planning.

– State-building from a people-centered point of view

Given the complex nature of post-war societies, responsibilities of the state should increase rather than decrease. The increase in the scope of the state’s activities does not mean that the state should take direct control of the economy, but that it should intervene in the areas where the market cannot ensure a fair allocation of resources, equal access to assets and opportunities for all people. The role of the state should be threefold: 1) to guarantee that the reconstruction process is equitable, efficient and empowering, 2) to promote investment that enhances “human capital”, and 3) to distribute resources equally.

First and foremost, the role of the state should be one of equalizing opportunities. The legitimacy of the state depends to a great extent on its capacity to take care of the needs of the population. The capacity to “provide” human security requires a strong state that can generate and distribute public goods, striking a fair balance between its obligation as a provider and its obligation as an overseer of society. It means the state should concentrate on poverty eradication, job creation, health care provisions, community development – prioritizing the improvement of infrastructures in the public domain and financing the most urgent public works projects which target the most vulnerable – while at the same time
providing incentives for private investment with assistance in particular from national funding.

For a human security agenda to succeed it is essential that it include measures designed to promote a fair and inclusive society, measures based on widespread consensus, and implemented through partnership between the state and civil society. This requires the development of the state’s capacity, at both the central and local levels, to mobilize social resources through partnership with NGOs, CBOs, community organizations as well as the private sector. A shift to a human security vision requires that people be involved as agents of change, and not simply as passive recipients of programs designed by others. Ultimately, participation and consultation processes are the keys to the shift to long-term development. Governments that practice tolerance and that allow people to control their own lives can better provide security than those that concentrate their efforts on military defense. Sharing power and responsibility lightens the burden for all involved, and thereby accelerates development.

Insert 5

The Dilemma of State-Building in Afghanistan

While the initial focus of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan was on the removal of the Taliban regime, it soon became apparent that Afghanistan needed a stable state, which was at peace with itself and no danger to the world community. Appendix 5 analyzes the dilemma of how to combine an ambitious national reconstruction program undertaken in a fragile political context, while at the same time pursuing a military campaign. It analyses the type of state that, in Afghanistan, can a) provide security, b) transform the war economy, and c) distribute resources evenly among the various regions.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Human security as a concept, represents a redefinition of traditional understandings of security and development. It entails:

– the recognition of new threats to security beyond those that are military, including factors such as underdevelopment and human rights violations;
– the recognition that efforts to provide security have to go beyond dealing with state governments to deal directly with the people concerned;
– the recognition that intervention can have positive effects, but that it can also have negative effects if not properly conceived and carried out.

Human security requires:

– the recognition of interconnections between development, security and human rights;
– the adoption of multi-dimensional solutions based on an inter-disciplinary approach;
– making use of academic research in the framing of policy proposals.

The question that remains is whether human security can be successful in challenging traditional security paradigms, or will it simply remain a marginal concept. In other words can human security serve as an operational basis for action? The assumption in this paper is yes, human security begins by asking the right questions. It proposes a framework that puts individuals at the center of both analysis and action. It can serve as a means to evaluate threats, foresee crises, analyze the cause of discord and propose solutions entailing a redistribution of responsibilities. In this respect human security is not only an analytic concept, it signifies shared political and moral values. Although human security analysis may not have provided explanations of how insecurity originates, it has called attention to the importance of recognizing the interconnections between a host of factors that in combination produce insecurity. Whatever its weaknesses may be as analytic tool, it provides an effective means for preventing the degradation of people’s well-being and dignity as well as diminishing the consequences of “insecurities”, be they man-made conflicts or natural disasters.

Human security should not be given a narrow definition, but remain flexible enough to develop as our understanding of the roots of worldwide insecurity deepens and our capacity to address these roots is improved. Although human security is frequently accused of being too broad an approach and too ambitious, its essence remains quite humble: to ensure that the worst does not come to pass. As such, it is call to reason.

Selected Bibliography


In addition, the following papers, written by students of the author’s Human Security courses at Sciences-Po (Paris, Spring 2004) and Columbia University (New York, Fall 2004) were consulted:


Appendices

Afghanistan Case Study
Appendix 1

SHIFTING THE TRADITIONAL “SECURITY” NARRATIVE IN AFGHANISTAN

The traditional security narrative for Afghanistan concentrates on the impact of insecurity on political processes, on the work of the international community, and on potentials for drawing in foreign direct investment. The international narrative on Afghanistan sees bombings, terrorism, kidnapping, and physical insecurity as the means to undermining the peace process in Afghanistan, delaying presidential and parliamentary elections, and the withdrawal of international aid organizations from the South and East. Targeted vulnerable populations to what is labeled as terrorists attacks are aid workers, government officials, troops and election officials. Within Afghanistan, traditional insecurity is further exacerbated by a system of incentives for armed regional militia loyal to individuals instead of institutions, as well as criminal opportunists, especially narco-criminals. Today, security continues to be seen in its traditional sense, from the position of the state, that of fragmented groups claiming political legitimacy, or that of global and regional interests. The unit of consideration continues to be the state, the market, the region, and the systems.

Yet, for 23 years the people of Afghanistan were subject to the consequences flowing from this exogenous approach to security, based on the interests of a state, of international community or of group interests. Foreign interventions fueled a series of wars that entrenched the power of unaccountable power-holders, divided the country along ethnic lines, and destroyed its already limited infrastructure and economic base. Gross violations of human rights by the communist regime, the mujahedden self-styled government and the suppressive Taliban were all done in the name of national or state security. The Western world was more interested in curbing the expansion of the Soviet Union than the consequences of heavily arming resistance groups and then abandoning Afghanistan, and its people, after the pull-out of the Soviet Army. Regional players continued to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan by backing various ethnic or language groups against each other. During the Taliban times, while humanitarian agencies struggled to cope with the catastrophe with limited resources, the international community imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan that harmed the ordinary civilians more than the Taliban regime. September 11 then attracted an overwhelming attention of the international community to Afghanistan – not for the sake of the Afghan people, but because it was believed that those who carried out the act of terror on the US soil were hiding and training in Afghanistan. Instability in Afghanistan was no longer an internal concern of the Afghans alone but of the world community as well.

But the security interests of other nations are not always to the interest of Afghan people. This was evident recently, when the US government was contemplating the eradication of drugs in Afghanistan through aerial sprays. Such solutions are harmful to the indebted farmers as they not only fail to address the real need of alternative livelihoods, but they also hike up prices and further enrich traffickers. Similarly, the expansion of NATO troops outside of Kabul may be seen as a short-term solution to violence that threatens the coalition troops, but not the answer to the security problems of Afghans. Ultimately it should be the Afghan State that should have the prerogative of taking back the provision of security in its own hands. The problem is not solely the rogue states which continue to harbor Al Qaeda, the problem is the need for a state-building process that strengthens the center while distributing possibilities throughout the country.

The answers to the traditional security problems today, warlordism, the narco-trade, groups that threaten the peace process, regional interference and crime, have been sought in the expansion of international ISAF troops led by NATO outside of Kabul, the demobilization of former militias, enforcement of an Afghan National Army and enhanced fight against Al-Qaida in Afghanistan by Coalition Forces, and the forced eradication of poppies without seeking alternative livelihoods. The perpetuation of this traditional security narrative has however led to the increase in the militarization of society and the privatization of security, both of which are detrimental to peace-building. As the state is unable to hold a monopoly on power in Afghanistan, its authority is
challenged by a number of competing factions. Armed regional and local private militia leaders, together with their armed followers, establish their own rules for the provision of welfare and security, the collection and distribution of wealth and booty, and clientelism. The fighting between Taliban and Al Qaida leaders and coalition forces, or factional leaders and central authorities, inevitably engulfs civilians. With terrorism and insurgencies on the rise, the October presidential election itself had to be “insured” through expensive private security companies contracted by the UN, the US-led coalition forces and NATO. The president is guarded by American Special Forces, ministers and other key government officials are also heavily guarded. The only people who have no security are poor civilians. For them, the security dilemma means feeling fearful, powerless and defenceless. While the international peacekeepers and coalition forces are tackling remnants of peace-spoilers, their presence throughout the country could give rise to an insecure feeling among the ordinary population. Such a climate gives rise to vigilantes, Afghan or international, which makes it difficult to know who genuinely is involved in working for security through the Government and who is not. The use of private contractors by the US Government has created a challenge to the “perception” problem. Private security personnel are interrogating detainees, but they may not always be accountable to standards of international human rights, a fact that has been evident from investigations of prisons in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Baghram base in Afghanistan. Agents of security can become perpetuators of insecurity themselves when they are not accountable to international norms.

In a militarized society, where even coalition forces engage in reconstruction and rehabilitation through Regional Provincial Teams, and the US provision of food aid is carried out under independent military authority, the distinctions between legitimate and effective human rights and humanitarian action by the UN and NGOs, and a military campaign is blurred. The privatization of security and the spread of a military mentality, even if it has been instigated by the pursuit of terrorists and peace-spoilers, has led to a climate of fear, intimidation, terror and lawlessness in many parts of Afghanistan. Most important, such a climate has given rise to a society that is ruled by the power of armed individuals, instead of vetted democratic processes.

Yet, security should be first and foremost a public good, not the privilege of those defending their interests through war. In contrast to this traditional narrative of the “security problem” in Afghanistan, a human security approach argues that the real security problem is that the reconstruction process has still not generated the means to provide services and jobs and protect human rights and human welfare in the country, especially in rural areas.

Security is not just the end of war, but also the ability to go about one’s business safely, in a safe environment, to have a job, to participate in political processes, to have choices for the education of one’s children, to live a healthy life and to do all this with the knowledge that one’s family is safe and not harmed. Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only a problem of physical safety, but also of deprivation and restricted access to health and education facilities, legal and political rights, and social opportunities. Hence, dealing with insecurity should not be sought through short term military solutions, such as the expansion of international peacekeeping forces throughout the country, but a long term comprehensive strategy that abides by promises of development and promotion of human rights. It should promote public policy and state-building efforts that reduce local incentives that trigger conflict in the first place.

In a country where security and development are interdependent it makes little sense to make one as a condition for another. Security is the basis of economic and social development in Afghanistan. At the same time, security is not only that of the state and its institutions or of the national territory but also, and especially, of the people living within Afghanistan. Twenty three years of armed conflict has become the main obstacle to Afghanistan’s human development progress on the one hand. On the other, a development centered on people’s well-being is central to successful peace-building and prevention of further conflict. Yet, too much focus on a displaced security problem also fogs the urgency of under-development and the need for a political process of national reconciliation. When poverty is what threatens the Afghan population more than terrorism, the solutions should not be solely sought in military deployment and interventions.
Appendix 2
IDENTIFYING NEW INSECURITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Among threats to the human security of the Afghan people, the following can be identified:

**Human poverty, inequality and job insecurity**

Under the post-Taliban interim Government, Afghanistan’s economy has recovered significantly. Non-drug GDP rose to about US$4.05 billion in 2002 – a yearly recovery of 25–30 per cent. In 2002, agriculture made up 52 per cent of the aggregate national output with a value of about US$2.1 billion. Economic growth for 2003 is estimated to have been around 16 percent, and over the next decade, non-drug GDP is expected to achieve a 10-12 per cent growth rate. While this expected recovery may improve the human development statistics, it may not help the overall human security situation if it does not tackle the unequal distribution of wealth, other forms of inequality and the prevailing poverty.

With respect to poverty, the majority of the Afghan population can be classified as poor. The UNDP Human Poverty Index places Afghanistan just above Niger and Burkina Faso, and far below its two neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan. According to the 2003 country-wide National Rural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) study of 11,000 rural households, 20.4 per cent of the rural population consumes less than 2,070 kilocalories per person per day. Human poverty in Afghanistan is a multidimensional problem that includes inequalities in access to productive assets and social services, poor health, education and nutritional status, weak social protection systems, vulnerability to macro- and micro-level risks, human displacement, gender inequities and political marginalization. Some groups and/or households, such as women, the disabled and Kuchi nomads, are more vulnerable to poverty. Of the causes for poverty in rural regions, drought is identified as the main source, affecting more than half the population. Other sources include pest infestations, epidemic diseases such as malaria; and economic shifts such as market price fluctuations. Surprisingly, violence as a cause of poverty was reported by only two to five per cent of the rural population.

While reliable data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that economic growth so far has done little to alleviate the extent of inequality, whether it is related to income, gender or geographical location. In 2003, a Da Afghanistan Bank study found that the poorest 30 per cent of the population receive only nine per cent of the national income, while the upper 30 per cent receive 55 per cent. Using food consumption as a proxy for the variable in income, the 2003 National Rural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) data found that the poorest 20 per cent of the population spends four times more on food than the richest 20 per cent.

Dismal livelihood prospects are one of the greatest threats to human security in Afghanistan. Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is estimated that unemployment is as high as 2 million out of an estimated labor force of some 8 million. Job security is threatened by the negative growth rate of over two decades of war and the failure of recent recovery to trickle down to provide jobs and poverty alleviating employment. Agricultural sector and agriculture-based industry, such as food processing, will remain an important economic arena for providing livelihood to the majority of Afghans, particularly the poor, but the sector is threatened by three factors: competition over access to water, land, and opium related activities. Despite new opportunities from donor investments and the return of people to their land, unemployment remains a pressing problem.

**Social insecurities: education and health**

Access to basic and quality education is both a human right, and a means to the security of human lives. Basic education eradicates illiteracy, secures jobs and employment, allows people to
defend their rights and voice their needs, and empowers people to decision making processes, whether in public policy or household decisions. The education of women has been proven to lead to increased economic and social empowerment with positive rippling effects on all aspects of well-being of not only women, but of all society. Quality education allows people to partake of opportunities, both national and ultimately, globally. This requires a reform in the curriculum system, away from narrowly based functional education to broad values of knowledge and analytical capacity. Yet, after 23 years of conflict, Afghanistan's education system had become the worst in the world. An estimated 80 percent of the country's 6,870 schools were damaged, if not completely destroyed. Higher education is of concern for it is one of the lowest in the world. There is a regional, as well as rural-urban disparity in educational provisions, combined with a huge gender disparity that must be addressed. The quality of education is severely affected by the lack of qualified teachers both in primary, and secondary schools. To modernize the current education system and to address the poor quality of curriculum and knowledge delivery mechanisms, a radical reform and a total revival of the education apparatus of the country is needed.

The literacy rate in Afghanistan is currently one of the lowest among developing countries. Only 29% of the Afghans over the age of 15 can read and write with men consisting of 43% and women 14% of the total literate population. This puts Afghanistan fifth in the world from the bottom (only above Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Guinea). Nevertheless, considerable progress took place since the downfall of the Taliban: more than 3 million students were enrolled in grades 1-12 in 2002 and in 2003, the figure went up to a remarkable 4.2 million. Although primary enrollment ratio is about 54.4% now, girls' primary school enrolment is only still 40.5% of the total rates.

Like education, access to basic and quality healthcare is both an issue of social justice in itself, as well as a resource for improved living standards. Security of health includes access to basic and quality services, social justice in health care, and prevention of new and old infectious diseases. Causes of health insecurity are poverty and inappropriate social policies, declining living and sanitary conditions, poor nutrition and food insecurity, drastic reductions in health expenditures leading to breakdown of services and decrease in qualified medical staff, behavior, and unsafe environment. Life expectancy at birth in Afghanistan is a meager 45 years for males and 44 years for females. Poverty, poor nutrition, lack of adequate shelter and access to safe drinking water and sanitary conditions, limited access to health services contribute to the high death rates. Most of health insecurities are indeed water born diseases, related to poor hygiene and inadequate access to safe water with only 32.5% of Afghans using safe drinking water. One out of four children die before the age of five and one woman dies from pregnancy related causes approximately every 30 minutes, among the highest in the world. Less than 15% of deliveries are attended by trained health workers. About half of children under 5 years of age are stunted due to chronic malnutrition and up to 10% have acute malnutrition. Malaria is another public health threat that is prevalent, and on the rise with an annual incidence estimated to be 2-3 million in 2002, putting more than 60% of the country with a population of 13 million people at risk. WHO estimates indicate that 95% of the population in Afghanistan have been affected psychologically, and one in five suffers from mental health problems, including anxiety, depression, psychosomatic problems such as insomnia and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorders. CSO figures for 2002 give a dismal figure of 0.5% of public expenditure on health. The number of MDs per 1000 people is a mere 0.167 against 1.1 on average for all developing countries.

Food and environmental insecurity

Food security continues to threaten the livelihood of Afghanistan today, both in terms of quantity and quality, despite recent improvements. A recent MOH/CDC/UNICEF survey indicated that an estimated 37% of households are displaced largely to urban centers to cope with the threats to their food and resource insecurity. Food insecurity in Afghanistan is manifested by poor caloric consumption and malnutrition among a large percentage of the population. The causes are not
only several years of severe and continued drought since 1999, but also insufficient income to purchase necessities, and lack of access to land and the lack of availability of arable land (currently standing at 12 per cent of total land of the country). The insecurities are exacerbated by the inefficient access to and use of water and land, and related social factors, i.e., settlement patterns, destructive coping strategies, and, to a lesser extent, inter-communal prejudice and practices of exclusion.

Environmental degradation and poor access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation are major environmental security threats. Limited access to land resources and the scarcity of water for agricultural use, combined with lack of access to a diverse diet are some indications to suggest that people’s capacity to cope with threats has been depleted. The lack of available energy services correlates closely with many poverty indicators. Afghanistan’s urban dwellers are exposed to many of the worst toxic and carcinogenic air pollutants known. Environment scarcity, if not a main cause of social conflict, can trigger processes that heighten ethnic, communal and class based rivalries. Bad management of the environment leads to the marginalization of the poor, to economic hardship and conflict over water, in addition to health insecurities.

Personal Insecurities

Personal security in Afghanistan today refers both to “physical” violence, such as those originating from war, crime and abuse, as well as violence, mental, moral or physical, stemming from violations of human rights. Personal security is exasperated by a lack of effective mechanisms for civil control over the police and institutions responsible for public order as well as the incapability of the government to protect people’s human rights.

Personal security requires security from physical violence and from various threats. In Afghanistan, people are increasingly threatened by sudden and unpredictable violence, such as threats from the armed militia and the ruling powerful elite through physical torture inflicted by the security forces and police, threats from international or cross-border terrorism advocated by the Taliban, violent attacks on civilians, threats from individuals or gangs against other individual or street violence, threats from hostage taking by foes, threats directed against women such as domestic violence, child abuse or rape, child abduction, neglected child labor, or child prostitutions, and threats to one’s self such as drug use, which is on the rise.

These are exacerbated by the continuation of low-intensity conflict in many areas outside Kabul, the weakness of law-enforcement structures, and ineffective legal and judicial processes, including courts in some regions. A general disregard for the rule of law persists unfortunately among not only paramilitary organizations and independent “warlords”, but also agents of the state and even the international community. Ultimately, the continuation of human rights violations is a reflection of a lack of political will on one side, and the low awareness of human rights issues among the population on the other.

Under threats to personal security that have risen in Afghanistan today, one can count crime, war, drug trade and drug consumption, infringement of human rights, terrorism, violence against women, and even corruption, “white collar crime”, the latter associated with bribes, embezzlement, fraud, etc., which directly undermine the security of the state, but also affect that of individuals. The rise of illicit trade in drugs, money and people, as well as radical terrorism, are manifestations of human insecurity, and contribute to both increased criminal activity and increased victimization. Although the strengthening of law enforcement structures is important to protect Afghans from personal crime and terrorist threats, it is as important to understand the motivations that compel people to seek illegal means of expressing insecurities. The guarantee of civil and political rights and human security can be achieved not only through constitutional, legal and administrative reforms, but especially in the presence of the will and the capacity of the government to reinforce them. It also requires cooperation from civil society, which can reinforce values and influence public opinion through advocacy and education. It requires a strong, fair and accountable state as much as an informed and active population capable, and willing, to express its voice.
The impact of years of discrimination against women, coupled with poverty and insecurities prevailing in Afghanistan, has meant that Afghan women have among some of the worst social indicators in the world today. The UNDP calculated Gender Development Index, valued at 0.300 for Afghanistan, puts it above just two countries in the world, namely Burkina Faso and Niger. Only 14% are literate. Maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan are 60 times higher than for women in industrial countries. Seventy per cent of people affected by tuberculosis are women. The feminization of poverty, serious malnutrition, exclusion from public life, gender-based violence, rape, lack of basic health facilities, illiteracy, forced marriage and routine denial of justice are some of the human security concerns of Afghan women.

Human security has different connotations for men and women. For women, gender-based violence is often engrained in local cultural and religious norms and is often tolerated, while physical violence in armed conflict is condemned by the international community. Furthermore, since most of the physical and mental violence against women happens within the family, the state may often shy away from intervening with the private sphere. Yet, men and women face different security threats both during armed conflicts as well as during peace. During the conflict, although women’s lives were not threatened as much and as directly as that of men’s, women suffered from displacement, widowhood, and ensuing poverty. Afghan women, however, did not play a significant role in the Bonn process which restored an interim government in Afghanistan after the downfall of the Taliban, although their coping mechanisms and survival skills allow for more sustainable peace building processes in local communities. Their role in reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts should not be neglected. Human security threats to women are also not limited to situations of armed conflict. Domestic violence within the home, perpetuated by a patriarchal system that respects the authority of the husband, father, and brother continue to be documented throughout Afghan society.

**Political security**

Political exclusion is visible in the form of labeling and stereotyping entire ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, the monopoly of power, inadequate ethnic representation in higher ranking government positions, denial of the right to employment to certain groups such as the disabled, access to higher education that is restricted to certain groups, unequal distribution of resources, and the monopoly of the public media by one group. To change the negative domination and menace of power-holders over the state-building process in the country, it is necessary to implement a radical reform to address conflicts of interest in the structure of the state, and in doing so, to secure the national interests of Afghans, rather than the interests of particular groups.

Threats also include the perception that people have about the relationship between the state and warlords and narco-mafia bosses. In the summer of 2004, regional warlords still wielded significant influence over scarce resources, and often set and enforced their own rules and their own personal or group interests. With political and militia groups still focused on personal, group, or ethnic interests, allegations and labels such as “war criminal” were assigned only to the loser groups. In the absence of a national reconciliation process, no one had been tried the human rights violations or crimes against humanity that have persisted for 23 years, and accusers have failed to assume any responsibility for their own crimes.

Without an institution that transcends communalism, steps to address the threats that arise from fragmentation cannot take hold. A functioning state must replace the status quo, the wielding of power by local warlords, otherwise, the lack of state power and influence at the local level will continue to be a critical deficit. So far, the central Government’s soft approach has failed to provide institutional cornerstones for conflict transformation, state-building, and social and economic reforms, even though people’s demand for more state involvement in local governance is high all over the country.
Appendix 3

GREED AND GRIEVANCE AS MOTIVES EXPLAINING CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

The causes of the conflict in Afghanistan are many, and attempts to point to one determining factor are generally not successful. From the onset, it is hard to pinpoint whether grievances such as unusually high inequality and weak political and civil rights, are the main motives that explain conflicts. Yet, the emergence of certain trends suggests strong linkages between scarcity, inequality and institutional weaknesses in society and the inability to ensure peace and security. It is misleading to talk about ‘the Afghan conflict’ in a unified term. Absolute poverty, social and political exclusion, acute inequality and inequity in the distribution of resources and opportunities among different identity groups based on ethnicity, geography etc. have made Afghanistan vulnerable to conflict in the past. One can postulate that poverty and lack of progress on development indicators exacerbated and sustained the conflict in Afghanistan. Poverty forced people to join militias as an alternative to employment. The lack of viable and alternative means of livelihoods or opportunities perpetuates the sense of frustration, creating new tensions (such as over land and natural resources) or feeding into existing tensions (e.g., inter-ethnic rivalries). Although external factors such as foreign invasion and interferences were the predominant factors leading to 23 years (1978-2001) of conflict in Afghanistan, persistent pervasive human insecurity cannot be discounted as a contributing factor to deepening and sustaining the war and devastation. Afghans have a history and a memory of tensions over land, of failed states, of challenges to power structures and of external influences. Internally, the country’s history is characterized by tribal and ethnic rivalries and a struggle for progress. From the external side, powerful neighbors and regional powers have imposed regimes inside the country, while ordinary Afghans have had little opportunity to participate in the decision making processes that affected their lives.

At the risk of over-simplification of a complex conflict, for the purposes of a human security analysis, one could propose that first phase of the conflict (1978-1992) may have had a very different motive than the second phase (1992-2001). In the first phase, one could offer an account of conflict in terms of motives: rebellion occurred as a result of grievances ranging from threats to independence, to cultural values, to poverty, illiteracy, political repression and threats to livelihoods and human rights violations, fueled by foreign occupation. These motivations and grievances prompted people to engage in violent protest in defense of their motherland, national dignity, and cultural identity. Theirs was also a civil aspiration for freedom, justice and fairness, as well as freedom from poverty. In contrast to this phase, the post-1992 conflict could be explained in terms of opportunity rather than motive. Rebellion during 1992-2001 in Afghanistan was mainly motivated by greed, which was presumably sufficiently common that profitable opportunities for rebellion would not be passed up. A particularly powerful factor in this context was the dependence of many of the Mujahideen groups upon primary commodity exports, such as lapis lazuli, emerald, ruby, timber, and in the later stages, opium gum, combined with archaeological and antique artifacts of the country which provided opportunities to finance war.

The Afghan case shows that economic agendas have been intertwined with social and political crisis. Grievances have included worsening poverty and inequality that may center on ethnic or cultural identities. They have been fueled by and added fuel to “greed”, associated with the rise of conflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers, private militia commanders and narco-mafia style profit seekers in the country. It is this dimension that has led to the collapse of legitimate state authority and social control, which bred crime and disorder, disturbed the livelihoods of the people, brought about resource scarcities, environmental degradation, spread of poverty-related diseases, hunger, exhaustion of the national budget, inflation, depletion of the national historical heritage, and, ultimately, further dependence of the country on international humanitarian operations.
Grievance: conflict as justice seeking

In Afghanistan, the relative human poverty of different ethnic, gender or geographic groups is hard to identify given the lack of disaggregated statistics based on these variables. If available, disaggregated statistics could show relatively more poverty or illiteracy in different ethnic groups, marginalized from international markets, or state benefits. The feeling of unfairness in Afghan society comes from an extremely skewed distribution of development gains and political opportunities. The existence of ‘horizontal inequalities’ as a differentiated experience of access to socio-economic opportunities, resources and power-sharing, has created a reality of multiple experiences, hence multiple states within the country. Poverty and lack of progress on development indicators exacerbated and sustained the conflict, while lack of viable and alternative means of livelihoods or opportunities perpetuated the sense of frustration, creating new tensions, pointing to a dialectical relationship.

"Horizontal inequalities" between groups — whether ethnic, religious or social — are the major contributing factors to the conflict. Inequalities — and insecurities — matter not only in incomes but in political participation (in parliaments, cabinets, armies and local governments), in economic assets (in land, human capital and communal resources) and in social conditions (in education, housing and employment). Issues of land degradation have long contributed to tension and grievances in Afghanistan. While lack of access to land has been a grievance for the majority of the population in Afghanistan, it has also been an asset and a means of control for greed seekers. More than 100 years of power struggles in Afghanistan have set the scene for present day land disputes, and each region has its own history of land changing hands multiple times as one of the most precious spoils of war. The multiple claims over land that stem from this history were accompanied by few title deeds. Where they exist, they are often contested because customary, religious and state laws have respectively generated various forms of documentation to prove land ownership. The two decades of migration and refugee movements have further complicated the situation. As large numbers of refugees return to resettle regions where they once made their homes, they are finding themselves confronted with new conflicts and insecurities over land rights. About 80 % of Afghans depend on what they can grow, but the country increasingly lacks water and fertile land. Even in the relatively peaceful 1970s, less than 6 % of the land was irrigated. The war almost halved that. The drought, which continues after seven years in some region, has lowered the water levels in almost all parts of the country. Drought was also an ally of the Taliban. They could not have pushed north without picking up farmers along the way who, having lost their crops and herds to drought, hoped to earn something by shouldering a gun.

In the chaos of the 1990s, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, ethnicity seemed to become the dominant factor in the Afghan civil war. Although some experts equate ethnic groups with dominant military-political movements and see them as uniform bodies, many insist that there has been no real ethnicization of the Afghan conflict. While the recent history of the Afghan society is marked by political and even violent attempts for ethnic dominance, diversity in the country has also positively prohibited disintegration, keeping the national integrity of the country intact. While acknowledging the reality of historic and ongoing discrimination against minorities, ordinary Afghans feel little ethnic hatred. Instead, blame for ethnic tensions is attributed to political interest groups and their foreign sponsors, for building regional power bases along ethnic lines as a pretext for political revenge and profiteering. Dominant factions have targeted and still continue to target minorities in areas under their control often with catastrophic consequences. Many ethnically and politically targeted victims during the past decade feel bitterness over the neglect of justice and accountability with respect to those responsible for some heinous crimes. The problem in Afghanistan is not ethnicity, but the skewed distribution of resources and justice among the entire population.
Greed: Conflict as Opportunity

Opportunity as an explanation of the 23 years of conflict in Afghanistan shows consistency with the economic interpretation of conflict as greed-motivated. Conflict in Afghanistan clearly has had its beneficiaries. For example Afghanistan became a transport and marketing corridor for a flourishing illicit economy based upon opium and smuggled consumer goods. Economic agendas became increasingly important and incentive systems developed for vested interests in the continuation of violent conflict. Quantitative indicators of opportunity during the conflict era in Afghanistan are many, among them, opportunities for financing rebellion through three major sources, i.e., illegal trade, extortion of natural resources, and subventions from hostile governments. During the conflict years, the economic system collapsed to the point of negative growth, while the impact of primary commodity exports on conflict was highly significant. During years of conflict, the economy of Afghanistan depended less on primary commodity export, such as dry fruits and handicrafts and more on illegal exports such as gemstones, archaeological artifacts, and poppy gum.

This legacy comes from the years following the end of the Cold War when a decline in the superpowers’ support led to local warlords becoming more dependent on local resources to maintain their military activities. During this time, Afghanistan became a transport and marketing corridor for drugs and contraband. Under the Talibans, Afghanistan became the world’s major source of opium with production peaking at 5,764 metric tons in 1999. The drought was also an ally of opium traders, as herders, who used to move livestock around the country, now moved opium by being paid advances on next year’s harvest. A June 2000 ban by the Talibans hike up the prices of opium gum in the country while reducing opium output to relatively insignificant amounts in 2001 (250 tons), and post-Taliban years saw a profitable expansion of this lucrative cultivation. It is estimated that trade in opium products in Afghanistan brought in $2.5 billion, more than half of the country’s gross domestic product in 2003, and experts expect plantings to reach a record in 2004. The cultivation of opium poppy was expanded to some 80,000 hectares in 2003, compared with 74,000 hectares in 2002, which represents an increase of some 9.25 % in a year.

It is estimated that in 2003, Afghanistan produced three-quarters of the world’s illicit opium, and some 80–90 % of the heroin consumed in Europe comes from Afghan opium, threatening the human security of millions of people all over the world. Trafficking of archaeological artifacts was another booty that sustained the conflict for years and continues to exist. Though the share of illegal selling of the archaeological artifacts in the overall GDP is not known, the flow of money from the sale of these items is quite significant. It is estimated that 75 % of the ancient artifacts belonging to the national museum in Kabul were smuggled out of the country during the conflict since 1992.

Today, this war economy is sustained: among the illegal commodity exports, poppy products constitute over 50 % of the GDP, notwithstanding that gems and lumber extraction, and excavation of archaeological artifacts still continue to feed the war profiteers. The legacy of the opium industry and the drug lords undeniably represent one of the most daunting obstacles to the state-building process. Presently, drug related activities are the core component of the informal and criminal economic sector. The risk of drug economy and violent conflict forming a vicious circle where one reinforces the other is still present. The enormous profits that the drug industry creates threaten to corrupt state officials and to undermine the weak state capacities of the country, creating a possibility of it becoming a narco-state.

One of the major causes of conflict in Afghanistan can also be attributed to the external interventions of states, neighboring and distant, each of whom attempted to assure their respective interests through the manipulation of internal Afghan affairs. The flow of aid to Afghanistan played a significant role in the formation and the conservation of a ‘prosperous’ war economy. During the 1980’s, Western-backed aid programs, provoked by humanitarian need, became entangled with Cold War and, later, post-Cold War political agendas. During the Cold War between 1979 and 1989, the Mujahideen groups were receiving about US$7 billion in military and
economic aid from the US and some other western countries. The opportunity for rebellion may have been exacerbated by the fact that conflict-specific capital, such as military equipments, were provided to the actors either for free or at an unusually cheap rate. In the early 1980’s, Western aid was part of a conscious strategy to undermine the pro-Soviet communist government. Avoiding official structures and instead working through local commanders, mostly in eastern regions where the central government was weak, patterns of aid distribution tended towards preference for political ties over real humanitarian need. This inevitably accentuated national-regional and center-periphery tensions and legitimized Mujahideen groups in rural areas. Essentially, humanitarian aid was being distributed to resistance groups much in the same way arms had been only years earlier. In addition to creating a ‘culture of dependency,’ particularly on food aid, the ‘aid and arms pipeline’ directly led to the build-up and the legitimization of factional forces and eventually to the expansion of smuggling and other businesses.

Regional interference in Afghanistan can also be an explanation of greed factors in the conflict. Afghanistan’s social and economic situation had and continues to have significant regional spill-over effects—through unofficial trade, narcotics, terrorism and extremism, financial flows, and movement of people, undermining revenue collection, governance, and the effectiveness of economic policies in neighboring countries. There are significant groups who are benefiting from the status quo, having a vested interest. Trade and dealings that involve arms and aid transfer often rely on social and ethnic networks. Because all of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups are also found in significant sizes in regional countries, Afghanistan shares common languages and culture with many of its neighbors. In the past two decade, this helped facilitate the creation of cross-border networks as well as interferences by neighbors. Moreover, the arm groups and warlords used their cross-ethnic ties for their involvement in the narco-trade and smuggling.

**Learning from History**

History matters, and the history of the Afghan conflict is one of greeds and grievances feeding into each other and perpetuating social fragmentation. Some of the most pertinent lessons that can be learned from this revolving history include:

1) **Root causes of fragmentation have to be addressed.**

At the same time, there is a need to understand the motivation behind violence and recognize its transformatory role. Understanding the Afghan conflict means understanding what motivates warring groups and the broader role of violence in society in general. In any conflict, there is usually a continuum of different forms of violence, from organized warfare and systematic economic violence by the state or other organized military actors, through to more individualized forms linked to crime and opportunism. In Afghanistan, economic agendas have become intertwined with social and political crisis, making it difficult to disentangle causes and effects of the conflict from wider processes at work. Patterns of vulnerability may change rapidly with the shifting fortunes of different communities or different social groups. Understanding what motivates violence could help policy-makers recognize and anticipate changing patterns of vulnerability and reach adequate decisions about the appropriate responses. Effective policies are those that deal with the causes and the consequences of the conflict simultaneously and make an attempt to integrate conflict transformation and social cohesion objectives into governance, poverty reduction and environmental programs. By keeping injustice on the agenda, governance processes in the new democratic Afghanistan must address and not exacerbate existing power inequalities. A long-term strategy for addressing the root causes of Afghanistan’s crisis needs to build on the positive aspects of inter-group and inter-ethnic relations such as respect, tolerance, and the benefits of diversity to promote joint problem solving and consensus-building.

2) **With high levels of poverty and unemployment, holding to Kalashnikovs or engaging in poppy cultivation and narco-industry are still considered as a means to survival.**
In many rural communities, the young are increasingly dependent on income from cultivation and trade of opium poppies. Any successful but untargeted interdiction program would most certainly have a very negative effect on the food security of the resource poor group that only recently managed to upgrade their survival strategy to coping thanks to their access to the fringes of the opium poppy economy. Enlisting in a militia group or joining a criminal band may for many individuals represent a livelihood strategy. Reducing the vulnerability of rural communities to predation may thus depend on finding suitable livelihood options and alternatives for those involved in banditry and militia violence.

3) The response to the societal security problems is a genuine of reconciliation – something that so far Afghanistan’s state-building process has shied away from.
   Reconciliation is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. It is a multi-complex process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, and healing, in order to find ways to coexist with former adversaries. It becomes clear that a mere provision of financial support for reconstruction-oriented state building is not sufficient: the key to the success lies in embedding the concept of reconciliation into the process of state building.

4) Ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversities are Afghanistan’s rich legacies and cannot be discounted as political factors.
   It cannot be emphasized enough that a government able to bring a lasting peace and stability to Afghanistan has to be representative of all ethnic, cultural and regional groups. The state-building process must give every citizen a sense of belonging to the government and to the country, by giving recognition to their respective cultural, religious and linguistic values – as has been done by Afghanistan’s new Constitution.

5) There is a regional dimension to many of the security problems that have beset Afghanistan for many years.
   These include black market regional trade, narcotics, cross-border arms smuggling, human trafficking, and ethno-regional identities that compete with national ones, etc. The changed political circumstances after the Taliban provide an opportunity to improving regional relations by expanding legitimate trade and initiating other forms of positive cooperation with the countries of the region. The forward strategy is to take a regional approach to solving many of the inter-linked problems – particularly, in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan which have become incubators of violence and conflict because of entrenched poverty, and with the Central Asian republics which offer renewed opportunities for collaboration.

A human security analysis of the Afghanistan situation today postulates that both grievances and greeds still continue to exist in Afghanistan and may not have been dealt with adequately to prevent future conflicts. Greed from the drug economy and amongst power-holders for more power and wealth has kept the government fragile and unable to fulfill many of its responsibilities in meeting people’s needs in terms of welfare, employment and security. This in turn could lead to people’s disenfranchisement, hence grievances. These problems cannot be dealt with through ineffective and short-term policies focused on political compromise. Instead, there is a need to identify root causes that can continue to endanger the new democracy.
Appendix 4

APPLYING A HUMAN SECURITY LENS TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

The challenge of assessing needs

In Afghanistan, for example, there was a lack of crucial information available to decision-makers, and the kinds of needs assessment required to generate this were conducted only sporadically. The result was that few situations are assessed as a whole, making prioritization within and across contexts difficult. When data was collected by various agencies and by the Central Statistical Office (CSO), it was not always the relevant data, or in a form that would allow comparisons and cross-examination. The baseline and population figures were necessary for the voter registration and were carried out by the CSO in the summer of 2003. Yet, data collection in an insecure environment such as Afghanistan has been very difficult, as exemplified by the murder of numerous CSO officials conducting the pre-census. Two country-wide assessments sought to shed more light on the situation of poverty and vulnerability in Afghanistan: A National Rural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) and a UNICEF/CSO conducted Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) surveys were conducted in sample regions in 2003-2004. Both surveys however were conducted in less than perfect circumstances of lack of access to some regions, or lack of ability to properly analyze and cross-check the findings. They were nonetheless the most comprehensive surveys conducted in Afghanistan and became the basis of figures presented in the UNDP National Human Development Report and subsequent policy documents by the government.

Applying a human security lens to development assistance

An assessment of international aid to Afghanistan starts with a reexamination of the responsibility towards the well-being of the Afghan people. An analysis of assistance in Afghanistan shows that the wrong kind of aid runs the danger of creating perverse incentives leading to renewed conflict. Despite the dangers, aid is nonetheless essential for Afghanistan’s successful reconstruction and the manner in which it is administered will ultimately determine whether or not the country and those who reside within its boundaries, will find long-term stability and prosperity. However, the implementation of such an agenda will largely depend on how the international donors and the UN system approach the task of reconstruction and whose interest they ultimately reflect. Promoting human security in Afghanistan would require that donors, agencies, and NGOs make building Afghan institutions owned by and accountable to the people of Afghanistan. Hence, donors and aid agencies must be more self-critical and aware of the potentially negative effects of aid than they have been in the past.

Given that Afghanistan’s human insecurities have been the result of conflicts compounded by foreign interference, the world now has a particular obligation to help solve them. This responsibility also stems from having successfully driven the Taliban out of Afghanistan and then making a promise of nation-building. For long the interest of the West was what many would consider opportunistic self-interest: showing-off Afghanistan as a test case for international intervention, benefiting from the control of the drug trade while gaining access to Central Asian oil and gas supplies. There was a striking contrast between the way the West pursued its strategy interests in Afghanistan during the cold war and after September 11 with its effective disengagement and the resulting political vacuum which was allowed to continue unchecked during the interim period, from 1992 to 2001.

The legacy of the way that donors and aid organizations, from the west, from the Soviet Union, and from regional powers, operated in the past, when dealing with the various powers in control of Afghanistan paints a picture of the politicization of aid. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Afghanistan became a ‘rentier’ state with external finance, mostly from the Soviet Union and the
United States, playing a large role in funding domestic expenditure. Following the Soviet occupation at the end of 1979, the Soviet government replaced the cessation of Western development programmes in subsidizing the Afghan state and its mostly urban project of modernization. Western development programmes were replaced with humanitarian aid, which mirrored the arms pipeline to resistance groups. Humanitarian aid, led by NGOs, given that the UN and ICRC could not provide aid to Mujaheddin held areas because of sovereignty issues, became especially tangled in the militarization of refugee camps which became a base for the Mujaheddin. Such humanitarian assistance during the past two decades reinforced power structures at both the regional and the local levels. Aid was short term, encouraging dependency rather than sustainability, with an emphasis on camps and urban environments, and failing to build long term capacity. This made it possible to register some local development, but did not modify a regionalized political economy of war that made leaders more dependent upon - and responsive to - outside forces rather than their own people. The legacy of the role that foreign aid played was the creation of a rentier elite and a state that failed to develop a social contract with its citizens in different stages of the conflict.

To reverse this legacy, sustained political commitment to state-building in Afghanistan and a substantial aid package are first and foremost necessary for Afghanistan to transform a war economy into a peaceful one. Although at the beginning of the reconstruction period there was talk of a Marshall Plan, this did not materialize. However, at the Berlin Conference in March 2004, commitments were guaranteed for the next seven years, when the international community pledged $4.5 billion in the first year and a substantial part of the Afghan requests of $27.5 billion requested by the then Transitional Government of Afghanistan over seven years for the second and third years. In late 2003, the United States, Afghanistan’s most generous donor, also sharply increased aid, expanded technical assistance, and actively involved itself in the Afghan constitutional process and in support of democratic elections. These commitments renew hopes for keeping Afghanistan on the global agenda. But the commitment should not be only about the quantity, but the quality of aid.

The challenges of aid in Afghanistan are summarized below:

**The aid presence: a “light footprint”?**

At the Bonn Conference, the UN promised a “light footprint”. However, worldwide attention on Afghanistan brought a myriad of international aid workers to the country, making the relief scene similar to other post-war situation. Problems associated with heavy foreign aid, especially in Kabul, amounted to pressure on real estate prices which skyrocketed, and to the “white vehicle syndrome” which could lead to popular resentment. They also included a serious distortion of salaries, prompting the flight of qualified local personnel to the aid sector. Although large amounts of money have been given to Afghanistan, the danger of introducing requests for large amounts of money raises Afghan expectations of rapid growth and recovery to an unrealistic level.

In *Securing Afghanistan’s Future*, the Afghanistan transitional administration presented the case for a large amount of money from the international community in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a ‘narco-mafia state’. This argument, valid as it may be, places the focus on a bribery of a potentially dangerous state instead of on meeting the needs of the Afghan population. It is questionable whether increased money for reconstruction by itself would bring peace. How the aid is spent may be more of an important question, as is institutional context of local capacity. At the same time, large inflows of aid may mean that Afghanistan becomes a rentier state funded through foreign countries. Dependency on this kind of funding means that the Afghan government would have to be accountable to foreign patrons for the next seven years, and not to its own people, as had been envisaged as an objective of Bonn.

Large amounts of aid do not guarantee improved well-being, the same way that the human development approach argues that growth in itself does not necessary trickle down to all members of society. Talking about the quantity of aid does not address issues of efficiency, distribution...
impact and overall well-being. Yet, too much aid can be a curse rather than a blessing; it can lead to lower domestic savings, and higher exchange rates which lower the competitiveness of national enterprises in domestic and foreign markets. While its contribution to long-term and sustained economic growth is questionable, it could lead to serious indebtedness. The same way that public policy can translate economic growth into human development, well targeted, designed, implemented and monitored interventions could ensure that the large amount of aid translates into addressing the needs of the Afghan people.

The dilemma of top down versus bottom up

It is mostly through the state that people relate to the international community or to the international system. The international community can forgo the state and co-operate directly with sub-national societal units of the population. In this case the international community risks replacing or weakening the state, which would not necessarily enhance human security perspectives in the long-run. If aid in Afghanistan, for example, bypasses the central government and works directly with regional administrations controlled by regional power-holders, this risks heightening tensions between the centre and the periphery.

In search of a more effective approach, multiple aid agencies have already taken on the challenge of experimenting with alternative, community-based initiatives. These initiatives are built on the conviction that aid, at the individual and community level, may effectively support alternatives to war by cultivating ideas, values, livelihoods, forms of governance, and leadership. The underlying belief is that aid, administered at the individual and community level in a ‘conflict sensitive’ manner, can subdue violence and thereby make communities less vulnerable to the interests and agendas of ‘conflict entrepreneurs.’ The effects of these micro-level initiatives are likewise assumed to spillover and influence macro-level politics. Though the effects of such efforts have yet to be measured, the importance of the work being done by these ‘social entrepreneurs’, who attempt to bridge the gap between civil society and top leadership should not be underestimated. Beyond a political dimension, aid agency interventions may also bridge social gaps countering the social fragmentation, which peace spoilers create and exploit to their ends.

However, one should not assume that bottom-up peace-building approaches will automatically have a cumulative effect. Bottom-up approaches of the past have led agencies to avoid working with the authorities at the national level while their efforts remained highly localized, not to say fragmented. Moreover, such community-based approaches tend to overestimate the capacity of ‘civil society’ to have an influence on an unaccountable leadership, which have often came to power with the gun rather than through consent. It is mostly through the state that people relate to the international community or to the international system. The international community can forgo the state and co-operate directly with sub-national societal units of the population. In this case the international community risks replacing or weakening the state, which would not necessarily enhance human security perspectives in the long-run. If aid in Afghanistan, for example, bypasses the central government and works directly with regional administrations controlled by regional power-holders, this risks heightening tensions between the centre and the periphery.

In the coming years, it will be necessary for all aid agencies to work together to devise an appropriate Afghan model for aid. Ideally, this model would involve an optimal blend of top-down and bottom-up aid strategies. To give priority to one over the other would likely lead to undesirable consequences. Though the dangers of top-down aid strategies are perhaps more easily identifiable given the very exposed mistakes made in pre-war aid policies, favoring bottom-up approaches may be no less problematic, running the risks of undermining central authority and reinforcing fragmentation.
Quick fixes versus long term interventions

The large amount of aid that has poured into Afghanistan has made it difficult to resist the temptation of quick fix-projects that produce quick results. The problem in Afghanistan is not the shortage of the funds but absorption capacities and policy priorities. The most important thing is to avoid expectations of a quick recovery. Lack of quick progress may lead to disillusionment with reconstruction especially among the high rate of unemployed youth. Expectations are particularly high during post-conflict situations. As the short-term humanitarian relief to address the imperative of saving lives continues in many parts of Afghanistan, aid agencies have also begun concentrating on longer-term livelihoods support and capacity building. This would mean building on the foundations of community coping skills to create alternatives to the war economy, rebuilding social capital, physical infrastructure, and, most importantly, helping “de-militarise the mind”. To build the bridge between quick impact projects to deliver the peace dividend and longer term interventions towards the MDGs requires involving people in the recovery and reconstruction process so that they have a vested interested in sustaining peace.

The danger of dependency

The inevitable dependence on external assistance, in the short-term at least, must not be allowed to render the successor transitional administration more accountable to donors than to its citizens. In the 1960s, for example, foreign aid in Afghanistan accounted for more than 40 % to the state budget.29 The ruling elite was never forced to develop domestic accountability through internally derived revenue because of the strong role of external finance. Afghanistan today continues to heavily rely on foreign aid to finance development. Two-thirds of the operating budget for the fiscal year 2003-2004 and the entire first National Development Budget were financed by foreign aid. International technical advisors were assigned to most of the ministries in Kabul, partly also in the provinces. Absorptive capacities for the large amounts of funding requested at Berlin were guaranteed through hiring large international companies to assume responsibility for reconstruction of infrastructure to performing accounting functions for the Government. Large amounts of aid means that both donors and the recipient state like the Afghan Transitional State, are tied to the culture of financial accountability required for the management of short, fixed term budgets measured by indicators of expenditures. Funding is geared to financial probity and timely disbursement, rather than the more difficult task of measuring its effectiveness through social impact evaluations of long lasting improvements. For the state, which is heavily dependent on international money, this practice creates accountability to international and national financial intuitions and taxpayers in other countries. In addition, the timeframe creates a situation that even if international organization, and the state, are both morally accountable to beneficiaries for their interventions – the Afghan people – in practice accounting is subservient to those controlling the resources and budgetary calendars.

Holistic, not sectoral approaches

Sectoral approaches, promoted by UN Agencies and International NGOs with specific sectoral mandates, may not be the best way to deal with human security in Afghanistan not only because they may lead to fragmentation and contradictions, but especially because they fail to take into account the inter-connection. Instead, an integrated and holistic approach is needed. For example, if food aid (relief assistance) is not correlated with food security (agriculture and rural

economic recovery), it could hamper post-war agriculture recovery. Similarly, agriculture recovery needs to be correlated with mine clearance and the employment sector. The reintegration of refugees and IDPs should not be dealt with separately from the reintegration of demobilized combatants, given that they are likely to be returning to the same rural and urban communities. Women and children are recognized as vulnerable “categories” but the old and many thousands of disabled may not be identified as such. Similarly, although many agencies work on mainstreaming gender issues into their programmes, women are singled out as a “category” in isolation from their wider social, cultural and family context. A macro-economic framework based on market incentives may lead to inequalities and the proliferation of needy individuals. The list of interconnections can go on, each time pointing to the need for a more integrated approach to planning, budgeting and monitoring to avoid negative externalities. This fragmentation extends to the way that the UN, and the various Consultative Groups and Government ministries discussed adopt sectoral approaches, with separate programmes, and separated budgets. Responsibilities for different “needy persons” are allocated to separate agencies. A human security approach however, needs to go beyond the fragmentation of the needs based on sectoral interests of agencies, both national and international.

**Building capacity**

Capacity of Afghan intuitions is a slow process, which cannot be expected to grow overnight. Afghan people and institutions must be given the necessary respect to be given the time-frame that suits them best, and not the constraints of budget deadlines determined by Western capitals.

A perceived lack of capacity, the haste of implementing relief while providing security and the desire to promote Afghanistan as a show-case for the international community may have meant that the early stages of reconstruction plans were running ahead of Afghan preparedness and preempting the process of national negotiation and decision-making. Since 2002 however, there has been a process of building government capacity and finding personnel that have the competence and authority to act as genuine counterparts. The limited capacity within line ministries continues to represent a major constraint to planning, implementing and monitoring development programmes. Central institutions have been weakened by the conflict, and their relationships with the periphery hampered by insecurity and by lack of communications infrastructure. Capacity needs to be built in the center and in the provinces simultaneously in order to ensure that the reconstruction process is indeed led by the Afghans themselves.

In the absence or weakness of administrative structures, the UN agencies, IFIs and bilateral donors increasingly pursue a policy of direct intervention, including becoming involved in the day-to-day administrative running of the government through advisors, or through “technical assistance” strategically placed in key institutions. The same trend is seen when NGOs substitute the state at the local level in providing services with the assumption that there are no capable state structures. Replacing the state at the local or national level, either directly or indirectly, however, does not lead to long term capacity building or ownership.

**Afghan ownership**

Afghan ownership does not only mean keeping people informed or consulting with them. It means allowing them to be in the driver’s seat in designing strategies. At the same time, while it is vital that Afghans take centre-stage in the decision-making processes concerning their reconstruction, it should not be assumed that there exists a national consensus concerning a vision for the nation’s future reconstruction and development priorities. Hence, there is a danger that the country’s weak transitional structures will be overwhelmed and marginalized in the decision-making processes. The international community taking the lead may undermine the inputs from the people of Afghanistan. Hence, there is a need to support national institutions at the
central, provincial and district level, as well as local-level authorities such as the *shura*.

Aid agencies have often failed to recognize existing social institutions. The implication has been to bypass the social formations that have emerged through history, and to rely on a small set of organization with characteristics conforming to the Western NGO model. This western cultural bias may mean overlooking traditional social formation that are central to people’s lives: associations based on ethnic and religious allegiances; *ad hoc* and informal groupings; the extended family etc. Instead, when civil society is viewed within a confrontational relationship with the state, it denies the possibility to these institutions to play a role to work both constructively with the state and holding it accountable.

Adequate consultation has been perhaps the most thorny question in a situation where funding proposals had to be submitted to international conferences in a short time, while insecurity prevented consultation with various regions, and where the infrastructure for consultation has not been put in place. But consultation requires effective consensus-building on the elaboration of anything from development strategies to negotiations over small projects. In Afghanistan, however, there has not been much consultation on any of the agendas, beginning with the NDF to the Securing Afghanistan’s Future. While pressure from the international community on the Transitional Administration and on the aid agencies to deliver is understandable, the danger is that this pressure may be at the expense of proper consultation, both with the majority of Afghans, and within the different branches of the administration itself. It risks perpetuating the perception that aid is to sustain the presence of a large international community. Consultation, formal and informal, with civil society, and with the *Shuras* and even with the Diaspora is essential for planning the path towards genuine and lasting democracy and development.

The lack of education provision for the overwhelming majority of the younger generation (men as well as women) has left a huge gap in the general capacity of the nation to resume control of its affairs. This situation is already leading international agencies to take the convenient option (from a communication and timesaving point of view) of relying on the returning, Western-educated expatriates as sole interpreters of the culture and aspirations of the whole nation. While these returning nationals constitute a precious resource, they too have a learning process to follow. In the meantime, the internal (largely illiterate) population, still struggling for physical survival and coming to terms with loss, is in danger of being overridden by the usual hasty solutions, before they have time to consider their role in the process. The first step towards reconstruction and development would be to recognize and value people’s existing resilience to survive in conflict situations and to nurture coping skills. In Afghanistan, despite decades of violent conflict, there are community level structures and parts of a civil society which have not only survived but also continued to grow. Too often the international community may not recognize or value such local initiatives and insist on creating new structures instead of building on these. It is therefore also important that in such politicized environments, space is given for civil society to mature and to contribute positively to any ongoing peace negotiations or processes. It is of critical importance that civilians be centre-stage in the decision-making on Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The dilemma facing the country is that there has not been a neutral space for debate to enable a vision to emerge, or for intellectuals and development professionals to gather, to think, to discuss and to plan.
Appendix 5

THE DILEMMAS OF STATE-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

While the initial focus of a US-led intervention in Afghanistan was on the removal of the remnants of the Taliban, it became soon apparent that Afghanistan needed a stable state, that which was at peace with itself and no danger to the world community. The “State Building” process started with the December 2001 Bonn Agreement which created first an interim and subsequently a transitional government, consultative processes leading to a new Constitution in January 2004, national presidential election in October 2004, the return of over 2 million refugees, billions of dollars pledged first at the Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference in January 2002 in Tokyo and then in March 2004 in Berlin. Although efforts were made in promoting a national army and security force in Afghanistan, the provision of security was seen as the agenda of the Coalition troupes and NATO-led ISAF forces. Today in Afghanistan, the dilemma is that an ambitious national reconstruction program is launched at the same time as a fragile political transition and an ongoing military campaign. The very real constraints of the new government, in terms of resources, geography and history need to be dealt with first and foremost through political will.

The viability of a peace-building process depends ultimately on the establishment of a legitimate Afghan state, responsive to the demands of the population, responsible to provide human security public goods, and able to resist threats from regional military groups within the country as well as pressures from external parties. The legitimacy of the state depends heavily on its capacity to take care of the needs of the population. The Government can delegate some of its responsibilities to the international aid community, to external military forces and to commercial and non-government organizations, but it still bears the ultimate responsibility if it is to be legitimate. This box focuses on four of the most urgent imperatives for the state in Afghanistan: deciding on the nature and responsibilities of the state, transforming the war economy, providing security, and a balanced development.

What type of state? A responsible state and an accountable state-building process

What role for the state in Afghanistan? Social security, physical security and rule of law, as well equal distribution and upholding of human rights are considered as vital responsibilities of a “strong” state. A weak state is one that cannot deliver human security priorities and can breed grievances. The inability to provide basic needs for the population in provinces can hamper the credibility of the central government. NGOs, and the private sector can help the state’s efforts in providing services but they cannot replace the state in its primal responsibilities.

Yet, a number of factors contribute to Afghanistan as a “weak state”. Geography and topography are not conducive to facilitating communication, and they contribute to the formation of regional power-centers competing with the center. The interference of strong regional and international powers in the internal political process has prevented a strong state from evolving. The legitimacy and power of a central state is challenged by the evolution of local tribal structures led by powerful personalities. Instead, what is sought is a redistribution of the “power” of the state equally among the different groups to ensure that all are implicated in the political discourse on state building throughout the country and not only in Kabul. While a strong state is needed to provide human security as a public good, a strong centralized state which does not distribute its power may also mean exacerabing the horizontal inequalities that could lead to conflicts. There is a need for order at the national level, but at the same time, the geography does not facilitate central control, and freedom should be bestowed on the regions to allow for local economic development. Devolution of power therefore is needed at the same time as this power is consolidated at the center. What needs to be avoided is the segregation of the country into semi-autonomous regions. This state-building process in Afghanistan requires cooperation between the central government and its local representatives, as well as with community / tribal leaders that
have been instrumental in creating law and order in provinces. These relationships, based on mutual interest, adequately spelled out in the Constitution, need to be adequately reinforced.

At the same time that the state should provide for its people, people should also be willing and capable to contribute to it. Checks and balances against the powers of the state should be mobilized through regular traditional negotiation structures such as the Loya Jirgah to ensure that the relationship between Afghan civil society and the central state ameliorates and becomes one of mutual engagement rather than distrust.

This mistrust can be lifted by launching a reconciliation process made part of the state building process. The challenge in Afghanistan was whether, in view of the current challenges to transitional justice, answers to the questions of the past may be “postponed” until the critical threshold for long-term stability has been achieved, or whether justice had to be pursued at the same time as stability. The risk remained that absent any measures to demonstrate commitment to deal with previous injustices and grievances, public trust and confidence in the newly established state structures, particularly its judiciary, further corrode to the detriment of the state-building process itself. This may particularly apply in cases where political interests seek to exploit past grievances as a support-generating mechanism.

The crucial issue will be whether the models of “transitional justice” that have been applied in other post-conflict contexts can be adapted to fit the complexities of the history of war in Afghanistan. Yet, specific means to address the country’s past entrenched in conflict and internal strife remain the knots of a Pandora-box, which both national and international actors are hesitant to touch. The multi-ethnic layers of Afghan society combined with the fragile texture of state-building efforts which remain dangerously exposed to polarization as a potential source of perpetuating conflict, necessitate a cautious approach towards the revisiting of the past as a means to promoting a process of national reconciliation. While few would disagree that long-term political stability in Afghanistan is closely tied to the resolution of past grievances - including human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity- the sequencing of reconciliation as well as the mechanism by which a process of “national healing” is to be facilitated in post-conflict Afghanistan are yet to be determined.

The immediate test for the government will be the extent to which the political environment of upcoming parliamentary elections will be perceived as fair and secure. The intermediate test will be the government’s ability to build the necessary structures to allow for a functioning parliament, which can meaningfully represent the people and exercise control over the executive. Whether the rule of law, observed by the judiciary and executive organs, will finally replace the rule of the gun will be the ultimate test for the government to generate the necessary trust by the people.

The challenge remains one of state building in this new era: Engaging on a path of modernization that does not alienate people, finding the balance between a strong protector state and one that does not stifle initiatives, reconciling relations with other countries according to win/win options without sacrificing sovereignty or cultural identity, and taking advantage of globalization opportunities without plunging further into dependency and debt.

A state that can provide security

Max Weber once defined a state as that entity that has a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the country. To be able to ensure human security, and to function as a capable state, the Afghan state should take back its monopoly of providing security and put an end to the privatization of security that is creating negative competition.

The on-going military campaign against remnants of Taliban fighters and peace-spoilers could present trade-offs that the new government and its international partners must deal with, including diversion of funds to the military, concentration on rogue provinces, etc. Although for the moment, this has been the responsibility of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, the state should increase its responsibilities to protect the citizens of Afghanistan, as well as those of other countries affected by insecurities in Afghanistan.
By the end of 2004, debates concentrated on how peace and security should be pursued and in whose interests Afghanistan should be made secure. While the Coalition Forces largely pursued their own agenda, hunting down the Taliban, al-Qaeda and anyone actively and violently opposing them, and NATO-led ISAF was considering its timid expansion beyond Kabul, the capacities of the Afghan National Army to address the broader national agenda for stability and peace building were inadequate, raising questions about the influence of the then Transitional Government beyond the capital. At the same time, ISAF’s role in security were deemed inadequate, as the numbers were small, and inappropriate, as they created a sense of dependency amongst Kabul residents.

State-building requires the strengthening of an accountable national police and army that has the will and capacity to enforce the law throughout the country. Hence, international security forces should help improve the delivery of security by means of extending the influence of the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and not by creating dependence on a foreign military presence.

An immediate focus should be on the remodeling and implementation of a strengthened and accelerated DDR strategy, and the accelerated reconstruction of Afghanistan’s own security capabilities in the form of a national army and police force. Disarmament however needs to be carried out within a context of employment creation and alternative livelihoods. An ill-planned DDR under which the there is no long-term plan for the employment of disarmed persons and no training for security personnel to replace them may be more dangerous than no DDR at all. Even though the current private militia are largely responsible for the insecurity threats throughout the country, they would become more lethal if the self-assigned security responsibility in the areas under their control is taken away from them through DDR and then left to ad-hoc strategies.

At the same time, however, it needs to be recognized that security achieved through an expansion of military operations, while without doubt an immediate priority, cannot provide a permanent solution to the security dilemma in Afghanistan. Nor does such a narrowly defined security goal amount to what will be required to meet the human security needs of Afghans, the vast majority of whom remain poor, highly vulnerable and without fundamental human rights. There is no fast track to lasting human security and political stability through military action alone. Without peace and stability, there can be no sustainable human development in Afghanistan. Beyond the call for more international forces to be deployed throughout the country, security, however should not to be dealt with through increased militarization of society, but through a genuine national reconciliation which addresses adequately the greed and grievances existing in Afghanistan today.

Transforming the war economy

The precarious security situation in Afghanistan is ultimately linked to the perseverance of the war economy. If today the majority of the resources of the central government are international aid, and given the lack of adequate distribution of funds to the regions, regional power-holders question the government's capacity to provide basic public goods and seek to develop their own alternative resources through illegal transit fees, smuggling, and drug dealing. Given dependency of most Afghans on private militias and power-holders, insecurity and economic stagnation will continue fueling each other until either an effective security and development system is put in place or more profitable, licit economic opportunities come into existence.

For the drug economy to be eradicated, estimates predict that the legal economy would need to grow at a steady 9% for many years to come. In general, there is little money for alternatives which would allow farmers to grow viable money-earning crops to harvest, and a 2004 attempt to buy out opium farmers only encouraged more areas to plant poppies. Essentially, opium prices, though falling, are still high, and the profits still more than compensate for the risks generated by the crop's nominal illegality. Changing the calculation of risk and reward would involve punishing poppy growers and opium distillers more consistently, and making trafficking harder and riskier,
both of which require security institutions which do not yet exist.

Most important, Afghans need other ways to make ends meet. One possibility for the diversification of livelihood among Afghans is dried fruit, herbs, flowers and cotton, as well as ensuring that Afghan rugs produced in Afghanistan reach global markets. The lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan clearly represents a hindrance to economic security. Transport is integral to economic regeneration in Afghanistan, both in terms of trading and of serving as a transit route. This requires a viable national road system with a toll that could help government revenues, and increased investments in cross-country transportation systems, including a much needed railroad.

Foreign aid and foreign engagement are both essential for rebuilding Afghanistan but the country will remain one of the world's poorest, and its human security threatened, unless it finds a way out of the multiple vicious circles in which it seems to be trapped. Economic progress depends on security and a stable government, however, security also depends on economic opportunities. With neither security nor alternative economic opportunities, many Afghans will continue to cultivate poppies, thus enriching peace-spoilers who thrive on and sustain lawlessness.

A balanced distribution

The initial stages of the reconstruction program concentrated most development efforts in Kabul and major urban centers. As the drug economy contributes now to the development of cities, the international community and the Government must now balance this imbalanced growth with increased focus on rural areas, including remote villages. A comprehensive regional development strategy must be designed which builds on the successes of initiatives such as the National Solidarity Programme.

Assistance to Afghanistan should not give the impression of uneven re-development, even if for security reasons some provinces are easier to access than others. What should be avoided is the evolution of an increasingly divided country between a turbulent South and East, on the one hand, and a more stable crescent stretching from the West to the North, where rehabilitation and development can move forward. As an equalizing and empowering measure, the state should address the wide gaps in opportunities between different regions as well as between urban and rural areas. A long-term human security vision should avoid islands of privileges (the cities) within seas of poverty (the rural areas). Wide gaps exist today in income opportunities, as well as in provision of jobs and basic services and infrastructure, with a high concentration of opportunities in Kabul, because of the concentration of public sector jobs, the international community and an informal sector boosted by revenues from drugs. Rapid and hyper-urbanization of Kabul, which has attracted people from rural areas for its better services and prospects for employment is a worrying phenomenon. The population of Kabul has gone from 800,000 to 2.9 million people and the ratio of rural/urban went from 20/80 to 30/70

An adequate regional and rural development strategy would enable Afghanistan to make the best use of its human capital. While the central government requires the resources of the provinces, it needs to also enter into appropriate relationships that empower the local communities and their representatives. By being involved in the design and implementation of projects and policies, people, political and community leaders in different regions also share the responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the area. Balanced development also means curbing corruption and correcting a situation where those in power have access to funds and money. It also means a more balanced redistribution of national revenue, especially of taxes received by some of the provinces, a large portion of the local revenue of which does not reach the central government.