‘Re-reading citizenship and the transnational practices of immigrants’

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From being an issue of low political importance, international immigration has now become a high priority on the political agenda, particularly in relation to security, development aid and clandestine immigration. Several authors have noted a growing convergence of immigration control instruments, of social integration policies for immigrants, and of the promotion of a citizenship ideology in industrialized countries (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994: 3). All Western countries are presently involved in controlling asylum requests and the flow of people without identity papers, as well as curbing recourse to services provide by the welfare state, and keeping a close eye on the cultural, religious and political practices which are playing themselves out in metropolitan areas.

In Canada, for example, it is noteworthy that there has been a clear protectionist shift in immigration policy over the past decade. The Canadian government is also active on the ideological front, seeking to enhance the value of its passport and to define and promote Canadian citizenship along with its underlying values and obligations. This offensive goes beyond the issue of controlling immigration; it is linked to the first nations question, the issue of Quebec, and the neo-liberal shift affecting the management of the state. A similar offensive is underway in the USA.

Within immigrant populations there is a parallel trend. Immigrants demand multiple identities and citizenships, while their intellectual spokespeople advocate transnationalism by theorizing the well-known fact that immigrants weave a variety of durable links with their countries of origin. As Balibar argues, internationalisation is being accompanied by an increase in political subjects (Balibar 1992), the interests of which may or may not converge with those of large national and international development agencies.
The increased role of government underscores the asymmetry created by the greater freedom the movement of international capital enjoys through regional groupings such as NAFTA, and the extensive sifting of the flow of people to the advantage of certain privileged actors (entrepreneurs and investors, strategic workers) and to the disadvantage of other categories (unqualified workers, sponsored immigrants, refugees).

What is the significance of these two trends, which at first glance seem opposed to one another? On the one hand, there is a trend for governments to tighten immigration control and to reinforce among the citizens a national feeling of belonging. On the other hand, there is a trend for immigrant populations to diversify the way they express their solidarity with their country of origin and to procure for themselves several citizenships. We would suggest, as others have, that we are witnessing a process of redefinition of the link between citizenship and nationality. New forms of transnationality are linking some immigrant populations with their country of origin, and some with others, within the framework of a double mimetic relation. Immigrants become acculturated to the way of life in the host country and wish to transfer certain of its aspects to the country of origin, while still rejecting the very idea of integration. At the same time, immigrants’ friends and family in the country of origin dream of sharing the benefits of the way of life in the country of immigration - via transfers received from the latter- the benefits of life in the country of immigration.

In order to develop this idea, we propose to delineate the current transnationality phenomenon, illustrate the case of the Haitian diaspora in North America, and to forward a critical reading of the transnationalist discourse.

Citizenship and fragmentation

Several interrelated factors converge to underline the relative dissociation between citizenship and nationality. In its juridical-legal sense, citizenship confers a formal status on people, by virtue of which they enjoy a set of rights and obligations within a given nation state. These rights are anchored in a set of institutions, one of the historical roles of which has been to control access to the scarce resources of national societies. Citizenship thus defined
presupposes the establishment of national borders and social closure (Turner, 1997: 5-7).

In addition to the legal status it confers on individuals, citizenship also confers a collective identity on the groups that are part of the nation state. Last, the national political community gives citizenship a territorial base and an historical foundation, develops a national culture that feeds into a national history, nourishes a feeling of belonging, and renews collective memory (Turner, 1997: 9).

In the political-philosophical sense of the term, citizenship refers to the prerogatives and privileges of citizens vis-à-vis non-citizens, to the power they can legitimately exercise within a given political community arising from their incorporation and their participation in this community.

In the case of migrants, can the new belonging, the new identity, and the new allegiance required of them substitute for or be superimposed upon the initial identification with the country of origin? This question lies at the core of ongoing debates about the tension between citizenship and multiculturalism (Martiniello 1997; Touraine 1996; Wieviorka 1996; Zolberg 1996) and about the transnationalisation of many forms of social life (Baubock 1994; Soysal 1994; Laguerre 1995; Turner 1997).

The first factor of dissociation between citizenship and nationality is associated with the globalisation of the contemporary world, where contradictory processes of homogenization and differentiation now affect political communities (Featherstone 1990; Robertson 1990). Wallerstein, for example, argues that the ideologies of universalism, racism, and sexism foster constant tensions and a differentiation within the world system (Wallerstein 1990: 51). They contribute to the fabrication of a subordinate status for immigrant populations and diasporas (Hall 1993) and have an impact on these groups’ feeling of belonging.

The second factor refers to the influence that international human-rights organizations have on the mobilization and the political regulation function of nation states. The ideology of human rights favours the protection of immigrants and refugees, the legitimacy of demands by particular groups, and contributes to a greater formal acceptance of diversity and to debates about the cultural rights of minorities.

The third factor is related to the phenomenon of emigration of populations from Southern regions, where they may have had to deal with non-democratic regimes. The issue of identity
politics is thereby raised. The populations are carriers of a new difference, being ethnically, phenotypically or religiously distinct. They are involved in both the transition to democracy and the development of their country of origin, despite the effects of globalisation and neo-liberalism (Hurbon 1996).

The ideology of multiculturalism has developed in this context as a means of managing diversity. It takes several forms, from cultural multiculturalism to business multiculturalism. In fact, diversity is now managed, oriented toward the market opportunities opened up by the ethnic economy, toward intercultural training of multinational corporate or organisation cadres destined to work abroad, or toward cadres returning to the countries of origin. The effects of the last-mentioned flow would, among other things, ensure new vehicles for the penetration of know-how, values, and institutions. We will refer to this as ‘economic transnationalism’.

**Citizenship, immigration and transnationality**

In the classic liberal model, the nation state is not merely a fact. It is also an ideal, a normative vision of political and social belonging (Brubaker 1989: 6). In this model, belonging must be egalitarian (no one should be a second-class citizen), sacred (citizens must be ready to perform ultimate acts for the state), national (anchored in a cultural, linguistic, political community), democratic (participation must be open and linked to residence), unique (each person must belong to a single state), and socially consistent (belonging entails privileges and obligations) (Brubaker 1989).

Inasmuch as naturalized immigrants can only be members of a single nation state, they must abandon their first citizenship. In this model, dual or multiple citizenship is highly undesirable. In principle, in the United States the oath of allegiance requires the renunciation of all allegiance to any foreign government. In fact, however, the United States does authorize dual citizenship, but does not encourage it. This model has fundamentalists and multiculturals at loggerheads. The former consider that assimilation and naturalisation of immigrants is necessary to ensuring their loyalty. The latter claim that citizenship must be totally dissociated

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1 “I hereby declare on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen…” (Pickus, 1997: 31).
from its sacred character and its nationality (Brubaker 1989: 6; Pickus 1997).

In Canada the debate is similar. Recently, the Standing Committee of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Canada 1994) recommended that Canadians holding dual citizenship accord precedence to their Canadian citizenship and that one of the conditions of obtaining Canadian citizenship be the acknowledgement of this principle by immigrants who opt for naturalisation.

But historical facts have contradicted the intended ideal of assimilation. On the one hand, systemic inequalities have marginalized certain groups and weakened their feeling of belonging to their new host society; on the other hand, the attachment of immigrants and their descendants to their country of origin has led them to play a role in its political affairs (political parties, unions, religious or charitable organisations, media), while actors in the country of origin often intervene in the organisation of the immigrant populations.

The same behaviour has given rise to different and opposing interpretations. Sometimes it is seen as a loyalty deficit towards the host country. At others, it is deemed an excessive allegiance to the country of origin, or again as the expression of multiple citizenship: the Irish engaged in a war of independence against Great Britain; American, Canadian, or European Jews involved in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, who supplied not only money but combatants as well. Indeed, several authors have noted that immigrants embrace nationalities and ethnicities to which they had been indifferent in their country of origin, and be they Polish or Japanese, nationalist leaders have considered the actions of immigrants to be a strategic factor in the building of the ‘home’ nation state (Weiner 1995: 123-130; Glick Schiller 1996). In what way are these practices distinctive?

New immigration, new transnational practices

The notions of *bricolage* of identities and cultures, hybridity, creolisation, fluidity, multi-locality, and diaspora have acquired considerable influence in the analysis of immigrant practices, and have a variety of analytic or metaphorical statuses. Cultural and post-colonial studies, historical-structuralist theories of migration, and the theory of networks have drawn attention to the diverse forms of immigrant incorporation and identities. These new approaches have led to a reconsideration of the binary categorisation which, in the traditional literature,
opposed settlers and sojourners, a model that implied that immigrants were obliged to choose between the country of immigration and the country of origin. This dichotomy does not take into account the complexity of migration, of which circular migration is a particular instance: immigrants (Caribbeans and Mexicans, for example) earn their living abroad but maintain family, social ties, and residence in their country of origin (Pessar 1997).

In Nations Unbound, Bash, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc stand apart from the assimilationist and pluralist arguments that dominated American literature in the 1970s and 1980s. They define migrants as cultural and political actors in more than one system, and transnationalism as a process

by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders... (1994: 6)

In the view of these authors, migrants, confronted by and often engaged in the building of two, or even more, nation states, construct new identities under the influence of the established categorisation in the settlement societies (race, ethnicity, nation) and of the attitudes of the host population. In the current context of globalisation, their practices and the deployment of a multiple identity often translate into positions of resistance against ambient racism, economic insecurity, the selectivity of immigration policies, and the negative effects of a greater penetration of global capital. Glick-Schiller goes so far as to argue, erroneously in our view, that diasporas ‘are serving as a base for continuing the illusion of national independence in the situation of massive capital penetration and re-colonization’ (1996: 24; Glick Schiller, 1995). National sovereignty is not an illusion, even if globalisation obliges sovereign states to redefine their roles.

Mittelberg and Waters note in this regard that newcomers are often identified with proximal hosts: “The eventual identities of the immigrants and their descendants in the United States are the outcome of the different constellation of elements of ethnicity in their countries of origin, and the different opportunities offered by the host society, as well as the overall hierarchy of groups which reflects the power relations in the receiving countries. We also posit that the host society should not be understood as a homogeneous structure, but rather should be considered in terms of the proximal host for the immigrant group, in addition to the wider society. The proximal host is that group which would be the category or group in which the immigrant group would be likely to be classified or absorbed” (1992: 413).
Is transnationality a new phenomenon? Portes maintains that contemporary immigration differs from immigration in the previous century in that it has given rise to the proliferation of ‘transnational communities’. These communities …are dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks, an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both. (Portes 1997: 812)

This difference is accentuated by the fact that ‘the number of people involved, the nearly instantaneous character of communication across space, and the fact that the cumulative character of the process makes participation “normative” within certain immigrant groups’ (idem: 813). Portes notes that these transnational activities enable immigrants to avoid professional dead-ends and a discriminated status (idem: 813). The construction of ‘transnational communities’ by immigrants is a new process: driven by the very forces promoting economic globalization, as common people are caught in their web and learn to use new technologies...The aphorism "capital is global, labor is local", may still hold on the aggregate, but it is being increasingly subverted by these grassroots initiatives based on long-distance networks and a newly acquired command of communications technologies. (Portes 1997: 813-814)

According to Laguerre (1995), the processes linking diasporas to their country of origin are transnational in the sense that they are deployed above and beyond the nation state. A policy of the simultaneity of practices has replaced the policy of succession that prevailed in the context of traditional dual citizenship. Individuals demand or appropriate political, cultural and social rights in both countries, and they develop dual or multiple identities that reflect the border-crossing process lived in their daily lives. This crossing of borders and cultures is made possible by the availability of means of communication and new technologies that have
contributed to the compression of time and space (Laguerre 1995: 1-2). Laguerre concludes that contemporary practices are not congruent with traditional citizenship and that it would be better to speak of transnational citizenship. This new form of citizenship is the result of global processes:

- in the areas of politics, economic restructuring, information technology, and transnational migration; of cultural flows to which the nation state is a participant; and of transnational practices of citizen-subjects. These global transformations and the crisis of the nation state provide the international context in which these practices take place and transnational citizenship takes a hold (...). Just as we recognize the US as a society with plural ethnic communities, we must also recognize the US as a society with plural citizenship types. Transnational citizenship is but one form of the American citizenship experience. (Laguerre 1995: 13, 28)

It is in this context that the notion of diaspora has been put back on the agenda, with the aim, in particular, of moving away from the majority/minority ethnic group opposition which is analysed only within the framework of a given national society. This renewal has occurred under the strong influence of the Birmingham School, a group of researchers associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, who have mapped cultures of resistance in disparate sites of cultural production. Several attempts at typologies have since emerged (Gilroy 1994; Clifford 1994; Grewal and Kaplan 1997; Kaplan 1996; Laguerre 1998; Toloyan 1996; Weiner 1995).

Wieviorka also identifies three types of diaspora. The first type refers to an experience of severe oppression. The second type covers immigration experienced as emigration, even after several generations. And the third is diaspora defined as a ‘cultural affirmation and response to relations of domination and exclusion, of contempt, of rejection, and of experienced hatred, without being limited to a national space’. Wieviorka writes that it is ‘the association of the globalization of economies and the internationalization of culture, on the one hand, and cultural fragmentation, on the other hand, that paves the way for the creation or the renewal of diaspora networks’ (1996: 274). The diversification of the notion of diaspora offers and alternative to the
universalism of national societies, to the isolation of ghettos, and a new mode for articulating ethnic, social and political relations (1996: 175).

**Migrant’s transnational practices**

Let us first mention the important transfers made by migrants to their country of origin (money, material goods, new technologies, services). ‘For several years’, writes Durand, total transfers by migrants to the domestic economy or businesses of all kinds in the country of origin rank second only to petroleum in international economic exchanges (evaluated at $600 billion by the UN) and are probably very close to those made by organized drug rings. The phenomenon is therefore massive. The repatriation of salaries and capital contribute significantly to the budgets of certain countries of origin. Solidarity chains and exchange circuits, which as a general rule have little to do with states, very closely link places to one another. (1994: 149)

Mention should also be made of social and political transfers. For the most part they are manifestations of political movements and community organisations defending the interests of particular categories of migrants. For example, many federations of associations of migrants with the same national origin link groups established in various North American or European cities. There are also links among associations of migrants of diverse origins.

Immigrants have in effect become important political actors influencing both political processes in host countries and relations between their countries of residence and origin (Weiner 1995: 123), not to mention policies in their initial country. In host countries, political influence is focused on demands for rights and privileges (jobs, residence, education, immigration policies, cultural protection, etc.) Immigrants can attempt to influence the domestic affairs of their country of origin through investment, active promotion of commerce, technology transfers, or funding of rival political organisations. Political action can be directed toward the foreign policies of host countries, urging intervention to promote rights and liberties, religious freedom, democratisation, self-determination, or the political independence of the country of origin. In this sense, it is a case of ‘new domestic and foreign policy issues that have arisen as
a consequence of the emergence of transnational peoples and their increasing politicization' (Weiner 1995: 129). All of this depends, however, on the resources they mobilise, and in this regard their position varies considerably from one country to another. Immigrants seek not only to influence the foreign policies of host countries. Certain groups are organised autonomously in favour of change or taking power in their country of origin, by participating in transnational political movements and organisations.

Last, mention should be made of the symbolic transfers (philosophy, values, lifestyles) evident in the cultural phenomena which classic anthropology associated with cultural diffusion and syncretism. The notions of culture crossing and of transculturation need to be linked to the reinterpretation of multiple and varied cultural forms, issuing from every cultural horizon, including dominated peripheries and diasporas.

What are the factors likely to explain the variability of transnational practices? The economic and political situation in the country of origin, the reasons behind the emigration of immigrants, and the generation phenomenon comprise a first set of variables to be examined. Immigration and integration policies, the degree of openness of civil society, job market structure, and community structuration make up a second set of factors (Portes 1995; Weiner 1995).

Where it exists, the welfare state has engendered demands by immigrants fleeing dictatorships and non-welfare-state countries. These immigrants are mobilised around issues such as income, jobs, representation, respect and dignity. Their demands for rights can also be directed toward the government of their country of origin. In the present neo-liberal context, the rise of unemployment and poverty, the widening of inequalities, and the growing restriction of democratic spaces give rise to new redistribution issues.

The racialisation of groups is another factor to be considered. The transnational practices of immigrants and their descendants can be the expression of defensive positions against a subaltern status (linked to proximal hosts with whom there are not necessarily any affinities) and against the normative integration ideologies of host societies, the promises of which are not kept. At the same time, these practices find support in national reconstruction (and sometimes democratization) projects and ideologies of return (*idéologies du retour*). They are fuelled by the insecurity and de-qualifying of professionals, cadres, and university graduates whenever social
mobility is no longer assured, as is the case in the present North American economic conjuncture. The country of origin thus becomes a possible source of work, and national origin can, though not necessarily, be an asset.

Finally, among the factors accounting for the transnational practices of migrants is the self-directed work by intellectuals of immigrant origin: defence and illustration of a migrant identity; critical re-considerations of racial categorisations; demands on behalf of and participation in the invention of a culture in flux; redefinition and re-symbolisation of political belonging and citizenship; mobilisation with a view to modernising and democratising countries of origin.

Thinking about transnationalisation: a critical review

What emerges clearly from a review of the literature is the vagueness and ambiguity of the discourse surrounding a presumably new phenomenon. As such, ‘transnational’ is sometimes equivalent to and sometimes not equivalent to ‘international’; it connotes at times the new danger threatening the national sovereignty of host countries, and at other times the opportunity afforded immigrants, now conceived as minorities, to create a new site from which they can affirm themselves.

Immigrants themselves are designated as transmigrants, the business transactions they develop with their country of origin are redefined as a transnational economy, and their aspiring to an open citizenship, undertaken both in the society of origin and the host society, might be assimilated into a demand for transnational citizenship.

Some arguments tend to construct essentialist visions of new types of communities. Rather than speaking of ethnic groups, they will talk of transnational communities. But one must be careful to distinguish ethnic categorisation from the fact of communalisation and not infer the existence of communities from census practices; nor can one infer the existence of transnational communities or of a transnational citizenship from the existence of transnational practices. In any event, the matter is an open question. Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that transnationality practices vary considerably according to migrant group, as they do within the groups themselves.
It is also important to distinguish transnational from international, and not confuse transnationalism with transnationalisation. ‘Transnational’ designates members of dispersed groups who see themselves as members of the same national political community of origin, who maintain links among themselves, whereas ‘international’ establishes a relationship between members of two or more national communities. ‘Transnationalisation’ concerns exchanges of goods — material objects, symbolic signs — among ‘nationals’ in a new symbolic space that transcends national territory. In this sense, immigrant groups do not create a delimited territory on foreign soil which could become an outpost of national territory reconstituted in a foreign country and belonging to consular territories. It does not establish a distinctly owned site or margin within the host country, as some authors suggest. ‘Transnationalisation’ refers rather to the symbolic extension, abroad, of the social solidarity links constitutive of all imagined communities. With regard to ‘transnationalism’, it is understood as a discourse, or policies, on the transnationalisation phenomenon.

The idea of a transnational community — imagined, multilateral — can be extended by reference to the voluntary, symbolic identity which immigrant groups continue to maintain or demand with respect to their national community of origin and to their historicity. However, even if they are mobile and circulate across multiple solidarity networks, even if they show themselves capable of multiple allegiances — as do many ‘founding’ nationals — immigrants do have a geographic settlement base; they are established in a host society. As many authors correctly note, notwithstanding globalisation they are not cast into the sea, ‘footloose and country free’ (Sutton 1992).

The idea of the de-territorialisation of nation states as expounded by Glick Schiller is therefore a problematic one, for it might create the illusion that immigrant groups are portions of nation states of origin on foreign soil, an idea which could then be invoked to nourish the growing fear in the North of a war of civilisation, as some have argued.

One can also understand the ambiguity entailed in talking in terms of transnational citizenship (Shafir 1998). The effective citizenship that is realised through participation in the res publica is always inscribed, at a given moment, in a political community. In this sense, transnational citizenship would have no hold on the public life of any nation; it would remain
suspended in a void, unconnected with political reality. While nationality can transcend borders and become transnationality, political citizenship is typically circumscribed, bounded, and regulated within national borders, even though in its juridical-legal sense it can be dual or multiple. Citizenship can be acquired, lost or accumulated; nationality can be recombined, it can be concealed or displayed, depending on the circumstance or situation.

Nor are immigrants the basis of a transnational economy (Laguerre 1998: 127). Rather, they are actors or promoters of certain international commercial activities between their host country and their country of origin. And above all — and this a new approach worth noting in international development — they are increasingly viewed in North America as ideal participants in the development of the South and the East. They are likely to reduce and ultimately halt at the source the massive immigrant flows feared by the West as the effects of unequal globalization, which exacerbates the poles of wealth and zones of exclusion (Le Bras 1997). Within this context, we are witnessing the promotion of economic transnationalism, that is, a discourse and a policy supporting 'more cooperation for less immigration', by way of immigrants themselves (Institut Panos 1993).

In our conclusion, we will come back to the analysis of this new political issue, but first we shall illustrate it by way of a description of the cooperation practices of immigrants with their country of origin. The example we use is that of the Haitian diaspora.

The North American segment of the Haitian Diaspora

The emigration of Haitians took place under the influence of structural factors, at once economic and social (misery, unemployment, collapse of economic structures, absence of social protection) and political (American occupation in 1915, despoilment of land and goods, dictatorship under the Duvaliers, difficulties related to the transition to democracy) (Laguerre 1998). These internal structural factors lying at the source of mass migrations are largely tributary of global logics articulating Caribbean societies with American hegemony: a logic of capitalist accumulation; a geo-political logic organised on the base of security; an ideological and symbolic geo-political logic (Grosfoguel 1996: 120). This diaspora was created in several stages on the basis of complex and differentiated migratory circuits and migrant networks, the social
origins of which and reasons for leaving varied from one period to another (Larose 1984). Beginning in 1964, the moment at which the Duvalierist regime took ‘the president-for-life turn’ (Moïse and Ollivier 1992: 38), the exodus induced a forced dispersion into the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and North America (Labelle et al 1983). Of Haitian communities living abroad, Moïse and Ollivier note that ‘they have affirmed themselves as a non-negligible factor in the historical dynamic of contemporary Haiti’ (1992: 39).

Today, transfers from emigration represent a very important contribution in foreign currency for the country. Total individual transfers for all Haitian emigration are estimated to be between $180 million to $250 million annually, to which must be added sums from private investment, collective transfers (around $2 million annually), and contributions to Haitian political parties and movements ‘which actively seek financial support from emigration’ (Icart 1995: 13-17).

Government policies in host societies make up one of the fundamental determinants of community structuration and transnational practices. As such, the welcome reserved for boat-people fleeing to the United States engendered resistance and repression, particularly in Florida, with regard to the preferential treatment accorded Cubans fleeing the Castro regime, and an immense mobilisation of immigrant groups in North America. In Quebec, on the contrary, on three occasions (1972, 1980, and 1986) during the Duvalier dictatorship, the Quebec government obtained permission from the Canadian federal government to accord special treatment to illegal Haitians and their families (Déjean 1990). Moreover, during the return of the military (September 29, 1991 to October 15, 1995), Haitian refugees met with very different results depending on whether they went to the United States or to Quebec (Icart 1997). The mobilisation of intellectuals and leftist militants beginning in 1962 struck a more sympathetic chord in Quebec, very much a social-democratic society during the Quiet Revolution (1960s and 1970s), than in

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3 According to Laguerre (1995), the rapidity of means of communication (telephone, electronic mail, fax, community radios, large television stations, video cassettes, express mail, banking services, such as Hatrexco, etc.) Play an exceptional role in the links maintained by the Haitian diaspora. Radio-Canada, for example, has been received directly in Haiti since 1986, and has had a relatively important impact. Three large weeklies and several community broadcasts in Creole (a hundred or so in Miami, for example) circulate in North America, in France, and in Haiti.

4 See the various articles on this subject published at the time in the journal Collectif Paroles, Montreal.
the USA, where the welcome reserved for Haitians varied over time according to American geopolitical interests in the Caribbean, domestic economic worries, and the rise of racist reactions toward Haitian immigrants (Grosfoguel, 1996: 131).

In New York, according to Charles (1996), two elements modelled the political struggles and the transnational community structuration of Haitians: opposition organised during the 30 years of the Duvalier dictatorship and the American government’s racist policies towards Haitians, which contributed to their stigmatisation. The community was initially mobilised around opposition to Duvalier (1957 to 1964) and centered on traditional politicians. Between 1965 and 1972, the war against poverty resulting from the civil rights movement induced Haitians to enter the ‘ethnic’ competition for special federal government programs. Between 1972 and 1982, the large tide of illegal entrants mobilised organisations against American immigration policies. From 1982 to 1986, mobilisation focused on the stigmatisation which victimised Haitians as carriers of AIDS. The departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 marked the beginning of a new era: the reinforcement of cooperation projects for Haiti and the election of Aristide as President (16 December 1990). ‘From its inception, writes Charles, the community has been caught in a tension vis-à-vis its form of integration into US life...most leaders in the community gave priority to nationalist politics...’ (1996: 300).

In Montréal, anti-Duvalierist struggles and struggles for the rights of immigrants were simultaneously led by democratic and progressive organisations linked with community organisations, with the two main ones being the Maison d’Haiti and the Bureau de la communauté chrétienne des Haïtiens de Montréal. Immigration was initially the affair of professionals, cadres, and intellectuals fleeing the dictatorship. The arrival of immigrants from the working and peasant classes in the 1980s, literacy and make-up schooling needs, unionisation, the struggle against discrimination, second-generation youth unemployment, and family problems gave rise to a diversification of the functions of the associative movement. The force of events brought community leaders to begin to invest in public institutions around the issues of the management of diversity and multiculturalism, even in Canadian and Quebec political parties, thereby taking their distance from ideologies of return (Labelle and Therrien 1992; Labelle and Lévy 1995).
The contribution of intellectuals of the Haitian diaspora to cultural and political life is of some significance. A large share of Haitian literature of the last 30 years has been written outside the country. Two of the most important opposition reviews in the late 1970s were founded in Montréal: *Nouvelle Optique* and *Collectif Paroles*, to which Québec francophone intellectuals contributed (Moïse and Ollivier, 1992) – and the same was true of *Les Éditions du CIDHICA* (*Centre international d’information de documentation et d’information Haitienne, caraïbéenne et africaine*). Following the return movement begun in 1986, several intellectuals and professionals supplied executives for government and civil institutions, and to movements and political parties in Haiti. The redefinition of identities is another aspect and one to which has benefited from the contribution of intellectuals living in or regularly visiting Quebec (Ollivier, 1984; Berrouet-Oriol and Fournier, 1993).

In the 1970s, the political leanings of the diaspora came under the hegemony of a leftism defining itself as anti-Duvalierist, nationalist, and anti-imperialist. Of the 20 or so leftist groups existing at the time, several of them had their leadership dispersed in Montréal, New York, Paris, Mexico City, Moscow and Havana. These groups included the *Parti unifié communiste Haitien* (PUCH), the *Parti des travailleurs Haïtiens* (PTA), *En Avant, Voie démocratique*, the *Organisation révolutionnaire Haïtienne d’action patriote* (ORHAP), the *Union des forces patriotiques et démocratiques Haïtiennes*, which was born in 1980 in Europe (IFOPADA), the *Mouvement de libération d’Haïti* (MLF), *Groupe 18 mai*; and the *Comité pour la défense des droits démocratiques en Haïti* (KODDPA). This transnational leftist movement was led by intellectuals, priests, and artists, more than one of whom has participated in the struggles of the democratic movement of the 1960s (Charles 1996: 295; *Collectif Paroles*; Moïse and Ollivier 1992).

The consolidation of what Moïse and Ollivier call the democratic and popular movement, and what Midy calls the *mouvement social pour le changement radical*, began to take place in 1982 under the influence of an independent national press, the alliance of the Catholic Church with the poor (the *ti-legliz*, or core ecclesiastical communities, the orientation of which is influenced by the theology of liberation), the organisation work of lay cadres in Haiti and in the diaspora (Midy 1995). In Haiti, people’s groups and political and civic organisations came together...
to create national organisations (Comité national du Congrès des organisations démocratiques (CONAKOM) in January 1987; Front national pour le changement et la démocratie (FNCD), in August 1987) which opened chapters in New York, Montréal, and Miami. In addition, right-wing parties and Christian-democratic parties created international branches (Charles 1996: 299).

Traversed by various currents...the diaspora found itself at the heart of the questioning that arose in the wake of the events of September 7, 1986...it was to become an essential component of the Haitian nation, and which could not be ignored in any economic development, social progress, or implementation of democracy project .(Moïse and Ollivier 1992: 39-40)

The Mouvement social pour le changement, whose slogan is fok sa chanje! (things must change), calls for

the end of the society of exclusion, the end of the repressive and predatory state, the end of the quasi-apartheid culture dividing the nation into a knowing elite in power and the ignorant masses held apart... . It demands the rule of law and equality and above all justice and dignity: tout moun se moun! (Midy 1997: 133).

It has strong support among the working-class of the diaspora because it contests the practices and culture of a violent state, revitalises civil society, and undermines the historical duality in Haitian society that distinguish between the moun andeyo (the country outside) and others (Midy 1997: 144). It supported the candidacy of Aristide, elected on December 16, 1990. These first free elections reinforced the redefinition of the diaspora as a ‘10th department’ and was accompanied by the even greater and formally acknowledged inclusion of immigrated populations in Haitian political life (Charles 1996).

The notion of a 10th department has existed since 1986 and was created by Georges Anglade, who defined it as ‘The integration of a 10th department consisting of Haitians living abroad; it also means the recognition of the dual nationality of a million human beings forced into exile’ (1990: 543-546).
Beginning with the 1990 elections, a large number of intellectuals from the Quebec diaspora\(^5\) became involved as consultants and political cadres in Haiti itself, and, following the military coup, in political lobbying of the American and Canadian governments in light of the anticipated return of Aristide, exiled in Washington and reinstated on October, 15, 1994. Moreover, the coordination centre for the struggle against the coup was set up in Quebec. Haitian-Québécois intellectuals have been and continue to be at the heart of the activities and the difficulties associated with the transition to democracy and at the heart of negotiations with the international community (UN, OAS, UN multinational peacekeeping force, World Bank, IMF, PNUD, NGOs, etc) (Hurbon 1996).

The September 29, 1991 military coup and the low-intensity war conducted by the putschists, with the support of the CIA (Midy 1997: 136) against the people's movement fostered support for the return to democracy in Haiti and for the Lavalas (Raging Torrent) organisation which emerged in 1991: marches, demonstrations, radio broadcasts, fund raising, interventions in the national press of countries of immigration, etc. Following the coup, the Plateforme des organismes Haïtiens de défense des droits humains (PODDH) conducted an inquiry into victims of repression. The Commission nationale de vérité et de justice (CNVJ), created by ministerial decree in March 1995 in order to establish the truth about human rights violations during the coup, submitted its report — Si’m pas rêlé (If I don’t shout)— to Aristide (Midy 1997: 127). This Commission involved migrants from abroad and had an influence on the Haitian women's movement in its political action with respect to violence against women.

The diaspora's contribution was so intense that in 1994 the Aristide government created a Ministère des Haïtiens vivant à l'étranger in order to acknowledge and invite the participation of Haitian communities living abroad in the country's socioeconomic development process and in the construction of a genuine democracy in Haiti, to support the integration of members of various Haitian communities already established abroad in their respective host sites, to organise jointly with other concerned government bodies the reinsertion of major groups and welcome structures suited to the reintegration of

\(^5\) Many more Haitian-Quebecois intellectuals returned to Haiti, definitively or temporarily, because of the experience they acquired in Quebec's francophone system. Québec's systems of civil law and education are closer to the French system traditionally in place in Haiti.
cadres wishing to return to the country. (Icart 1997: 20).\(^6\)

This initiative had been preceded by the 1988 creation of a *Commissariat des Haïtiens d’outre-mer*, then by a *Commissariat des Haïtiens du 10ème département* in 1991. The redefinition of the diaspora, usually limited to industrialised countries, thus rests on the replacement of the national borders and creates new symbolic ones. This redefinition thus represents the high point in the tension between nationality and citizenship which characterised the first Haitian immigration in North America.

Given the ideology of return advocated during the initial settlement period and the consequences or naturalisation in a foreign country on Haitian citizenship, issuing from the American oath of allegiance in particular, the acquisition of American or Canadian citizenship was for a long time deferred for certain segments of Haitian immigrants in North America.\(^7\) For example, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti prohibits dual citizenship: Haitian citizenship is lost following naturalisation in a foreign country. The Constitution also limits the right to own property and full political participation. These obstacles still represent an issue for the diaspora's political militants engaged in Haiti's national reconstruction and transition to democracy (Icart 1997).\(^8\)

In 1997, the *Collectif ID (Initiatives Démocratiques)* was created. This movement's structure is resolutely transnational, but with a preponderantly Haitian core. Some of its leaders

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\(^6\) The heightened mobility of Haitian cadres is desired by international organizations; it stimulates transnational practices. As such, while Aristide was in Washington, PNUD (Programme des nations unies pour le développement) funded an inquiry, headed by Gérard Pierre-Charles in Haiti, to establish a list of qualified persons living in Canada, France, The United States, and Africa. Decided in 1993, the project was directed in Montreal by Franklin Midy, and the Canadian contribution was funded by CIDA (see CRESFED-PNUD/CAM-UQAM, 1996).

\(^7\) The American oath of allegiance is based on the affirmation of exclusive loyalty to the nation-state of the host country.

\(^8\) It should be noted that The Dominican Republic, Haiti's neighbour, follows an analogous process of symbolic "de-territorialization" of its borders in order to incorporate its immigrants, by altering, in its case, the legal definition of citizenship. Haitians born in The Dominican Republic cannot hold Dominican citizenship, and the new law maintains this exclusion but extends citizenship rights (including the right to vote) to those of Dominican heritage who have become citizens of other countries by birth or by naturalization. The same phenomenon can be observed in Colombia, and in Algeria, where members of the Algerian diaspora have been elected to the national parliament, including one representative in Quebec.
support demands for dual citizenship and for representation by an elected member in the Haitian Chamber of Deputies. The ID collective will, moreover, begin a public debate on this matter in the fall of 1998. The argument in favour of this demand brings out the fact that members of the Haitian diaspora could make a difference in the process of transition toward democracy by voting, and that they would be more motivated to become involved in development projects in Haiti. On the other hand, two difficulties have already been pointed out. First, the fear that many unemployed cadres will be tempted to look for an opening in political professions in Haiti, and that an over-representation of the diaspora in positions of power or decision would exacerbate the existing negative attitudes towards them. Second, Haitians deported for criminal activities could become relays for international crime in Haiti.

Feminist movements provide another example of transnational practices. According to Charles (1995: 157), the women's movement has taken root in two important processes. One is the gendering of state violence under the Duvalierist regime which led to a redefinition of the role of women and to changes in state policies and the transnationalisation of women's struggles with international immigration. The Duvalierist regime saw in effect the emergence of a women's militia (les fillettes lalo) who were involved in the Macoutist repression. To these two factors in the redefinition of the role of women must also be added the place accorded everywhere, including Haiti, to militants in the 1960s. Moreover, politically motivated rape was elevated to the rank of systematic torture, becoming a common repressive practice during the 1991 military coup (Midy 1997; 127).

In Montréal, the first groups (the Point de ralliement des femmes Haitiennes, Nègès Vanyan, the Mouvman patriotik fanm d'Ayiti) were created between 1970 and 1982 (Labelle and Ravix 1984; Rateau and Longchamp 1995). The leaders of these organisations were not only active in Haitian affairs but equally so in minority group organisations in Quebec and in 'status of women committees' of national organisations (unions, political parties, etc). In New York, the Union patriotique des femmes Haïtiennes (UPAF), a Nègès Vanyan branch, was formed in 1979.

The objectives of all these anti-Duvalierist, progressive, feminist groups were to organise their community and foster solidarity with Haiti and the international women's movement. As
such, in 1975 groups from Montréal participated in writing the address made by the delegated spokesperson for Haitian women at the Berlin Forum of the first world conference for International Women’s Year. In 1994, the Haitian American Women Advocacy Network (HAWANET) invited groups to a Fowom Fanm Ayisyen Lan Xe Depatman in order to prepare the Beijing International Conference. Their concerns included the torture and repression of women in Haiti; the conditions of female political prisoners; and the recognition of refugee status due to sexual persecution. Many women, political refugees in foreign countries, returned to Haiti in 1986 to participate in the creation of new feminist organisations (Fanm d’Ayiti, Kay Fanm) (Charles 1996: 150-151).

The interpenetration of demands affects the society of origin and the society of immigration. As such, in November of 1997, in the wake of the 1995 Commission nationale de vérité et de justice (CNVJ), Kay Fanm organised, in Port-au-Prince, an International Tribunal for the Elimination of Violence against Haitian Women. This tribunal invoked human rights, international agreements, and the Organisation of American States, and looked into domestic, sexual, and political violence. The eight judges and three experts were from human rights groups in the United States, Costa Rica, Uganda, Canada, Quebec, and Haiti. The debate was pursued in Montréal with regard to the fight against domestic violence.

Last, regional associations are another site for transnational practices. In Quebec, most of these associations are grouped into the Confédération des associations régionales Haïtiennes (CARHAQ). Many among them are organised into a single network linking New York, Miami, or Boston, which involves frequent trips and the recognition of regional interests. The Regroupement des organismes canado-Haïtiens pour le développement (ROCHAD) brings together 27 Haitian associations and ten associate members among the Quebec organisations (unions, international cooperation organisations).

The identity of migrants of Haitian origin cannot be reduced to the idea of a diaspora or of a ‘10th department’. Identity mobilisation fluctuates between national identity (Haitians in the diaspora), ethnic identity (Haitians as members of a group or an ethnic community in host societies, depending on the terminology in vogue in these societies), racialised identity (Haitians as a component of the Black community(ies) in Canada or the USA), and a citizen identity, with or
without a hyphen (Canadians or Québécois, Haitian-Canadians, Québécois of Haitian origin, etc.). The racialisation processes at work in Haitian society are reworked. As such, the amalgamation into the 'proximal host', in this case African-Americans or anglophone Afro-Canadians, engenders contradictory reactions — either resistance or voluntary identification, the choice in part dependent on the nature of racism in the host societies. Haitian communities in the USA generally share a very strong awareness of the Haitianité; it is grounded in language, nationalism, and a different meaning attached to colour and to the notion of 'black' (Charles 1996: 291; Glick Schiller 1995: 114; Zéphir 1996), which complicates the dialogue between Haitians and African-Americans. The same holds for Quebec, despite the variation linked to class or generational differences. As such, New York Haitians have developed an identity distinct from those in Miami, the environment of which has been dominated by the importance of political struggles among Cubans, white people, and African-Americans (Portes and Stepick 1993). According to one leader from Quebec, while the Haitian women’s movement demands a specific identity different from that of Haitian men, like Haitian men, it attaches considerable importance to nationality. This characteristic differentiates Haitians, men and women, from other populations categorised as black, and gives rise to certain difficulties in their relations with black movements in Quebec and in Canada (Labelle and Lévy 1995).

One could certainly say that the official recognition of the 10th department contributed to defining a terrain of identity and diaspora, following the experience of the Duvalier dictatorship and in face of racial discrimination and the precarious position of segments of the immigrant population. As a response both to conditions in the country of origin and in the host country, the allegiance and identity options of immigrants and their descendants cannot therefore be reduced solely to this symbolic notion of the 10th department, which is also contested by some intellectuals and leaders.
Conclusion

The transnational practices of migrants organised into diaspora networks illustrate the new dimensions of citizenship. Status, ties of belonging, identity attached to national borders (Turner 1997) - all contribute to the tension between citizenship and nationality.

In the case of several migrant groups, the new belonging, the new identity, and the new allegiance demanded of them do not very often substitute for the initial identity, the belonging, and the allegiance to the country of origin, which presents challenges to understanding the relationships between citizenship and nationality.

Moreover, the discussion surrounding transnationality was introduced as recognition grew that the immigration issue in the West was undergoing change; from being a ‘low politics’ issue, international migrations have become a ‘high politics’ issue. This change, we remarked, involves increasing and converging control measures for immigration in highly industrialised countries. The aim is to prevent massive migration before it occurs through a policy of cooperation, the sub-text of which is: More cooperation for less immigration! In short, give development aid to the East and to the South so as to reduce the propensity to emigrate.

It is in this new conjuncture that immigrants have been discovered as eventual ideal partners of international development. As Condamines (1993 and 1998) recently pointed out, Europe has more than 12 million immigrants, half of whom come from the South. Organised into regional or village associations, many among them have for some time been weaving dense solidarity networks with their country of origin, which have served as channels for the support of various community cooperation practices. Western countries believe that they have found new partners for the development of the East and the South in these workers. They have thus made it their duty to explore this new field of cooperation: the appearance of institutes specialised in assisted international cooperation,9 the multiplication of conferences on the solidarity practices of immigrant groups with their country of origin; funding for research into the originality of these experiences and into inventories of professional and technical resources of

9 Consider, for example, the Soros Institute in the United States, present everywhere in the South and the East; the Canadian Fundation Foundation for the Americas in Canada; the Institut Panos, an international NGO founded in 1986, the mission of which is to reinforce capacities for sustainable development, particularly in the South.
the diaspora available for cooperation in the country of origin. Almost everywhere, attention is focused on the virtues of international partnership with immigrant associations devoted to the development of their country of origin. We are witnessing the promotion of an assisted economic transnationalism.

What meaning should we attribute to the support Northern countries are showing immigrant associations’ increasing number of solidarity initiatives in favour of the country of origin? What goals are being pursued by Northern governments in favouring the transnational cooperation practices of immigrants from Southern countries, in encouraging the ‘return of immigrant brains’ to the South to help in the South’s development, while simultaneously closing their doors to further immigration? What are the aims of the diaspora leaders and intellectuals formulated in transnationlist discourse? What role do they play in the redefinition of the diaspora identity and in promoting transnational citizenship? In sum, what does economic transnationalism signify?

One must not over-estimate the sustainable development effect of immigrant contributions to the local economy of their villages or regions of origin. Le Bras (1997) argues that the unfavourable position of entire Southern regions in the new world-economy is a major handicap to their independent development: ‘The periphery is doubly handicapped by low-value production which has been rejected there and by the difficulty of creating links with other peripheries without going through the centre’ (1997: 25). Taking a similar approach, the Canadian economist J. Jacobs (1986) has studied community cooperation experiences between immigrant associations and villages of origin. She demonstrated the near impossibility of these experiences having a significant impact on the regions of emigration.

In fact, the policy of support for transnational cooperation between immigrant associations and villages of origin can be best explained by the crisis of the welfare state and by political authorities’ advocacy of individual and collective responsibility. Even in Northern

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10 PNUD and CIDA (for the Canadian contribution) funding for the Haitian project Inventaire des ressources professionnelles Haitiennes à l’étranger - Banque de ressources humaines is a significant example.

11 In the case of Haiti, Ottawa rejects nearly 40% of all visa requests by immigrants and tourists from Haiti, and makes an abusive use of DNA tests (Berger, 1997). Moreover, Ottawa has a policy of expelling Haitian youths with criminal records in Canada. Fifty such youths have been expelled since 1990.
societies, there is increasing pressure from the state to foster responsible citizenship. Even immigrants are strongly encouraged to assume a part of international development aid, this at a time when states have fewer and fewer resources to assume by themselves the burden of international cooperation, and in a neo-liberal context which has seen the provisional triumph of a market ideology. In this new context, immigrant groups, already linked to their country of origin by a variety of solidarity practices, see themselves responding as responsible citizens with regard to the development of their country. And as such, paradoxically, it turns out that the utopia of transnational citizenship demanded by immigrant intellectuals converges at many points with the invitation to a transnational citizenship of service made by the leaders of Northern countries.

The concluding remarks by Canadian Foundation for the Americas at the Gouverner Haiti Conference clearly express the new role foreseen for diasporas: ‘The Haitian diaspora...must participate significantly in the reconstruction and development of Haiti. It can contribute through considerable financial support for ongoing development projects, in addition to providing important technical aid. Moreover, the Haitian diaspora can permit the convergence of exogenous and endogenous reconstruction and development efforts. Strengthened by experiences acquired in a foreign country, the diaspora will be more easily able to identify a terrain of agreement between the consensus in Washington and that in Port-au-Prince’ (FOCAL, 1997: 65).

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