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Notes sur le 2e congrès des Mujahidins d’Indonésie (Solo, 10-12 août 2003): Dilemme entre démocratie et violence
Espaces et réseaux de l'Islam radical en Asie du Sud-Est. Le Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara à l’épreuve des sciences sociales
Identities, Indonesia, Malaysia, Migrations, Networks, Philippines, Religions, Southeast Asia, Thailand, Transnational, Les dossiers du CERI
Democratization, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Middle East, North Africa, Politics / Political Systems, Religions, Syria, Les dossiers du CERI
Archive, Azerbaijan, Caucasus / Central Asia, Democratization, Diasporas, Iran, Religions, Syria, Turkey, Wars / Conflicts, Les analyses du CERI
Iran, Iraq, Middle East, Regional integration, Religions, Syria, Turkey, Wars / Conflicts, Les analyses du CERI
Identities, India, Pakistan, Politics / Political Systems, Religions, South Asia, State, Questions de recherche
Pakistan was created in 1947 by leaders of the Muslim minority of the British Raj in order to give them a separate
state. Islam was defined by its founder, Jinnah, in the frame of his “two-nation theory,” as an identity marker
(cultural and territorial). His ideology, therefore, contributed to an original form of secularization, a form that is
not taken into account by Charles Taylor in his theory of secularization – that the present text intends to test and
supplement. This trajectory of secularization went on a par with a certain form of secularism which, this time,
complies with Taylor’s definition. As a result, the first two Constitutions of Pakistan did not define Islam as an
official religion and recognized important rights to the minorities. However, Jinnah’s approach was not shared
by the Ulema and the fundamentalist leaders, who were in favor of an islamization policy. The pressures they
exerted on the political system made an impact in the 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was instrumentalizing Islam. Zia’s
islamization policy made an even bigger impact on the education system, the judicial system and the fiscal system,
at the expense of the minority rights. But Zia pursued a strategy of statization of Islam that had been initiated
by Jinnah and Ayub Khan on behalf of different ideologies, which is one more illustration of the existence of an
additional form of secularization that has been neglected by Taylor.
Boko Haram et le terrorisme islamiste au Nigeria : insurrection religieuse, contestation politique ou protestation sociale ?
Networks, Nigeria, Religions, Security policy, Terrorism, Violence, Wars / Conflicts, West Africa, Questions de recherche
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos
In Nigeria, the Islamic terrorism of Boko Haram raises a lot of questions about the political relationship between so-called "religious" violence and the state. At least three of them expose our confusions about islamization, conversion, radicalization and the politicization of religion, namely:
– Is it a religious uprising or a political contest for power?
– How does it express a social revolt?
– How indicative is it of a radicalization of the patterns of protest of the Muslims in Northern Nigeria?
A fieldwork study shows that Boko Haram is not so much political because it wants to reform the society, but mainly because it reveals the intrigues of a weak government and the fears of a nation in the making. Otherwise, the radicalization of Islam cannot be limited to terrorism and it is difficult to know if the movement is more extremist, fanatic and murderous than previous uprising like the one of Maitatsine in Kano in 1980. The capacity of Boko Haram to develop international connections and to challenge the state is not exceptional as such. Far from the clichés on a clash of civilizations between the North and the South, the specificity of the sect in Nigeria has more to do with its suicide attacks. Yet the terrorist evolution of Boko Haram was first and foremost caused by the brutality of the state repression, more than alleged contacts with an international jihadist movement.