



## WORKSHOP

### The Framing of Crises in Europe

7-8 December 2017

Sciences Po  
Salle du Conseil (5<sup>th</sup> floor)  
13 rue de l'Université  
75007 Paris



Contact: [benedetta.voltolini@sciencespo.fr](mailto:benedetta.voltolini@sciencespo.fr)

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## The concept

Crises seem to be a constant feature of today's life. Newspapers, commentators, academics and the public speak incessantly of crises, such as the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, the Ukrainian crisis, an institutional crisis in the EU, a legitimacy crisis, etc. And by definition, political action is required to bring the situation back to what is considered normal or is viewed as preferable (Roitman 2013; Hay 1996). Once we call something a 'crisis', this narrative structures our thoughts as well as influence political responses. Analysts are not immune from this, as crisis-based analyses look for the origins and causes of failure, for the deviation from the right pattern of action and are based on implicit comparisons of what is normatively supposed to be the alternative and more preferable state of normal (Roitman 2013). In Roitman's (2013) view, this also precludes a series of other interesting 'anti-crisis' questions.

This idea of omnipresent crises thus offers an interesting opportunity to reflect on the meaning of 'crisis', on how crises are framed, narrated and what implications this has on political action. While there is extensive research on the causes and responses given by different governments and international organisations to different types of crisis, less attention has been paid to the ways in which these sets of events have been defined and framed as crises in the first place, the types of narratives that have followed from this definition and the impact that the adoption of the 'crisis' frame has had on political action and responses.

This workshop thus analyses current crises in Europe to unravel processes of framing and narrative construction, to discuss how frames are enacted and with what implications, to investigate which actors contribute to framing processes and what makes certain actors successful in shaping frames and narratives. Starting from the idea that crises are socially constructed and produced, this workshop brings together people working on different sets of crisis to shed light on the actors, processes, impact and consequences of defining as crises certain events and situations.

Because Europe (meaning the EU and its member states) is in the middle of most of nowadays crises, it is an interesting focal point that would allow a thorough and comparative analysis of the abovementioned aspects.

The main research questions that are tackled in the workshop, therefore, address various aspects of the general topic of how crises are framed in Europe. Aspects that will be relevant to all sessions are as follows, while more specific issues are indicated for each session:

- When did the crisis begin? Why was it framed as a crisis?
- Which actors have participated in the processes of framing/reframing/de-framing a series of events as a crisis?
- How are frames enacted and how is political action shaped by the definition of crisis?
- What impact has the use of a 'crisis' frame/narrative in practice?

The general purpose is thus to challenge the assumption of crisis as a given and to shed light on the construction of events/series of events as crises, the actors involved and implications of the 'crisis' narrative in practice. By comparing different types of crises, the workshop also aims to identify patterns across policy areas.

# Programme

## Thursday 7 December

3:30-3:45 pm Welcome by **Benedetta Voltolini** and **Cornelia Woll** (Sciences Po, CEE)

3:45-5:45 pm **Session 1: The financial and economic crisis: A decade-long crisis**

Since 2008 and the fall of Lehman Brothers, newspapers, politicians and academic analyses have used the word 'crisis' very frequently. Without denying the relevance of the events that unfolded since 2008, the idea of an economic and financial crisis is linked to a series of assumptions, responses and consequences that are not present (or not necessarily so) in a non-crisis situation. When did the economic and financial crisis actually begin? And what options are available by calling this series of events a crisis? Who benefits from this framing? And who constructed this narrative? What are the implications of a crisis narratives in terms of public policy and legitimacy?

Chair and discussant: **Colin Hay** (Sciences Po, CEE)

Speakers:

- **The virtue of sacrifice: the procedural and moral legitimation of austerity policies in Italy and Spain during the Eurozone crisis (2010-2013)**  
**Arthur Borriello** (University of Cambridge)
- **The symptomatology and pedagogy of economic crises**  
**Bob Jessop** (Lancaster University)
- **Perpetuating austerity: narratives of the Eurozone crisis**  
**Amelie Kutter** (European University Viadrina)
- **'A narrow trail'?: Legitimation and adaptation in the reconfiguration of Southern European Welfare Capitalisms**  
**Tiago Moreira Ramalho** (Sciences Po, CEE)

6-7 pm *Drinks (Comptoir des Saints-Pères, 29 Rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris)*

7:30 pm *Dinner (Caffè Toscano, 34 Rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris)*

## Friday 8 December

9-10:30 am

### Session 2: Foreign policy crises: conflicts in the European neighbourhood and beyond

Conflicts and diplomatic crises on the international stage are rather frequent. For instance, the Arab uprisings were a wake-up call for Europe concerning the situation on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, while the annexation of Crimea by Russia and Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine are sources of constant worries in Brussels and national capitals. But when does Europe perceive external events as crises? And what does this imply in terms of European action and reaction? Which actors frame events as crises? Which actors 'gain' by defining something as a crisis?

Chair and discussant: **Christoph Meyer** (King's College London)

Speakers:

- **Reassessing EU foreign policy change: European Neighbourhood Policy reform after the Ukrainian crisis**  
**Nikki Ikani** (King's College London)
- **The framing of Ukraine crisis as (non-)recognition games: categories and metaphors in practice**  
**Michal Natorki** (Maastricht University)
- **Non-state actors, crisis construction and early warning: the case of International Crisis Group**  
**Benedetta Voltolini** (Sciences Po, CEE)

10:30-10:45 am

*Coffee break*

10:45 am-  
12:45 pm

### Session 3: The migration and refugee crisis: normal or exceptional times?

Migrations and refugees are not new phenomena in Europe, but the influxes in recent years have been perceived as amounting to a crisis. Media have played a substantial role in shaping the public image of crisis and of dramatic situations and consequences. Politicians have been criticised from all fronts and for all types of actions. Populists and right-wing parties have used the 'refugee crisis' for political purposes. In this chaotic situation, how do actors make sense of the situation, when and why have migrant and refugee influxes been perceived as a crisis and who has contributed to this definition? What role has the media played in this framing process? And what political actions do these frames allow?

Chair and discussant: **Virginie Guiraudon** (Sciences Po, CEE, CNRS)

Speakers:

- **The Rise of Prejudice in Europe: A Migration Crisis or a Crisis of the EU's Political Project and its Values?**  
**Valeria Bello** (United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility)
- **Contested borders: pro- and anti-refugee movements in Italy**  
**Pietro Castelli** (C-Rex, University of Oslo) & **Lorenzo Zamponi** (Scuola Normale Superiore)
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- **Making sense of the refugee crises in Europe and North America**  
**Leila Hadj Abdou** (European University Institute)
- **The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean: Norm Entrepreneurship and Policy Change in Europe**  
**Sarah Léonard** (Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

12:45-1:30 pm *Lunch*

1:30-3 pm **Session 4: Europe and horizontal crises: from legitimacy to environment**

A series of horizontal and cross-cutting crises are currently challenging the EU. While the legitimacy of EU institutions has frequently been contested by many political actors across the left-right spectrum over the years, the rise of populist and far-right actors has recently opened up a new and more vigorous challenge. The British referendum in June 2016 and the process of Brexit have also undermined the European project, opening a debate about the EU, its legitimacy and its ability to cope with existing problems. If institutional and legitimacy crises are clearly a main issue on the EU agenda, other horizontal and pressing issues such as the environment have also entered mainstream European political discourse, but have remained in the sphere of 'normal politics'. It is therefore worth asking whether there is a legitimacy crisis of the EU and European politics. Which frames prevail in this context? What role does the media play in framing some issues as crises while others not?

Chair and discussant: **Florence Faucher** (Sciences Po, CEE)

Speakers:

- **Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK-EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign**  
**Tatiana Coutto** (University of Warwick)
- **The Political Economy of Ecological Crisis**  
**Martin Craig** (University of Sheffield)
- **It's not the elites! The Far right and the framing of Euroscepticism on Twitter in Western democracies**  
**Caterina Froio** (University of Oxford)

3-3:30 pm *Conclusions and way forward*

## LIST OF ABSTRACTS

### **The Rise of Prejudice in Europe: A Migration Crisis or a Crisis of the EU's Political Project and its Values?**

**Valeria Bello (United Nations University on Globalization, Culture and Mobility)**

The past few years have witnessed a rise in prejudice in some places in Europe, which are often perceived as a direct consequence of increased migratory movements to the continent. However, societies have diversely responded to migration even in countries that presented similar economic performances and immigration inflows: Some countries have suspended the Schengen Agreement that grants free movements in the EU; others have built up fences; while others have kept a more welcoming policy towards newcomers. These different reactions have raised some important questions, including: is this increase in prejudice really a consequence of immigration inflows or is it connected to a broader European crisis? This work claims that it has been the dismantling of the EU's Welfare State, which is key to the EU's political project, what has intensified individuals' risk perceptions to the extent that people increasingly perceive others as competitive and security threats.

Through a multilevel analysis of 24 European countries, this work shows that migrant population growth alone has not entailed a rise in anti-migrant sentiments but that this has been the case only in those countries that have concurrently experienced cuts to the two key EU Welfare State public sectors of education and health.

### **The virtue of sacrifice: the procedural and moral legitimation of austerity policies in Italy and Spain during the Eurozone crisis (2010-2013)**

**Arthur Borriello (University of Cambridge)**

During the economic crisis in Southern Europe, we have witnessed the convergence of various national governments towards austerity policies. This policy convergence has raised the question of the "strange non-death of neo-liberalism" (Crouch 2011), which appears to be unchallenged, if not reinforced, by the crisis (Crespy & Schmidt, 2014; Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). It has also raised concerns about the meaning of democracy itself, since political *alternance* does not translate into different policy choices anymore (Schäfer & Streeck 2013). From a discourse analysis perspective, it has drawn the attention to the discursive strategies pursued in order to legitimate unpopular economic policies (Bickes & al., 2014; Fonseca & Ferreira, 2015; Kutter, 2014; Vaara, 2014).

In a recent paper (Borriello, 2017), I have shown that the discourse of Italian and Spanish leaders during the crisis has consisted in a combination of four elements: the invocation of an economic 'state of exception', the depiction of globalisation and the EU as external constraints, the construction of an economic common sense and the metaphorical naturalization of economic issues. However, this discourse may be harmful for the legitimacy of political actors, since its fatalistic dimension makes them appear powerless and interchangeable, in contradiction with the symbolic exigencies of their charge. Indeed, political actors are supposed to preserve the autonomy of the political sphere and to conform to its main myths. They have to preserve the *original* and *functional grandeur* of politics (Le Bart, 2003), that is, the sanctification of universal suffrage as the main source of political legitimacy and the apparent ability of political actors to solve problems and to exert a positive influence on social life.

Therefore, this chapter focuses on a specific research question: how do Italian and Spanish national leaders reconcile the fatalistic dimension of their austere discourse with the symbolic exigencies of their function? On the one hand, I analyse the way they preserve the value of universal suffrage, whether by putting the emphasis on the political *alternance* which they embody, or by underlining the exceptional, temporary and consensual character of its suspension. On the other hand, I analyse the way they emphasise the determination, efficiency and moral value of the government's action against the economic crisis.

The analysis focuses on the public speeches of three national leaders (Mario Monti, Mariano Rajoy and José Luis Zapatero) between 2010 and 2013. It is based on a two-step methodology that combines quantitative (lexicography) and qualitative (narrative and metaphor analysis) tools for discourse analysis. The comparison enables me to show the common characteristics of their discourse beyond ideological and national peculiarities. The results show that, despite the strong imperative and depoliticized dimension of their discourse, national leaders try to reaffirm the autonomy of politics and the importance of their social role. By

distinguishing between “fair” and “unfair” austerity, they distinguish themselves from each other and reassert the relevance of political *alternance* while, by emphasising the moral value of collective sacrifice and the efficiency of their action, they reaffirm the positive and voluntary dimensions of political action.

### **Contested borders: pro- and anti-refugee movements in Italy**

***Pietro Castelli Gattinara (C-Rex, University of Oslo) and Lorenzo Zamponi (Scuola Normale Superiore)***

The increase in asylum applications over the past years set in motion two interrelated processes across European societies: on the one hand, the radical right mobilized to ‘defend the borders’ of Europe, promoting institutional and extra-parliamentary initiatives against refugees; on the other, a wide set of grassroots actions in solidarity with asylum-seekers were promoted by left-progressive movements at the national and transnational level. Thus far, however, very little research has looked into the competitive interaction between these two camps. Conversely, we consider the recent dynamic as a potentially fruitful chance to overcome a known limit of social movement studies – the tendency to focus on individual movements as isolated actors – and investigate the reciprocal influence of the opposing movements. Accordingly, the paper offers an in-depth analysis of movement-counter-movement dynamics in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy. What are the main frames and repertoires of action promoted by the pro-refugee and anti-refugee camps? To what extent their choices have been shaped by initiatives taken by their opponents? How did they attempt to limit the expansion and resonance of the opposing camp and its influence on mainstream actors and narratives? Based on new empirical data from over 40 face-to-face interviews with activists from anti-immigration as well as solidarity groups in Italy, we show that discursive opportunities and interaction with the state contributed to shaping the frames of both movements around similar resonant themes, although triggering conflicting interpretations and distinct repertoires of action. Furthermore, our analysis shows a visible interaction between the two movements, with the pro-refugee camp often intervening in reaction to initiative of the opposite front. While the pro-refugee movement effectively mobilized in solidarity to asylum seekers, intervening in situations perceived as critical, it was considerably less successful in countering the hegemonic frames promoted by anti-immigration and populist right-wing coalitions.

### **Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK-EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign**

***Tatiana Coutto (University of Warwick)***

This paper explores the political construction of UK-EU relations during the referendum campaign, and in the months that followed the decision to leave the European Union (EU). Using a mixed-methods approach based on the typology developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), this work seeks to investigate how different political leaders and the media framed Brexit, and how these frames might have influenced public attitudes towards the EU. Data stem from public statements made by leading figures of pro and anti-Brexit groups, press coverage of the referendum and petitions published on UK government’s website. Preliminary analysis shows that crisis frame was used by both camps as a means to mobilise voters. *Leave* partisans tended to portray the EU as responsible for the degradation of British living standards, regarded UK-EU relations as a zero-sum game and framed Brexit as an opportunity to mitigate UK’s (perceived) social and economic crises. A more detailed analysis, however, shows significant variation in the arguments and discourse adopted by different pro-Brexit actors. *Remainers*, by contrast, focused on the political uncertainty and economic crisis that leaving the EU would entail, but failed to emphasise future benefits of EU membership. Results may shed light on the way the relationship between the EU and its members is framed in different states and regions, and how the EU institutional and legitimacy crises may be constructed by various political actors.

### **The Political Economy of Ecological Crisis**

***Martin Craig (University of Sheffield)***

The notion of an unfolding ‘ecological crisis’ has entered mainstream European political discourse. In many respects, the notion names the defining political and economic contradiction of our times: the growth imperative central to capitalist political economies remains coupled to environmental degradation, and the ‘decoupling’ which is taking place is happening at an insufficient pace to ensure the orderly reproduction of those political economies. Yet – as Colin Hay observed as long ago as 1996 – it is questionable that mainstream political understandings of this ecological contradiction really amount to a crisis at all. A discursive and practical strategy for the necessary decisive intervention is yet to be fashioned. Instead, the conversation

centres on the urgent need to make commitments to future actions. Thus, environmental politics in Europe remains a situation of 'normal politics', subject to the imperatives and constraints of liberal capitalist state forms and their national socio-economic models.

In this paper I discuss the features, potentials and limitations of Hay's constructivist crisis theory when apprehending the politics of capitalism's ecological contradiction, before considering the contribution that can be made by complementary historical institutionalist concepts describing the path-shaping effects of incremental changes. Through a critical engagement with Hay's earlier claims in light of the intervening decades, I advance a qualified defence of the capitalist state as a site for effectively managing the intensification of capitalism's ecological contradictions in a way that preserves the potential for the emergence of future, more progressive, political-economic models.

### **It's not the elites! The Far right and the framing of Euroscepticism on Twitter in Western democracies**

***Bharath Ganesh (University of Oxford) & Caterina Froio (University of Oxford)***

Euroscepticism plays a major role in the discourse and appeal of far right political parties and movements. To complement existing research on Euroscepticism based on survey data, offline and online news data, the paper focuses on frames on Twitter. We examine whether populist frames are a significant part of current far right Eurosceptic discourse and how they are intertwined with nativism. Building on existing literature on the far right, Euroscepticism and the internet, we identify two major discursive frames: populist ones that argue against 'elites' and identitarian frames that make nativist, racialised claims about European 'identity'. We contend that interpreting far right Euroscepticism mostly as populist does not fully account for nativist-anti-elitist tendencies within far right critiques to European integration. We make this argument based on social media content shared by Twitter accounts of far right parties, movements and leaders. Using language processing techniques, we combine statistical analysis of language use as well as critical discourse analysis to explore the ways in which Euroscepticism is framed. Our combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches allows us to interrogate Eurosceptic discourse at a new scale. Combining mixed method analysis with a sustained theoretical engagement with populism and nativism in far right discourse, this paper suggests that the moniker 'populism' does not adequately name the form of contemporary Euroscepticism as it is expressed on Twitter by the far right.

### **Making sense of the refugee crises in Europe and North America**

***Leila Hadj-Abdou (European University Institute)***

The refugee crisis has been widely perceived as one of the biggest challenges that Europe is facing. Plenty of insightful critiques and analyses exist as regards the 'management' of this crisis. This paper complements these analyses by looking at how the understanding of this crisis was constituted, i.e. how it was interpreted and made sense of; and how these ideas in turn shaped responses to the crisis. Premised on the idea that crises are not to be understood as exogenous shocks but are actively constructed by governance actors, this presentation, thus, shines light on the processes of sense making as regards the increased influx of refugees, and their relation to policy solutions.

In order to understand these dynamics more in depth, the European case will be compared with the 2014 migration crisis at the US-Mexico border. Although the latter was a comparatively smaller scale phenomenon, both events were perceived by political leaders and in the public debate as a major crisis. Rather than supporting the idea of European migration governance as unique, the comparison of these two cases reveals a variety of common patterns in contemporary migration governance systems in Europe and North America.

The presentation draws on empirical research conducted in the framework of the ERC project 'Prospects for International Migration Governance', combining an analysis of policy documents, and qualitative interviews with key migration governance actors in the U.S. and the EU.



## **Reassessing EU foreign policy change: European Neighbourhood Policy reform after the Ukrainian crisis**

***Nikki Ikani (King's College London)***

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Ukraine crisis, a critical juncture in the EU's relations with the Eastern neighbourhood, has shaped the policy changes made to the ENP during the formal reform round of 2015, in order to subsequently improve our understanding of EU foreign policy change. It takes a historical institutionalist (HI) approach, focusing on the decision-making process following the critical junctures.

Building forward on second wave HI theorizing, the paper explores how two key insights improve our understanding of the policy changes made to the ENP in 2015. First, the "institutional effects" of the ENP institutions and their assumed "plasticity". The behaviour of decision-makers is seen as being informed by both institutional rules and regulations that define who are the competent actors in the ENP, and the way in which they perceived the critical junctures, gave meaning to them and subsequently perceived their interests in pursuing policy changes. When we imagine institutional change, we need to know how institutions structure the decision-making process, and to what extent these institutions themselves are shaped by agency.

The second explanatory factor of policy change concerns its temporal contingency. Taking into account temporal contingency means replacing the notion of universal causality with that of contextual causality in order to address how temporal processes and events generate and influence actor preferences and perceptions, as well as patterns of decision-making regarding policy change. This paper will describe the 2015 ENP reform as a 'structured episode', in which both explanations will be discussed.

## **The symptomatology and pedagogy of economic crises**

***Bob Jessop (Lancaster University)***

Crises are objectively overdetermined, subjectively indeterminate moments that can be considered both as events and processes. Their objective overdetermination requires explanation in scientific terms – though there can be disputed about what a valid scientific account would involve – as well as in terms of other interpretive frameworks (e.g., ones framed by rival political, economic, religious, or other social imaginaries). A major challenge in explaining economic crises is the often opaque relation between the symptoms of crisis and their underlying aetiology – this creates the space for competing construals of the symptoms (pursuing the metaphor, Hippocrates was not the only doctor in town) and their connection to underlying causes (especially when these are overdetermined). Often the full nature of the crisis emerges only from trial-and-error attempts to manage or eliminate them. This is where the pedagogy of crisis becomes relevant. A further challenge relates to the subjective indeterminacy of crises – how to move from diagnosis to crisis-management or crisis-resolution. Whereas explanations for a crisis could be more or less scientifically "valid", responses can only be more or less "correct" in terms of how to move forward. They always involve a speculative gamble on the current conjuncture, the balance of forces, the future effects of the crisis, and the capacities to mobilise support for one response and block support for alternative crises. I use examples from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and Eurozone crises to illustrate these arguments.

## **Perpetuating austerity: narratives of the Eurozone crisis**

***Amelie Kutter (European University Viadrina)***

Austerity has been the default approach to crisis management adopted by all member states of the European Union since the surfacing of general fiscal crisis in late 2009 and the sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone, more particularly. The mixture of cuts to public expenditure, internal devaluation and structural reform was also sustained when criticism of reverse effects intensified, voiced by both experts and protest movements. It brought electoral defeats to governments and landslide shifts to the political landscapes in all crisis-struck countries. This paper explores the discursive dynamics that, in this conjuncture of possible change, contributed to the perpetuation of austerity, drawing on a combined content and discourse analysis of narratives of crisis in statements addressed to international audiences by EU representatives and major oppositional forces in Greece and Spain between 2010 and 2014. Developing earlier work on the analysis of crisis discourse (Kutter 2013, 2014), the paper first outlines how the construction and mobilization of crisis and crisis resolution can be studied from a discourse-analytical angle, using narrative strands in interpretive policy studies and political economy. It then shows that causal stories differ strongly between a discourse coalition of the majority of EU representatives, on the one hand, who highlight sovereign debt as a phenomenon and

excessive spending or misconduct by some Eurozone members as a cause, and a discourse coalition of Syriza, Podemos and the presidential candidate Hollande, on the other, who point to a social and legitimization crisis and austerity policy as cause. The two narratives seek to deconstruct each other and suggest diametrically opposed policy scenarios. Yet, the 'euroalternative' vision put forth by the anti-austerity coalition is partially co-opted in the other coalition's plea for growth and taps into similar elements of narration such as extrapolation from the Greek case, blame on governments in Southern Europe, and reference to the classic dichotomy between Keynesian and neoliberal paradigms of economic policy. This meta-narrative of the Eurozone crisis effectively disables efforts at redefining policies of crisis resolution.

## **The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean: Norm Entrepreneurship and Policy Change in Europe**

***Sarah Léonard (Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel) & Christian Kاونert (Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel)***

This paper examines the extent to which the ongoing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean has led to the development of new asylum norms and policies in the European Union. In order to do so, the paper develops a theoretical framework drawing upon international relations constructivism, norm entrepreneurship and its links to policy change. The following empirical analysis is structured into two main sections. The first identifies the norms that have underpinned the development of the European Union policy on asylum from its inception until the start of the refugee crisis. The second section analyses to extent to which, if any, the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean has been used as a window of opportunity by norm and/or policy entrepreneurs to advocate for new asylum norms and practices. It also considers how successful these norm and/or policy entrepreneurs have been in order to assess the extent to which new asylum norms and policies have emerged in the European Union in the context of the Mediterranean refugee crisis.

## **'A narrow trail'?: Legitimation and adaptation in the reconfiguration of Southern European Welfare Capitalisms**

***Tiago Moreira Ramalho (Sciences Po)***

The response to the southern European debt sovereign crises that started in 2010 was consistently framed as inevitable, or close to it. Both at the level of the creditor institutions and countries, but also at the level of the governments of the debtor countries, the discursive construction of a 'narrow trail' out of the crisis would be recurrent, implying that only one way out of the crisis was available, and that there was no margin of manoeuvre in it. Yet, closer analysis to the implementation processes of the bailout arrangements in Portugal, Greece, and Spain shows that the terms of the conditionality programmes would be revised multiple times, that benchmarks and deadlines would be softened as the crisis unfolded, and that general conditions of the loans themselves would be changed throughout the period. This chapter aims at analysing this apparent contradiction, searching for the conditions of stability of the programmes as well as of the dominant crisis narratives that underlie them. It suggests that the adaptation of the programmes is central to (and a strategy towards) the re-legitimation of the dominant narrative of the Southern European crisis, and hence of the policy agenda for the reconfiguration of its welfare capitalism model.

## **The framing of Ukraine crisis as (non-)recognition games: categories and metaphors in practice**

***Michal Natorksi (Maastricht University)***

Why do international crises emerge? The struggles for recognition constitutive for social identities are the source of human motivation to act as well as a driver of social interactions. Therefore, the literature on struggles of recognition in international politics attributes the emergence of crises to the refusal to recognize identity claims of involved actors. However, mis-/non-recognition does not lead automatically to crises and eventually conflicts, but can motivate also the opposite dynamics of persuasion and collaboration.

To take account of this variation, this paper argues that the nature of discursive framing of (non-)recognition orientates conflictual and/or collaborative practices. The discursive framing will be analysed in two dimensions. Firstly, the analysis takes account of the framing of symbolic authority from the perspective of categories attributed to the actors involved in struggles for recognition. Secondly, the paper studies the dispositions motivating actors' actions through the prism of employed metaphors about the prospects of relations between actors.

To illustrate empirically this argument, this paper analyses the emergence and continuation of Ukraine crises in the EU-Russia-Ukraine triangle of interactions. It shows that the struggles for recognition in the EU-Ukraine dyad stimulate collaboration, while in the EU-Russia and Russia-Ukraine dyads led to crisis and conflict respectively.

### **Non-state actors, crisis construction and early warning: the case of International Crisis Group**

***Benedetta Voltolini (Sciences Po)***

This paper analyses how NGOs and think tanks working in the domain of conflicts and early warning construct a series of events, such as political instability, triggering events, conflicts and ongoing violence, as crises that require the attention, if not the intervention, of external actors. Instead of taking crises as objectively given or looking at the impact of crisis narratives on policies, this paper aims to unpack the process of framing by conceiving it as a collection of practices, i.e. routinized and patterned activities. The process of crisis construction is investigated in the case of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a well-known NGO in the field of conflict prevention and early warning. The analysis shows that the ICG's work of crisis construction and early warning is based on two sets of practices: researching & analysing (doing) and writing & visualising (saying). On the basis of fieldwork, the ICG portrays events on the ground as a threat to the regional/global stability and values. This diagnosis of the problem at stake is followed by a set of recommendations that provide guidance for action, with the aim of reducing the uncertainty that crises normally produce. Unveiling the daily work of crisis construction by the ICG thus gives a more tangible account of framing: it shows how framing works, that it is not necessarily a very conscious process, but there is a socialising effect on thinking and identity. In doing so, the subjectivity, dynamic and changing nature of crises emerge, as their meaning evolves and adapts over time, across cases and on the basis of the targeted actors.